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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
FEDERICO PUPPO
This volume was inspired by a conversation between Christo-
pher Tindale, Leo Groarke and myself, which took place, maybe
not by coincidence at Christopher Tindale’s house in Windsor. I
remember that, on that occasion, I asked them if there existed an
anthology, developed coherently by Canadian scholars, of arti-
cles and essays dedicated to argumentation – demarcating, so
to speak, a common point of view (if there was one). We spoke
briefly on the topic only for them to determine that no such text
existed. Immediately this gave rise to the question that brought
about the title of this volume: Does there exist something which
could be called the Canadian school of argumentation or, at least,
a certain way of studying and analyzing argument which would
permit some sort of uniform definition for the experts actively
studying in this field? Does there exist, then, a Canadian tradition
amongst those that make up the greater field of the study of argu-
mentation?
It is well known that in Canada, more precisely in Ontario,
in Windsor, there is a research centre – the Centre for Research
in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric (CRRAR) – founded
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in 2006. This centre was the result of an important branch of
study which goes by the name ‘Informal Logic’, which began
at Windsor, and was established in part to continue that tradi-
tion. This field’s beginnings and developments are recorded by J.
Anthony Blair in the autobiographical essay which opens the col-
lection of this volume. He writes about the studies and research
developed by him and Johnson in the early ’70s. Blair discusses
the difficulties they encountered publishing Logical Self-Defense –
their volume that expressed “the possibility of such a departure
from old-fashioned approaches” (J. A. Blair in this volume) – and
how, in 1978, the first “Symposium on Informal Logic” was held
in Windsor – even when at that time “there was no dedicated
source of literature on informal logic” (ibid.). This Symposium
was followed, in 1980, by the first international conference, and
then, only three years later, by the second, which led to “the cre-
ation of the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking
(AILACT)” (ibid). In 1984, Informal Logic appeared, a “blind-peer-
reviewed academic journal, to appear three times a year” (ibid.).
It was the year in which, among other things, Apple presented
the first of the Macintosh series, Carlo Rubbia won the Nobel
Prize for Physics and the XXIII Olympic Games took place in Los
Angeles. It was also the year in which the Eastern Division of the
American Philosophical Association organized a meeting in New
York which included AILACT sessions. Blair and other Canadi-
ans, like David Hitchcock, took part in the event.
During the conference David and I were approached by two tall
strangers with distinctive Dutch accents (and flawless English), who
introduced themselves as Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grooten-
dorst, and asked if they could make a presentation during the
AILACT session. David pointed out that the agenda had been
arranged in advance and was full. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst
asked if they might meet with the two of us after the session, and we
agreed. We retired to a nearby pub and began a conversation that
lasted, over several rounds of draft beer, well into the night, the gist
of which was to exchange information. We told them about infor-
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mal logic and they told us about their new theory, which they called
“Pragma-dialectics” and the newly published monograph in which
they presented it, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984)
(copies of which they either gave us then or sent us soon after-
wards), and the program they had set up at the University of Ams-
terdam. It was the beginning of life-long friendships. […] Soon after
our meeting in New York, van Eemeren and Grootendorst asked
me if I would serve on the board of a new society they were form-
ing, which they had christened the International Society for the
Study of Argumentation (ISSA), and which was going to sponsor an
international argumentation conference in Amsterdam the follow-
ing spring, in June 1986 (ibid.)
The rest, as they say, is history: in 1987 “a new journal, to be
called Argumentation” (ibid.) was born and future projects and
collaborations led to the radical transformation of the world of
argumentation. “In the mid-1970s both Scriven in the U.S.A.
and Johnson and Blair in Canada had trouble finding textbook
reviewers among their colleagues who would recommend infor-
mal logic manuscripts to publishers. A decade later dozens of
new informal logic textbooks were competing for adoption”
(ibid.). And already with “the second ISSA conference in Ams-
terdam in 1990, an international community of scholarship had
been formed” (ibid.).
But in all this, in view of the role played in the development of
the theory of argumentation by the Canadians, “Is there any basis
in any of this for what might be dubbed “the Canadian hypothe-
sis”? Is there some role that is distinctively Canadian, or citizen-
ship aside, a result of factors from Canada that played a role in
the emergence of this field?” (ibid.) Blair’s negative answer is as
follows:
Johnson and I did get support from our university as well as from
a small conference fund from the federal government administered
by a national research-funding council, but I assume that other
countries had similar funding available. Given the entrepreneurial
promotion of the pragma-dialectical theory by the Dutch and the
readiness for change in the American speech communication com-
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munity, it seems likely that argumentation would have developed as
a field without participation of Canadian pioneers such as Woods
and Walton, Govier, Hitchcock, Gilbert, and Johnson and Blair.
Canadians got on board partly because of the Windsor conferences,
and because the Informal Logic journal cornered the philosophy side
of the market as the journal of record for philosophically-oriented
theorizing early on. Perhaps I am too close to see it, but I must
confess to an inability to recognize anything distinctively Canadian
about our contributions (ibid.).
This is an authoritative opinion which cannot be ignored. But
one might wonder, if it is true, how the texts collected here, this
set of essays offered for reading, makes proper sense. In answer
to these doubts, I want to propose another interpretation.
John Woods (who is himself “part of the Canadian story” (J.
Woods, in this volume)), in his essay, speaks of a “Canadian influ-
ence on theories of argument [that] flow from their contributions
to informal logic in the aftermath of Charles Hamblin’s call to
arms in 1970 for the restoration of the fallacies project to the
research programmes of logical theory” (ibid.). Embellishing
Blair’s story, Woods recalls
the umbrella under which the Windsor conferences are staged is
OSSA, the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, in emu-
lation of the earlier example of ISSA, the International Society for
the Study of Argumentation, established in Amsterdam as the orga-
nizational, congregational and publication centre of pragma-dialec-
tical approach to argument. The name “ISSA” has two virtues which
“OSSA” lacks. It is earlier, and it is accurate. OSSA’s active member-
ship is as far-flung as ISSA’s, and there is nothing noticeably Ontar-
ian about the logics contrived by OSSAnian. A foundational work
for the Canadians was published by an Englishman [i.e. Toulmin]
who in due course would become an OSSA star (ibid.).
Woods makes express reference to the “Windsor approach to
formal logic” (ibid.), or rather, informal logic, characterized by
the fact that “formal logics – certainly those of the 1970s – were
mainly about deductive reasoning, whereas most of the best of
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human reasoning is deductively invalid. Seen this way formal
logics simply miss most of the target set by informal logicians”
(ibid.). Therefore,
[f]or a good many of Canada’s theorists of argument and reasoning
the only point of contact with formal modelling is by way of what
is mistakenly called the “translation” rules for mapping natural lan-
guage arguments to their logical forms in a formal language L –
usually that of first-order classical logic. In its standard understand-
ing, translation preserves meanings or at least approximations to
them. While natural languages brim with meanings, formal “lan-
guages” have none at all. It is not possible to order a hamburger in L
or simply to say what your name is (ibid.).
We have already noted Woods’ reference to a “Canadian influ-
ence on theories of argument,” to the “Windsor approach to for-
mal logic,” and to a group of “Canada’s theorists of argument and
reasoning” (ibid.). Further on, he speaks about “Canadian infor-
malists” or of an “informal logic sector of Canadian approaches
to the theory of argument” and notes “that there is, as far as I can
see, little concurrent inclination to denounce the popularity of
formal semantics in analytical philosophy, which is home turf of
Canada’s informal logicians”. On the other hand, “[i]n the years
closely following Hamblin, perhaps Canada’s most internation-
ally recognized contribution to the theory of argument lay in fal-
lacy theory” (ibid.).
Here and elsewhere Woods allows for the possibility of refer-
ring to the Canadians as a group (which he does) and tracing,
among them, some common characteristics. The most relevant
of which is perhaps that “[e]veryone in the Canadian informal
logic community was educated in the analytic tradition. For
many of them, perhaps a hefty majority, doing philosophy ana-
lytically is simply the preferred way of doing it” (ibid.).
The accounts of Blair and Woods are a useful prod and start-
ing point in an attempt to understand the nature of Canadian
approaches to the study of argumentation. Another part of the
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story is tied to the rise of the Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation. As Woods points out, it was inspired by ISSA,
but in a way that was securely rooted in Ontario. As one of
the attendees of the first conference (Leo Groarke) remembers:
“Someone, I believe it was Michael Gilbert, sent around an e-mail
that said something like: ‘There are ten or twelve of us going to
ISSA from Ontario. We are all going to make presentations and
listen to our European colleagues and won’t have time to listen
to each other. So why don’t we supplement it with a conference
at home, in Ontario, where we can listen to each other?’” The end
result was the first of eleven OSSA conferences, which proved so
popular that they quickly expanded beyond the original vision of
a conference for scholars living and working in Ontario.
In embryonic form, the development of OSSA suggests some
possible ways to identify and characterize a ‘Canadian’ approach
to the study of argumentation. It included, obviously, a geo-
graphic context (first Ontario, then Canada) and a community
of scholars who share a common background as philosophers in
Canadian philosophy departments. One can reasonably expect a
certain way of doing philosophy that binds these scholars and
makes them recognizable, together with some basic themes
expressed in their research. At the same time, one of the most
interesting features of this particular community is the extent to
which its members move in different directions from a shared
foundation that includes little more than the philosophers’ tra-
ditional view –that arguments are sets of propositions made up
of premises and a conclusion – and an interest in the attempt to
apply this to natural language (“informal”) arguments. As Woods
suggests, some members of the community embrace fallacy the-
ory, though others reject it. Some retain a pronounced commit-
ment to formal logic, others are notable for the extent to which
they reject it. In the long run, some informal logicians are heav-
ily influenced by other trends in argumentation theory (notably
rhetoric and pragma-dialectics), while others ultimately reject
6 FEDERICO PUPPO
the model of rationality which they began with (which empha-
sizes language and a rejection of emotion).
In keeping with this discussion, some of the essays in this
volume critically discuss some key aspects of the traditional
approach to logic. One example, the discussion of questions
related to missing premises and the nature of logical conse-
quence, analyzed by David Hitchcock, demonstrates this. He
notes “the whole tradition of supposing that reasoners and
arguers leave unstated a premiss on which they are relying […]
rests on a mistake (Hitchcock 1998). The mistake is to suppose
that the only way that a conclusion can follow definitely from
premisses is logically. Logical consequence is rather a special
kind of consequence, distinguished by the absence of extra-
logical terms in its articulation” (D. Hitchcock, in this volume).
In his account of the methods of informal logic, Hans V.
Hansen recognizes the intrinsic limits of formal logic and its
virtues, contrasting them with the developments characteristic
of informal logic. He at once offers us a range of ways to
approach informal logic and a common definition which can
encompass all of them, reformulating informal logic as a field
comprised of “the set of methods of non-formal illative evalua-
tion” (H.V. Hansen, in this volume).
In a manner relevant to this attempt to understand Canadian
approaches to argumentation, Trudy Govier’s essay opens the
theory of argumentation to the social aspects of group dynamics.
She discusses the “compositional phenomenon” that is “the appli-
cation of intentional language to groups”: by assuming “that
groups, small or large, organized or not, can do things” she con-
siders “responses that would purport to eliminate” the compo-
sitional phenomenon (T. Govier, in this volume). “Then [she]
move[s] on to set it in the context of the theory of argument,”
by discussing “the Fallacy of Composition, in which we mistak-
enly infer conclusions about wholes or groups from premises
about parts or individuals.” It is a fallacy that “is genuinely a fal-
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lacy, and an important one – but that the gap underlying this fal-
lacy can be plausibly bridged in some cases” (ibid.). Govier rightly
observes that “there is much to learn by logically probing claims
about ‘the Danes’, ‘the West’, ‘Muslims’, and so on” provided that
we remember that “the gap defining the Fallacy of Composition
can be bridged insofar as group structures and relationships pro-
vide contexts for people to think together and act on the basis
of their joint deliberations” (ibid.). This does seem present in the
case of ‘Canadian informal logicians,’ who have thought together
and acted on the basis of these deliberations, though this does not
imply that they speak (or act) with a unitary voice.
Here it is worth returning to the opinion of Blair which
started us on this investigation – and which expressed a negative
point of view about the possibility of recognizing “anything dis-
tinctively Canadian about our contributions” (J.A. Blair, in this
volume). At this point we can affirm sufficient clues to sustain the
idea that there is, fundamentally, a certain tradition of thought
or approach among the ‘Canadians’: that of informal logic and
of the analytical approach to philosophy, with a particular way
of looking at argumentation and reasoning, and a geographical
context which spurred them to share – and often to debate –
their respective points of view. This is not to say that only Cana-
dian scholars have developed the informal logic orientation or
that only Canadians are involved in its study: but it does seem
that this tradition exists and that it was born and was developed
in Canada, with a notable connection to Windsor.
Of course, the existence of an informal logic tradition might
seem tenuous and peculiar, because we will also see that it con-
tains no shortage of disagreements and contrasts. We will talk
about this soon enough, but it may already be clear that the
Canadian school of argumentation is, to the extent that it is a
school, quite different from the way we would usually under-
stand other schools. It is useful to compare pragma-dialectics,
which not only has a central seat of origin, but, above all, is
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recognized by a founder that has generated a series of pupils
working on common themes, who have developed the theory
by applying it to various fields of knowledge (excluding some
differences that naturally exist between the different develop-
ments of pragma-dialectics). In the case of Canadian argumen-
tation scholarship, the situation is largely different: yes, there is
a seat (Windsor), but the commonality of the scholars who work
there, assuming that there is one, is defined by the themes they
work on and from the approach they use; certainly not from the
presence of a common ‘master’ or ‘founder’. Insofar as this does
not exist, one might argue that there is no basic element that
would allow us to recognize the existence of a school.
We will return to these considerations later. For the moment
it may be said that elements of commonality have emerged (geo-
graphical connections, a common field of study and common
training), even if they concern a knowledge in constant evolu-
tion. That evolution continues in this collection, in, for exam-
ple, Ralph Johnson’s work on one of the contributions he made
to informal logic in ““Argumentation as Dialectical” (Blair and
Johnson 1987[…]) where the seeds of the proposal regarding the
dialectical tier may be found” (R. Johnson, in this volume).
Johnson, like Blair, remembers the beginning of the informal
logic movement, which started “more than 30 years ago with
the tradition in which we had been raised which I have baptized
FDL,” that is “the traditional logical perspective on argument”
that failed to take into account the “gaps between that theory and
argumentative practice” (ibid.).
In real life arguments have various purposes; but no mention of
purpose in FDL. In real life arguments, we often have to go with
premises that are not known to be true (Hamblin); no provision for
that in FDL. In real life, good arguments often fall short of valid-
ity; no provision for that in FDL. In real life, there are good argu-
ments for and good arguments against a particular proposition or
proposal (Hamblin); no provision for that in FDL. In real life, good
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arguments typically confront objections and other dialectical mate-
rial; but no mention of that in FDL (ibid.).
The rejection of FDL led to the development of a theory
meant to “bring the conception more into line with best prac-
tices” (ibid.). This development was assisted, in the early and mid
80s, by two developments: “a connection between our project
and the critical thinking movement in North America […]the
many different initiatives outside of logic, among them the
pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, and the broad
international and multidisciplinary community working on
argumentation theory” (ibid.). In this context, a “theory of argu-
ment that gives proper credit to arguments which, if not sound,
are yet good, or good enough, and to arguments in which the
arguer acknowledges and comes to terms with what [Johnson]
call[s] dialectical obligations” (ibid.) was developed.
Part of that rethinking took the form of proposing that dealing
with one’s dialectical obligations is an essential component of the
very idea of argument, robustly considered. Arguments in the par-
adigmatic sense require a dialectical tier in which the arguer dis-
charges his or her dialectical obligations: i.e., anticipate objections,
deals with alternative positions, etc. That proposal had the follow-
ing two presuppositions. First, the focus is on the use of argu-
ment to achieve rational persuasion. […]. Second, the focus in the
first instance is on argument as it expresses itself in texts (such as
found in newspaper editorials, journal articles, books etc.), as dis-
tinguished from an oral argument between two participants, which
is what dialogue logics […] and the pragma-dialectical approach
take as their focal point. (This is roughly the distinction between
product-driven and process-driven theories.) (ibid.).
This last quotation raises a potentially problematic point for
our analysis (soon to be joined by others): in fact, within informal
logic there is a very strong debate, which has touched, among
other things, the arguments put forward by Johnson. He himself
reminded us: “since I originally proposed that arguments require
a dialectical tier, many commentators have weighed in with
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objections and challenges. Originally Govier, then Leff, Hitch-
cock, Tindale, Groarke, Hansen, van Rees and Wyatt – to men-
tion just those who have gone on record with objections to that
proposal” (ibid.). Johnson answers some of these criticisms in his
essay and it is not up to us to judge whether the answer is final
or not. In the current discussion the point of note is the disagree-
ment that characterizes the debate.
To the extent that we have found the existence of a certain
common tradition of thought among Canadian scholars who
practice informal logic, we must also note that there is within it,
a strong debate. We can see this in the differences of approach
between product-driven and process-driven theories. For exam-
ple, the approach of Johnson and that developed by Krabbe and
Walton. This diversity of vision does not, however, negate the
hypothesis that there is a Canadian ‘school.’ No one would deny
that there was a school like Plato’s Academy (perhaps the arche-
type of the school model) just because those who belonged to
it at various times had partly different (and sometimes radically
different) views which gave rise to real philosophical debate.
Indeed, the existence of such debate shows that there is a certain
number of scholars who, arguing among themselves on common
themes, prove that a community exists and recognizes itself.
Johnson himself speaks of it when he notes that his “proposal
might also be seen as a counterpoise to the tendency to broaden
the range of argument” (ibid.), expressed by Groarke’s visual
argumentation and Gilbert’s multi-modal argumentation. As
Johnson himself notices, “if we are going to adjust our theories
and approaches to include such specimens (which my proposal
makes provision for), then it seems to me imperative – as a mat-
ter of balance – that we should also adjust in the other direction
by also emphasizing the more developed forms of argument –
those with a dialectical tier” (ibid.).
This is a matter we will come back to shortly, partly because
the essays of Gilbert and Groarke await us. For the moment we
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should observe how this indicates that informal logic is a project
still waiting to be completed via a collective enterprise that has
grown in parallel with the analysis of Douglas Walton. Walton,
with Krabbe, was able to “attempt to systematically classify dif-
ferent types of dialogue representing goal-directed frameworks
in which argumentation takes place” (D. Walton, in this volume).
It is a work that “has had many citations, as a dialogue typology
has had applications in many different fields, including artificial
intelligence, law, medicine, discourse analysis, linguistics (espe-
cially pragmatics) and education. The purpose of [Walton’s]
paper is to survey many of these applications to see how they fit
with informal logic” (ibid.), something that he does by drawing
“an important lesson: [that] distinctions between the various
kinds of dialogue can be clarified and formulated more precisely
by showing how each of them relies on different approaches to
the burden of proof” (ibid.).
The analysis conducted by Walton highlights the development
(and evolution) of informal logic in a way that underscores its
ability to incorporate and extend key notions in a way that is
motivated by points of friction and by mutual understandings.
One sees a similar push and pull in Sharon Bailin and Mark
Battersby, who consider “that argumentation constitutes a sig-
nificant aspect of critical thinking” (S. Bailin & M. Battersby, in
this volume) and note that their “discussion will take as its point
of departure three points made by Ralph Johnson:
1. the theory of argumentation should develop out of an
understanding of the practice of argumentation;
2. an important feature of the practice of argumentation is
that it is dialectical;
3. the pedagogy of argumentation should include this
dialectical dimension (ibid.).
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The essay by Bailin and Battersby emphasizes this third strand
of thought, highlighting the usefulness of argumentation in the
field of pedagogy. In the process, they emphasize the transversal
nature of argumentation as a form of knowledge (something
demonstrated by the reference to the legal context that closes
the analysis of Balin and Battersby, which is not accidental). This
makes it a true and proper method of knowledge itself, in a way
that makes it a typical form of educational process. Thus, “think-
ing about argumentation in terms of rational persuasion may
have the result of reinforcing students’ tendencies to try to find
support for and persuade others of positions they already hold
[…]. Adding a dialectical tier is a move in the right direction in
that it imposes a requirement to look beyond one’s own argu-
ments” (ibid.), as long as the dialectical dimension is recognized
in its proper, expanded role
truly recognizing [that] the dialectical dimension means more than
simply discharging one’s dialectical obligation to address criticisms
and objections to particular arguments. Rather, taking seriously the
dialectical dimension means focusing not on particular arguments,
but instead on the debate and an evaluation of competing cases in
order to make a reasoned judgment on an issue (ibid.).
The extent to which informal logic has been extended beyond
the narrow view of argument that gave rise to it (embedded
within analytic philosophy) is already evident in the essay by
Robert Pinto and, mostly, in the multimodal argumentation of
Michael Gilbert, the visual argumentation of Leo Groarke, and
the overall re-evaluation of the rhetoric due to Christopher Tin-
dale. From this point of view, according to us, it is not by chance
that it is from a previous book by Tindale (1999) that Robert
Pinto makes the moves for proposing his general account of
having and giving reasons in order to “shed any light on why
there are different “cultures of theorizing” about argumentation
– theorizing about practices which turn on the presentation and
exchange of reasons” (R. Pinto, in this volume). Tindale (1999)
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called attention to the logical, dialectical and rhetorical perspec-
tives, and Pinto reminds us (by offering in a few lines the picture
of the different theories we may have) that
within each of these there are a variety of ways in which the per-
spectives can unfold or develop. Formal and informal logic repre-
sent quite different species of “logical” perspective on argument,
and themselves divide into varieties of sub-species. The formal
dialectic […], the “controversy-oriented approach to the theory of
knowledge” […], the pragmatic-dialectic approach of the Amster-
dam school, and the somewhat different dialogue approach that
Walton takes […] are among the quite different species of dialectical
approach. And finally you will find just some of often quite different
approaches that may be classed as rhetorical in Aristotle, Cicero,
Perelman, Wenzel, Tindale himself, as well as in the design theoretic
approach to normative pragmatics inspired by the work of Scott
Jacobs and Fred Kauffeld […]. However, across this broad spectrum
of “cultures of theorizing” there appears to be general agreement
that arguing involves offering and/or exchanging reasons. My aim
in what follows is to outline a general account of reasons – of what
it is to have them and of what is required to offer or present them
(ibid.).
By doing this, Pinto helps us to better understand what an
argument is by putting into question the reason-giving process,
the role played by the speaker and, mainly, by the hearer. The
same concepts of arguments, argumentation, reasons and ratio-
nality, and normativity (since for him the force of reasons is nor-
mative), are disputed. Finally, according to Pinto, it is possible to
claim that “the varieties of logical perspective tend to emphasize
questions about what is a reason for what” (ibid.), while “the value
of making dialogue the preferred context for studying argumen-
tation – which might be seen as lying at the heart of dialecti-
cal perspectives – is […] most clearly seen when we recognize
the important effect that undermining and overriding consider-
ations have on the force of reasons” (ibid.). The last perspective,
the rhetorical, with his “value of emphasizing the effect of argu-
ment on audience” (ibid.) seems to Pinto “quite real” (ibid.). In fact
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if an argument fails to persuade an audience, the fault may lie in
the audience’s failure to accept what they see it is reasonable for
them to accept, or it may lie in the arguer’s failure to make it man-
ifest to the audience that it is reasonable for them to accept what
the arguer wants them to accept. Adopting a rhetorical perspective
requires getting clear about what it will take to get an audience in
a proper frame of mind to accept what they’ll be shown it is rea-
sonable to accept, as well as getting clear about what it will take to
make it manifest to the audience that it is reasonable to accept what
the arguer wants them to accept (ibid.).
In our view, such a conclusion could be read as an indication
for a better understanding of the development of informal logic.
To such an extent, what Catherine Hundleby discusses about
Govier’s account of adversariality in argumentation could play a
deep role. In this latter case, the issue is about responses given by
Govier (1999) to “the feminist critiques of adversarial assump-
tions about argumentation” (C. Hundleby, in this volume).
Hundleby dissents from Govier’s – but also from Walton’s (2007)
– accounts of politeness, according to which “politeness can
reduce adversariality to a necessary minimum” (C. Hundleby,
in this volume). According to her, in fact, “the gendered quality
of politeness disadvantages and even disqualifies some arguers
via differentially gendered measures of aggression” (ibid.). And,
since “feminism is intrinsically controversial” (ibid.), it “demands
adversarial engagement that politeness restricts from some of
those, notably women, whose interests demand change” (ibid.).
Behind this discussion, and for reasons clarified by Hundleby
herself in her essay, what is at stake here is the theoretical foun-
dation of argumentation, and of concepts such as persuasiveness,
cogency and rationality of the premises and their relevance, that
is considered to be the basis for cogent argumentation, by con-
sidering again the role played by the dialectical tier. In any case,
what seems to be clear is that a distinction between “arguing
with people” and “arguing against people” should be made, so to
leave room for “collaborative exchanges of reasons […] [that] may
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be means for rational persuasion” (ibid.), for example in science
and education, where “we argue without disputing a claim” (ibid.).
From this point of view, it can be said that “we may exchange rea-
sons without opposing each other’s ideas – never mind oppos-
ing each other personally. Adversariality is not necessary or even
ideal for argumentation, despite its value for democratic politics
and critical thinking” (ibid.). In any case, until now, “these non-
adversarial practices deserve to count as forms of argument, and
argumentation theorists such as Govier seem to deny them that
status only because they presume that argumentation must be
adversarial” (ibid.).
From a more general point of view, this last remark gives to
Hundleby the possibility to underline one of the characters she
still finds in informal logic, that is “idealization”. In fact, accord-
ing to her,
despite the intention of Govier and others to account for real rea-
soning practices, idealization or ideal theory persists in informal
logic. While all philosophy may be normative and ideal in a generic
sense, the type of abstraction and its degree may impede philoso-
phers’ ability to address concrete problems. Misguided abstraction
can make our ideals too idealized or idealized in the wrong ways.
Failing to account for how gendered communication practices
including politeness affect norms of argumentation and for human
logical frailty makes Govier’s picture of the argumentative adver-
sary problematically abstract and idealized (ibid.).
In Hundleby’s opinion, “the oppositional mode appears uni-
versally productive only because the adversaries we have in mind
are abstract” (ibid.), but “adversarial modes of reasoning have nei-
ther foundational nor over-riding value as means for rational
persuasion” (ibid.), since we may have “rational persuasion among
people who may disagree or doubt a proposition under consid-
eration, but who need not have contradictory opinions” (ibid.).
At the same time, idealization is what makes it difficult (or even
impossible) to consider in a proper way the role of the arguers
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themselves, which is ignored by “every major approach to argu-
mentation theory” (ibid.). This counts in order to remember that
“philosophers must abstract away from concrete situations –
whether epistemic, ethical, or argumentative – in order to
develop ideals in the broad philosophical sense of norms” (ibid.).
But, at the same time, “we must take care not to abstract away
from what we recognize to be problems demanding attention”
(ibid.).
In a certain sense, this kind of methodological suggestion –
which draws attention to the concrete dimensions of argumen-
tation – seems to be seriously taken into consideration, among
others, by Michael Gilbert. For his part, Gilbert “would like to
take this opportunity to examine [his] now post-teenage theory
in light of the developments in our discipline” (M. Gilbert, in this
volume). He does this by declaring the reasons why his perspec-
tive has not found acceptance, precisely in the context of infor-
mal logic. On one hand, Gilbert believes “that Argumentation
Theory is a vital discipline that can be used to understand and
hone the tools people draw on to communicate with each other,
embrace agreement and avoid violence”, on the other, he believes
that “arguing is not a linear process with clearly defined edges
and readily identifiable components” (ibid.). Rather, according to
Gilbert, “(virtually) every argument contains at least a minimal
emotional component”, even if “there is nothing irrational about
the non-logical modes” – “emotion and whatever logical sense
goes into an argument are inseparable” (ibid.). It is a sign of the
debate between different minds mentioned earlier. In the eyes
of Gilbert, it appears that “the ability to diagram an argument,
investigate it for fallacies, apply a Pragma-Dialectic analysis, are
all vital tools for the argumentation analyst. Nonetheless, my
sense that the richness of communication was being missed by
not applying these tools within the various modes, by not apply-
ing them in a finer way, led me to believe that a great deal of
importance was lost to the analyst” (ibid.).
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One very interesting factor that has come to the fore in the 20 or so
years since I began promulgating multi-modal argumentation has
been just where and where not it has, if you will, caught on. It has
not been a major success in Argumentation Theory as performed
in Canada, the United States, or Holland; three places where Argu-
mentation Theory has definitely taken hold. These are all countries
where the logical mode and the critical-logical model are dominant.
While certainly eschewing formal logic as a model for marketplace
argumentation, its replacement, informal logic or pragma-dialec-
tics, is also quite structured and linear. Most importantly, it is prod-
uct-orientated. Arguments are artifacts that are viewed and
examined in isolation from context and situation. The arguer is
irrelevant to the analysis of the dispute on pain of fallacy, i.e., argu-
mentum ad hominem. The self-same argument given in dramat-
ically different circumstances by very different interlocutors and
audiences with very different goals and backgrounds would be
assessed in the very same way. […] [A]n argument is a series of mes-
sages centred on an avowed disagreement. Everything that touches
on the comprehension and interpretation of those messages is part
of the argument. This includes the relevant emotions, physical loca-
tion, personalities of the arguer and audience, gender of the arguer
and audience, actions of the participants, and even possibly the
weather. To say that Informal Logic and pragma-dialectics do not
make room for such factors is an understatement. Multi-modal
argumentation as well as Coalescent Argumentation have been well
received in other places. One in particular, is Mexico […] including
Spain […] my work appeals to the Latin soul (ibid.).
This is a strong opinion we leave for further debate. Here
it suffices to say that Gilbert and multi-modal argumentation
are part of the Canadian ‘school’ this book presents. His is work
by a Canadian philosopher which is a reaction to the shared
account of argument that gave rise to informal logic – work
which broadens our understanding of argumentation and allows
us to better understand its connotations.
Even if multi–modal argumentation has not been a major suc-
cess in Canada, within informal logic, it has not been ignored.
Johnson criticizes it, but also recognizes it (and visual
argumentation), when he declares that his proposal might “be
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seen as a counterpoise to the tendency to broaden the range
of argument” (R. Johnson, in this volume). This usefully high-
lights an important counterpoint that has informed the discus-
sion within informal logic – one element pushing to expand,
the other pushing to limit the range of argument. As Johnson
suggests, the goal can be seen as a matter of balance between
these different approaches — between two branches that unfurl
from the same trunk.
Looking from overseas, it seems that (to extend the analogy),
wanting to cut one or the other branch would risk losing the vital
sap of this tree, which finds its peculiar characteristic precisely
in its luxuriant being. At the same time, it is absolutely normal
for different approaches to be unraveled from the same ‘school’,
eventually even potentially conflicting: this is how the Lyceum
was born from the Academy, for example. Considered from this
point of view, Aristotelian philosophy is perhaps less antagonis-
tic to Platonic philosophy than many common readings would
have us think. Taking note of these kinds of developments and
recognizing them can serve to affirm one’s own identity, in not-
ing them in the case of informal logic, one can say that the pro-
posal in this volume has been satisfied.
Leo Groarke uses his essay as an opportunity to “present a
state-of-the-art account of visual argument that reflects what
we have learned from the discussions that have occurred over
the intervening twenty years after the publication of the first
papers on visual argument” (L. Groarke, in this volume). Groarke
emphasizes how “[i]n many ways, a growing interest in visual –
and multimodal – argument has been driven, not by theoretical
discussions of argument, but by the desire to explain the reality
that visuals are widely used in real life arguments” (ibid.).
“Acknowledging visual argument is an important first step
toward an inclusive theory of argument” (ibid.) – the develop-
ment of the ART approach provides Groarke with an opportu-
nity to reply to Johnson and “his rejection of visual argument”
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(ibid.) (in keeping with his preference for a narrower conception
of argument that excludes visual and multimodal argumenta-
tion).
Johnson 2005 has written that: “The … problem for a theory of
visual argument is to deal with the related issue of how to ‘convert’
the visuals, which are the components of a visual argument, into
reasons which can function as premises that are supposed to lead to
a conclusion, so that the machinery of informal logic can be applied
to the resulting argument.” But the method I propose suggests that
it is a mistake to think that we need to ‘convert’ the components of a
visual argument into reasons that can function as premises or con-
clusions. No conversion is necessary. All we need to do is recognize
these elements and the way that they are used in argument. […] The
problem Johnson focuses on is not, inherent in visual arguments,
but in his and other traditional approaches to argument, which
define the key components of an argument in terms of words (either
as sentences or as the propositions they refer to). If one assumes this
view, then the only way to make room for visual argument compo-
nents is by finding some way to convert them into verbal analogues
that can play the role of premise or conclusion. The way to over-
come this challenge is not by finding a way to convert visuals, but by
giving up on this assumption and adopting a more expansive view
of argument. Doing so can help us better recognize the argumenta-
tive roles that visuals can, qua visuals, perform (ibid.).
In the study of real life arguing, this seems very sensible and
usefully highlights an ongoing evolution: informal logic arising
as a ‘heterodox’ development of the traditional approaches to
argumentation that remained confined within the narrow logis-
tical boundaries, too far, as we have seen, if our interest is real life
argumentation. On this point, specifically, Gilbert and Groarke
(and others) have embraced multimodal and visual argumen-
tation and expanded the scope of informal logic beyond
approaches to argument “which define the key components of an
argument in terms of words” (ibid.). Instead, these contributors to
informal logic take a further step forward along the path started
by informal logic’s attempt to expand what began as a narrowly
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defined conception of argument. As Groarke says, he is inter-
ested in “adopting a more expansive view of argument” because
“[d]oing so can help us better recognize the argumentative roles
that visuals can, qua visuals, perform”, but also, in our opinion,
to better understand and recognize the nature of argument qua
argument. Here it should not be forgotten how the classical tra-
dition assigned an important role to what, mutatis mutandis, could
be considered a multimodal or visual aspect of argument, that is,
the actio. This is a central element that is broadly developed with
Cicero and Quintilian, a central element of the ‘rhetorical retic-
ulum’ which plays a key role in their very precise conception of
argumentation.
Informal logic’s relationship to rhetoric is the subject of the
last essay collected here, that of Christopher Tindale, who pro-
poses a further expansion of informal logic’s account of argu-
mentation – a repositioning of argumentation that is aligned
with rhetoric, in a way that “is closely related to that which can be
extracted from Aristotle” (C. Tindale, in this volume). To this end,
Tindale considers it necessary to overcome, first of all, the “sta-
tic” concept of argument that lies “behind the way many infor-
mal logicians talk about arguments” (ibid.). This confirms the
advances of theories like that of Johnson, which suggests that
informal logic did not began with the more formal models of
argument, but with the ““new” dialectical tier. It is this tier that
deserves attention because it begins to push in the direction of
a more rhetorical conception of argument (without quite reach-
ing it)” (ibid.). Tindale’s essay provides a more detailed discussion
of the relationship between rhetoric and informal logic and the
debate that arose in response to Johnson’s account of the dialec-
tical tier. In an attempt to understand the relationship between
informal logic and other views of argument, the important point
is his suggestion that Johnson’s resistance to rhetorical elements
may depend on the fact that “the concept of rhetoric implicated
in these discussions is not as modern as his concept of argument”
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(ibid.). Seen from this point of view, we can say that informal
logic has traveled, so to speak, at ‘two-speeds’: quickly forward
toward a more expansive view of argumentation, but at times
more slowly, in a way that is reluctant to embrace the broader
aspects of argumentation evident in the essays by Gilbert,
Groarke and Tindale. Tindale writes:
The definition of informal logic drawn from Blair and Johnson is
still very much a logical one. They would judge informal logic to be
just that – a logic. By contrast, another informal logician, Douglas
Walton, sees informal logic to be essentially dialectical. […]. [But] it
simply means that for Walton an argument will be something that
arises in a dialogue. […] In agreement with what we have seen in the
traditional model, an “argument” for Walton is simply “made up of
statements called premises and conclusions” (ibid.).
There is no shortage of “suggestions of a more dynamic sense
of argument here [as we see in Hitchcock’s analysis]. But they
are only suggestions” (ibid.). To make suggestions for a more
dynamic account of argument something more is required: “it is
important to establish rhetoric’s relation to informal logic. Like
other theories of argument and argumentation, informal logic
was developed without any positive engagement with the tradi-
tions of rhetoric. Thus, bringing rhetoric into informal logic (or
vice versa) is a difficult project because informal logic is already
established” (ibid.).
In Tindale we can discern an echo of the words of Woods, who
recalled how a characteristic feature of the Canadian tradition
is a common philosophical training of an analytical type: previ-
ously this allowed us to identify a common characteristic among
scholars belonging to that tradition. Now we can confirm this,
but we must also observe how it has been a limiting factor as
well. It is, in fact, precisely because of this analytical training that
it was difficult, in the early days of informal logic, to attribute to
rhetoric the role in understanding real life arguments that would
seem to be its due. As Tindale notes, “philosophically trained
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informal logicians were likely unaware that rhetoric could have
anything other than a pejorative sense” (ibid.). More recently the
situation seems to be changing:
Recent decades have seen members of the rhetoric and speech com-
munication communities enter into fruitful discussions with those
from the informal logic community, discussions that have encour-
aged a more accurate appreciation of the wider senses “rhetoric”
can have, including the positive. […]. It is difficult, then, to see
the pejorative sense of rhetoric promoted in the work of serious
informal logicians. If anything, there is a tendency toward neglect
rather than dismissal […] What is still lacking in mainstream infor-
mal logic, then, is a full engagement with positive rhetoric, and that
might begin with the explicit recognition of a more dynamic con-
ception of “argument” (ibid.)
According to Tindale, the latter could account for the fact that
“an argument is alive; it is a message of activated potential. In
terms of particularly important Aristotelian terms that capture
the way he conceived natural and social objects, an argument is a
potentiality (dunamis) and two actualities (energeia)” (ibid.).
Here it is worth noting that this appears connected to a certain
idea of logic as logos which, by itself, expresses a dynamic concept
of logic, typically Aristotelian (strongly opposed by the Megar-
ians and, later, by the Stoics, who instead cultivated precisely
the static vision that will then become typical of traditional
approaches): Tindale himself underscores this when he observes
that “the poetic has a movement, so too must logic itself: logic
has a life, and its structures have internal movement. This sense
needs to be transported to the study of argumentation” (ibid.).
*****
As interesting as they are, arguments concerning the study of
the possible developments of the theory of argumentation push
our gaze beyond the confines of the present volume and the pre-
sent essay. The latter is focused on a different question: the ques-
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tion whether there is a ‘Canadian overview on argumentation’.
From what we have learned and can see, it seems that the ques-
tion from which this volume developed can be answered in part
although not definitively. The various minds that make up the
variegated universe of informal logic (here only partially repre-
sented) have something in common (they spring, one might say,
from the same roots) but this is not enough to speak of a tradition
of unitary thought. In this regard, Woods expresses some scepti-
cism about the possibility of a “Canadian brand” of logic.
The Canadian brand was never as well-defined and organization-
ally and doctrinally sustained as the Amsterdam brand. Brands, as
we know, come and go, and these two have flourished for decades
now. It remains to be seen how well they hold up in the years and
decades ahead. Judged from where we are now on the Canadian
scene, there are clear signs of where the country’s research efforts
are likely to be directed. One of them is logical structure of argu-
ment and reasoning in legal contexts. Another signals a renewed
alliance with cognitive, experimental and social psychology, neu-
robiology and the other empirical branches of cognitive science.
In one of its streams, we see an effort to do for logic what Quine
and others have done for epistemology, namely to give it the nat-
uralized form which has been intermittently in play in logic since
Bacon, Mill, Husserl, Dewey, and later Toulmin, notwithstanding
the intense efforts of Frege and others to make all of logic dance
to the tune of mathematics. Also of note are the already mentioned
efforts to build alliances with computer science and AI, in a way
perhaps of exposing how the mathematics of software engineering
might leaven the insights of those whose purpose is the elucidation
of human argument on the ground. Also of growing importance is
the exposure of human argument-making to the plethora of work
already under the belt of theories of defeasible, default and non-
monotonic consequence. Whether any of this outreach will lead to
new Canadian brands remains to be seen. Ray Reiter’s paper on
the logic of default reasoning, was published when he was a mem-
ber of UBC’s mathematics department prior to his departure for
the University of Toronto. Although a foundational contribution
by a Canadian, no one thinks of default logics as carrying a Cana-
dian brand. In the theory of argument the Canadian brand is, like
all brands, a fleeting thing. I foresee no successor to that Canadian
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throne holding sway for the next forty-seven years (J. Woods, in this
volume).
Surely it must be granted that a Canadian school of logic in
the strong sense does not exist. There is no common school of
thought comparable to the “Amsterdam brand” which is “well-
defined and organizationally and doctrinally sustained” (ibid.).
At the same time, Woods is speaking of logic in a much
broader sense than that which is the focus of the present book.
Here the question is whether informal logic is in some sense a
school of thought that can be understood as a Canadian contri-
bution to argumentation theory – itself understood as an attempt
to understand real life reasoning. In this regard there is much
of note – as this volume demonstrates, a group of distinguished
Canadian scholars widely recognized for their work in informal
logic and argumentation theory; the common origins in philoso-
phy departments and analytic philosophy that have already been
noted; a major journal (Informal Logic) that has been publishing
for forty years; many scholarly books (like those in this series);
and countless texts and numerous conferences within a tradi-
tion of scholarship that continues in Windsor, in Ontario, and in
other provinces. The result is a number of shared issues which
are shared even though those within the tradition disagree with
and debate one another. At the very least this seems to make
possible the talk of a shared Canadian spirit in informal logic
in the same sense that we speak of Italian cuisine or French wines
which do not correspond in an exact or precise way to a unique
brand, but are nevertheless indicative of a group identity that
everyone can recognize.
*****
In an attempt to understand the school issue in an examina-
tion of Canadian contributions to informal logic and argumen-
tation theory, it is very useful to look to the 5th-4th century
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BC Athens, Greece. It is well known that in this period the city
experienced “the Sophists’ arguments, the Socratic method and,
later, the birth and development of the schools of Socrates, which
we call “minor” in comparison to Plato. These are the school
of asceticism of Antisthenes, which later became “cynical” with
Diogenes of Sinope, the Dialectical school of Euclid of Megara
and the hedonistic school of Aristippus of Cyrene. All of these
men were (with the exception of Diogenes) a few years older
than Plato” [E. Berti, 2010, 5. Our translation]. Among these
schools’ examples, the dialectical school of Euclid of Megara, also
referred to as ‘Megarians’, can help us understand why it is pos-
sible to speak today of a ‘Canadian school’ or, more correctly, of
‘Canadians’ with reference to the theory of argumentation.
It is well understood that the Megarian school expresses a
philosophical approach similar to the Eleatics and contrary to
Aristotle. However, a careful reading of the sources does not
allow us to confirm without reservation that Euclid of Megara
founded a school, it cannot definitively be said to have existed as
a school (at least in the terms in which we are used to defining
schools).
K. von Fritz has thoroughly criticized the very assumption of the
existence of a Megarian school, namely the validity of that per-
spective of integration between Eleatism and Socratism which he
considered instead a later doxographic scheme. […] The Megarian
school, like all the other so-called Socratic schools, is a particular
type of school: it is characterized not by a purely theoretical tradi-
tion of doctrine (like the Eleatics or the Atomists), nor by a com-
munity of scientific research (like the Peripatetic school or the
Academy), nor by a strictly dogmatic or all-encompassing concept
(such as Stoicism or Epicureanism), but rather by an ideal of educa-
tion and life skills training for the students, without any precondi-
tion for the training of new teachers. […] This means that when we
talk about “school”, specifically the minor Socratics, we mean some-
thing very different from the Peripatetic, the Stoa and the Garden:
there are no compulsory dogmas and well-constructed systems, but
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only, as K. von Fritz has argued, the aim of “educating and training
students for life” (G. Giannantoni, 1990, 44-45. Our translation).
Specifically with regard to the ‘Megarians’:
it is good to understand the meaning of “school”: if it is used to des-
ignate a stable and lasting educational and scientific organization in
which a group of people carries out a common preparatory work,
teaching and learning of knowledge, this term finds this use only in
the case of the Platonic Academy, which became the most advanced
scientific and cultural institution in the ancient world […]; recent
criticism has gained the conviction that the classification in schools
of other Socratics is above all the result of the work of schematiza-
tion systematically made by the authors of successions of philoso-
phers. However, in this case we must observe that the same work of
“scholastic” systemization, accomplished by Hellenistic historiogra-
phy, cannot have appeared on an arbitrary basis and without some
connection to the historical reality of the facts. […] What has been
said is also significant in clarifying the way in which one speaks of a
Megarian “school”, whose foundation is attributed from sources to
Euclid. These – who were, undoubtedly, among the most devoted
disciples of Socrates […] – had to build around themselves – as
indeed did the other Socratics – a circle of followers, with the intent
to continue, in possible ways, the work of the teacher. Therefore,
this also had to be a school of life for life (L. Montoneri, 1984,
26-27. Our translation).
And so, “although we speak of the “Megarian school”, one of
the so-called minor Socratic schools, this classification appears
hardly applicable, perhaps even out of place, given that this pre-
sumed school does not exist as a solid and unique institution nor
do its members profess common and unanimously accepted doc-
trine” (D. Pesce & E. Spinelli, 2006, 7218. Our Translation).
The Megarian school, in the strongest sense of the term, did
not exist and that is why here we referred to it as a ‘school’
(in scare quotes). But there certainly existed a circle of thinkers
(including Plato himself) who gathered in Megara (probably
around Euclid) after the death of Socrates (that Euclid certainly
knew and spent time together with Plato, See G. Giannantoni,
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1990, 36; W.C. Kneale & M. Kneale, 1962, 14) and that was,
assuredly, still thriving in the days of Aristotle. The individual
philosophers who were part of it were characterized as “being
followers of the Eleatism” (G. Giannantoni, 1990, 44. Our trans-
lation) and the group, as a whole, was known by the “appellations
of “eristic” and “dialectical”” (ibid, p.46), with the clarification that
this should not lead to the error of thinking that who was labeled
as such could for this reason only be ascribed as belonging to that
group.
This suggests that the meaning that Plato and Aristotle attrib-
uted to the term dialecticós “does not signify belonging to a
particular school, but rather the one who practices a certain phi-
losophical or argumentative method” (ibid., p. 47). Likewise, the
well-known polemics of Aristotle, laid out in his Metaphysics,
should be understood in a similar way, since when we speak
of the “Megarians” [Arist., Metaph. 3, 1046b 29] it is very likely
that this should be understood as “a doctrinal and non-institu-
tional denomination: [meaning] “those who refer to Megarian
doctrines” and not “to those who belong to the Megarian
school”” (G. Giannantoni, 1990, 49. Our translation). In effect,
the Aristotelian formula “evidently had to allow the contempo-
raries of the Stagirians to easily identify the group of thinkers
who he intended to refer to as representatives of a specific spec-
ulative point of view that he criticized” (L. Montoneri, 1984, 27.
Our translation). This point of view is later identified with the
appellation “Megarian doctrines” (Arist., Metaph. 3, 1047a 13),
whose most noted scholar Aristotle identified, not as Euclid of
Megara, but as Eubulis of Miletus, who harbored a strong hos-
tility towards Aristotle, which was then transmitted to the Stoics
(see W.C. Kneale & M. Kneale, 1962, 139).
This long digression allows us to highlight the important fact
that there are in the history of philosophy (from its very begin-
nings) many ways to talk about “school,” and that there are dif-
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ferent ways to be a school (that in this case, in effect, “to be can
be said in many ways”). A school can, for example, be identified:
• as a solid and unique institution, the members of which
profess common and unanimously accepted doctrines
and, therefore, as a stable and lasting teaching and scien-
tific organization in which a group of people carries out a
common process of preparation, teaching and learning of
knowledge, recognizing authority, by experience, senior-
ity or ability, of the founder (or group of founders);
• but also as a circle of scholars who meet with the intent to
continue, in possible ways and with an educational ideal,
the work of others, with the possibility of identifying
some characteristic traits that allow, for each ‘product’, to
be identified by its name brand, created and fine–tuned by
a single entity;
• or, finally, even as a group of philosophers that can be
denoted by a common appellation because they practice
a certain philosophical or argumentative method, in the
presence of an affective, amicable relationship or in any
case, we would say today, with a common link between
the components.
A “school” can be all these things put together or some or only
one of them. A “school” must be more than a clan or random
group of people. To exist, it must be recognizable by at least one
of the characteristics mentioned here, in keeping with what our
philosophical tradition tells us. It can be said that a “school” is, if
you want, a vague concept or notion, but sufficiently precise to
allow us, as does the history of philosophy, to recognize different
instances (or models) of “school”.
With this in mind, we can now give a positive answer to the
question which began this volume: in our opinion, and for the
reasons we have already stated, one can speak of a ‘Canadian
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school of argumentation’ because there exists, at the very least, a
group of Canadian scholars who practice a certain philosophical
method; share common goals (to understand and teach argumen-
tation); read and react to similar texts and ideas; carry out a com-
mon process of preparation, teaching and learning of knowledge;
work within shared educational and scientific organizations; and
are associated with common conferences and research centres.
The Canadian ‘school’ inevitably deals with works and ideas
that constitute a large set of theories that, like the pieces of a
mosaic, may not fit together perfectly: but, as figurative arts and
music teach us, a possible dissonance does not diminish a funda-
mental harmony. The testimony that shows this is found in the
essays that make up this volume, but also in those that, inevitably,
have been left out. It is natural, in fact, that it was necessary to
make choices to identify, hopefully in a way that is acceptable
for most, the names of the ‘Canadian’ scholars who were invited
to contribute to this collection, who, in turn, chose the material
they would contribute.
One of the strengths of the selection is evident in the ways
that the opinions we find expressed in the essays collected here
demonstrate different perspectives on common themes, but in a
way that reflects their dialogue with each other. These are, basi-
cally, opinions expressed by people who work or have worked in
the same place (in Windsor, in Ontario, in Canada) and who, as
we know, have in some cases become friends, to this the writer
can personally testify. And it is in this very quality that we find,
perhaps, the most important confirmation of the existence of a
‘school’. Here there is an echo of Aristotle’s words written in
remembrance, in all probability, of the twenty years spent in the
Academy of Plato (the first real school), which he attended until
the age of 37:
And whatever existence means for each class of men, whatever
it is for whose sake they value life, in that they wish to occupy
themselves with their friends; and so some drink together, others
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dice together, others join in athletic exercises and hunting, or in
the study of philosophy, each class spending their days together in
whatever they love most in life; for since they wish to live with their
friends, they do and share in those things which give them the sense
of living together (Arist., Nic. Eth., IX, 12).
“Others join … in the study of philosophy” that characterizes
the life of the Academy, translates in English the Greek term
“sumphilosophousin”, which carries a most auspicious meaning.
Indeed, this is
the first time the verb sumphilosophein appears in ancient Greek lit-
erature and appears to indicate the Aristotelian concept of “that in
which each man finds his reason for being”, of “that which men
want to live for”, that is, of happiness. The greatest happiness, there-
fore, for philosophers is not only “philosophizing” (philosophein), but
doing it with (sun) friends, something that Aristotle experienced in
the Academy, where they “passed the days” doing what they loved
“above all others among the things that compose a life” (E. Berti,
2010, vii-viii. Our Translation).
And, si parva licet componere magnis, perhaps this is also true
for the experiences that philosophers have made in the course
of their lives in the places where they work, together with the
people they work with, if they are lucky enough in the choice of
their friends, and so it is true for Windsor and for the ‘Canadi-
ans’, whose ‘school’ we hope is, from now on, more easily recog-
nizable.
This volume aims to make some contribution in this regard,
without any presumption of finality, in the selection of the essays
presented here we do not presume to have answered definitively
the original quandary. But there is the conviction that, if nothing
else, the way in which the problem was posed has a value in
itself: as a philosophical question, born of a query resulting from
a dialogue between people who were, such as happened to Saint
Augustine and his friends in the otium of Cassiciacum, in a con-
genial place; so it was at the home of Christopher Tindale,
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amongst friends discussing things they are passionate about
(Christopher and Leo). Like any good philosophical experience,
it will never really end, but we hope it will become a part of the
debate on the subject of the ‘Canadian perspective’ on argumen-
tation and therefore, on argumentation itself.
The proposal of Christopher Tindale, which closes this col-
lection (but which is also the subject of discussion by some of
the essays within it), is essentially the first essay of a hypothetical
new collection. It allows expressly, from our point of view, the
possibility of bringing logic back to argumentation and to
rhetoric, at least with the Aristotelian intent (understood as
logos): in this way it will finally be possible to completely eman-
cipate logic from that typically static style of the formalist
approach and, at the same time, free rhetoric from the negative
interpretation that has affected it for a very long time. It is well to
remember that this negative interpretation, we note in passing,
had already begun at the time of Aristotle by those who adopted
a logical concept that then became typical of the subsequent for-
malist developments and which is different and in many ways
contrary precisely in relation to the Aristotelian one: we are talk-
ing about the developed concept, based on the philosophy of the
Eleatics, the Megarians and, later, the Stoics (to whom, for exam-
ple, we owe the idea – wrong but later in the centuries to become
dominant – for rhetorical reasoning, the enthymeme, is a kind of
‘defective’ reasoning – Woods recalls here in his essay).
For our part, we believe that the reclaiming of the Aristotelian
lesson, which we would like to call “classical” tout court, still waits
to be fully implemented, but it is what will turn our discipline
back to being the “filosofia prima” from which it cannot be
ignored (it is, as it has been pointed out by F. D’Agostini, 2012,
“ubiquitous”) and it is necessary as a means itself of educating (as
explained by Balin and Battersby). But, as we say, this is another
story: that we will have to talk about another time, having
already lit the spark here.
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*****
Like any book this would not have been possible without the
help and support of many people. Therefore, I would like to
thank the former Dean of the Faculty of Law of Trent, Giuseppe
Nesi, who in 2016 funded a research program between Trent
and Windsor Universities. In this regard, I would like to express
my sincere thanks to Leo Groarke of Trent University and to
Christopher Tindale of The University of Windsor who, with
generosity, availability and uncommon friendship, made living
in Ontario an authentic philosophical experience. To them (and
their families) my gratitude goes also for having welcomed and
supported me and this project, and having helped me to complete
it; from its birth, to the selection of the authors, even at times
interceding with them, up to the publication of the volume in the
Windsor Studies in Argumentation. My gratitude goes to those who
have agreed to contribute to this collection, also for the kindness
and warmth shown through their exchanges and letters.
Finally, I would like to thank the people I have come to know
in these years of studying argumentation and who honor me
with their friendship. People who enrich our community with
their relationships of affection and sharing that we spoke about
before. In particular I would like to thank, in addition to Leo
Groarke and Christopher Tindale, Sara Greco, Gabriela Kišiček,
Fabio Paglieri, Giovanni Tuzet and Jean Wagemans: they are not
the only ones, but these are the ones I have been able to discuss
the project of this book with, or some aspects of it, receiving sup-
port and valuable advice. A special thanks to Maurizio Manzin
and Serena Tomasi: it is with and thanks to them, in fact, that
there exists for me, in Trento, what for Plato and Aristotle was,
in Athens, the Academy, a place where you can discuss with your
friends things, as Heidegger would say, “which your life depends
upon”.
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Obviously, what is written here and the choices made to com-
pose this collection are to be considered my exclusive personal
responsibility.
A number of these papers appear here for the first time, others
have been published previously. Many thanks to those who have
given us permission to reprint these articles. They are noted in
the Acknowledgement sections of each chapter.
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CHAPTER 2.
PIONEERING INFORMAL LOGIC AND
ARGUMENTATION STUDIES
ANTHONY J. BLAIR
Abstract: This paper traces, in a first-person account, my journey
from an assistant professor teaching ethics and political philosophy,
through (together with Ralph Johnson) teaching “applied logic”,
authoring Logical Self-Defense, organizing the first-ever symposium
on informal logic, editing the proceedings, publishing and editing
the Informal Logic Newsletter and later the journal Informal Logic,
organizing later Windsor conferences, revising Logical Self-Defense;
then meeting van Eemeren and Grootendorst, serving on the board
of ISSA, and more – during the emergence of informal logic and
argumentation theory as scholarly fields.
PREFACE
The following is an account of my participation in some of the
signal developments in the infrastructure supporting the emer-
gence of informal logic and argumentation theory in the last
quarter of the 20th century.
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1. BEGINNINGS
On September 1st 1967, two months after Canada’s centennial
celebrations, I began a 39-year appointment in the University of
Windsor philosophy department in Windsor, Ontario, Canada. I
was hired out of a doctoral program at the nearby University of
Michigan, to teach principally philosophical ethics and political
theory (which I did teach, among several other things, through-
out).
Shortly before the start of the 1972-73 academic year, I was
asked to help out with a new course, which my colleague Ralph
Johnson had created the previous year that had proven so pop-
ular the enrolment had doubled—from 20 to 40, as I recol-
lect—causing the opening of a second section (those were the
days!). Johnson, who had been hired to teach modern formal
logic among other things, called the course “Applied Logic”. Its
objective was to improve students’ ability to analyze and evaluate
the arguments about public affairs to be found in the media of the
day, especially in newspapers and magazines. The textbook John-
son had selected for the course was Howard Kahane’s Logic and
Contemporary Rhetoric, The Use of Reason in Everyday Life, which
had just been published in 1971. My exposure to logic had been
a two-semester symbolic logic course as an undergraduate at
McGill University over a decade earlier and a one-semester for-
mal logic course as a graduate student at Michigan. I didn’t have
tenure at Windsor at the time, so I agreed, but I insisted that I
needed Johnson to tutor me. We taught our two sections in sync,
covering the same material each class, using the same assign-
ments, tests and final exams in both sections. Most important,
we discussed the material and its reception together before and
after classes, and shared in the collection of examples to use in
assignments, tests and exams. By the second year, while we con-
tinued to teach our two classes as two identical sections of a sin-
gle course, I was at home with the material and we team-taught
as equals.
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2. THE ORIGINS OF LOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE
(1973-1976)
The “Applied Logic” course continued to prove popular, although
there was a heavy workload of written assignments (with a cor-
respondingly heavy marking load), and the standards were rig-
orous. It was hard to get an A. In those days courses in most
Canadian universities were eight months long, a full academic
year. By the end of April, students and teachers in “Applied
Logic” were exhausted. But the improvement in the students’
analytic and critical skills over the year certainly seemed to be
striking. Johnson and I were enthusiastic about the subject mat-
ter, and the students themselves recommended the course to
their friends as challenging but worthwhile, so we ended up get-
ting a growing enrollment population of serious students pre-
pared to work.
Kahane’s approach was to use the informal fallacies as analytic
and critical tools. His chapters were peppered with examples of
arguments, mainly about political and social issues of the day,
which he analyzed and then assessed, modeling the kind of
analysis and evaluation the students were expected to apply to
the exercise examples at the end of each chapter. Spotting the
logical blunders was not always easy, but it was satisfying, and
left the critic feeling smugly superior.
Several features of Kahane’s book were attractive. (1) Accord-
ing to Kahane, a person who is persuaded by a fallacious argu-
ment commits a fallacy no less than does a person who is guilty
of making a fallacious argument. So the pressure is on the stu-
dent both to recognize fallacies and to avoid arguing fallaciously.
(2) Kahane made the fallacies student-friendly rather than eso-
teric by replacing intimidating Latin labels (with the exception
of ad hominem) with descriptive English labels. (3) He intro-
duced “new” fallacies that occurred in the arguments of the day,
and dropped several from Aristotle’s classic list that turned up
rarely, if ever, in contemporary discourse. (4) Among the “new”
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fallacies were problems with an argument’s premises; not all fal-
lacies were inferential. (5) The text is thick with examples of
short arguments that people of the day made in print, which he
used both in explaining each fallacy and in the chapter end exer-
cises. (6) There was a chapter on extended arguments—those in
which the author develops and defends several lines of reason-
ing in support of the conclusion. (7) Kahane included chapters on
advertising tricks and on problems with the presentation of the
news in the mass media of the day.
Johnson and I liked these features, and they seemed to con-
tribute to the book’s success in engaging students. However,
before long we began to hand out revisions of portions of the text
to our classes. For one thing, excellent though Kahane’s exam-
ples were, they were almost entirely drawn from the American
media and targeted at an audience of U.S. students. We often
had to spend time providing backgrounds for examples from
the textbook that were necessary if our students were to under-
stand them, explaining such things as how the U.S. republican
system of government differed from the Canadian parliamentary
system. My undergraduate political science course in compara-
tive governments paid off. We had to hunt for Canadian exam-
ples. We spent many an hour in the evening and on weekends
pouring through the Windsor Star, the Toronto Globe and Mail, and
Maclean’s magazine hunting for a nice example of a straw man
argument or a case of ambiguity or any of the other twenty or so
fallacies that Kahane discussed.
For another thing, we began, usually on the basis of examples
that didn’t quite fit Kahane’s description, to see the need for dis-
tinctions that Kahane overlooked or had chosen not to draw.
For instance, we found examples of ambiguity some of which
traded on a word’s being vague—having different meanings that
bleed into one another—and others that traded on an equivoca-
tion, where there is an actual switch between one clear meaning
to another from one premise to the next or from the premises
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to the conclusion. Or again, dealing with causal arguments we
found a distinction Kahane did not emphasize needing to be
made between arguments based on causal claims and arguments
aimed at establishing causal claims. While we liked the category
of what might be termed “premissary” fallacies, we didn’t like
the need to attribute bad motives to the fallacious arguers that
Kahane seemed sometimes to suppose. We also wanted to make
clearer and more explicit the fact that while certain patterns of
argument could harbor fallacies, arguments exhibiting those pat-
terns were not necessarily fallacious.
Where Kahane would offer a loose description of a fallacy, we
found it helpful for our students to provide a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions for each fallacy. This list also helped our
students make their case that a particular fallacy had been com-
mitted by producing an argument for each condition being met.
Kahane enjoined his readers to give their reasons for their fal-
lacy charges, but he did not lay out a set of steps to be followed
in order to do so adequately. We found that our students, once
familiarized with a particular fallacy, could fairly easily recognize
an instance of it, but they had a devil of a time constructing a
case that would serve to establish, before a demanding, impar-
tial judge, that the fallacy had been committed. Having the con-
ditions of each fallacy in hand and in mind offered them a way to
organize the steps in their case and to provide the detail needed.
It also helped us as instructors to be able to pinpoint precisely
where a student’s case for a charge of fallacy was incomplete,
problematic, or mistaken.
We did not appreciate at the time that our defining conditions
for each fallacy were describing argument schemes, along with
critical questions that would establish their fallacious use if
answered affirmatively.
We liked the fact that Kahane went after sources of informa-
tion, including the news media, and after advertising. But some
then-recent books, such as Carl Wrighter’s I Can Sell You Any-
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thing (1972), and Edward Jay Epstein’s News From Nowhere (1973),
plus the inside information we received from Johnson’s brother
Bud, who worked in advertising, and from my then brother-in-
law Don McNeil, who was the Canadian Broadcasting Corpo-
ration’s chief TV news correspondent in Washington, led us to
want to revise Kahane’s stories about advertising as arguing and
media news reports as sources of information as well as to apply
the material to Canadian news media and advertising.
Finally, we were dissatisfied with Kahane’s classification of
the fallacies. He divided them into two groups: arguments that
are fallacious even if valid, and those that are fallacious because
invalid. Even so, his stipulative definition of validity was to our
liking, for it did not rely on a distinction between deductive and
inductive arguments, a distinction that is notoriously difficult
to apply in practice: “A valid argument is an argument whose
premises, if true, alone provide good, or sufficient, grounds for
accepting its conclusion” (Kahane 1971, 3).
In the winter of 1976, we received in the mail, as did, it seems,
every philosophy department in the U.S.A. and Canada, a form
letter from Michael Scriven, a well known philosopher of science
at Berkeley, advertising a new textbook he had written and was
publishing himself, since his regular publisher, McGraw-Hill
(New York), did not think there was a market for it. He said it was
“for teaching reasoning skills of an elementary kind, using almost
no formalism or technical vocabulary”. It was designed to help
students develop systematic analyses that “will handle the typi-
cal messy and often emotional arguments and prose of politics,
propaganda, ethics and practical economics. The basic assump-
tion is that doing this is difficult, important and teachable—and
… better taught by a direct approach than via formal logic.” This
message coincided with our own motivation, and so we ordered
copies of the book, called Reasoning.
Although Scriven argued against teaching reasoning by teach-
ing fallacies, whereas we aimed in part at doing exactly that, we
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were influenced by other features of Scriven’s book. For instance,
we agreed with the direct approach vs. via teaching formal logic,
and we shared his view that diagrams can help portray the logical
structure of arguments.
After three years of teaching the course together, Johnson and
I had, in our class handouts, what amounted to most of the
manuscript of a textbook of our own to replace Kahane. How-
ever, it took the McGraw-Hill Ryerson textbook salesman, Herb
Hilderly, to point this out to us and to urge us to submit a man-
uscript to his company. (M-HR was the Canadian branch of the
American publisher, McGraw-Hill.) We called it Logical Self-
Defense; our students called it LSD. Several features of Kahane’s
text found their way into LSD.
3. DIFFICULTIES IN PUBLISHING LOGICAL
SELF-DEFENSE (1976)
We sent off a manuscript (ms.) of over 500 pages to Toronto.
In due course we received a letter from McGaw-Hill Ryerson
regretting that the two referees who had reviewed the manu-
script both recommended against its publication. The two ref-
erees’ letters were enclosed. One’s principal complaint was that
we had not covered enough fallacies. We later learned this critic’s
name, and he was the author of a textbook that distinguished 92
fallacies! The other attacked the quality of the material. His letter,
we noticed, was the original copy, with the author’s name only
covered by White-Out. I held the letter up to a light, and there,
showing through the White-Out, was the author’s name, clear as
can be.
I was immediately suspicious of the appropriateness of this
reviewer, for I knew him. He had been my discussion-group
leader in my first philosophy course when I was a junior under-
graduate at McGill, and I also knew him from faculty seminars
I attended as a senior. He had then shown no great interest
in logic, and had a traditional education at Oxford. It seemed
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to us that he was from the start antagonistic to the non-tradi-
tional introduction-to-logic course that Logical Self-Defense rep-
resented. Moreover, it seemed evident that he had dismissed the
book after reading the first few chapters, and had not read it
through, for despite his contemptuously-expressed criticisms of
the early chapters, he had nothing at all to say about the bulk of
the book.
I was furious. After a conversation with Johnson in which we
discussed lines of response, I sat down and typed up a long,
heated letter to McGraw-Hill Ryerson, arguing that the review-
ers represented a traditional approach whereas the ms. could
only get a fair, and from M-HR’s point of view, a marketing-rel-
evant appraisal from reviewers who could entertain the possibil-
ity of such a departure from old-fashioned approaches. Without
mentioning that I knew his identity, I took up and argued aggres-
sively against the strongly critical reviewer’s objections, point-
by-point. I accused him of laziness and of failing to read the
entire ms. and invited M-HR to show our response to him. I also
included point-by–point rejoinders to the criticisms of the fal-
lacy-favoring referee’s report. Johnson read the letter and sug-
gested toning down some of the outrage, which I did, and it went
out over both our signatures.
To our surprise, M-HR agreed to send the ms. out to new ref-
erees, ones who might be more open to our approach. We later
learned that it went to Michael Gilbert at York, and Terence
Penelhum at Calgary. Penelhum didn’t have time to do the review
and suggested his former student, Trudy Govier, then at Trent,
who took it on. Both Gilbert and Govier liked the concept and
the contents, both recommended publication, and both said the
ms. was far too long. One suggested cutting it in half; the other
noted that we should leave the instructor something to say in
class! M-HR agreed to consider publishing a much-shorter ms.
We set to work, cutting the fat from our prose and slashing
inessential material. I think we finally submitted a c. 300-page
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(double-spaced) ms. and M-HR offered us a contract. The first
edition was 236 pages long.
4. LOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE (1977)
Logical Self-Defense went through three Canadian editions (1977,
1983, 1993). Seeking riches in the American market, in 1993
we asked McGraw-Hill of New York if it would publish the
third Canadian edition but with the examples and their discus-
sion replaced with American examples. When we submitted the
manuscript, McGraw-Hill insisted on sending it out for review
before agreeing to publish it. The reviewers made several good
suggestions, so that in revising the manuscript to respond to
them, we produced an improvement over the third Canadian
edition. The U.S. edition came out in 1994, and to my mind it is
the definitive version of Logical Self-Defense. It was our impres-
sion that McGraw-Hill failed to market the book aggressively,
but for whatever reason it did not sell well in the United States
and in due course McGraw-Hill remaindered the book and
returned the copyright to us. In 2006, through a friendship I had
with Robert Trapp, an American debate coach and communica-
tion studies scholar who did some work for IDEA (the Interna-
tional Debate Education Association), IDEA Press (New York)
published a reprint of the 1994 U.S. edition in 2006, which is still
in print.
This is not the place to describe the book in detail or to track
the changes made from edition to edition. I will, instead, list what
seem to me to be some of its important features in general.
a. The introduction of “Acceptability”, “Relevance” and “Suf-
ficiency” as criteria of logically good arguments and viola-
tions of them, respectively, serving as a way of classifying
fallacies. These criteria were picked up and used, often
without attribution, by several other textbook writers.
Some have even taken them to be the earmarks of infor-
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mal logic. However, (a) Hansen has suggested they are not
original, being already distinguished by Chaim Perelman;
(b) Siegel has pointed out that sufficiency presupposes rel-
evance, and so inferred that relevance cannot be a separate
criterion, and (c) Tindale has shown that there are prob-
lems with our handling of all three criteria within the text.
b. Boxed fallacy conditions. These grew more detailed from
edition to edition. One condition or set of conditions
identified the type of argument, and another condition or
set of conditions identified the circumstances in which
an occurrence of such a type of argument would be fal-
lacious. We thus held that it is not a particular type of
argument that is fallacious, but rather particular uses of it.
We thereby were adopting a sort of argument scheme the-
ory, and Walton’s view that it is not particular argument
schemes that are fallacious, but instead particular misuses
of them. Our conditions under which an argument of a
given type would be fallacious were an independent ver-
sion of Hasting’s “critical questions”. The boxed condi-
tions also served as a checklist for our students, whom we
required to make a case for their charge whenever they
alleged that a fallacy had been committed. We had discov-
ered that a skill in recognizing the occurrence of fallacies
does not correlate with an ability to argue cogently in sup-
port of that allegation.
c. Argument analysis. The importance of an analysis of an
argument under assessment that lays bare its inferential
structure, and the need for a careful, context-sensitive,
functional and charitable reading of texts in order to pro-
duce a fair and accurate structural analysis.
d. Argument mapping. The introduction of tree diagrams
and a numbering convention, both of which convey the
illative relations of the argument(s) in a text, including
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meta- and meta-/meta- arguments. Some students read
maps better, others read text better.
e. Complex extended arguments. The expansion of the ana-
lytic apparatus to apply to extended arguments: argu-
ments that include many lines of support and much
meta-argumentation. Thus we applied what was learned
using snippets of arguments to longer, more fully devel-
oped arguments.
f. Distinction between persuasion and argument in adver-
tising. A chapter on the “logic” of advertising that explains
how the laws governing advertising are rules that permit
counter-intuitive invitations to draw inferences. We also
argued that advertising often, or even usually, does not use
arguments to persuade, although it often uses arguments
to mask more effective motivational devices. Too often
communication theorists continue to treat advertising as
a fertile source of examples of attempts at persuasion by
arguing, to our mind missing the masking function of
arguments in advertising.
g. Influence of material conditions on information via the
news media. We offered advice for watching TV news and
reading newspaper news reports. We assumed that these
were major sources of information, regarded as reliable,
that funded our students’ belief formation. Our approach
was not so much to warn students to watch for bias or
provincialism as to know how news reports originate, get
assigned and written, and must deal with unavoidable dis-
torting properties of the respective media.
h. Use of arguments to support judgments as an aid to learn-
ing. The requirement to support a critical analysis of an
argument or item of information using arguments was an
important learning tool.
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i. Fallacies as not-always-fatal flaws. Our emphasis on the
fact that fallacies as we conceived them are often corrigi-
ble mistakes, so that receiving a charge of fallacy does not
necessarily put one in fear of having to abandon a line of
argument. Arguments can often be repaired in the wake of
successful fallacy charges.
5. THE WINDSOR SYMPOSIUM ON INFORMAL LOGIC
Johnson and I completed Logical Self-Defense in 1976, probably in
the early fall, for it appeared in 1977. We held the “Symposium
on Informal Logic” on 26-28 June 1978, a year and a half later.
So it must have been at some point in the late fall of 1976 that
we decided to hold a conference on informal logic. What caused
us to do so? My memory of the specifics is feeble, so I had best
quote from the preface to the proceedings, which was written in
1979, a good deal nearer the event:
The basic premise behind the calling of the Symposium was a sim-
ple one: the time was ripe. Interest in informal logic was growing
rapidly. Courses in informal logic or critical reasoning were spring-
ing up at an astonishing rate across North America, and work on
informal logic in the journals was increasing markedly. At the same
time there was little if any contact between philosophers working
and teaching in the field. In fact, what was remarkable about the
proliferation of informal logic courses and writing was that it
appeared to exhibit a sort of unconnected spontaneous generation.
Another feature of these developments was a paucity of broadly-
focused theory. (The theoretical work in the journals was largely
directed in a scattered way at various informal fallacies.) Hence it
appeared that the Symposium would serve to highlight the present
status of informal logic and provide nurture for its further develop-
ment. (Blair and Johnson 1980, vii).
We sent flyers advertising the conference to philosophy depart-
ments in universities in Canada and in the surrounding states in
the U.S. Midwest. The speakers on the program were all invited,
for we had no way to issue a call for papers. In fact there was
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no dedicated source of literature on informal logic. Johnson and
I presumed to give the introductory paper, which was a review
and analysis of what literature there was. We invited: the two
Canadian scholars who had been co-authoring a series of papers
analyzing informal fallacies, John Woods and Douglas Walton;
the two prominent American textbook authors, Howard Kahane
and Michael Scriven; a Canada-based author of a book on fallac-
ies, Alex Michalos, and from neighbouring University of West-
ern Ontario, philosopher Robert Binkley. Finally, we invited the
Wittgenstinian professor from York University, Peter Minkus,
on the assumption of a Wittgensteinian influence on the emer-
gence of informal logic. There were eight presentations over two
and a half days. A ninth paper, by Thomas Tomko and Robert
Ennis (who had attended the conference) was added to the Pro-
ceedings at Michael Scriven’s suggestion.
In addition to more than a dozen colleagues and students from
the University of Windsor, some 40-50 university faculty mem-
bers mainly from surrounding provinces and states registered
for the conference. In addition to the invited speakers, among the
attendees who previously or later (or both) published in the field
were: John Barker, Robert Ennis, David Gallup, Trudy Govier,
Nicholas Griffin, David Hitchcock, John McPeck, Stephen Nor-
ris, Deborah Orr, Robert Pinto, William Rapaport, Thomas
Tomko, and Sheldon Wein.
Part of the folklore of that first informal logic conference
involved Professor Minkus, a stereotypically idiosyncratic and
impractical professor. A hypochondriac who suffered from vari-
ous real and exaggerated or imagined ailments, he arrived bear-
ing a large bag of ointments and a shovel handle with which to
apply them to his back. The student assistant who took him to his
room in a university residence showed him how he could lock
the door from the inside by pushing in the button in the handle,
and how to open the window by sliding half the window from
one side across the other. Left alone, Minkus checked the door.
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Finding the button in the doorknob pressed in, he inferred that
the door was locked, and then seeing nowhere to insert his door
key to unlock it, he concluded that he was locked in his room. He
rushed to the window to open it and call for help, but he hap-
pened to rush to the side of the window that was fixed and did
not slide. In full panic, he grabbed his shovel handle, smashed
the window and yelled to a passersby below that he was trapped
in his room. Someone called the fire department and Professor
Minkus was extricated. Our Dean of Arts, Eugene Malley, kindly
picked up the bill for repairs to the window.
6. THE INFORMAL LOGIC NEWSLETTER
When the conference ended, several voices called for a meeting
to decide what would come next. There was a consensus that the
Windsor symposium should be followed up so that the enthu-
siasm the meeting had generated would not be allowed to dis-
sipate. The participants gathered for a planning session. The
sentiment was that we should keep in touch and there was men-
tion of some sort of newsletter. It occurred to me that we were
well-positioned to put out a newsletter and Johnson agreed, so
we offered to do so. Waving a note in the air, Scriven declared,
“Here’s five dollars for my subscription.” Others offered funds
too. In the event we were able to pay for postage and other costs
for $4 a year to individuals, $8 to libraries and other institutions,
for four issues (that is $15 and $30 in 2017 dollars).
We were able to put together a 10-page first issue of the Infor-
mal Logic Newsletter the following month, July 1978. We typed it
ourselves or, with the support of the Head, got help with the typ-
ing from the Windsor philosophy department secretaries. I took
charge of the design, and Johnson was content to accept my aes-
thetic judgment. We pasted up the master copy ourselves, and
had copies run off by the University print shop.
The Newsletter grew steadily in size. After the second issue, we
reduced the print font size from 12-point to 10-point and lay
48 ANTHONY J. BLAIR
out the text in two columns (thus increasing our capacity from
c. 500 words/page to c. 1,300 words/page). The first two issues
were 10 and 14 sides long (5 and 7 sheets); the third jumped
to 16 page sides with the two-column, 10-point font format—a
roughly three-fold increase in content. By its fifth and final year,
the longest issue of the Newsletter ran to 36 pages, a capacity of
over 45,000 words—90 times the amount in the first issue.
The contents of the Newsletter started out being focused on
teaching and aids to instructors. They included textbook lists,
reports of textbook contents, some critical reviews of textbooks,
course descriptions, puzzles for analysis, scores of examples of
passages containing fallacies gleaned from newspapers, maga-
zines and books, announcements and reports of conferences, and
sample test questions. However a small note by Trudy Govier
in Volume One mentioning Carl Wellman’s contention in Chal-
lenge and Response that there can be arguments that are neither
deductive nor inductive, provoked a short article in response
by Perry Weddle. Weddle’s c. 4,500-word “Inductive, Deductive,”
and John Woods’s “What Type of Argument is Ad Verecundiam?”,
published in Vol. 2, No. 1, were the first scholarly articles to
appear in the Newsletter.
Over time the percentage of space devoted to articles
increased, from 30% in Vol. 2, No. 1 (1978), to 60% (75% if you
count a couple of critical reviews) in Vol. 5, No. 2 (1983).
7. INFORMAL LOGIC, THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM (1980)
My recollection of how we came to decide to publish the pro-
ceedings of the Windsor symposium is hazy. I infer that it must
have been with the encouragement of Michael Scriven, for when
we were unable to find a willing publisher, he undertook to pub-
lish it using Edgepress, the company he had formed to publish
his textbook, Reasoning, when McGraw-Hill had turned it down.
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Using his own money, Scriven printed 1,000 copies. It has long
since been out of print.
None of the papers in the proceedings stands out today, how-
ever Johnson and I appended to our introductory chapter, “The
recent development of informal logic,” a list of 13 “problems and
issues in informal logic” that seems to have had an influence on
the direction of subsequent research. Here is the list without the
glosses that were attached to the items: (1) The theory of logical
criticism, (2) The theory of argument, (3) The theory of fallacy,
(4) The fallacy approach vs. the critical thinking approach [sc. in
teaching], (5) The viability of the inductive/deductive dichotomy,
(6) The ethics of argumentation and logical criticism [the prin-
ciple of charity], (7) The problem of assumptions and missing
premises, (8) The problem of context, (9) Methods of extracting
arguments from context, (10) Methods of displaying arguments,
(11) The problem of pedagogy, (12) The nature, division and
scope of informal logic, (13) The relationship of informal logic to
other inquiries.
8. THE SECOND EDITION OF LOGICAL
SELF-DEFENSE(1983)
Meanwhile, by 1982 Johnson and I were revising Logical Self-
Defense in the light of our experience in using it as the text for
our “Applied Logic” course for five years, and taking into account
criticisms and suggestions by our students and by instructors
and students in other universities in which the text had been
used. Besides updating the examples, the principal changes in
the second edition of LSD were tightening the boxed conditions
for commission of each fallacy, and the introduction of a new
chapter on how to construct arguments. This chapter reflected
growth in our understanding of the nature of argument, based
on our reading of the developing literature and our own dis-
cussions. It introduced the idea that (advocacy) argumentation is
dialectical, in that it presupposes addressing a dissenting voice
50 ANTHONY J. BLAIR
and entertaining and responding to critical arguments. It made a 
distinction between using arguments to inquire and using them 
to advocate, and borrowed heavily from Jack Meiland’s College 
Thinking in proposing a method for using arguments to decide 
what position on a controversial issue seems justified and then 
constructing an argued case for that position using the findings 
of the inquiry. Thus we were understanding argument as dialec-
tical well in advance of our exposure to van Eemeren and Groo-
tendorst’s pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, published 
in 1984, which we did not read until 1985.
9.  THE  SECOND  INTERNATIONAL  SYMPOSIUM  ON 
INFORMAL  LOGIC  (1983)
By 1981-82 we were hearing murmurings from colleagues that it 
was time to hold another conference and in the May 1982 Infor-
mal Logic Newsletter we announced the Second International 
Symposium on Informal Logic (SISIL) for 22 June 1983. There 
were 84 registrants. Among those who were not at the first con-
ference and who were either prominent philosophers or later 
published in the field (or both), were Stephen and Evelyn Barker, 
Seale Doss, Maurice Finocchiaro, Robert Fogelin, James Free-
man, James Gough, Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka, John Hoaglund, 
Baylor Johnson, Fred Johnson, Charles Kielkopf, Jack Meiland, 
John Nolt, Richard Paul, Thomas Schwartz, Christopher Tindale, 
Perry Weddle, Mark Weinstein, Joseph Wenzel, Arnold 
Wilson and George Yoos. Repeat customers included Robert 
Ennis, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, John McPeck, Stephen 
Norris, Robert Pinto and Michael Scriven.
The proceedings of SISlL were not published, but many of the 
papers present at the conference were published as articles in 
Informal Logic (see below).
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10. AILACT (1983)
SISIL saw two significant outcomes. One was the creation of the
Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT),
with the purpose of promoting these fields and organizing ses-
sions at the American Philosophical Association (APA) and the
Canadian Philosophical Association (CPA). AILACT continues to
this day, regularly organizing sessions at the Eastern, Central and
Pacific annual APA conferences. The CPA initiative did not catch
on. Informal logic and critical thinking papers were included in
CPA programs and meetings of the Ontario Philosophical Asso-
ciation, but attracted negligible new audiences.
11. INFORMAL LOGIC (THE JOURNAL , 1984)
The other outcome of SISIL was the encouragement due to the
attendees’ support for Blair and Johnson’s intention to transform
the Informal Logic Newsletter into a blind-peer-reviewed academic
journal, to appear three times a year. The last issue of ILN, Vol. V,
No. 2, came out in July 1983; the first issue of the journal, Infor-
mal Logic (numbered Vol. 6, No. 1),
1
published and edited by Blair
and Johnson, came out in January 1984. The founding editorial
board included, Robert Binkley (Western Ontario), Robert Ennis
(Illinois), Trudy Govier (independent scholar), Merrill Hintikka
(Florida State), David Hitchcock (McMaster), Howard Kahane
(Maryland), Richard Paul (Sonoma State), Robert Pinto (Wind-
sor), Nicholas Rescher (Pittsburg), Michael Scriven (Western
Australia), Dougas Walton (Winnipeg), John Woods (Victoria)
and George Yoos (St. Cloud State). Chaïm Perelman was invited
but declined, saying that the journal was too pedagogical and not
sufficiently theoretical for his participation.
1. The conceit was that the five volumes of the Newsletter should be included in the
numbering system of the journal. This has led to some confusion over the years. I
now think we would have been better advised to consider the newsletter and the
journal separate enterprises.
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In 2000, Blair & Johnson invited their colleague in the Windsor
philosophy department, Hans V. Hansen, and Christopher W.
Tindale, to join as co-editors. In 2017, Informal Logic is in volume
37, available only on-line and open-access, and with Johnson’s
and Hansen’s retirements as co-editors in 2016, is edited by Blair
and Tindale. Informal Logic is unusual in that it is published by
individuals—Blair, Johnson, Hansen and Tindale.
12. MEETING VAN EEMEREN AND GROOTENDORST
AND THE INTRODUCTION TO PRAGMA-DIALECTICS
(1984/85)
In December 1984, I took advantage of the Eastern Division of
the American Philosophical Association meetings in New York
City to take my family there for a few days during the Christmas
Holidays while I attended the AILACT sessions at the APA. Also
attending from Canada, among others, was David Hitchcock of
McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, who was a member
of the AILACT executive. During the conference David and I
were approached by two tall strangers with distinctive Dutch
accents (and flawless English), who introduced themselves as
Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, and asked if they
could make a presentation during the AILACT session. David
pointed out that the agenda had been arranged in advance and
was full. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst asked if they might
meet with the two of us after the session and we agreed. We
retired to a nearby pub and began a conversation that lasted,
over several rounds of draft beer, well into the night, the gist of
which was to exchange information. We told them about infor-
mal logic and they told us about their new theory, which they
called “Pragma-Dialectics” and the newly published monograph
in which they presented it, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions
(1984) (copies of which they either gave us then or sent us soon
afterwards), and the program they had set up at the University of
Amsterdam. It was the beginning of life-long friendships.
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13. THE FORMATION OF ISSA AND THE FIRST
AMSTERDAM CONFERENCE (1985/86)
Soon after our meeting in New York, van Eemeren and Groo-
tendorst asked me if I would serve on the board of a new society
they were forming, which they had christened the International
Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), and which was
going to sponsor an international argumentation conference in
Amsterdam the following spring, in June 1986. My role would be
to do my best to publicize the conference among philosophers
in Canada and the United States and encourage their participa-
tion, and to help with the vetting of abstracts and the editing of
the planned proceedings. I learned that they had asked Charles
Arthur Willard of the University of Louisville to play the same
role among those focusing on argumentation in the speech com-
munication scholarly community in the United States. Thus the
four of us became the “Board” of ISSA. Later, when they decided
to hold an ISSA conference every four years, van Eemeeren and
Grootendorst instituted an annual prize for lifetime achievement
in argumentation studies, three of the four winners to be keynote
speakers at the next conference, they consulted Willard and me
about who should receive an ISSA Prize. I served on the ISSA
“Board” through six ISSA conferences, until my retirement from
the University of Windsor payroll in 2006 (due to a then-extant
government policy of compulsory retirement at age 65).
This invitation had an impact on my scholarly career and on
my life as a whole. It exposed me to the Amsterdam theory, to
the world-wide argumentation scholarship that was exhibited
at ISSA conferences, and to scores of acquaintanceships from
Europe and North America, many of which turned into friend-
ships. And because I was associated with informal logic, my pro-
file at ISSA helped to publicize our journal and our conferences
in Canada. Also it resulted in invitations to be a visiting scholar
in Amsterdam for two and three month periods, deepening my
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Dutch friendships and my fondness for Amsterdam, Leiden,
Groningen and The Netherlands in general.
Following our retirements as professors, and our stepping
down from the ISSA board, the new board bestowed ISSA prizes
on van Eemeren (2011), me (2012) and Willard (2013). (Grooten-
dorst had died from cancer in 2000.)
14. ARGUMENTATION (THE JOURNAL , 1987)
At the first ISSA conference in 1986 plans were already afoot to
launch a new journal, to be called Argumentation and published by
Reidel (which became Kluwer in 1988, and Springer in 2005). Its
managing structure reflected the need at the time to signal wider
participation than just The Netherlands. The Editor-in-chief was
Swiss (Jean-Blaise Grize, Neuchâtel); the editors Dutch (Frans H.
van Eemeren) and Belgian (Michel Meyer, Bruxelles); the man-
aging editors Dutch (Rob Grootendorst) and French (Christian
Plantin, Lyons); the editorial board was French (Jean-Claude
Anscombre, Paris), Swiss (Marie Jeanne Borel, Lausanne) and
Belgian (Marc Dominicy, Bruxelles). I was invited to join what
was called the advisory board, along with fellow Canadians John
Woods and Douglas Walton; Americans Sally Jackson (Okla-
homa), Perry Weddle (UC Sacramento), Joseph Wenzel (Illinois),
and Charles Willard;. (Louisville) and, among others, such lumi-
naries as Umberto Eco (Bologna), Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt)
and Olivier Reboul (Strasburg). Within five years Argumentation
had become established. When Meyer resigned, Kluwer sup-
ported its continuation under van Eemeren’s leadership, as
Springer does today. I was well acquainted with the Dutch and
the North Americans. Of the others I met Michel Meyer, Marc
Dominicy, Jean-Claude Anscombre and Marie Jeanne Borel. I
later got to know and hit it off with Christian Plantin, whose
work I particularly admired.
Johnson and I were invited to submit an article for the first
issue of Argumentation. As was our custom, one of us would write
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the first draft of a joint article or chapter, then the other would
write in constructive changes, the initial drafter would then
make further changes, creating a third draft, and so on, back and
forth, until we were both satisfied with the latest draft. I wrote
the initial draft of “Argumentation as dialectical” and Johnson’s
changes were minimal. It became one of our most-cited papers.
In it we laid out how our understanding of the dialectical char-
acter of argumentation provides a basis for identifying the argu-
ments in written texts, and for evaluating the adequacy of
premises and of the premise-conclusion link in arguments. It
held that arguments are motivated by doubt or question, and aim
to serve an epistemic function: to provide reasonable grounds for
beliefs.
15. SCHOLARLY ACTIVITY (1980’S)
By the late 1980s, informal logic was becoming entrenched as
field of scholarship. Informal Logic and Argumentation were able to
fill their pages from a steady and growing stream of respectable
articles. Conferences were being organized elsewhere than
Windsor and Amsterdam—I recall one at George Mason Univer-
sity in Washington, D.C.; several were put on by John Hoagland
at Christopher Newport College (now University) in Newport
News, VA, beginning in 1985; Alec Fisher organized one at the
University of East Anglia in Norwich, England in 1988; and there
were others.
16. THE ALTA CONFERENCES
Joseph Wenzel, a scholar of argumentation and rhetoric in the
field of Speech Communication at the University of Illinois, had
come to SISIL in 1983. Wenzel, like Willard, later, made me
aware of a large community of scholarship in argumentation and
debate located in speech communication departments in Ameri-
can universities. It had its own journal, the Journal of the American
56 ANTHONY J. BLAIR
Forensic Association ( JAFA), and in conjunction with the Speech
Communication Association in the U.S., it held a biennial sum-
mer conference at the winter skiing resort of Alta, Utah, near
Salt Lake City. At Wenzel’s urging, I attended the 1985 Alta con-
ference and so became acquainted with a parallel universe (to
informal logic) of argument theory. Like informal logic, but a
little earlier, members of this community were moving away
from classical logic—in their case, Aristotelian class logic—and
they had early on discovered both Toulmin and Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca, who turned them away from formal logic in
general as an adequate theory of argument and argumentation.
I became aware of a large body of work by Wenzel (a senior
figure), Wayne Brockriede, Douglas Ehninger, Daniel O’Keefe,
Barbara O’Keefe, Sally Jackson, Scott Jacobs, Charles Willard,
Thomas Goodnight, David Zarefsky, Michael Leff, Dale Hample,
Robert Trapp, Ray McKerrow, Carole Blair, Bill Balthrop, Bill
Benoit, Pamela Benoit, Karen Tracy, Robert Craig, Jerry Hauser
and many others. And I got to meet most of these people, to
count most of them as congenial acquaintances, and to consider
several of them as friends.
17. LOOKING BACK
The account so far has been a chronology of one person’s passage
along a scholarly pathway that many others travelled, if not along
the identical route, then at least across similar territory and per-
haps in a somewhat different order. Is there a story here? As
Hansen (2017), following White (1980), has written, “A chronol-
ogy puts events in temporal order. A narrative builds on a
chronology by selecting events from the chronology and giving
them an interpretation, a meaning” (p. 7). Is there anything that
can turn this chronology into a narrative? Is there a story line in
these travels? I think perhaps there is one.
I suggest that this chronology reports one view from inside what, from
the outside, can be described as the story of the development of a field
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of international scholarship. In the mid-1970s both Scriven in the
U.S.A. and Johnson and Blair in Canada had trouble finding text-
book reviewers among their colleagues who would recommend
informal logic manuscripts to publishers. A decade later dozens
of new informal logic textbooks were competing for adoption.
The first Windsor Symposium gathered (mostly) philosophers in
1978; the first SCA/AFA biannual Summer Conference at Alta,
Utah gathered speech, rhetoric and communication scholars in
1979. A decade later the world of argumentation scholarship had
been transformed. In 1988 the Journal of the American Forensic
Association, in one reflection of the new state of affairs, changed
its name to Argumentation and Advocacy. In the prominent speech
communication scholar Charles Arthur Willard’s 1983 mono-
graph, Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge, there
is no reference to informal logic or pragma-dialectics; but in
Willard’s 1989 monograph, A Theory of Argumentation, Blair and
Johnson and informal logic, and van Eemeren and Grootendorst
and pragma-dalectics are all to be found in the index. By the
time of the Third International Symposium on Informal Logic,
at Windsor, and the sixth Speech Communication Association/
American Forensic Association Summer Conference at Alta,
Utah, both held in 1989, and the second ISSA conference in Ams-
terdam in 1990, an international community of scholarship had
been formed. People like me attended all three conferences.
I end this chronology at the point that we are able to under-
stand it as one person’s perspective—one participant-observer’s
perspective—on the birth of a field of scholarship, argumenta-
tion studies. In looking back, we can see collections of overlap-
ping subject matters and the competing or coexisting theories
developed to try to make sense of or even to understand those
subject matters. There is no field without ideas and the ideas
were proliferating. It is equally true, however, that without jour-
nals and publishers to provide venues to publicize and commu-
nicate those theories to a wide and varied audience, who absorb
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and then respond, led to embrace, or reject, or modify what is
thus communicated, and without conferences to bring people lit-
erally together, to listen to one another and converse—without
the infrastructure—it would be hard for a field to develop. There
are no ideas without channels of communication. There was a
happy mix of simultaneous and interacting intellectual and infra-
structural developments.
Is there any basis in any of this for what might be dubbed “the Cana-
dian hypothesis”? Is there some role that is distinctively Canadian or,
citizenship aside, a result of factors from Canada that played a role in
the emergence of this field? Johnson and I did get support from our uni-
versity as well as from a small conference fund from the federal govern-
ment administered by a national research-funding council, but I assume
that other countries had similar funding available. Given the entrepre-
neurial promotion of the pragma-dialectical theory by the Dutch and
the readiness for change in the American speech communication com-
munity, it seems likely that argumentation would have developed as a
field without participation of Canadian pioneers such as Woods and
Walton, Govier, Hitchcock, Gilbert, and Johnson
2
and Blair. Canadians
got on board partly because of the Windsor conferences, and because the
Informal Logic journal cornered the philosophy side of the market as the
journal of record for philosophically-oriented theorizing early on. Per-
haps I am too close to see it, but I must confess to an inability to recog-
nize anything distinctively Canadian about our contributions.
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CHAPTER 3.
FORMAL MODELS
JOHN WOODS
Abstract: The most highly developed account of formal models
in philosophy can be found in what has come to be called formal
semantics. In its pure form, a formal semantics is the model theory of
an abstract and purely formal logistic system. The formal language
L of any such system is an artificial one, carrying none of the mean-
ings to be found in natural language. In its less pure and philosoph-
ically more adaptable form, a formal semantics is a theory of truth
for a natural language modelled on how the pure theory formally
represents truth in L. Once truth is defined for a formal language,
it is easy to define logical truth and logical implication modelled on
the pure theory’s provisions for their formal representation in L. As
an expository ease I’ll call these adaptations “applied formal seman-
tics.”
A nearly unanimous theme that runs through Canadian
approaches to argument is that formal logic is of little value, if any,
in representing how best to get at the logical structure of argument
in everyday life, not only about commonplace things but about any-
thing at all that human beings argue about, including the Contin-
uum Hypothesis or black holes. There are in the Canadian literature
various instances in which “social license” of formality is contem-
plated and sometimes granted. Most notable perhaps is the Cana-
dian fondness for argument-schemata. But nowhere in this
literature is there any social-license consideration of consigning the
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burdens of natural language argumentation to the representational
devices of either pure or applied formal semantics. Not even in
those cases in which systems of logic are adapted for use in fallacy
theory, was any ever chosen for its model-theoretic provisions.
That alone makes a chapter on formal models in a book about
Canadian argumentation theory stand out like a sore thumb, raising
the question of whether it belongs there. My answer is that the pre-
sent paper is no sore thumb, and that it has a perfectly proper place
in a book like this. In the pages to follow, I’ll try to show that even an
applied formal semantics of the mother tongues in which humans
advance their arguments is saturated with problems which haven’t
yet been laid to rest. I will suggest that, in its sweeping indiffer-
ence to formal semantics, the Canadian theorists of argument have
shown an intuitive reluctance which reflects great credit on them.
“The most reliable way of carrying out a proof, obviously, is to
follow pure logic, a way that, disregarding the particular charac-
teristics of objects, depends solely on those laws upon which all
knowledge rests. Accordingly, we divide all truths that require justi-
fication into two kinds, those for which the proof can be carried out
purely by means of logic and those for which it must be supported
by the facts of experience. But that a proposition is of the first kind
is surely compatible with the fact that it could nevertheless not have
come to consciousness in a human mind without any activity of the
senses.” Frege, 18791
1. THE FORMALIST PRESENCE IN INFORMAL LOGIC
To a dominant extent, the Canadian influence on theories of
argument flows from their contributions to informal logic in
the aftermath of Charles Hamblin’s call to arms in 1970 for the
restoration of the fallacies project to the research programmes
of logical theory. A good early overview of informal logic’s self-
directed remit is provided by Ralph Johnson and Tony Blair in
“Informal logic: The past five years, 1978-1983” in the American
Philosophical Quarterly.
2
It was clear even that early on, that infor-
1. Gottlob Frege, Begriffsschrift, a Formula Language, Modelled upon that of Arithmetic, for
Pure Thought, in van Heijenoort 1967 at pages 5-82.
2. Vol. 22 (1985), 181-196. See also Informal Logic, 7 (1985), 69-82, Douglas Walton,
Informal Fallacies, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1987. Earlier was John Woods,
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mal logic had been spurred to more than just one revival. In addi-
tion to fallacies, dialogue logic and dialectical logic received an
even more productive boost, made so by the fact that there were
bustling developments already in full swing in the more formal
and mathematical treatments of these matters. Similar develop-
ments were taking root in logic programming and other com-
putational approaches to reasoning and arguing. Adaptations of
the modal logics of knowledge, time and action were also being
made. Informal logicians who took the path of dialogue and
dialectic had more fellow-travellers to talk to than those who
took the fallacies path. The dialogue and dialectic path-takers
had large and rapidly developing current literatures to react to
and learn from.
3
The fallacy path-takers had no current litera-
ture to immerse themselves in, and were driven to the desper-
ate expedient of consulting the leading undergraduate textbooks
"What is informal logic?" in Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, editors, pages
57-68, Point Reyes, CA: Edgepress, 1980, and later his “The necessity of formalism”,
in John Woods, The Death of Argument: Fallacies in Agent-Based Reasoning, pages
25-42, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004, and “The informal core of formal logic”, pages
43-61, The Death of Argument. I add now a stylistic remark: Since I myself am part of
the Canadian story, I shall adopt the following conventions. When I refer to me as a
participator in this literature I’ll adopt the third person perspective. When I refer to
myself as the person writing this essay, I’ll adopt the first person perspective.
3. See, for example, E. M. Barth and Erik C. W. Krabbe, From Axiom to Dialogue: A
Philosophical Study of Logics and Argumentation, Berlin and New York: de Gruyter,
1982. In the first year of its publication, Argumentation published Jaakko Hintikka’s
“The fallacy of fallacies”, 1 (1987), 211-238, in which fallacies were worked up
within an interrogative logic of game-theoretic cast. In a number of places, the
influence of Hintikka’s foundational contributions to epistemic logic was also dis-
cernible. In Woods and Walton’s Fallacies: Selected Papers 1972-1982, there are nine-
teen chapters, and no fewer than nine of them involve dialectical factors. The
influence, direct or otherwise, of epistemic logic is discernible in six of them. Ralph
Johnson is a bit more circumspect in his engagement of dialogical and dialectical
considerations. See his Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument, Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum, 2000. Even so, pragmatic and dialectical considerations including
Johnson’s own recognition of the dialectical tier, are evident in all the Canadian
writings. See, for example, Robert C. Pinto’s, Argument, Inference and Dialectic: Col-
lected Papers, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2010. In their dialectical tilt and pragmatic and
contextual sensitivities, these papers are typical of Canadian practice.
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for use in introductory logic classes in universities and four-year
colleges. Virtually without exception, they saw in them abundant
confirmation of Hamblin’s own already low opinion of how, if
at all, they handled fallacies. In no time at all, informal logicians
would be publishing what they hoped would be better introduc-
tory texts.
4
Certainly they were no substitute for frontier schol-
arship and, in that regard, the newly minted fallacy theorists had
little to rely on but their wits, their intuitions, and the older
literatures that had been put into an undignified retirement by
the overthrow of logic by mathematics, drawing upon what they
took to be adaptable features of current literatures in philosoph-
ical logic. The significance of the comparatively scant references
in note 1 of this essay to Canadian publications in which there is
explicit reference to informal logic by title is that, by and large,
Canadian informalists had their say about the nature of their
subject by just getting on with the job of developing it.
It might strike us as strange that a book devoted to the Cana-
dian influence on theories of argument arising from contribu-
tions to informal logic, should make room for a chapter on
formal models. It will have been noticed in earlier chapters of
this volume that the organizational, congregational and publish-
ing centre of the Canadian movement in informal logic is the
University of Windsor, inaugurated in 1979 by the First Inter-
national Symposium on Informal Logic. A number of the move-
ment’s leading figures are based in Windsor. Even more are
based elsewhere in the country, and several score more are “hon-
orary Windsorites” from foreign climes. As of today, at least four
or five of Windsor’s locals made their reputations elsewhere,
and two of its first three elders weren’t always Canadian. The
umbrella under which the Windsor conferences are staged is
4. Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, Logical Self-Defense, Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1977; John Woods and Douglas Walton, Argument: The Logic of the Fallacies,
Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1982; David Hitchcock Critical Thinking, Toronto:
Methuen, 1983; and Trudy Govier, A Practical Study of Argument, Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 1985. All are still in print in newer editions.
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OSSA, the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, in
emulation of the earlier example of ISSA, the International Soci-
ety for the Study of Argumentation, established in Amsterdam
as the organizational, congregational and publication centre of
the pragma-dialectical approach to argument.
5
The name “ISSA”
has two virtues which “OSSA” lacks. It is earlier, and it is accu-
rate. OSSA’s active membership is as far-flung as ISSA’s, and
there is nothing noticeably Ontarian about the logics contrived
by OSSAnians.
6
A foundational work for the Canadians was pub-
lished by an Englishman who in due course would become an
OSSA star.
7
Among locals and awayers alike, the Windsor approach to for-
mal logic ranges from hostile and dismissive to the highly acqui-
escent. There is a theme that runs throughout that strikes me as
certainly right. It is the confident belief that all the going formal
logics of 1979 would have had a hopeless time in elucidating the
logical structures of everyday argument and inference, including,
by the way, the everyday inferences of Frege, Russell and Tarski.
Human reasoning is inherently practical, but there are no people
in the standard logics of deduction. Those logics were and still
are the wrong keys for those locks.
A good many informal logicians think that the principal reason
for this alienation is that formal logics – certainly those of the
1970s – were mainly about deductive reasoning, whereas most
5. I must confess to a disliking of the word “argumentation”. There is no need for it in
English. “Argument” will do all of the heavy lifting intended for “argumentation”. It
is a count noun and a mass term, and it honours the process-product divide. I’ve
decided on a slight indulgence. If the reader will grant me “theories of argument”, I’ll
grant him an occasional “argumentation theory.”
6. We might note that, since the beginning, Windsor’s Tony Blair has served on ISSA’s
executive committee. Argumentation’s editor-in-chief, Frans van Eemeren has had a
lengthy presence on Informal Logic’s editorial board, and John Woods is one of Argu-
mentation’s three editors and a member of the Argumentation Library’s editorial
board.
7. Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press,
1958
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of the best of human reasoning is deductively invalid. Seen this
way, formal logics simply miss most of the target set by informal
logicians. This is true as far as it goes. But it too readily cedes to
the formal logics of deduction their bona fides as accurate expos-
itors and assessors of what a human reasoner is up to when he
makes what he intends to be a truth-preserving argument, that is
to say, a deductively valid one. I shall say more of this three sec-
tions hence when I briefly survey the route from Tarski to Quine
to Donaldson which brought to philosophy the formal seman-
tics of the mother tongues in which we humans frame our argu-
ments. Suffice it to say for now that the formal logics of that
day were encumbered by two problems. One, as we just said,
is “the missed target problem” and the other is “the conceptual
distortion problem.” By this I mean that the more abstract our
representations of a natural language concept, the greater the
likelihood of making it unrecognizable in the formalizing wash.
Jointly these problems produce what I’ll call the formalist crisis for
theories of real-life argument and inference. In what follows, I’ll
consider the crisis’ prospects of relief. But first, something more
should be said about the words “formal” and “model”.
2. THE UNRULINESS OF “FORMAL MODEL”
The expression “formal model” is ambiguous in English, as are
the two words within. They are unruly and challenging ambigu-
ities. “Formal” ranges all the way from the correctness of one’s
words to our Sovereign Lady the Queen, to the suit one dons at
his nuptials, to the abstractions of plane geometry. Models model
clothes on the runways of Milan and in the design centres of
Paris. Toy-stores sell models of World War II Spitfires, and some-
times, for good or ill, Dads are models emulated by their sons. In
first-order classical logic, a model is a set-theoretic structure, and
in macroeconomics models are mathematical entities of a quite
different construction. In climate science, they are yet another
kind of mathematical thing. Sometimes a model is a way the
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world couldn’t possibly be, and that the good that’s sometimes
in it is a strictly collateral benefit. This happens when reflecting
on how this particular aspect of the world couldn’t possibly be,
we are led to see how that other feature of the world actually is.
In other cases, a theorist formalizes a concept simply by giving it
a biconditional definition. In still others we give our arguments
formal expression when we avoid enthymematic formulation.
Sometimes a formalization of something is a pictorial represen-
tation of it or a schematic rendering. It might also be true that,
in some cases, real-life arguments are pictorially advanceble.
8
For
all this semantic fog, some clear lines are discernible. Simplify-
ing slightly, formal logics of argument heavily traffic in applied
mathematics. Informal logics of argument show little trace of it.
9
For a good many of Canada’s theorists of argument and rea-
soning the only point of contact with formal modelling is by
way of what is mistakenly called the “translation” rules for map-
ping natural language arguments to their logical forms in a for-
mal language L usually that of first-order classical logic. In its
standard understanding, translation preserves meanings or at
least approximations to them. While natural languages brim with
meanings, formal “languages” have none at all. It is not possible
to order a hamburger in L or simply to say what your name is.
This present view of formal languages requires historical qual-
ification. When we turn to Frege’s treatment of the sentential
calculus in the Begriffsschrift of 1879, we see that he was serious
in saying that the formulae of his “formula language of pure
thought” would be both vehicles for real thought and susceptible
to affirmation and denial. A horizontal stroke or Inhaltsstrich pre-
fixed to a formula φ signifies its propositional content or the
thought it expresses, as with “–φ” for example. When a small
8. See, for example, Leo Groarke, “Logic, art and argumentation”, Informal Logic, 18
(1996), 105-129, and J. A. Blair, “The possibility and actuality of visual argument”,
Argumentation and Advocacy, 33 (1996), 23-39.
9. A questionable exception, as I think is the over-modelling of inductive argument
and non-demonstrative belief revision in the probability calculus.
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vertical line is attached to the left side of the content stroke, a
Urteilsstrich or judgement stroke is formed. The two combined
together come to be called the assertion sign. The content stroke
prefixed to φ signifies the judgeability of its content. When the
judgement stroke is prefixed, it expresses the affirmation of the
thought conveyed by φ. Negation works in the following way,
“-┬-φ” signifies the negation of φ, and “∣-┬φ” the denial of φ.
There is no inkling of these strokes in what has long been the
standard notation for classical sentential logic. The last part of
the English subtitle of the Begriffsschrift is also important. Frege’s
formula language of pure thought would be “modelled upon that
of arithmetic”. It is provable in number theory that 2 + 2 = 4.
Frege wanted a formal language capable of saying that same
thing, but not in the workaday language of arithmetic. What
Frege wanted from his formula language is the means to say that
2 + 2 = 4 without the necessity to mention or quantify over num-
bers. In this way, the way of logicism,
10
Frege’s formal language
would be purpose-built for the reduction without relevant loss
of number theory to the pure logic laid out in the Begriffsschrift. It
would be designed from the get-go to give to arithmetic a com-
fortable truth-preserving home.
The idea that the formal language of a logistic system is
entirely devoid of propositional content arises from a somewhat
later source. In Hibert’s quest for a logic freed from the burdens
of propositional content, truth and meaning, launched the proof
theories in which this quest is fulfilled.
11
In due course, modern
logic would accommodate both model theory and proof theory,
and would prove important correspondences between them. But
for that to happen, both parties had to agree (and did) that the
10. Frege develops the philosophical case for logicism in The Foundations of Arithmetic,
translated by J. L. Austin, Oxford: Blackwell, 1950. First published, in German, in
1884.
11. David Hilbert, “On the foundations of logic and arithmetic”, in van Heijenoort 1967
at pages 129-138. Original German text of a talk in 1904 to the Third International
Congress of Mathematicians.
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respective properties in correspondence were definable over a
common artificial language bereft of content, and incapable of
expressing thought.
I come back now to Frege, briefly. By the time Frege issued the
first volume of Basic Laws of Arithmetic in 1903, the judgement
stroke “∣–” would be given a new role to play. It would now sig-
nify a function from names to truth values. Formal sentences for-
merly taken to be thought-expressing were now names of truth
functions. Accordingly, “—φ” would be a name that denoted the
truth-value (Wahrheitswert) the True (T), and since all names
therein must also denote truth-values, the horizontal line must
assign truth-values to them, notwithstanding their own thought-
inexpressibility. In these cases, they would name truth-value the
False (F).
12
This is yet another striking difference from today’s
standard logics in which only sentences are assigned truth-val-
ues.
13
The point to emphasize is that the state in which classical logic
has been for decades is one in which formal languages are seman-
tically dead, prompting thereby the question of whether they are
capable of semantic revival by mathematical means.
A more accurate term for what are misdescribed as translation
rules from English to L is “mapping rules”, rules attempting to
establish one-to-one correspondences between natural language
expressions and their formal counterparts in L. Consider a sim-
ple example. For every logician of every stripe, validity is a prop-
erty of interest, and especially valued are procedures which
reliably determine its presence or absence in arbitrarily selected
cases. One way in which an argument’s validity in English is
tested is by using the mapping rules to find its counterpart argu-
ment in L, which is said to be its “logical form”. The formal lan-
guage has a well-defined notion of validity instantiable by L’s
12. “Truth-value” is Russell’s rendering of “Wahrheitswert” in Appendix A of The Princi-
ples of Mathematics 1903
13. I will provide further citations in various places ahead.
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formal arguments. The further features of formal validity are
provided by L’s model theory, giving to “validity” a meaning in
the metalanguage of L that it certainly does not possess in Eng-
lish. For that reason it is helpful to use “validity” to denote what
valid English arguments have and “*validity” to denote what
*valid formal arguments have. Even so, formal *validity and the
mapping rules conduce to a good end. For, whenever an English
argument maps to a formally *valid one in the model theory of
classical logic, the English argument is also *valid, or as we may
also put it, formally *valid. The mapping rules have this interest-
ing feature. They reflect back to English arguments the *valid-
ity of its logical form in L. This is the backwards reflection property
with respect to *validity.
It turns out that any formally *valid argument of English is
also valid, i.e. is such that its conclusion follows of necessity from
its premises jointly. The English term “necessity” has no formal
counterpart in L. There is nothing in this logic to which “neces-
sity” can be mapped. From which we may conclude that, what-
ever “*valid” means in L, it does not mean that the conclusion
of an L-argument follows of necessity from its premisses jointly.
Still *validity in L implies validity in English. Although the map-
ping rules are a perfect test of formal *validity in English, they
are only a partial test of validity in English. The reason why is
that the “atomic” or simple indicative sentences of English have
meanings and the atomic wffs of L have none. The atomic mean-
ings of English enable meaning connections, some of which gen-
erate validity as in the well-worn example of the “coloured shirt
argument”:
1. The shirt is red
2. Therefore, the shirt is coloured.
Since the conclusion of this argument follows of necessity from
its premiss, it is valid. But its form in L is
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1′. p
2′. q
which is not *valid (and not valid either).
14
This creates a nontrivial problem for the mapping rules. For
the rules to have the backwards reflection property for *validity
it is necessary that the set of English atomic sentences not stand
to one another in any semantic or logical relation. They must
be pairwise semantically and logically inert. I know of no logic
textbook that develops the right filtration device for inputting
the atomic sentences of English to the function described by the
mapping rules in ways that avert coloured shirt problems.
15
Everyone in the Canadian informal logic community was edu-
cated in the analytic tradition. For many of them, perhaps a hefty
majority, doing philosophy analytically is simply the preferred
way of doing it. I won’t be able to say my piece about the place of
formal models in argumentation theory without having my say
about the dominant presence of formal semantics in philosophy,
especially the analytic philosophy of language. And I won’t be
able to do that without a quick Cook’s Tour of conceptual analysis.
I’ll turn to that now. Formal semantics will come right after.
3. PHILOSOPHY GOES ANALYTIC
Formal semantics has a twofold parentage. One is a crisis in the
foundations of arithmetic. The other is a crisis in analytical phi-
losophy. A proper understanding of it requires that we make
some brief mention of them. The crisis in arithmetic was
prompted by Frege’s conviction that all of higher mathematics
14. A similar difficulty attaches to the map from sentences such as “The tabletop is oval
and the tabletop is rectangular”, made inconsistent by virtue of predicate-meanings.
Its formal representation in L is the formally consistent wff “p ∧ q”.
15. For a bit more on this, interested readers could consult Woods’ The Death of Argu-
ment, pages 48-53, chapter 3, “The informal core of formal logic”.
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has secure foundations in number theory. The question was
whether number theory is able to furnish its own foundations.
Towards the close of the 1870s Frege came to believe that it
could not. If arithmetic’s foundations couldn’t be found else-
where, Frege feared that all of mathematics would topple into
a rubble of confusion and mystification, causing massive collat-
eral damage to the sciences. In 1893 Frege thought he’d found
the answer he’d been seeking. The answer lay in logicism. In the
first volume of his Basic Laws of Arithmetic,
16
Frege thought he had
demonstrated how every true statement of arithmetic could be
matched in a truth-preserving way to a formula of pure logic in
which there is no reference to or quantification over numbers.
The logic in question was of Frege’s own invention (or if pre-
ferred, discovery) which was a second-order functional calculus
of great ingenuity. If Frege’s solution held, the mathematical
foundations’ crisis would be averted.
Frege was also implicated in the rise of analytic philosophy,
with the publication of papers in the 1890s such as “Function
and concept”, “On concept and object” and “On sense and refer-
ence”, and later in the late 19 teens “Thought” and “Negation”
17
.
Another important source was G. E. Moore, with early papers
in the short interval from 1899 to 1903, such as “The nature of
judgement”, “The refutation of idealism” and “Kant’s idealism”
and the classic Principia Ethica.
18
Moore was instrumental in con-
16. Gottlob Frege, Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Derived Using Concept-Script, volumes I and II,
translated and edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg, with Crispin Wright,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Volume I first appeared, in German, in 1893
and II in 1903.
17. "Function and concept" in Peter Geach and Max Black, editors, Translation from the
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, pages 42-55, Oxford: Blackwell, 1970; "On con-
cept and object”, in Geach and Black, pages 181-193; “On sense and reference”, in
Geach and Black, pages 56-78; “Thought” in Peter Geach, editor, Logical Investiga-
tions, pages 1-30, Oxford: Blackwell, 1977; and “Negation”, in Geach, pages 31-53.
18. “The nature of judgement”, Mind, 7 (1899), 176-193; “The refutation of idealism”,
Mind, 12 (1903), 433-453; “Kant’s idealism”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 4
(1903), 177-124; and Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903.
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verting Russell from a McTaggartian idealism to the methods of
conceptual analysis. Moore likened the elucidation of a concept
of philosophical interest to the decomposition of a substance
of chemical interest by chemical analysis. Concepts were either
simple and unanalyzable or complex. Simple concepts were
intelligible as they stood and in no need of clarification. If a
complex concept were in need of clarification, it would be pro-
vided by an analysis that decomposed into its simple constitutive
subconcepts. Largely independently, Russell and Frege had con-
verged on a common understanding of how to provide a con-
ceptual analysis of the notion of set.
19
It would be provided by
Frege’s axioms or basic laws, laid out in the first volume of The
Basic Laws of Arithmetic. This convergence was furthered by two
other points of agreement. Russell agreed with Frege’s logicism,
according to which number theory could be reduced without rel-
evant loss to pure logic. He also agreed that set theory was an
essential part of the pure logic required for this reduction.
In 1902, Russell wrote to Frege with the news that the axioms
of his set theory harboured a contradiction. Frege promptly and
ruefully replied eight days later.
20
This, the infamous Russell
paradox, would create the crisis of analytical philosophy. Frege
and Russell had agreed that Frege’s axioms provided a conceptual
analysis which revealed the true nature of what it is to be a set.
Russell expressly asserted that, thanks to the paradox, no philo-
sophical analysis of the concept of set was possible. Frege briefly
dithered and then permanently retired from the philosophy of
arithmetic. As Frege and Russell saw it, what made the para-
dox a crisis for conceptual analysis was not that the original
axioms were mistaken – principally Basic Law V which served
as a Comprehension Axiom. Frege and Russell were among the
19. For most of his working life as a philosopher of arithmetic, Frege eschewed the term
“sets” in favour of “courses of values of concepts”, and Russell favoured “classes”.
20. Bertrand Russell, Letter to Frege, in Jean van Heijenoort, 1967, pages 124-125; and
Gottlob Frege, Letter to Russell, in van Heijenoort at pages 127-128.
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last descendants of the long line from Aristotle, in which an
axiom was true, necessary, primary, most intelligible, and neither
needful of nor susceptible to independent demonstration.
21
So
understood, the axioms for sets disclosed that it lies in the very
nature of sets that there aren’t any. But without sets transfinite
arithmetic is impossible. So Frege turned the dial to geometry,
and Russell borrowed the empty name “set” (actually “class”) and
applied it to objects defined into theoretical existence by nominal
definition.
22
Since arithmetic can’t get by without something like
sets, Russell set about making something up and placed it within
the regulatory control of the mathematical theory of types. The
crisis of analytic philosophy was that conceptual analyses are
sometimes horrifically wrong, notwithstanding their appearance
of à priori certainty.
If we charted the jolt that analytical philosophy was dealt in the
months from 1902 to 1903, we could chart it on a “concept clar-
ification line”, with an intuitive concept K at the far left, and on
the far right a stipulated new concept K* with the same name but
not the same denotation:
K: _______________________________ K*
23
Assuming K to be analyzable, its immediate successor on the
line would be K(A), that is, K in its analyzed state. As we see from
the sharp change from 1902 to 1903, what the line in its pre-
sent configuration tells us is that K is uninstantiated and K* is a
theorist’s creation of some other concept. It would be a mistake,
however, to see the clarification of a consistent
24
concept in such
harsh binary terms. It wasn’t to be a matter of “Analyse it or for-
21. Frege would later say that Basic Law V hadn’t carried quite the same conviction for
him as did the previous four axioms. I do not think, however, that this remained for
long his considered opinion.
22. Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, 2nd edition, London: Allen and
Unwin, 1937. First published in 1903; pp. 27 and 114.
23. A word of caution: my concept-clarification line is not a Fregean stroke.
24. More carefully: “widely believed to be consistent and neither known nor believed to
be otherwise”.
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get it and change the subject!” To help see why, it would repay us
to take note of the impact of logical positivism on what would
retain the name of analytic philosophy. If there were space for
it we could have a small section entitled, “Philosophy goes sci-
entific”. We don’t, so we won’t. We’ll make do with something a
good deal briefer. The two features that one associates with sci-
entific philosophy is its interests in using numbers to achieve a
qualitative concept’s clarification by making it more precise. I’ll
call this conceptual explication. The other already has a name –
rational reconstruction. A common example of explication is the
representation of the idea of degrees of likeliness by real num-
bers via the probability calculus in the unit interval. A celebrated
example of rational reconstruction was Carnap’s attempted
reduction of the physical world to the phenomenal one in the
Aufbau.
25
Putting K(E) for an explication of K and K(RR) for its
rational reconstruction, we see that the conceptual clarification
line, more fully realized, provides four options for K, not just
two:
K: _____K(A) _____K(E) _____ K(RR) _____K*
Each option is a form of making. Analysis makes a concept
explicit. An explication makes it precise. A rational reconstruction
makes it over. A stipulation changes the subject and makes a new
concept up. With these options available, we can easily see Russell
pleading that instead of just stipulating a new concept of class in
his theory of types, he was rationally reconstructing the old one.
But we couldn’t find for Russell unless he conceded that there
was little of the true nature of the intuitive mathematical concept
of class in its rational reconstruction. From this, a more general
point can be made. The further we proceed from the clarification
line’s leftmost node rightward to its terminus, the intuitive con-
cept becomes progressively less recognizable in its successors.
25. Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World: Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, Berke-
ley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1967. First published, in Ger-
man, in 1928.
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From which we must also see that all forms of conceptual clar-
ification are conceptual distortion to one degree or other, and
some are a good deal more distorting than others.
4. FORMAL SEMANTICS
The name “formal semantics” was coined by Tarski in what John
Burgess thinks was an act of theft. Although Burgess was joking,
he was making a serious point. Tarski’s tort was to take a name
in common scholarly and lay usage and re-apply it without for-
mal notice (no pun intended) to something entirely different.
26
As Tarski used the word, a semantics is the model theory of a
formal logistic system. As everyone else uses the word, seman-
tics is a theory of meaning for natural languages. “Well”, some
might say, “what’s all the fuss about? Doesn’t the model theory of
first-order classical logic (say) assign something like meaning to
its formal expressions, strings and sequences?” If we were to ask
these sceptics where they would be inclined to place a theory of
Tarskian meaning on our concept clarification line, they might
tick the explication box. That would be a mistake. A good case
can be made for ticking the stipulation box instead, thereby mak-
ing the original concept of meaning unrecognizable in the made-
up concept.
Tarski’s contribution to model theory was in the slipstream
of Frege’s early recognition of the need for it and the important
advances in the early part of the 1900s, notably by Löwenheim in
1915 and Skolem in 1919/20, in what came to be known jointly
as the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem.
27
The theorem asserts that
any theory in first-order logic with identity has a countable
26. John P. Burgess, “Tarski’s tort”, in his Mathematics, Models and Modality: Selected Philo-
sophical Essays, pages 149-168, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
27. Leopold Löwenheim, “On possibilities in the calculus of relatives”, in van Hei-
jenoort, pages 228-251, and Thoraf Skolem, “Logico-combinatorial investigations in
the satisfiability or provability of mathematical propositions: A simplified proof of a
theorem by L. Löwenheim and a generalization of the theorem”, in van Heijenoort,
252-263.
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model if it has a model at all. Tarski would later prove that the
“upward” version of it, showing that theories with infinite mod-
els also have models of every infinite cardinality. I mention these
seemingly arcane results not to dwell on them here but rather to
underscore the sheer distance of Tarskian models from the struc-
tural regularities of human argumental life. But the last thing
models are is distant from the commonalities of a standard good
second-year textbook on deductive logic, with which everyone in
the Canadian corps will have had to deal as an undergraduate
or graduate student and later, in some cases, as a teacher of for-
mal logic.
28
The importance of saying so lies in this. It is simply
not true that Canadian informalists are unacquainted with mod-
els in this sense. The fact that they don’t put them to use in their
own work indicates the conviction that, so used, Tarski models
neither add value nor pay for their keep. But the fact remains
that there is, so far as I can see, little concurrent inclination to
denounce the popularity of formal semantics in analytic philoso-
phy, which is home turf of Canada’s informal logicians.
What follows now, as briskly as I can do it, is a refresher of
what everyone already knows about model theory. A logistic sys-
tem L is a theory which distributes properties of interest over
entities constructed in its formal language L. The language arises
from a lexicon of basic expressions, including those designated
as atomic formal sentences or wffs. Formation rules recursively
define all the non-atomic ones. The lexicon, and formation rules
are part of L’s syntax. L’s syntax provides an infinite array of
proper names each carrying its own unique index, as well as an
infinity of individual variables also uniquely indexed. Rules also
provide for the binding of an individual variable by quantifiers
prefixed to the same variable. The syntax’s further parts recur-
sively define sequences of formal sentences, and generate pro-
28. An excellent example is George Boolos, John P. Burgess and Richard C. Jeffrey, Com-
putability and Logic, 4th edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. (Fal-
lacies aren’t discussed there.)
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cedures for the ascription to them or their constituent parts of
properties such as theoremhood, deducibility, proof, provabil-
ity, and (syntactic) equivalence and (syntactic) consistency. L’s
semantic or model-theoretic part provides interpretations which
fix L’s domain (or universe) D with respect to which truth-val-
ues are the denotations of L’s syntactically rendered wffs. D is an
infinite set of otherwise uncharacterized individuals, each indi-
viduated by a unique index. Functions map particular parts of L’s
syntax to correspondingly specific elements in or set-theoreti-
cally constructable from L’s domain. L’s semantical rules provide
rigorous specification, for the interpretation in question, of the
properties of reference, quantification and nary predicate-deno-
tation, and therefrom the further properties of satisfaction, truth,
valid sentence or logical truth, valid sentence-sequence, entail-
ment, (semantic) equivalence and (semantic) consistency.
In the metalogic of classical first-order logic, further results
are also provable. If L’s predicates are monadic, validity is a
decidable property. Monadic or not, there also exists between
L’s syntactic and model theoretic properties a one-to-one corre-
spondence by which φ is a theorem of L’s syntax iff it is a logi-
cal truth of its semantics. Close by is the equivalence of syntactic
deducibility and semantic entailment. Logics having this prop-
erty are said to be complete with respect to their semantics. Log-
ics in which the correspondence is not only one-one but also
onto are sound with respect to their syntax. While everyone con-
cedes that the atomic wffs (well-formed formulas) of a formal
“language” are entirely meaningless, it is often (and mistakenly)
said that the logical particles of such a language – e.g. the con-
nectives of the sentential calculus – have the meanings conferred
on them by the system’s formation rules for molecular wffs,
whereby truth conditions are imposed on sentences in which
particules occur. This is not true. What the formation rules
assign are truth-values, of which in first-order logic there are
only two, T and F. Every wff is assigned one or the other and
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never both. T and F are undefined abstract objects denoted by
wffs. They are not linguistic objects, and so the question of their
having meaning doesn’t arise. In natural languages such as Eng-
lish, truth and falsity are properties ascribed to linguistic objects
by the predicates “is true” and “is false”, neither of which occurs
even in the model theory of classical logic. It is said, however,
that “φ denotes T” formally models natural language sentences of
the form “‘S’ is true” by way of a formal representability relation
R. But there is in the Canadian literature, and everywhere else
in the argumentation community virtually no work on how R
is structured so as to deliver the desired result. Consider again
the difficulties discussed in section 2 posed by the mapping rules
from English to counterparts in L.
The term “truth-value”, as we now see, is a tort. So are all
the following, the very terms that make up the working vocab-
ulary of Tarski’s semantics: “*vocabulary”, “*sentence”, “*name”,
“*predicate”, “*argument”, “*proof”, “*theorem”, “*syntax”,
“*truth”, “*valid (sentence)” “*valid (argument)”, “*entailment”,
“*semantics”, and on and on.
29
None of these expressions bears
any recognizable resemblance to what those terms actually mean
in pre-tort reality. The qualification “formal” no more makes a
formal sentence a kind of sentence than the qualification “fools’”
makes fools’ gold a kind of gold. Here are two further examples
to consider. In the semantics of L a formal sentence is true in an
interpretation I iff it has a model in I, iff every countably infinite
sequence of elements in I’s domain of discourse D satisfies φ in I.
φ is satisfied by a countably infinite such sequence S iff the fol-
lowing conditions are met: If φ is an atomic wff of the sentential
calculus, it is satisfied by S iff φ denotes T in I. if φ is an atomic
wff of the predicate calculus with n-ary predicate ψ, S satisfies φ
in I iff for each denota of its singular terms stand to one another
in a way that structures them as n-tuples of the class of n-tuples
denoted by the predicate ψ. If φ is a wff in the form ⌐∼ψ¬ for arbi-
29. Also, recall our discussion of *validity in section 2.
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trary wff ψ, S satisfies φ iff it doesn’t satisfy ψ. If φ is a wff in the
form ⌐ψ∨ψ’ ¬, S satisfies φ iff it satisfies ψ or satisfies ψ’ or both.
If φ is a wff in the form ⌐∀xk (ψ)¬, with xk is the variable whose
index is k in I, S satisfies ψ iff every countably infinite sequence
of elements in D differing from S at most in its kth element satis-
fies ψ.
The second example is more quickly dealt with. From its very
foundation, logic has had an abiding interest in entailment.
When considered as a property of pairs of English sentences A
and B the still dominant view of what “entails” means has it that
A entails B iff it is logically impossible for A to be true and B false
(or anyhow not true). It is utterly routine for teachers of logic
and others who should also know better to paraphrase this as “A
entails B iff it is logically impossible for A to be T and B to be
F (or anyhow not T). This is false. As we’ve already seen, T is an
undefined object of the formal semantics of L, thus making “A
is T” ill-formed in English and L alike, vitiating thereby the lazy
paraphrase of the dominant definition of “entails” in English.
Here is how it goes in L: φ entails ψ iff there is no interpretation
in which φ has a model but ψ doesn’t. More specifically, there is
no interpretation in which every countably infinite sequence of
its D-elements satisfies φ yet does not satisfy ψ. No one with any
sense and without an axe to grind would say that in these formal
notions of truth in I and entailment there is a recognizable pres-
ence of the truth and entailment in natural language.
Paragraphs ago I surmised that if an analytic philosopher of the
present day were asked to place Tarski’s concepts of truth in an
interpretation and of entailment in all of them, he would hover
over the point at which the line moves from analysis to explica-
tion. But as is now apparent that would be more hopeful than
accurate. The right place over which to hover is the terminus, the
place at which the ever-torting Tarski just made these things up
while retaining the original names.
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“What in the world would motivate Tarski to have gone so
far?”, people will ask. The answer lies in the Liar paradox which,
as Tarski saw it, did to theories of truth in natural languages what
the Russell paradox did to sets. Tarski blew very hot and only
very slightly cold about the fix that the concept truth was in. In
hot moments, he echoed Frege and Russell in thinking that it lies
in the very nature of truth in natural language that no sentence
of natural language is true – in other words, that the truth predi-
cate has a null extension. In more reflective moments he thought,
as did Russell about sets, that natural languages simply couldn’t
get along without a consistent predicate for truth operating in
something like the way Russell thought the predicate “set” had
had to be made to work. At this juncture, it is convenient to mark
two sides of Tarski’s intellectual personality. Considered purely
as a model theorist, Tarski thinks that natural language is a dead
duck. But as author of “The concept of truth in formalized lan-
guages”, he turned his sights to truth’s rehabilitation in natural
speech.
30
The post-1902 Russell wanted a new concept that would serve
the purposes for which the logical paradox had disabled the intu-
itive concept of set. So he made one up. Tarski, the model theory
pioneer, wanted a concept that would serve the same purposes
in L from which the semantic paradox had disabled the intuitive
concept of truth. He wanted to rehabilitate the logicist claim that
for every true proposition of arithmetic there exists a truth-pre-
serving relation to its unique counterpart in the *theorems of
pure logic.
31
So he made up a new concept of truth, and got
30. Alfred Tarski, “The concept of truth in formalized languages”, in Logic, Semantics and
Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-1938, translated by J. H. Woodger, 2nd revised
edition, with an editor’s introduction and analytical index by John Corcoran, pages
152-278, Indianapolis, IN: Hacket, 1983. First published in Polish in 1933.
31. A gentle reminder. In first-order logic, the word “theorem” is a tort. The theorems
of L bear no recognizable resemblance to what “theorem” means in English – a
statement shown to be true by way of valid proof. “Proof” here also occurs with its
ordinary meaning.
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on with the logicist programme. The new concept with the old
name is the one we’ve just finished tarrying over. The question
that now presses is whether this make-up of truth can preserve
the original intent of logicism. The answer is that it cannot.
When it was originally proposed that every true statement of
arithmetic is provable in pure logic without the need to refer to
or quantify over numbers, “true” carried its intuitive mathemati-
cal meaning. I don’t think that Frege and Russell were fully seized
of the alienations effected by the new logic’s defections from
everyday mathematical speech. By the 1930s, Tarski appears to
have cottoned on to the alienation from semantic reality effected
by pure logic’s model theory.
After 1931 Tarski will have been aware of an extraordinary
technical feat pulled off by Gödel in his famous incompleteness
paper.
32
Gödel’s proof depends on a device of his own origina-
tion called Gödel-numbering, for arithmatizing syntax in a for-
mal representation FA of Peano arithmetic, PA. In particular,
Gödel showed that the primitive recursive functions of PA are
formally representable in FA. Without that subproof, the incom-
pleteness proof fails. The formal representability relation that
mapped FA’s primitive recursive functions to PA’s met two
essential conditions. One was that the map was isomorphic. The
other was that its representations of the properties of PA’s prim-
itive recursive functions caused no telling misrepresentation of
how these functions actually work in PA. The representation
relation had two essential virtues. It was tight and straight.
Let’s come back to our concept-clarification line, with par-
ticular reference to how the intuitive concept of truth fares in
Tarski’s model theory. On the face of it, and rightly, it fares very
badly. But upon reflection, there is something that might be done
to repair the damage. We could postulate a relation of formal
32. Kurt Gödel, “On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and
related systems I”, in van Heijenoort 1967 at pages 592-616. First published, in Ger-
man, in 1931.
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representability mapping Tarski truth language truths, suitably
adjusted to handle the havoc imposed on intuitive truth by the
Liar. Call this relation R. The question that now arises is obvi-
ous: Is R both provably tight and straight? The answer is that it is
not.
33
Even so, in his 1935 paper Tarski assigned himself two tasks.
One would be the reformulation of the model theory of standard
first-order logic to spare its own truth predicate from the ravages
of paradox. The second was to turn his sights on natural language
truth-predicate which would yield to Tarski’s formal repre-
sentability ambitions. Thus the title of this classic paper is cor-
rect with respect to the first objective and wholly misses the
mark with respect to the second.
34
In his formalized language, Tarski handled the formalized
truth predicate in the way that post-paradox set theorists han-
dled the new concept of set. In each case infinite hierarchies were
called into play. In the case of truth, sentences of the language
were sorted into levels. At level one, no attributions of truth are
allowed. At level two, truth-ascriptions can be made of the sen-
tences at level one and only they. The levels pile up into the trans-
finite, directing truth-ascription at each level so as to keep the
Liar at bay. Nowhere in the hierarchy could a sentence be found
that ascribed falsity to itself. No sentence on any level would be
allowed to ascribe falsity to itself. Given that a formal language is
33. More details are available in Woods, “Does changing the subject from A to B really
provide an enlarged understanding of A?”, Logic Journal of the IGPL, 24 (2016),
456-480.
34. There is little work on the model theories of formalized languages by Canadian
informal logicians. A notable and artful exception is the translation of Tarski’s fol-
low-up paper of 1936 by Magda Stroika and David Hitchcock’s translation of “The
concept of following logically”, History and Philosophy of Logic, 23 (2002), 155-196.
Polish and German originals first published in 1936. The more common title in
English is “On the concept of logical consequence”, a translation of the original Ger-
man title of 1936, “Über den Begriff der logischen Folgerung”. The Stroika and
Hitchcock translation is more faithful to the German. A Polish friend tells me that
the same holds for the Polish title.
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a made-up thing with a name that’s not its own, there is no real
shock in making room in its lexicon for an infinite number of
inequivalent truth predicates. Let’s call this theory Tarski’s the-
ory of *truth.
Having fixed *truth for formal languages, Tarski now turns
to natural languages and their home predicates for truth. What
Tarski wanted was a theory of truth in natural language that
would be modelled on his theory of *truth. This could be accom-
plished in one or another of two ways. He could infinitely enlarge
a natural language’s number of truth predicates in the way that
he’d done in his theory of *truth, or he could retain a single truth
predicate and assign it infinitely many meanings in any given
natural language. Either way, predications of truth could be sub-
ject to ascription constraints by predicate-rank or the particular
meaning which the univocal predicate had at that level. English
would be spared the chaos of paradox.
Whatever we may think of Tarski’s theory of *truth, there is
nothing to be said for his theory of truth, beyond that it has all
the virtue of theft over honest toil, as Russell said of another
thing.
35
Tarski’s theory of truth in English is false on empirical
grounds. It so greatly distorts the truth about truth as to make
it virtually unrecognizable in Tarski’s approach. Even had Tarski
established a tight relation of formal representability that hooked
up the theory of *truth with the theory of truth, it could not
have been a straight one. That leaves the theory of truth hovering
midway between the terminus of the conceptual clarification line
and its rational reconstruction node. In 1944, Tarski published
a somewhat more accessible account of his treatment of truth.
36
In no time at all, the formal semantics bug bit hard, and an
35. Actually the axiom of reducibility.
36. Alfred Tarski, “The semantic conception of truth”, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 4 (1944), 341-375. Here, too, we have a misleading title, in which truth is a
natural-language property and “semantic” means “model-theoretic”. Tarski’s most
accessible account, and also the shortest, is “Truth and Proof”, Scientific American,
220 (1969), 63-77.
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ambitious literature in the philosophy of language flowed forth,
attesting throughout to the determination of analytic philoso-
phers to get to the bottom of truth and meaning in natural lan-
guage, with methods pioneered by Tarski.
If the modern history of the philosophy of language in English-
speaking communities is our guide, the habit of calling logic’s
model theoretic provisions for its formulas a truth conditional
semantics for them
37
now spreads to English itself in a suitably
adjusted retrofitting. With it comes the quite striking allied
assumption that the meaning of an English sentence is uniquely
determined by its truth conditions, that is, its honest-to-good-
ness no-sneer-quotes truth conditions. We can plot the rise of
this surprisingly captive idea from Tarski’s provisions for artifi-
cial languages to Suppes’ application of them to the philosophy
of science the so-called semantic theory of scientific theories
and to Davidson’s appropriation of them for the languages of
mankind.
38
In “Truth and meaning”, Davidson writes as follows:
“Much of what is called for [in a Tarski-style theory of truth] is to
mechanize as far as possible what we now do by art when we put
ordinary English into one or other [regimented] canonical notation.
The point is not that canonical notation is better than the rough
original idiom, but rather that if we know what the canonical nota-
tion is canonical for, we have as good a theory for the idiom as for
its kept companion.”39
37. More accurately, a T-conditional semantics.
38. Patrick Suppes, Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science: Selected Papers
from 1951-1969, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969, and Representation and Invariance of Scien-
tific Structures, Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2002. See also Frederick Suppe, The
Semantic View of Theories and Scientific Realism, Urbana and Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, 1989. Donald Davidson, “Theories of meaning and learnable lan-
guages”, reprinted in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation at pages 3-15. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984, “Semantics for natural languages”, reprinted in the same col-
lection at pages 55-64.
39. Donald Davidson, "Truth and meaning", reprinted in Inquiries into Truth and Interpre-
tation at pages 93-108. Emphasis in the original.
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It is worth noting how closely what Davidson is saying here
resembles what teachers of logic often say to disgruntled stu-
dents smart enough to see that the mapping rules that take (cer-
tain classes) of natural language arguments to their logical forms
in L are defective. The teacher will admit the difficulty and
encourage the student to apply the rules with intuitive discre-
tion. This, by the way, is not bad advice. It is easier for us to avoid
sentences that meaning-imply others or are at odds with them
also by virtue of meaning, than to produce well-made theories of
these properties. Still, it’s an embarrassing situation for the map-
ping rules. As normally stated, they are insufficient to deliver the
backwards reflection property for *validity in the absence of a
principled theory of making-entailment and meaning-inconsis-
tency, neither of which can be modelled in a logic that provides
for entailment and inconsistency by logical form.
Davidson’s is an empirical theory. No empirical theory of any
note or durability is wholly free of non-empirical elements. But
some theories are a good deal more empirical than others. Some
are only glancingly empirical. Mathematical physics is less
empirical than theoretical physics and it, in turn, less so than
population genetics. Davidson’s theory of truth is empirical in
roughly the way that theoretical physics is, namely, not all that
much so. It is a theory embodying high-octane minglings of the
empirical and the theoretically distortive. Davidson is fully aware
that there is too much in natural English – indexicals for instance
or action sentences – to be captured by a finitely axiomatized
theory of truth in formalized languages with Tarskian bicondi-
tionals mapping chunks of English to L. Convention T is the
problem. It is a fundamental constraint in Tarski’s theory, pro-
viding that “Snow is white” is true just in case snow is white. But
if, for example, we wanted to include sentences with indexicals
for time and place, Convention T would deny them admission.
It is not simply the case that “It is now cold here” is true just in
case it is now cold here. Accordingly, Davidson constructs a two-
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step approach to natural language meaning. In much simplified
terms, step one will draw from Tarski what works for a frag-
ment of context-independent English, and step two will develop
a way of mapping one-to-one some of the contextually sensitive
ones that Tarski can’t handle to regimented sentences of English
which are thought to repair those omissions.
We won’t understand Davidson unless we understand that,
in canonical notation, the logical particles of L are neologisms
that enter the lexicon of beefed-up English with a presumptive
precedence over their counterparts in unenriched English. For
example, “∀” now joins the lexical ranks of “all” and “every”, but
it enters with stipulative intent and provides ready occasion to
summon up Burgess’s warning. What “all” and “every” used to
mean in unenriched English, they now mean what “∀” means in
L. Similarly, the theory of truth that is good for canonical Eng-
lish is the theory of *truth for L. Then “⊧” enters the lexicon of
the metalinguistic regions of spoken English as another neol-
ogism, displacing the native’s “logically true” and, in two-place
contexts, the native’s “entails”.
40
So there is something not quite
to like in this rather dismissive passage of Davidson’s. In light of
the difficulties currently in view the canonical notation interven-
tion carries nontrivial risk of a stipulationist high-jacking of pre-
cisely that ordinary idiom which Davidson assures us is no less
good than the good of its canonical notation. I admit to think-
ing, however, that Quine’s manic extensionalism seriously dis-
torts Tarski’s message, and that Quine’s influence on him places
Davidson himself at two removes from Tarski.
40. Some readers might think that I’ve taken this point too far. Why would we be so
hard on “⊧”? Why couldn’t it simply be a notational variant of “entails” or, as the case
may be “logically true”? The reason why is that the model theoretic property
denoted by “⊧” is not at all the property denoted by “entails” or “logically true”.
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5. HOW CRITICAL IS THE FORMALIST CRISIS?
In the early 1970s virtually any philosopher working in the
informal logic sector of Canadian approaches to the theory of
argument would have known about formal semantics and
wouldn’t have been much alarmed by it, provided it was put to
uses for which it was best suited. It was also true that when
these researchers talked about the suitability of formal methods
and formal models for real-life argument, they need not have
been thinking (and often weren’t) of formal semantics in the
model-theoretic sense. Even so, the prevailing mood was, and
still is, more anti formal methods than pro. Of course, there was
a minority who thought that formal measures could be pro-
ductive in ways that took proper notice of the variabilities in
what real-life argument aims for and the manner it is affected
by context in the formal logics of deduction, not because of
coloured-shirt problems and the problems posed by formal rep-
resentability presumptions, but rather for the straightforward
reason that most good argument and most good reasoning is
invalid. (Thus, the missed target problem.) There are several rea-
sons for these dissatisfactions. One, as we have seen, is that for-
mal systems can’t represent meaning connections in natural
languages upon which good inferences often crucially depend.
Another that we haven’t mentioned yet is that formal systems
tend to conflate conditions on implication with rules of infer-
ence, an equation that doesn’t hold true in natural language.
41
A
third reservation was the indifference of formal systems to the
crucial impact of context and agency on the success or failure of
real-life argument. In due course, there arose the idea that there
was nothing wrong with these logics in relation to what they
41. The classical paper is Gilbert Harman, “Induction: A discussion of the relevance of
the theory of knowledge to the theory of induction”, in Marshall Swain, editor,
Induction, Acceptance and Rational Belief, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1970.
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were designed for,
42
and nothing intrinsically misbegotten about
the idea that they can profitably elucidate their own respective
subject matters.
Why not, then, consider adapting existing logics, or building
new ones, with a view to capturing in suitably formalized ways
the peculiarities that matter for the realities of human argument-
making on the ground? Early examples were the efforts by
Woods and Walton to model composition and division argu-
ments in Tyler Burge’s formal theory of aggregation,
43
and to
do the same for petitio principia in formal systems of epistemic
logic in conjunction with those of formal dialectic.
44
The notion
of formal dialectic was itself an attempt to broaden the formal
modellability of human argument, in the way that ancient logic
dealt with contentious argument.
45
Indeed the whole sweep of
the Woods-Walton Approach was one that adapted various pre-
existing logical formalisms to the varying characteristics of real-
life argument, especially those that give rise to fallacies in what
had become to be known as fallacies in the traditional sense. In
that sense, a fallacy ticks the following boxes: It is an error of
reasoning; it is committed with a frequency exceeding the rea-
soning-error norm without regard to sex or gender distinctions,
ethnicity, (adult) age, or nationality; it is an inviting and attrac-
tive error that disguises its wrongfulness; and its rate of post-
diagnostic recidivism is extremely high; in other words the error
42. Notably their varied and sometimes rivalrous contributions to the foundations of
mathematics.
43. “Composition and division”, Studia Logica, 36 (1979) 381-406. Reprinted as chapter 8
in Fallacies: Selected Papers. Tyler Burge, “A theory of aggregates”, Noûs, 11 (1977),
97-118.
44. “Arresting circles in formal dialogues”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 7 (1978), 73-90.
Reprinted as chapter 10 in Fallacies: Selected Papers.
45. See for example, Aristotle’s foundational contribution in On Sophistical Refutations, in
Jonathan Barnes, editor, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised English Transla-
tion, two volumes, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984; I, 278-314.
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is incorrigible.
46
One thing that soon became apparent to post-
Hamblin researchers is how different in kind the fallacies on the
traditional lists tended to be. Why, for example, would we think
that there is a common structural core shared by the ad bacu-
lum fallacy and the fallacy of hasty generalization? Whereupon
was born the logical pluralism which underlay the Woods-Wal-
ton Approach.
47
In more recent times, there have been aggres-
sive attempts to re-engineer approaches to real-life argument in
formal systems of increasingly sophisticated mathematical com-
plexity, which have attracted little Canadian participation and
46. Not every fallacy theorist accepted the traditional concept of fallacy. See, for exam-
ple, Gerald Massey, “Are there any good arguments that bad arguments are bad?”
Philosophy in Context, 4 (1975), 61-77; “In defense of asymmetry”, Philosophy in Con-
text, 6 (1975), 44-45, supplementary volume; and “The fallacy behind fallacies”, Mid-
west Studies in Philosophy, 6 (1981), 489-500. See also Hintikka, “The fallacy of
fallacies” 1984. Much later came John Woods’ “Lightening up on the ad hominem”,
Informal Logic, 27 (2007), 101-134; “The concept of fallacy is empty: A resource-
bound approach to error”, in Lorenzo Magnani and Li Ping, editors, Model Based
Reasoning in Science, Technology and Medicine, pages 69-90, Berlin and Amsterdam:
Springer, 2007; and “Begging the question is not a fallacy”, in Cédric Dégrement,
Laurent Keiff and Helge Rükert, editors, Dialogues, Logics and Other Strange Things:
Essays in Honour of Shahid Rahman, pages 149-178, London: College Publications,
2008 (with Dov Gabbay). In Errors of Reasoning, Woods generalizes these findings,
arguing that the traditional list of fallacies fails to instantiate the traditional concep-
tion of them. In the interest of historical accuracy, I should point out that some of
these dissenters dissent from different doctrines. Massey dissents from the idea that
a fallacy is an argument or inference that disguises its invalidity. Hintikka rejects the
view that fallacies are errors of inference. Woods accepts the traditional conception
of fallacy and rejects the traditional list.
47. The Amsterdam School’s van Eemeren and Grootendorst are leading critics of W &
W’s pluralism in fallacy theory. Writing in 1992, they say: “The systematic explo-
ration of advanced logical systems in order to analyse fallacies is characteristic of
Woods and Walton’s approach, [according to which] every fallacy needs, so to speak,
its own logic. For practical purposes this approach is not very realistic... One only
gets fragmentary descriptions of the various fallacies... Ideally one unified theory
that is capable of dealing with all the different phenomena is to be preferred.” (Frans
H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies:
A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1992; p. 103.)
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only slight and equivocal attention.
48
I have it on good authority
that Woods is drawn to the construction of heavy equipment
technologies by the fun of making them up. When well-wrought,
he sees them as works of intellectual high art. Woods harbours
for the BGW attack-and-defend networks no conscientious aspi-
rations for the conceptual clarification of the concept of adver-
sarial argument in real life. He doesn’t, however, slight the as-yet
unfound good that sometimes lies in formal models that distort
their original targets beyond recognition, when they lead to a
better understanding of things not-yet heard of. Recall here
Bohr’s and Planck’s utter distortion of the Newtonian concept of
light in a way that helped turn physics in a direction that would
greatly enlarge our understanding of the natural world, as if by
chance. Not by chance, Woods thinks, but by Bohr’s and Planck’s
amazing nose for powerful new ideas.
Although the Woods-Walton Approach is still recognized as
something of foundational significance, it had actually run its
course by the mid-1980s after a scant decade or slightly more of
dominant play, especially in fallacy theory. In looking back now,
I think that it can be said with some assurance that the good
that Woods and Walton saw in modelling real-life argument and
inference formally arose from the efficiencies of simplified exem-
plication and, even more so of finite expressibility. It is a lesson
easily learned from a first course on the sentential calculus that,
while there are infinitely many wffs in its formal language L, they
are finitely expressible or representable as follows:
48. Howard Barringer, Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods, “Temporal dynamics of sup-
port and attack networks: From argumentation to zoology”, in Dieter Hutler and
Werner Stephan, editors, Mechanizing Mathematical Reasoning, Berlin: Springer-Ver-
lag, 2005; “Network modalities”, in G. Gross and K. U. Schulz, editors, Linguistics,
Computer Science and Language Processing, London: College Publications, 2008; and
“Modal argumentation networks”, Argumentation and Computation, 2-3 (2012),
203-227. Also notable is the turning of some argumentation theorists to AI. See here
Douglas Walton, Witness Testimony Evidence: Argumentation, Artificial Intelligence and
Law, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
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1. p1 is an atomic wff.
2. If pn is an atomic wff, so is pn+1.
3. Nothing else is an atomic wff.
4. If φ is an atomic wff, it is a wff.
5. If φ is a wff, so is ⌐∼φ¬.
6. If φ and ψ are wffs, so are
⌐φ ∧ ψ ¬
⌐φ ∨ ψ ¬
⌐φ ⊃ ψ ¬
⌐φ ≡ ψ ¬
7. Nothing else is a wff.
Another thing we can say with even greater assurance is that in
the early 1970s Woods and Walton certainly had not intended to
say their piece about fallacies in the manner in which Tarski had
tried (and failed) to say his piece about truth in natural language.
In reaction to Charles Hamblin’s challenge to restore fallacy
theory to its proper home in logical theory, Canadian contribu-
tions to the logics of argument, have been numerous, varied, and
in a number of respects highly influential, as witness the work
of Walton and his colleagues on argumentation schemes.
49
Walton’s
emphasis on argumentation schemes for elucidating the striking
type-complexity of human argument has considerably shaped
the study of argument internationally. It also reflects a differ-
ence of opinion about what makes a system formal. For most
of its long history, logic had been formal in Aristotle’s sense, in
which real arguments would be represented by sequences of nat-
ural language sentences whose general terms have been replaced
by schematic letters. From Frege onwards, formalization would be
49. Walton, Christopher Reed and Fabrizio Macagno, Argumentation Schemes, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2008; and Walton, Methods of Argumentation, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2013.
92 JOHN WOODS
provided by semantically barren artificial “languages” in which
quantification serves to bind free variables.
50
There is a world of
difference between a schematic letter and a variable. Variables
are bindable by quantifiers. Schematic letters are not. Consider
the schema “All A are B” together with its proposed counterpart
in L, “∀x, A(x) ⊃ B(x))”. The latter is a fully expressed formal sen-
tence of L or in a suitably regimental canonical notation. The
former is not itself a sentence of English. It is a schematic render-
ing of numberlessly many sentences got by uniformly substitut-
ing general terms of English for the schematic letters “A” and “B”.
The expression “For all A, B, (All A are B)” is in several respects
not well-formed in English or L. In looking back, one might
think that the early days Canadians with an eye on formal model-
ling favoured the formalization via variables approach, but more
recently have returned to the fold of argumentation schemes.
This, I think, is a misconception. Here is why.
In the years closely following Hamblin, perhaps Canada’s most
internationally recognized contribution to the theory of argu-
ment lay in fallacy theory. If it were distinctive of the Woods-
Walton Approach to call into service pre-existing logical
formalisms or readily adaptable ones, this wouldn’t be the case
for the others. One thing is clear in retrospect. Whatever Woods
and Walton thought they were doing in the 1970s and early
eighties, it was not what Woods decidedly did try to do in 1974
with his Logic of Fiction: A Philosophical Sounding of Deviant Logic.
51
In that book, Woods wanted a systematic theory of reference,
truth and inference for literary discourse, using a formal seman-
tics defined over a formalized language for modal logic, adapted
to the needs of a fictionality operator. This was not what he and
Walton were up to in their fallacies work. What they were doing
50. Gottlob Frege, Begriffsschrift, Halle: Louis-Nebert, 1879. Also in van Heijenoort
1967.
51. The Hague and Paris, Mouton. Second edition, with a Foreword by Nicholas Grif-
fin, volume 23 of Studies in Logic, London: College Publications, 2009.
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together falls a long way short of a formalist crisis.
52
In the first
place, they were using pre-existing theories as examples of how
points of interest to fallacy theorists might be worked up. For
example, W & W modelled their approach to the petitio principii in
the way that certain game-theoretical dialogue logicians handled
attack-and-defend arguments. Moreover, in all cases in which
logical symbolism was employed, the intention was simplifica-
tion, and the means of attaining it was schematic. Even in those
cases in which W & W borrowed from pre-existing theories that
had been formalized to a degree that would support a formal
semantics, they would not be a material feature of their borrow-
ings. From which we may safely conclude that, for all the occa-
sional anxieties of their critics, the W & W Approach was never
at risk for the formalist crisis. It came nowhere close to having
missed the target problem and it ran no risk of making its target
concepts unrecognizable by virtue of their formal misrepresen-
tations. Mind you, that is far from a wholesale absolution for the
errors and shortcomings that remain.
6. WHITHER?
The Canadian brand was never as well-defined and organiza-
tionally and doctrinally sustained as the Amsterdam brand.
Brands, as we know, come and go, and these two have flourished
for decades now. It remains to be seen how well they hold up
in the years and decades ahead. Judged from where we are now
on the Canadian scene, there are clear signs of where the coun-
try’s research efforts are likely to be directed. One of them is
logical structure of argument and reasoning in legal contexts.
53
52. I now think that what Woods was doing with fiction in 1974 was the real formalist
crisis. For more, see his Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic, forthcoming in the Syn-
these Library.
53. In addition to Walton’s contributions already noted, see Woods, Is Legal Reasoning
Irrational? An Introduction to the Epistemology of Law, Volume 2 of Law and Society,
London: College Publications, 2015.
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Another signals a renewed alliance with cognitive, experimental
and social psychology, neurobiology and the other empirical
branches of cognitive science. In one of its streams, we see an
effort to do for logic what Quine and others have done for epis-
temology, namely to give it the naturalized form which has been
intermittently in play in logic since Bacon, Mill, Husserl, Dewey,
and later Toulmin, notwithstanding the intense efforts of Frege
and others to make all of logic dance to the tune of mathemat-
ics.
54
Also of note are the already mentioned efforts to build
alliances with computer science and AI, in a way perhaps of
exposing how the mathematics of software engineering might
leaven the insights of those whose purpose is the elucidation of
human argument on the ground. Also of growing importance
is the exposure of human argument-making to the plethora of
work already under the belt of theories of defeasible, default and
nonmonotonic consequence. Whether any of this outreach will
lead to new Canadian brands remains to be seen. Ray Reiter’s
paper on the logic of default reasoning, was published when he
was a member of UBC’s mathematics department prior to his
departure for the University of Toronto.
55
Although a founda-
tional contribution by a Canadian, no one thinks of default log-
ics as carrying a Canadian brand.
56
In the theory of argument
54. For recent Canadian work in this vein, see Woods, Errors of Reasoning: Naturalizing
the Logic of Inference, 2013/2014. For important work from OSSA honorary Wind-
sorites, see Maurice Finocchiaro, Arguments About Arguments: Systematic, Critical and
Historical Essays in Logical Theory, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005;
James B. Freeman, Acceptable Premises, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005;
Finocchiaro, Meta-argumentation: An Approach to Logic and Argumentation Theory, vol-
ume 42 of Studies in Logic, London: College Publications, 2013; and Fabio Paglieri,
editor, The Psychology of Argument: Cognitive Approaches to Argumentation and Persua-
sion, volume 59 of Studies in Logic, London: College Publications, 2016.
55. Raymond Reiter, “A logic for default reasoning" Artificial Intelligence, 12 (1980),
81-132.
56. See here J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson, editors, Conductive Argument: An
Overlooked Type of Defeasible Reasoning, volume 33 of Studies in Logic, London: Col-
lege Publications, 2011. Although the editors are Canadian, the chief promoter of
the conductive cause, Carl Wellman, is not.
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the Canadian brand is, like all brands, a fleeting thing. I foresee
no successor to that Canadian throne holding sway for the next
forty-seven years.
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CHAPTER 4.
THE PROBLEM OF MISSING PREMISSES
DAVID HITCHCOCK
Abstract: Theorists of argument suppose that arguments with def-
inite conclusions that do not follow logically from their premiss
or premisses have a “gap-filling” unexpressed premiss, whose iden-
tification and addition to the stated premiss or premisses would
produce an argument whose conclusion does follow logically. A
common explanation for the omission of a premiss, found from
Aristotle to Quine and Copi, is that arguers leave unstated known
information that the readers or hearers can supply for themselves.
Traditional Aristotelian logic developed a method for supplying the
supposedly omitted premiss in the case of incomplete categorical
syllogisms. This traditional approach has two weaknesses. The first
weakness is that not every argument that is supposed to have a gap-
filling unstated premiss is an incomplete categorical syllogism. This
weakness can be remedied by recognizing that filling out an incom-
plete categorical syllogism by adding the appropriate categorical
statement is a special case of constructing a covering generalization
of the argument. The second weakness is that there is indetermi-
nacy about what covering generalization to supply, with respect to
both which repeated components of the argument are to be sub-
ject to generalization and how broadly to generalize over them.
This weakness can be remedied by adopting a policy of maximum
generalization, subject to constraints of context and plausibility. A
more fundamental objection to this approach is phenomenologi-
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cal: people reasoning and arguing in ways that are not logically
compelling have no awareness of having omitted a premiss, even
when they are reasoning something out for themselves. The whole
approach of postulating an unexpressed gap-filler rests on a mis-
take, the mistake of supposing that there is a gap. Rather, logical
consequence is a special case of a broader concept of consequence
that includes material as well as formal consequence. The question
to be asked in evaluating an argument with a definite conclusion is
not how to expand it so as to make the conclusion follow logically
but whether it has a non-trivially acceptable covering generaliza-
tion that supports counterfactual instances. The broader concept of
consequence has been recognized by Bolzano, Peirce, Ryle, Sellars,
Toulmin, George, Brandom and others, but has not yet been recog-
nized in introductory logic textbooks. It needs to be.
1. INTRODUCTION
At the First International Symposium on Informal Logic, held in
Windsor, Ontario in June 1978, Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony
Blair outlined a research agenda (Johnson & Blair 1980, pp.
25-26) for the sub-discipline of philosophy which their confer-
ence made newly self-conscious, a sub-discipline subsequently
recognized by the International Federation of Philosophical
Societies (FISP) under the title “philosophy of argumentation”.
1
In their “unclassified and partial list of problems and issues in
informal logic” (Johnson & Blair 1980, p. 25), there appeared
what they called “the problem of assumptions and missing
premises”, which they characterized by a set of questions:
What exactly is a missing premise? What different kinds of assump-
tions can be distinguished in argumentation? Which are significant
for argument evaluation? How are missing premises to be identified
and formulated? Are these just practical and pedagogical questions,
or theoretical as well? ( Johnson & Blair 1980, p. 25)
1. In the first circular for the FISP-sponsored World Congress of Philosophy in 2018,
philosophy of argumentation is the 57th of 99 alphabetically ordered sections to
which one could contribute papers (https://www.fisp.org/documents/
WCP%202018%20First%20Circular%20English.pdf; accessed 2017 12 06).
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Subsequently Ennis (1982) distinguished three types of implicit
assumptions in arguments: backups implicitly assumed as sup-
port for a stated premiss, presuppositions without which a pre-
miss of the argument would not make sense, and gap-fillers
needed by the argument or implicitly used by the arguer to make
the conclusion follow logically from the stated premiss or pre-
misses.
The postulation of gap-fillers arises quite naturally from pay-
ing attention to real arguments.
2
Almost always, the conclusion
of a real argument is not a logical consequence of its premiss or
premisses.
3
However, if the stated premiss or premisses and the
2. By real arguments, I mean arguments that people produce in their efforts to justify
their claims or to explain why they hold the opinions that they do or to point out the
consequences of others’ positions or to accomplish any other communicative pur-
pose (except serving as an example in a logic textbook or as part of a Socratic ques-
tion-and-answer refutation).
3. The point holds on any accepted conception of logical consequence, whether infor-
mation-theoretic, modal, model-theoretic, set-theoretic, substitution-theoretic,
schematic, speech-act-theoretic, or syntactic. An information-theoretic conception
(Corcoran 1998) takes a proposition c to be a consequence of a set ∋ of proposi-
tions if and only if the information in the propositions in ∋ includes the informa-
tion in the proposition p. A modal interpretation (Bradley and Swartz 1979;
Etchemendy 1990) takes a proposition c to be a consequence of a set ∋ of proposi-
tions if and only if p is true in every possible “world” (i.e. state of affairs) in which
the propositions in ∋ are true. A model-theoretic conception (Tarski 2002/1936)
takes a sentence c in a formal (or formalized) language to be a consequence of a set
∋ of sentences in that language if and only if c is true on each uniform interpreta-
tion (or re-interpretation) of the extra-logical constants in c and in the sentences in
∋ on which every sentence in ∋ is true. A substitutional conception (Quine 1970)
takes a sentence c in a formal or formalized language to be a consequence of a set ∋
of sentences in that language if and only if the sentence obtained from c as the result
of any uniform substitution on the extra-logical constants in c and the sentences in
∋ is true if every sentence obtained from the sentences in ∋ by this substitution is
true. A schematic conception (Quine 1972) takes a sentence c in a formal or formal-
ized language to be a consequence of a set ∋ of sentences in that language if and
only if c and ∋ are instances of at least one set of schemata c(x1, …, xn) and ∋(x1,
…, xn) containing no extra-logical constants for which every instance of c(x1, …, xn)
is true for which the corresponding instances of the sentence schemata in ∋(x1, …,
xn) are true. A speech-act conception (Kearns 1997) takes a statement or proposi-
tional act c to follow from a set ∋ of statements or propositional acts if and only if a
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stated conclusion are not hedged by such qualifiers as ‘perhaps’
or ‘generally’ or ‘may’, the conclusion will typically be a logical
consequence of an expansion of the argument in which a pre-
miss is added. Thus the notion arose that such arguments have
an unexpressed premiss, variously described as missing (Johnson
& Blair 1980), tacit (Hitchcock 1983), hidden (Gough & Tindale
1985), or suppressed (Copi & Cohen 2002).
2. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
The failure of most real arguments to conform to logicians’ con-
ceptions of the consequence relation has been recognized since
the time of Aristotle, who found this failure in the speeches of
orators and explained it as due to their accommodation of the
limited attention span of their audience, for whom arguments
needed to be concise and should therefore omit components that
the audience could supply for themselves:
An enthymeme is a rhetorical proof… The enthymeme must be
a syllogism, with few <premisses>, often fewer than the primary
syllogism. For, if any of them is familiar, it is not necessary to
state it, for the hearer himself adds it. For example, <to show>
that Doreius has won a crowned contest, it is sufficient to say that
he has won at the Olympics, and it is not necessary to add that
the Olympics are crowned, for everybody knows <that>. (Aristotle,
Rhetoric I.1.1355a6, I.2.1357a16-20; my translation4)
person is committed to accepting c who accepts the statements or propositional acts
in ∋. A syntactic conception (Tarski 2002/1936) takes a sentence c in a formal or
formalized language to be a consequence of a set ∋ of sentences in that language if
and only if c is deducible from ∋ using the rules of inference of a sound logic for
that language. There are variants on these conceptions. They are not equivalent to
one another. In particular, application of the conceptions defined in terms of a for-
mal or formalized language requires “translation lore” whose use requires judgment
and can be quite complicated. The differences among the conceptions turn out to be
relevant to the task of extending the concept of logical consequence to cover so-
called “material consequence” (Sellars 1953).
4. “esti d’apodeixis rhêtorikê enthymêma … anankaion … to d’ enthymêma syllogismon, kai ex
oligôn te kai pollakis elattonôn ê ho prôtos syllogismos˴ ean gar êi ti toutôn gnôrimon, oude
dei legein˴ autos gar touto prostithêsin ho akroatês, hoion hoti Dôreius stephanitên agôna
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By the “primary syllogism”, Aristotle here means the syllogism
found in attempts like that of Socrates in Plato’s “peirastic” (test-
ing) dialogues to refute his interlocutors’ theses. It is the kind of
reasoning for which Aristotle subsequently developed the first
system of formal logic, his categorical syllogistic. By definition,
the conclusion of a syllogism follows necessarily from its pre-
misses.
5
Aristotle used the word ‘enthymeme’ (Greek ‘enthymêma’) for
the syllogism’s rhetorical counterpart, which he took to be char-
acterized by reasoning from likelihoods or signs (Aristotle, Prior
Analytics II.27.70a10
6
). For Aristotle, it was not a defining feature
of an enthymeme that it has fewer premisses than a “primary
syllogism”, only a frequent occurrence. Stoic logicians, however,
defined an enthymeme as an incomplete syllogism.
7
Their defi-
nition became accepted in the European logical tradition. With
syllogisms taken to be Aristotelian categorical syllogisms, with
two premisses and a conclusion each of subject-predicate form
and of a definite quality (affirmative or negative) and quantity
(universal, particular or singular), the textbook tradition distin-
guished three types of enthymemes: first-order enthymemes in
which the major premiss (the premiss containing the predicate of
the conclusion) was missing, second-order enthymemes in which
the minor premiss (the premiss containing the subject of the con-
nenikêken˴ hikanon gar eipein hoti Olympia nenikêken, to d’ hoti staphantês ta Olympia
oude dei prostheinai˴ gignôskousi gar pantes” (OCT text, ed. W. D. Ross)
5. “A syllogism is an argument in which certain things are posited and something other
than the things laid down results of necessity through the things laid down” (Topics
I.1.100a25-27, my translation). “Esti dê ho syllogismos logos en hôi tethentôn tinôn het-
eron ti tôn keimenôn ex anankês symbainei dia tôn keimenôn” (OCT text, ed. Ross). Simi-
lar definitions can be found in Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations (164b27-165a2) and
in his Prior Analytics (I.1.24b18-20)
6. “An enthymeme is a syllogism from likelihoods or signs” (Aristotle, Prior Analytics
II.27.70a10, my translation). “Enthymêma de esti syllogismos ex eikotôn ê sêmeiôn” (OCT
text, ed. Ross).
7. “The enthymeme is an incomplete syllogism” (Epictetus, Enchiridion I.8.3; my trans-
lation). “... atelês syllogismos esti to enthymêma” (Teubner text, ed. Schenkl).
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clusion) was missing, and third-order enthymemes in which the
conclusion was missing (Copi & Cohen 2002, p. 270). The limited
number of types of two-premiss categorical syllogisms made it
possible to construct a sound and complete system for filling out
incomplete categorical syllogisms of the three orders, helped by
such generalizations from Aristotle’s results as the principles that
the middle term shared by both premisses must be “distributed”
at least once, that a universal conclusion follows only from uni-
versal premisses, that a negative conclusion follows only if there
is exactly one negative premiss, and so forth.
Consider, for example, the argument that birds are reptiles,
because they are vertebrates, are suspended in a membrane in
their embryonic stage, and are descended from the most recent
ancestor of living turtles, crocodilians and lizards. The conclu-
sion is a universal affirmative statement whose subject is the
term ‘birds’ and the premiss is another universal affirmative
statement with the same subject. To make this argument into a
categorical syllogism, one needs to supply a second premiss that
links the predicate of the stated premiss to the predicate of the
conclusion. The only categorical statement that does so in a way
that produces a categorical syllogism is a universal affirmative
statement whose subject is the predicate of the stated premiss
and whose predicate is the predicate of the conclusion: All ver-
tebrates that are suspended in a membrane in their embryonic
stage and are descended from the most recent ancestor of living
turtles, crocodilians and lizards are reptiles. The same method
can be used to find a statement whose addition as a premiss or a
conclusion will transform any incomplete categorical syllogism
into a complete one.
Although Aristotle located the supposed omission of a premiss
in the speeches of orators, samplings of arguments in scholarly
books and in calls to radio talk shows have found a similar failure
to conform to logicians’ models (Hitchcock 2002; 2009). In fewer
than 10% of the arguments discovered in either context (6% of
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the scholarly arguments, 7.7% of the spoken arguments) was the
conclusion a logical consequence of the premiss or premisses.
Aristotle’s explanation of this phenomenon continues to be
repeated, both in theoretical works (e.g. Quine 1972, p. 169) and
in introductory logic texts (e.g. Copi & Cohen 2002, p. 269).
Acceptance of the explanation that a premiss has been omitted
from such arguments naturally raises the question of how one is
to discover the premiss that has been omitted, especially in cir-
cumstances like the analysis of a written or recorded argument,
where one cannot ask the author to supply it or to assent to one’s
suggestion as to what it was.
3. FIRST WEAKNESS: LIMITED SCOPE
The traditional approach of turning an incomplete categorical
syllogism into a complete one has at least two weaknesses. First,
not every argument whose conclusion is not a logical conse-
quence of its premiss or premisses is an incomplete categorical
syllogism. We can ignore arguments whose conclusion is not a
statement or is qualified by a word like ‘probably’ or ‘presum-
ably’ or ‘perhaps’ or ‘possibly’, since there is no statement that
can be added to such arguments as an additional premiss to make
the conclusion a logical consequence of the expanded argument’s
premisses. Even setting aside such arguments, we can find argu-
ments whose conclusion is not a logical consequence of their
premiss or premisses but which are not incomplete categorical
syllogisms. Consider for example the following argument, put
forward by a woman caller to a radio phone-in program dis-
cussing the wish of a married woman to go to dance clubs with-
out her husband:
I think the reason why the wife wants to go to clubs is because
she would prefer to feel younger again. You know, when you go to
clubs, you know that you have it when you can pick up guys and
stuff. I think she wants that, and the husband either doesn’t have
the need or he doesn’t have it. So I think he should give her a break
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and if he doesn’t enjoy going give her that one night with the girls
(Hitchcock 2009, “Appendix”, p. 3).
This is a complex argument, which requires some analysis to
tease out its structure. The ultimate conclusion, introduced by
the word ‘so’, is supported immediately by the statement that
immediately precedes it. This supporting statement is a conjunc-
tion, whose first conjunct repeats in somewhat different words
the idea of the initial statement, for which the second statement
in the paragraph is offered in support. Filling in anaphoric ref-
erences, deleting the framing introductory phrases “I think” and
“you know”, construing “it” as referring to sex appeal, and using a
standard numbering system, one might analyze the argument as
follows:
1.1 When you go to clubs, you know that you
have sex appeal when you can pick up guys and
stuff.
1.The reason why the wife wants to go to clubs is
because she would prefer to feel younger again. (The
wife who wants to go to clubs wants to know that she
has sex appeal.)
2.The husband either doesn’t have the need to know that
he has sex appeal or doesn’t have sex appeal.
C.The husband should give his wife a break and if he doesn’t
enjoy going to clubs give her that one night out going to
clubs with the girls.
The main argument from premisses 1 and 2 to conclusion C
would be extremely difficult to massage into the form of an
incomplete categorical syllogism. Nevertheless, its conclusion is
an unqualified statement that does not follow logically from its
premisses. To fit the argument into the logician’s model, one
needs some way of attributing an unstated premiss to it. But the
approach of treating it as an incomplete categorical syllogism
does not provide such a way.
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The limited applicability of the traditional approach can be
overcome by recognizing that filling out a first-order or second-
order incomplete categorical syllogism is a special case of a more
general procedure. It can be shown by complete enumerative
induction that the premiss generated by the traditional approach
is logically equivalent to a covering generalization of the argu-
ment with respect to the term shared by the stated premiss and
the conclusion. We can use Aristotle’s Doreius argument as an
example, taking ‘Doreius’, the grammatical subject of both the
premiss and the conclusion, as the shared term. To construct
a covering generalization of such a one-premiss argument, we
form a conditional statement with the premiss as the antecedent
and the conclusion as the consequent:
If Doreius has won at the Olympics, then Doreius has won a
crowned contest.
We then replace the shared term with a variable of the appropri-
ate type, in this case a variable ranging over individuals:
If x has won at the Olympics, then x has won a crowned contest.
Formally, there should be an initial quantifier ‘for every x’, but we
take the universal quantification to be conveyed by the use, bor-
rowed from algebra, of small letters from the end of the alphabet
as being implicitly universally generalized. We then transform
the statement into something logically equivalent but more intel-
ligible:
Everyone who has won at the Olympics has won a crowned contest.
This is precisely the assumption that the traditional approach
would supply. It can be shown by complete enumerative induc-
tion on the moods of the categorical syllogistic that the covering
generalization of a first-order or second-order incomplete cate-
gorical syllogism with respect to the term shared by its premiss
and its conclusion is logically equivalent to the statement whose
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addition as a premiss would transform the argument into a com-
plete categorical syllogism.
Let us then apply the more general approach to the main argu-
ment of the dance clubs example. To construct a covering gen-
eralization, one forms first of all the argument’s associated
conditional, i.e. the (material) conditional whose antecedent is
the conjunction of the argument’s premisses and whose conse-
quent is the argument’s conclusion. In the above example, we get
the following conditional associated with the main argument:
If the reason why the wife wants to go to clubs is because she wants
to know that she has sex appeal and the husband either doesn’t
have the need to know that he has sex appeal or he doesn’t have
sex appeal, then the husband should give his wife a break and if he
doesn’t enjoy going to clubs give her that one night out going to
clubs with the girls.
Next, one identifies the repeated content expressions in the con-
ditional, making sure to include at least one content expression
shared by the antecedent and the consequent but also noting
content expressions repeated in the antecedent but not occurring
in the consequent.
8
By a content expression I mean a word or
phrase that can be replaced by a single independently significant
word without loss of grammaticality (Hitchcock 1985, p. 84). In
Aristotle’s example, the phrase ‘Doreius has won’ is a content
expression, because it can be replaced by the independently sig-
nificant word ‘win’ without loss of grammaticality. In our cur-
rent example, the repeated content expressions in the argument’s
associated conditional are “the wife”, “go to clubs”, “has sex
appeal”, and “the husband”. Putting variables of the appropriate
type in place of these phrases, and assuming introductory uni-
8. The reason for doing so anticipates the ultimate status of such a covering general-
ization as an inference-license rather than a premiss. Without the requirement of an
overlapping variable, there is no real inference to license. A conclusion could be said
to be a “consequence” of a set of premisses merely because it was true or merely
because the premisses were not all true. See (Hitchcock 1998, pp. 24-27).
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versal generalizations over these variables, one gets the following
(simplified) generalization of the associated conditional:
If x wants to do F because x wants to know that x has G and y either
does not want to know that y has G or does not have G, then if y
does not enjoy doing F y should let x do F.
Finally, one transforms the generalization into something more
intelligible. In our example, the result might be a statement like
the following:
One person should let another person do what they want to do if
the second person has a reason for doing it that the first person does
not share.
The reader may think that this statement is too general as a can-
didate for the missing premiss of the dance clubs argument. We
will consider this objection in due course.
4. SECOND WEAKNESS: INDETERMINACY
Extending the scope of the traditional approach in this way
addresses its first weakness, that not every logically incomplete
argument is an incomplete categorical syllogism. But a second
weakness remains, which as it happens both the Doreius argu-
ment and the dance clubs argument illustrate. Any argument
whose conclusion is not a logical consequence of its premiss
or premisses can be expanded in more than one way so as to
make the conclusion a logical consequence of the premisses of
the expanded argument.
9
Consider Aristotle’s Doreius argument.
9. The added premiss must entail (i.e. logically imply) the original argument’s associ-
ated material conditional. Otherwise, it would be consistent to assert the added pre-
miss and to deny the associated conditional. But denial of a material conditional is
logically equivalent to assertion of its antecedent and denial of its consequent. If the
conditional is an argument’s associated conditional, this amounts to assertion of the
original argument’s premiss(es) and denial of its conclusion, thus rejecting the claim
that the conclusion follows from the premiss(es) along with the added premiss.
Given that the associated conditional cannot coherently be supported by denial of
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If we take the traditional approach to completing it, we obtain
the unstated premiss that anyone who has won at the Olympics
has won a crowned contest. This assumption follows logically
from the assumption that Aristotle supposes will be supplied by
the hearer, that the Olympics are a crowned contest. But it is log-
ically weaker. For it would be true if, for example, the Olympics
were not a crowned contest but it was a requirement for com-
peting in the Olympics that one have previously won a crowned
contest. (Here we use a modal conception of logical consequence
to show that Aristotle’s unstated premiss is not a logical con-
sequence of the unstated premiss generated by the traditional
approach to enthymemes.)
One can however transform Aristotle’s example so that the tra-
ditional approach generates Aristotle’s assumption. To do so, one
needs to massage the stated components so as to make the entire
repeated phrase “Doreius has won” into a term. One might for
example rephrase the argument as follows:
Some contest at the Olympics is a contest which Doreius has won;
therefore, some contest which Doreius has won is a crowned con-
test.
With this rephrasing, the traditional approach generates the
assumption that every contest at the Olympics is a crowned con-
its antecedent or affirmation of its consequent (on pain of inconsistency in the first
case and begging the question in the second case), it needs a logically stronger state-
ment to support it. The obvious candidates for such a logically stronger statement
are universal generalizations of it. But any such generalizations can vary with
respect to which extralogical components of the associated conditional are subject
to generalization and how broad is the scope of the generalization. For many formal
languages, in fact, including the languages of first-order classical and intuitionistic
logic, it is a theorem (the Craig interpolation theorem) that, if one formula entails
another, there is an intermediate formula such that the first entails the intermediate
formula and the intermediate formula entails the second, an intermediate formula
that contains all and only the extralogical symbols in the first and second formulas
(Craig 1957, p. 267). Thus, if a supposedly logically incomplete argument is symbol-
ized in such a language, there will be an alternative to the proposed missing premiss
that is an interpolant between it and the argument’s associated conditional.
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test, which is the assumption that Aristotle supposed the hearer
can supply.
10
Aristotle based his choice on what he assumed
every hearer knows. But what of the many arguments that people
encounter where they do not have the required background
knowledge to select a known truth as the completion of a sup-
posedly incomplete argument?
Aristotle’s Doreius argument illustrates one way in which it
can be indeterminate which unstated premiss to attribute to a
supposedly incomplete argument: how much or how many of
the repeated components of the argument are to be abstracted
from (or generalized over) in constructing the unstated premiss.
Do we abstract from (generalize over) ‘Doreius’ or over ‘Doreius
has won’? Another example of this sort of indeterminacy, used
in (Hitchcock 1985), is the argument sometimes heard that mar-
ijuana should be legalized, because it is no more dangerous than
alcohol, which is already legal. Here we have three repeated
terms: ‘marijuana’, ‘legal’, ‘alcohol’. If we generalize on all three
terms, we get as an unstated assumption of the argument that
anything that is no more dangerous than another thing should
get whatever status that other thing has. But it seems unfair to
attribute to the argument an assumption that generalizes over
‘legal’ and to object that driving a car is no more dangerous
than cycling, which is already unlicensed, but that nobody would
agree that driving a car should be unlicensed. It seems fairer to
the argument not to treat ‘legal’ as a variable component.
The marijuana argument illustrates another way in which it
can be indeterminate which unstated premiss to attribute to a
supposedly incomplete argument: how broadly to generalize
over a repeated component of the argument. Intuitively, it would
be unfair to generalize so broadly over the repeated terms ‘mar-
ijuana’ and ‘alcohol’ as to expose the argument to the objection
10. For the proof that the traditional completion of the above incomplete categorical
syllogism is logically equivalent to its covering generalization with respect to the
shared term ‘contest which Doreius has won’, see the appendix.
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that not wearing a seat belt is no more dangerous than hang glid-
ing, which is already legal, but that it is not the case that not
wearing a seat belt should be made legal. The unfairness illus-
trates a felt need to restrict the scope of the generalization over
‘marijuana’ and ‘alcohol’ to recreational drugs: Any recreational
drug that is no more dangerous than a legal recreational drug
should be legalized.
Such restrictions of the scope of a covering generalization
apply particularly to what I came to call ‘occasional arguments’
(Hitchcock 2011). Quine (1960) used the term ‘occasional sen-
tence’ to refer to a sentence whose truth-value is partly a func-
tion of the occasion of its utterance. Similarly, an occasional
argument is an argument whose inferential scope is partly a
function of the occasion of its utterance. The following is an
example, provided by Robert Ennis in an e-mail communication:
… when Michael Scriven and I were trying to find our way to
Detroit airport in the car he rented, I said at one point, “The sign
says ‘Chicago’ [to the right], so we should turn right there.” (We were
trying to get on I-94 going to the airport.) (e-mail communication,
2009 June 8)
The quoted argument, including Ennis’s bracketed elaboration,
has as a premiss that the sign says ‘Chicago’ to the right and as
a conclusion that we should turn right “there”, i.e. at the place
where the sign points. The repeated content expressions in the
argument are thus ‘the sign’ and ‘[to the] right’. The covering gen-
eralization with respect to these repeated content expressions is
that we should turn in the direction indicated by any sign that
says ‘Chicago’. This generalization is a plausible candidate for
an implicit premiss of Ennis’s argument, with the caveat that it
needs restriction to the situation in which Ennis advanced his
argument. For example, after having gotten on I-94 going to the
airport, at the exit ramp from I-94 to the airport, it would be
a mistake for the driver to turn at that place in the direction
indicated by a sign that said Chicago. The inferential scope of
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Ennis’s argument is indicated by the additional information that
he supplied in his e-mail message. He and the driver were trying
to get on I-94 going to Detroit airport. As one can confirm by
consulting a road map, and as he and the driver both knew at
the time, they were on I-96, having come across the Ambassador
Bridge from Windsor, where they had been attending a confer-
ence. To restrict the scope of the covering generalization, it is
necessary to supplement the premisses with the relevant contex-
tually available information that is mutually known by the arguer
and the addressee, thus producing the following expanded argu-
ment, displayed in a standard form:
1.We are on I-96 after having crossed the Ambassador
Bridge.
2.We are trying to get on I-94 going to Detroit airport.
3.The sign says ‘Chicago’ to the right.
C.We should turn right where the sign says.
The supplementation of such occasional arguments has the func-
tion of specifying the scope of a plausible covering generaliza-
tion. It does not make the conclusion a logical consequence of
the expanded set of premisses. The repeated content expressions
in the expanded argument are ‘we’, ‘the sign’, and ‘right’. The
covering generalization with respect to these expressions, when
reformulated for intelligibility, is that anyone on I-96 after hav-
ing crossed the Ambassador Bridge who is trying to get on I-94
going to Detroit airport should follow the signs that say
‘Chicago’.
After this introduction of the concept of an occasional argu-
ment, we can return to the objection that the covering general-
ization supplied for the dance clubs argument was too general.
The proposed covering generalization was that one person
should let another person do what they want to do if the second
person has a reason for doing it that the first person does not
share. The argument, however, seemed very specific to the issue
of what a husband should let his wife do. In the context, there is a
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concern, pointed out explicitly by the talk-show host, that “most
of them [dance clubs—DH] are pick-up joints”. The caller’s claim
that the wife wants to go to dance clubs in order to know that
she still has sex appeal is thus implicitly a denial that she wants
to go to them in order to pick up a man with whom she will be
unfaithful to her husband. She doesn’t want to pick up a guy; she
wants to know that she still can do so. The caller assumes that
the wife would be willing for her husband to accompany her but
that he is not interested in going to dance clubs, thus reinforc-
ing the implicit denial that she wants to be unfaithful to her hus-
band. With these aspects of the context identified, we can treat
the dance clubs argument as an occasional argument and expand
it somewhat as follows:
1.The reason why the wife wants to go to clubs is
because she would prefer to feel younger again. ( The
wife who wants to go to clubs wants to know that she
has sex appeal.)
2.The husband either doesn’t have the need to know that
he has sex appeal or doesn’t have sex appeal.
3.The wife who wants to go to clubs does not want to be
unfaithful to her husband.
C.The husband should give his wife a break and if he doesn’t
enjoy going to clubs give her that one night out going to
clubs with the girls.
With this expansion of the argument, the most plausible covering
generalization will restrict the scope of those who permit behav-
iour and those whose behaviour is permitted to husbands and
wives respectively. Treating ‘the wife’, ‘the husband’ and ‘go to
clubs’ as repeated content expressions subject to generalization,
one gets the covering generalization that a husband whose wife
wants to do something to know that she has sex appeal and not
in order to be unfaithful to him should allow her to do it if he is
not interested in accompanying her.
The Doreius argument, the marijuana argument and the dance
clubs argument illustrate in various ways the indeterminacy of
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the approach of constructing a covering generalization for a sup-
posedly incomplete argument in order to make its conclusion
follow logically from its premiss or premisses. If more than one
content expression is repeated, it is indeterminate which of them
is to be generalized over. If the variable that replaces a repeated
content expression does not disappear in the simplification of
the covering generalization, the scope of this variable (i.e. in a
formal language the universe of discourse) is indeterminate. Fea-
tures of the context may be supplied as additional implicit pre-
misses in order to specify this scope.
To deal with this indeterminacy, I proposed in Hitchcock
(1985, pp. 93-94) that one should attribute to an unhedged argu-
ment whose conclusion is not a logical consequence of its pre-
miss or premisses the most general possible covering
generalization that was plausible in the context. Specifically, sub-
ject to considerations of context and plausibility, one should gen-
eralize over the entirety of a repeated molecular content
expression rather than over a proper part of it, over all distinct
repeated content expressions, and over the entire category of
items of the kind signified by a repeated content expression.
This approach goes as far as one can in rescuing the traditional
approach to filling out with one or more missing premisses an
unqualified argument whose conclusion is not a logical conse-
quence of its premiss or premisses. It addresses the weaknesses
of the limited scope of Aristotle’s categorical syllogistic and the
indeterminacy of the thesis that an argument of this sort implic-
itly assumes a covering generalization of the argument.
5. A FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTION
There remains, however, a fundamental objection to the claim
that the assumption so supplied is an implicit premiss of the
argument, left unstated because hearers or readers can supply it
themselves. The objection is phenomenological. If we pay atten-
tion to our own mental processes when we are reasoning to our-
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selves in this allegedly incomplete way, we have no awareness
of having omitted a premiss. Further, it would be incoherent to
suppose that we are leaving out a premiss because our intended
audience can supply it, because we ourselves are the intended
audience. Readers can recall for themselves a recent inference of
the type discussed in this chapter, and can verify the absence of
an unstated premiss in their thinking.
The whole tradition of supposing that reasoners and arguers
leave unstated a premiss on which they are relying, I maintain,
rests on a mistake (Hitchcock 1998). The mistake is to suppose
that the only way that a conclusion can follow definitely from
premisses is logically. Logical consequence is rather a special
kind of consequence, distinguished by the absence of extra-logi-
cal terms in its articulation. Consequence in general can be char-
acterized schematically or modally. Schematically, a conclusion
follows definitely from a set of premisses if and only if the argu-
ment is of a form that rules out non-trivially, for both actual and
counter-factual cases, that the premisses are true and the con-
clusion untrue (or, more generally, non-acceptable). The conclu-
sion of Aristotle’s Doreius argument follows in this way from its
premiss, because it is of the form ‘x has won at the Olympics,
so x has won a crowned contest’ and this form not only has
no actual counter-examples but would not have counter-exam-
ples if others had won at the Olympics; further, the absence
of counter-examples is not due to the absence of any instances
with a true premiss or to the absence of any instances with an
untrue conclusion (Hitchcock 2011). To determine whether the
conclusion of an unqualified argument follows from its premiss
or premisses, one needs to investigate whether it has such a
form. The so-called implicit premiss is thus not a premiss, but
the articulation in statement form of a possibly valid schema.
If one’s purpose in considering an argument is to determine
whether its conclusion follows, constructing an implicit premiss
is a superfluous spinning of wheels. It is more direct to seek
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a counterfactual-supporting covering generalization that would
license the inference from premisses to conclusion. For this pur-
pose, it may be necessary to appeal to known features of the con-
text of utterance of the argument that narrow the scope of the
variables in the covering generalization, i.e. in a formal context
to specify the universe or universes of discourse over which the
variables range. Articulation of these features attributes one or
more implicit premisses to the argument, and to this extent the
implicit premiss tradition has some merit. But the point of such
supplementation is not to make the conclusion a logical con-
sequence of the supplemented set of premisses but to narrow
the scope of the substantive covering generalization in virtue of
which the conclusion follows.
6. MATERIAL CONSEQUENCE
Recognition of a broader conception of consequence than logical
or formal consequence is not new. George (1983) finds it already
in Bolzano’s 1837 Wissenschaftslehre (Bolzano 1972/1837), in the
form of a substitutional conception of consequence where not
all the content expressions need be subject to substitution. Peirce
(1955/1867-1902) recognized that people reason in accordance
with, rather than from, what he called “leading principles”. Ryle
(1950) argued that a hypothetical statement like ‘If today is Mon-
day, tomorrow is Tuesday’ is not a premiss of a corresponding
argument like ‘Today is Monday, so tomorrow is Tuesday”, but
rather the principle in accordance with which the conclusion of
the argument is drawn. Sellars (1953) argued that there were not
only formal rules of inference but also material rules of infer-
ence, which determined the meaning of descriptive terms; his
student Richard Brandom has developed that idea in his “infer-
ential semantics” (Brandom 1994; 2000). Toulmin (1958) influ-
entially distinguished the “data” or “grounds” (Toulmin, Rieke &
Janik 1978) on which arguers based their claims from the “war-
rants” that licensed the transition from grounds to claim and
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pointed out that most warrants were substantive rather than
analytic.
In my own work, I have developed a schematic conception
of consequence that includes both formal and material conse-
quence, and have extended this conception to defeasible infer-
ences with a modally qualified conclusion. The end result of this
development is the following statement:
A conclusion follows from given premisses if and only if an accept-
able counterfactual-supporting covering generalization of the argu-
ment rules out, either definitively or with some modal qualification,
simultaneous acceptability of the premisses and non-acceptability
of the conclusion, even though it does not rule out acceptability of
the premisses and does not require acceptability of the conclusion
independently of the premisses (Hitchcock 2011, p. 224).
Of two contemporary accounts of the truth-value of counter-
factual statements, those of David Lewis (1973) and Judea Pearl
(2009), Pearl’s structural model semantics is easier to apply than
Lewis’s closest world semantics when determining the truth-
value of a counterfactual instance of a covering generalization
(Hitchcock 2014), and gives intuitively correct results. The con-
sequence relation described in the above-quoted statement satis-
fies three of the five structural rules of consequence identified in
(Gentzen 1964/1935)—namely, reflexivity, contraction and per-
mutation. It satisfies restricted forms of the cut rule and the
weakening rule (Hitchcock 2017, pp. 174-177). There is scope
for further investigation of the expanded conception of conse-
quence.
Despite these contributions, introductory textbooks continue
to treat logical consequence as the only kind of definite con-
sequence relation, and to give advice on filling out arguments
whose conclusion is not a logical consequence of their premiss or
premisses so as to make it a logical consequence of the expanded
argument. Thus the main problem of missing premisses in con-
temporary logical education is the problem of failing to recog-
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nize that in general no premiss is missing. In this respect, the
logical tradition in its conservatism has not yet gotten beyond
Aristotle’s mistake.
APPENDIX
We can use the rephrasing of Aristotle’s Doreius argument to
provide another example of proving the logical equivalence of
the traditionally supplied completion of a categorical syllogism
to the covering generalization of the argument with respect to
the term shared between premiss and conclusion. We need to
prove that the covering generalization of the rephrased argu-
ment with respect to the term ‘contest which Doreius has won’
is logically equivalent to the statement that every contest at the
Olympics is a crowned contest, which is the statement generated
by the traditional approach to such an enthymeme. To do so,
we infer each statement from the other. The following proof
deduces the traditionally generated statement from the covering
generalization:
1. For every F, if some contest at the Olympics is F, some F
is a crowned contest. (covering generalization)
2. If some contest at the Olympics is a non-crowned con-
test, then some non-crowned contest is a crowned con-
test. (from 1, by instantiation)
3. But no non-crowned contest is a crowned contest. (logi-
cal truth)
4. Hence no contest at the Olympics is a non-crowned con-
test. (from 2 and 3, by modus tollendo tollens)
5. That is, every contest at the Olympics is a crowned con-
test. (from 4, paraphrasing)
Now we deduce the covering generalization from the tradition-
ally generated statement:
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1. Every contest at the Olympics is a crowned contest. (tra-
ditionally generated statement)
2. Suppose (for conditional proof) that some contest at the
Olympics is F. (assumption)
3. Then some F is a crowned contest. (from 1 and 2, by exis-
tential quantifier elimination, universal quantifier elimi-
nation, conditional elimination, and existential quantifier
introduction)
4. Hence, if some contest at the Olympics is F, then some F
is a crowned contest. (from 2 and 3, by conditional intro-
duction, discharging supposition 2)
5. Hence, for every F, if some contest at the Olympics is F,
some F is a crowned contest. (from 4, by universal quan-
tifier introduction)
The first half of the proof illustrates the need to be judicious in
choosing one’s instantiation of the covering generalization when
deriving the traditionally supplied additional premiss.
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CHAPTER 5.
ARE THERE METHODS OF INFORMAL LOGIC?
HANS V. HANSEN
Abstract: This paper addresses one of the practical problems that
arise in connection with the evaluation of natural language argu-
ments, namely, how to determine their logical strength. Pursuing
this problem will invite a comparison between formal and informal
logic. Which of these two approaches is best for evaluating the log-
ical strength of natural language arguments (NLA’s)? The claim has
been urged that informal logic is best suited to the job or that it is at
least just as well suited to it as formal logic is. That may well be so,
but how are we to decide? A framework is developed that will give
us some guidance in answering these questions.
Imagine that you have received a grant to study the argumentation sur-
rounding a topic of current interest, the arguments about whether there
should be unrestricted building of energy-producing windmills, for exam-
ple, or whether your country should be involved in an overseas war, or
whether we should eat genetically modified foods. You want to know all
the different arguments that have been given on this topic, for and against,
over a given period of time in such-and-such sources (these newspapers,
these web-sites, those radio programmes). Not only do you want to know
what arguments have been given, you also want to know which ones are
good arguments and which ones are not good. But you can’t do all this work
yourself. You need others to help you.
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Enter at this point: the graduate students. One of them is writing a thesis
on Kierkegaard, another on the concept of social justice, and the third on
the private-language argument. Being graduate students there can be no
doubt about their intelligence and commitment; however, none of these stu-
dents has had any special training or background in the analysis or eval-
uation of natural language arguments, at least not those that are found
outside the philosophy seminar room. So, since the Dean has told you that
these are the helpers you must use if you want your grant, you now have a
practical problem: how do you prepare these people to help you with your
research?
I will use this story as a way of motivating and orienting a discus-
sion about one of the practical problems that arise in connection
with the evaluation of natural language arguments, namely, how
to determine their logical strength. Pursuing this problem will
invite a comparison between formal and informal logic. Which
of these two approaches is best for evaluating the logical strength
of natural language arguments (NLA’s)? The claim has been
urged that informal logic is best suited to the job or that it is at
least just as well suited to it as formal logic is. That may well be
so, but how are we to decide? What would justify our answer that
the one approach is better than the other? Below, a framework
is developed that will give us some guidance in answering these
questions.
The concept of ‘logical evaluation’ is ambiguous because some
people use it broadly to include both the evaluation of premisses
and the evaluation of the premiss-conclusion relationship,
whereas others use ‘logical evaluation’ narrowly to refer only
to the evaluation of the premiss-conclusion relationship – that
is, to the evaluation of the extent to which premisses are suffi-
cient for their conclusions on the assumption the premisses are
acceptable. To avoid confusion, I use the term illative evaluation
to refer to the evaluation of the premiss-conclusion relationship
in an argument or inference. The general problems that con-
cerns us, then, is, how to determine the illative strength of argu-
ments, and how to justify our illative judgments. The practical
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and more immediate problem facing us is to decide on a ser-
viceable method of illative evaluation that will be easy for our
new-found assistants to learn, and enable them to report back in
fairly short order on the illative strength of the arguments they
are studying.
1. IN PRAISE OF FORMAL LOGIC
The virtues of formal logic are many. One of them is that it
focuses on the premiss-conclusion relationship, ignoring the
question of premiss acceptability. True, formal logic texts intro-
duce the concept of a sound argument as one which is deductively
valid and has true premisses. But the introduction of this concept
usually comes at the point where the author(s) wants to distin-
guish logical pursuits from extra-logical ones. The truth is that
formal logic doesn’t have much to say about premissary ques-
tions except to offer a broad three-fold classification which sorts
them into necessarily true propositions (logical truths), necessar-
ily false propositions (logical falsehoods) and contingent propo-
sitions. The first two kinds of propositions are of interest to
formal logicians and philosophers and mathematicians (the pre-
misses (axioms) of formal systems must be logical truths) but they
are hardly of interest to anyone else since the premisses of NLA’s
are for the most part made of contingent propositions. Formal
logic has no means of evaluating contingent propositions as true
or false, and that is why formal-logic texts do not have exercises
on determining the truth or falsity of such propositions. Hence,
formal logic is aware that it cannot take it as part of its busi-
ness, in general, to pronounce on premiss acceptability, and that
therefore its true concern must be restricted to illative issues and
not the logical evaluation of arguments in the wide sense. This is
not to say that formal logicians do not have views about premiss
acceptability; surely, they do, but those views are not part of the
formal logic they espouse: they are something else, tacked on. We
should not be surprised then, when, at least since the nineteenth
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century, the preference has been to identify logic with the study
and evaluation of premiss-conclusion relationships and disasso-
ciate it from premissary questions. “[T]he rules of Logic,” wrote
Whately in the 1820’s, “have nothing to do with the truth or fal-
sity of the Premises; except, of course, when they are the con-
clusions of former arguments” (Whately 1875: 153), and about
175 years later we have Skyrms expressing almost the same view
when he writes that, except in special cases, “It is not the business
of a logician to judge whether the premises of an argument are
true or false” (Skyrms 2000: 15).
1
Many informal logicians take the practical task of their disci-
pline to be, in the broad sense, the logical evaluation of arguments,
and hence they include both premissary and illative questions in
informal logic. I believe this creates a dilemma which I would
rather see informal logic avoid. For, any questions of premiss
acceptability that reach beyond the very familiar, or common
sense, must be shared with colleagues in particular disciplines
such as history, politics, economics, biology, statistics, etc. as
well as those in more general fields such as epistemology, phi-
losophy of science, rhetoric and dialectical studies. People with
special training in field F will, in general, be in a much better
position to say whether a statement belonging to F is acceptable
than a logician would be. Although informal logicians, to their
credit, have been among those who have urged that the standard
for premisses must be acceptability rather than truth, informal
logic has hardly any means of determining whether premisses
actually meet the standard of acceptability. Thus, informal logic
decrees that the premisses of arguments of, say, economics must
be acceptable without having any means to determine whether
or not they are acceptable. Judgments about premisses in field
F must ultimately be made by experts in field F or by informal
1. Angell (1964: 43) concurs, writing that “traditional logic has not concerned itself
much with the acceptability of reasons; the main concern has been the analysis and
critique of argument connections”.
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logicians who happen to be experts in field F. Thus, with regards
to premissary questions, informal logicians are not in any better
position than that of formal logicians. Conversely, the experts
about premiss acceptability in special fields do not make a study
of how to evaluate illative relationships. I do not mean that they
are not discriminating in their illative judgments. They work
with the standards implicit in their fields, but they make no spe-
cialty of the study of illative goodness or the practical problem of
how to determine it. Accordingly, my preference is to use ‘infor-
mal logic’ in a narrow sense, parallelling that of the range of for-
mal logic, such that it is concerned only with issues that pertain
to illative evaluation.
It will be observed that informal logic can indeed be of help
in the evaluation of premisses, for it can detect inconsistency,
vagueness or ambiguity – all things that weaken a premiss set.
This is true enough, but these are means of negative evaluation.
Premisses can be logically innocent, but this is not enough to
say that they are acceptable. Passing this kind of test means only
that the premisses are not unacceptable on semantic grounds; it
does not show they meet the standard of acceptability. So, infor-
mal logic, as it is broadly understood in argumentation studies,
doesn’t have means for the positive evaluation of premisses
The other horn of the dilemma is that if informal logic is an
instrument for evaluating arguments that includes the evaluation
of premisses, then it must limit itself to a very narrow range of
arguments – those whose premisses belong to common sense, or
are “everyday”, or require no special training or knowledge at all.
Perhaps there is such a domain of knowledge. However, if infor-
mal logic is to be circumscribed by being restrained to deal only
with arguments whose premisses are of this kind, then the scope
of informal logic will be so restricted that it can be neither of
great interest nor of great value.
So, the dilemma is this: either informal logic is inadequate for
any kind of premiss evaluation other than basic semantic criti-
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cism (vagueness, ambiguity, inconsistency) OR, its range of appli-
cation being only as wide as common-knowledge premisses,
informal logic will be so limited that it has little practical import.
Given these two discouraging consequences of including pre-
miss evaluation as part of informal logic, it is advisable that
informal logic should be restricted to the range of illative evalu-
ation. Narrowing informal logic in the way that I propose does
not diminish the importance of argument evaluation. Argument
evaluation is the larger enterprise that gives significance to the
less encompassing field of illative evaluation. But by narrowing
informal logic to deal only with illative issues we not only have
the benefit of distancing ourselves from other approaches to
argument evaluation (rhetorical and dialectical approaches, for
instance
2
) and setting up a unique area of study; moreover, we
also prepare the ground for a comparison with formal logic that
puts both parties on equal footing.
Let us now consider other virtues of formal logic. Not only
does formal logic value conceptual clarity (the basic concepts are
few and well-defined), it is devoted to methods of illative eval-
uation, to making them perspicuous and transparent. Different
methods of formal logic have been identified and detailed: the
truth-table method, for example, the truth-tree method, nor-
mal form methods, the Venn and Euler methods, natural deduc-
tion method, etc. (see Quine 1982 whose book is called Methods
(plural) of Logic). All these methods share the same conceptual
standard of illative goodness. It is deductive validity. Judgments
about formal validity, however, are seldom made by direct appeal
to the conceptual standard, but rather by testing the argument
against some operational standard. Truth-table validity — that an
argument is truth-table valid only if there are only T’s in the
final column of the table — is one such operational standard,
and each of the methods of formal logic has its own operational
2. Both rhetorical and dialectical approaches to argument evaluation incorporate stan-
dards of premiss acceptability.
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standard in the service of the conceptual standard. The various
methods of formal logic (used for testing for validity) are really
methods for determining whether an argument satisfies an oper-
ational standard of illative goodness. The truth-table method
consists of an operational standard (there should be all T’s in the
final column), a set of concepts (e.g. the definitions of the truth-
functional constants, etc.) and a set of techniques (e.g., how to
construct a truth table, how to compute the value of the final col-
umn, etc). Employing the techniques constitutes a test for seeing
whether the operational standard has been satisfied. If the oper-
ational standard is satisfied, so is the conceptual standard. The
other methods of formal logic have analogous anatomies.
There are many illative methods of formal logic but in what
follows the truth-table method will stand in for all of them as the
method of formal logic for the sake of making the comparison
with informal logic. (The same points of differences and similar-
ities with informal logic could be made as well with any of the
other formal logic methods.
3
)
The formal-logic method of illative evaluation of NLA’s is
attractive for several reasons. One of these is that it can help us
decide hard cases, i.e., those which are near the edge of or beyond
our intuitive competence. Most of all, however, formal methods
are intertwined with a satisfying answer to the question, ‘What
makes an argument logically good?’. Postulating logical form as
the source of illative goodness is in line with our philosophi-
cal urge to seek the real truth behind surface appearances, the
deep structures that underlie the surface grammar of arguments.
Thus, taking the natural language arguments (NLA’s), transform-
ing them into formal language arguments (FLA’s), making illative
evaluations of the FLA’s by one of the methods of formal logic,
and then extending our findings to the original NLA’s, seems like
a good method. But this way of illatively evaluating NLA’s has
come under criticism.
3. Natural deduction, not being an effective method, is the exception.
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One reason is that it is sometimes difficult to find the right
FLA equivalent to an NLA. Moreover, it may be that the illative
strength of some NLA’s just can’t be captured in a corresponding
FLA, resulting in the disadvantage that the target argument must
remain either mis- or unevaluated. Furthermore, the formal logic
we have is meant for arguments that are to be measured by the
deductive standard, but it is generally recognized that not all
arguments are like that; some of them are more reasonably eval-
uated by, say, an inductive standard of illative strength. Also,
because formal logic can only give us a verdict of ‘valid’ or
‘invalid’, using formal logic we cannot ever arrive at intermediate
judgments of illative strength: no judgments like ‘pretty good,
but could be better’ are possible, yet, intuitively, that seems to be
the appropriate thing to say about the illative strength of many
NLA’s. Finally, formal logic requires a lot of learning; maybe six-
months to a year to get comfortable with the predicate calculus
and its modal extensions. Given these problems (and others not
mentioned here) we can see that although there is much to appre-
ciate about formal logic, there are also some reasons to be dissat-
isfied with it as a way of making illative evaluations of NLA’s—
reasons enough to consider alternatives.
2. ARE THERE METHODS OF INFORMAL LOGIC?
If illative evaluation is what is wanted and formal logic has sig-
nificant shortcomings, then we may consider an alternative —
informal logic, for instance. Informal logic attempts to do what
formal logic does but without relying on logical forms. We are
thus led to wonder whether there are methods of illative evalua-
tion for NLA’s that eschew a reliance on logical form. In The Logic
of Real Arguments (1988), Alec Fisher suggests that there might
be. In this paragraph, which nicely summarizes Fisher’s goals, the
word ‘method’ occurs five times.
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Our objective is to describe and demonstrate a systematic method
for extracting an argument from its written context and for evalu-
ating it. We want a method which will apply to a wide range of both
everyday and theoretical arguments and which will work for ordi-
nary reasoning as expressed in natural language (and not just for
those made-up examples with which logicians usually deal). We also
want a method which draws on the insights and lessons of classical
logic where these are helpful, but which is non-formal and reason-
ably efficient (both requirements exclude a method which requires
us to translate real arguments into the symbolism of classical logic).
Besides all this we want a method which is teachable and which
combats – to the proper extent – our tendency to rely on experts.
(Fisher 1988: 128)
Fisher’s method is clearly the kind of method that should interest
us but we must narrow it down two times. First, we will leave
aside the part of the method having to do with argument extrac-
tion, and concentrate on the method of argument evaluation.
Second, because argument evaluation has two parts, “its pre-
misses must be true, . . . , and its conclusion must follow from
its premisses” (Fisher 1988: 130), we must separate out what
concerns us. It is the ‘following-from’ part of argument evalua-
tion that Fisher thinks constitutes ‘the big question’ (ibid.) and
also ‘the interesting question’ (Fisher 1988: 5), and it coincides
exactly with what we are focussing on — illative questions. Are
there then methods of informal logic — methods of informal illa-
tive evaluation — just as there are methods of formal illative eval-
uation? Do informal logics have conceptual standards of illative
evaluation? Do they have operational standards? Are there infor-
mal methods for determining whether the operational standards
have been met, consisting of key informal concepts and informal
techniques?
Consider the following extant approaches to argument eval-
uation in the informal logic literature: the fallacies approach,
first suggested by Aristotle and developed by Copi (1961), and
adapted by Johnson and Blair (1977); the deductivism approach,
championed by Whately at the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
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tury, and still favoured by the brothers Groarke (1999, 2009); the
logical analogies approach urged by Burbidge (1990); the argu-
ment schemes approach, much in favour recently, and devel-
oped by Douglas Walton (1996). There is also the approach using
argument warrants, central to Mill’s logic (1843), and furthered
by Toulmin (1958). Finally, there is something we might call
“the thinking about it” approach; it is the method advocated by
Fisher (1988), and also by Pinto and Blair (1993), which involves
thought experiments to see whether conclusions follow from
premisses. Although, for the most part, these approaches have
not been presented as methods, never mind full-blown methods,
they include many of the nuts and bolts needed to be reconfig-
ured as methods of illative evaluation. Let us see how far we can
go with this.
We may begin by comparing a method built on Aristotle’s
list of fallacies in the Sophistical Refutations with the truth-table
method in formal logic. Aristotle’s fallacies are fallacies of fol-
lowing-from,
4
so they can be part of a method of illative evalua-
tion. The conceptual standard for formal logic is that of deductive
validity. Aristotle has a narrower conceptual standard, that of
syllogistic consequence: a conclusion follows from premisses if,
and only if, the premisses necessitate the conclusion, the pre-
misses cause the conclusion and the conclusion is non-identical
to any of the premisses.
5
The operational standard on the formal
logic side (we have agreed) will be that of truth-table validity
whereas for the fallacies method it will be that of not committing
any of the fallacies on the A-list (the inventory of fallacies in
Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations). The test for the formal method
is to determine whether there are only T’s in the final column
whereas on the fallacies method it is to determine whether the
argument commits any of the fallacies on the A-list. The tech-
niques involved on the formal side consists of making truth
4. Some see more in Aristotle’s fallacies; I don’t. See Woods and Hansen 1997, 2001.
5. See the first page of Prior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations
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tables and computing the values of compound sentences. For the
fallacies method the technique consists of carefully reading the
argument and then comparing it to each of the definitions that
identify the fallacies on the A-list, one-at-a-time. The concepts
involved on the formal side are the basic concepts of proposi-
tional logic; on the informal side they are the component con-
cepts in ‘syllogistic validity’ and the definitions of the fallacies.
As a second illustration, let us consider a method based on
argument schemes. What conceptual standard goes with that
method? Walton has written as follows:
Although the term valid does not seem to be quite the right word to
use with many of these argumentation schemes, still, when they are
rightly or appropriately used, it appears that they are meeting some
kind of standard of correctness of use . What is important to come to
know is what this standard is, for the most common and widely
used schemes especially, and how each of the schemes can be tested
against this standard. (Walton 1996: 1)
From the gist of his project it seems that Walton is proposing
a conceptual standard that is different from the deductive and
inductive ones we are most familiar with. It is that an argument is
illatively good if its premisses (on the assumption that they are accept-
able) establish a presumption that its conclusion is acceptable. This
we may dub the standard of ‘presumptive validity’. What then
might the relevant operational standard be? The evaluation of
arguments, on the schemes method, is guided by the unique set
of critical questions associated with each of the schemes. These
questions can be classified, some pertaining to the acceptabil-
ity of the premisses, others to illative strength, and so on. In
constructing an informal method of illative evaluation based on
argument schemes, we restrict ourselves to the questions relating
to illative strength. Let us then propose the following as an oper-
ational standard: an argument is presumptively valid if it satisfies
the questions (pertaining to illative strength) associated with the
scheme of which it is an instance. The concepts of the method are
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found in the schemes and the associated questions, some of them
like ‘probable’, ‘plausible’, ‘consistent’, ‘commitment’, ‘cause’, etc.
are technical and/or theory laden. The technique of the method
will consist of fitting the NLA’s to schemes, asking the relevant
questions, and evaluating the illative strength of the argument on
the basis of the answers to the questions.
I think that, with some work, similar comparisons can be made
for the other approaches to informal illative evaluation: logical
analogies, warrantism, and the methods of thinking about it.
That is, all the informal approaches mentioned above can be
analysed in such a way that they emerge as having the shape of a
method, complete with standards, tests, concepts and techniques
— just like formal logic.
3. ANALYSING AND COMPARING THE METHODS
When stated, methods give us discussible procedures for dealing
with difficult questions. They can be scrutinized, criticized, and
possibly improved. If there is more than one method available
to achieve a given end, the methods can be compared with each
other. For illative methods, I propose to compare them under
three different headings: the characteristics of methods, the content
of methods, and the functional adequacy of methods.
(a) Comparing the Characteristics of the Methods
Under ‘characteristics’ we may first identify the kind of standard
a method embodies. Is it an ideal standard (like Platonic forms)
appropriate for evaluating argumentation? Or a precise standard
such as deductive validity used to evaluate arguments by the
deductive standard? Or a minimum standard, specifying that an
argument is premiss sufficient if it is at least up to a certain
mark, like the standards of inductive and presumptive validity?
Another aspect of methods is whether they are direct or indirect.
Using schemes, or truth-tables, or warrants, seems to be a direct
method of evaluation since no other arguments will be involved
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than the one being evaluated. The method of logical analogies,
however, is an indirect method since it decides the illative value
of an argument by comparing it to another argument whose
illative value is given or assumed. One can also ask whether a
method is polar or bipolar; that is, whether it is capable of giving
both the result that arguments are illatively strong and the result
that they are illatively weak. The truth-table and schemes meth-
ods are bipolar, but natural deduction is not, nor is a method
built on an incomplete list of fallacies (kinds of mistaken infer-
ence). Finally, we ask whether a method can be used to give
us judgments of intermediate illative strength i.e., whether it
is scalar. It seems that the method of formal logic cannot do
this and neither can methods of fallacies, but a schemes method
could, since it involves several questions of which some can
receive a favourable answer and others not, and so, overall, we
might conclude an argument is of intermediate illative strength.
How methods can be compared under these headings just intro-
duced is displayed in Table 1.
Formal logic Fallacies (Copi) Logical analogy Schemes
Standards Precise Precise &Minimum6 Precise Minimum
Direct Direct (truth
table)
Direct Indirect Direct
Polarity Bipolar Polar (negative) Polar(negative) Bipolar
Intermediate
judgements Not possible
Not possible for
some; possible for
others
Not possible Possible
Table 1. Comparing the Characteristics of Methods
6. Copi includes both deductive and inductive fallacies.
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(b) Comparing the Content of the Methods
Methods can also be compared in terms of their content, by which
I mean their operational standards, concepts and techniques. The
content of methods is what is especially important for the prac-
tical dimension of our inquiry. What the student assessors need
is help with making judgments about premiss sufficiency. If they
are left to their intuitions, we can expect their judgments to vary
greatly and, moreover, not to be justified. Having concepts, tech-
niques, and standards tied together in a method, if that is possi-
ble, is a fix for both these problems.
Some of the points of contrast have already been noted, but a
few further observations may be helpful (see Table 2). For the fal-
lacies method, the concepts it employs are the definitions of the
fallacies, and the technique it uses is that of investigating argu-
ments to see whether they have committed any of the fallacies. As
for deductivism – in one of its guises – the technique is to ‘recon-
struct’ arguments such that they are deductively valid accord-
ing to the semantic conception of validity, and then determine
whether the newly added validity-making premiss is acceptable.
The concepts then are those of ‘semantic validity’ and ‘statement
acceptability’. Fisher’s method of ‘thinking about it’ relies essen-
tially on the concept of the ‘assertibility question’ and the notion
of a ‘field’ or ‘subject of study’; the technique for his method is
that of thought experiments. Interestingly, different techniques
ask different abilities of the argument assessors: all the methods
require an ability to read and understand arguments carefully,
but some methods require the ability to work with mathemati-
cal-like symbols, some require familiarity with the field to which
the argument belongs, and some require the power of imagina-
tion. From this we may anticipate that some assessors will be bet-
ter suited to some methods than to others.
ARE THERE METHODS OF INFORMAL LOGIC? 143
Formal Logic
method Fallacy method
‘Thinking about it’
method (Fisher)
Operational
Standard
An argument is
premiss sufficient
if it is truth-table
valid
An argument is
premiss sufficient
if it commits none
of the fallacies on
the A-list
An argument is
premiss sufficient if,
given the standards of
the field to which the
argument belongs, it is
not possible that the
premisses are true
and the conclusions is
false
Concepts
Truth functions
Truth-table
validity
Identifying
conditions of the
fallacies on a list
Syllogistic validity
Argument field
Assertibility question
Techniques
Constructing
truth-tables
Computing value
of compound
sentences
Reading the
results
Careful reading of
argument
Comparing
argument with
each of the
fallacies on the list
Finding field-relative
standard
Performing thought
experiment
Comment Mechanical Requiresinterpretation Requires imagination
Table 2. Comparing the Contents of Methods
(c) Comparing the Functional Adequacy of the Methods
Let us now turn to the basis for comparing the functional ade-
quacy of methods. Writing about argument cogency (her term
for ‘argument goodness’) Trudy Govier makes the following
observations:
An account of argument cogency is a reliable one if it can be used by
different people to get the same result. Or, if there are variations in
result, these are readily explicable in terms of pertinent background
beliefs about the warrantedness of the premises. And it is efficient
if it can be applied in a fairly uncumbersome way. (Govier 1999:
108-9)
I want to adapt these remarks, giving them a slightly different
twist, so they can be oriented toward the comparison of the ade-
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quacy of methods of illative evaluation. In addition to the two
aspects mentioned by Govier, reliability and efficiency, I will add
a third about the scope of methods.
(i) Reliability
There are really two aspects of reliability. The one is given by
Govier: a method of testing for premiss sufficiency is reliable to
the extent that “it can be used by different people to get the same
result”. Govier’s suggestion is that if a group of assessors were to
disagree about an argument’s cogency this would be explainable
by the group-members having differing beliefs about the argu-
ment’s premisses. But beliefs about premisses is a premissary
issue, not an illative one. Could not the assessors disagree about
the illative strength of the argument even though they were in
agreement about the premisses? And, if so, might there not be
some method to help them overcome their disagreement?
Considering the kind of project imagined above which
involves working with a group of student assessors, we should
say a bit more about the make-up of the group. We stipulate that
it is a group made of either senior undergraduate students or
MA level students in the humanities or sciences; the group is an
even mixture of men and women; the members are open minded
and willing to revise their views following discussions, but they
are not easily swayed. Importantly, no member of the group has
undue influence over the opinions of the other members; there is
no leader pressuring others to agree with him or her. The group
of student argument assessors is competent in the language of
the object arguments and they have neither learning disabilities
nor idiosyncracies that would keep them from correctly applying
the methods they are taught. Given this characterization of the
argument assessors we can put the reliability aspect in more def-
inite terms. Assume that the several members of a group, G, have
been well trained in how to use a method and that they are seri-
ous about argument evaluation, then,
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A method, M, used by a group of student assessors, G, to test a set of
NLA’s, A, for premiss sufficiency, is reliable to the extent that mem-
bers of G using M correctly will agree in their illative evaluations of
the members of A.
We may refer to this as the subjective reliability of an illative
method. Subjective reliability will be a matter of degree: some
methods may have a high level of subjective reliability, other
methods a lower level.
The other way in which methods are reliable has to do with the
results that they produce. It is possible that a method has a high
degree of subjective reliability when rightly used – that assessors
using the method tend to agree in their judgments – and yet that
it sometimes or even frequently results in mistaken judgments,
or even that it consistently misjudges certain kinds of arguments.
Polling methods that fare better at predicting election winners
are more reliable methods than those that aren’t right as often.
Similarly, of two methods of illative evaluation of NLA’s, the one
that results in false positives or false negatives less frequently
than another method is, other things being equal, the more reli-
able method. This we may call the objective reliability of a method.
Both subjective and objective reliability are a matter of degree
and illative methods will be comparable, vis-à-vis each other for
both kinds of reliability. (If the arguments that are ‘out there’ are
such that they should not all be evaluated by the same standard
of premiss sufficiency, then it will be difficult for any single-stan-
dard method to be objectively reliable.)
(ii) Efficiency
An account of argument cogency is efficient to the extent that “it
can be applied in a fairly uncumbersome way”, says Govier. Being
cumbersome seems to be something we might also say about the
employment of a method. Let us say that a method is learner-
efficient to the extent that its content — its operational standard,
concepts and techniques — can be learned fairly easily by our
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group of argument assessors. Once learned, however, the method
may not be easy to apply. Thus, not only is there a question of
learner-efficiency, there is also a question of user-efficiency. That a
method should be easy to learn and easy to use stems in part from
the desideratum that all those with an interest in argument eval-
uation (which is, or should be, nearly everybody) should be able
to use it. So, what is wanted is a method that is both learner- and
user-efficient. However, one method might be easy to learn but
hard to use, and another method, complex and technical, hard
to learn, yet once learned, quite user-efficient. (Methods that are
very difficult to learn and to use have a greater start-up cost than
other methods, and that might be a reason for funded research
not to prefer them.)
(iii) Scope
The more kinds of arguments a method can be used to evaluate,
the greater is its scope, and the greater its scope the more useful
the method is. Methods of truth-functional logic cannot deal
with relational arguments and for that reason we consider them,
qua illative methods, to have narrower scope than methods that
can deal with relational arguments as well. Deductive logic, in
general, cannot deal with inductive arguments, and so it has nar-
rower scope than a method that can handle both deductive and
inductive arguments. In general, methods built on short invento-
ries of fallacies or schemes will have narrower scope than those
built on longer lists. Like reliability and efficiency, the scope of
an illative method will be comparable to that of other methods.
When an illative method is applied to arguments that lie outside
its scope, objective reliability suffers.
(iv) Assessing the Adequacy of Different Methods
Our knowledge of how functionally adequate — efficient and
reliable — methods of illative evaluation are must await empir-
ical investigation. Still, we can make some tentative guesses at
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how things might work out. Formal logic has been criticized for
being hard to learn which means it has low learner-efficiency
and we can predict that its user-efficiency will vary with the
complexity of the arguments being evaluated. We should expect
a high level of subjective reliability among assessors who have
learned the method; however, formal logic is criticized for not
being applicable to the main body of NLA’s we meet in popular
discourse because they aren’t ‘deductive arguments’; this implies
formal logic has restricted scope, and that as we try to apply it to
the arguments to which it is not a natural fit, the objective relia-
bility of the method decreases.
The method of ‘thinking about it’ is advertised as being learner
and user-efficient. True, it is not a hard method to learn, and
Fisher thinks we can begin to use it even if we don’t really have
a lot of familiarity with the subject matter. Still, it is harder to
apply the method than it is to learn (understand) it. It is notewor-
thy that the method has no limitation in terms of scope: in prin-
ciple it can be applied to any argument. However, this method’s
subjective and objective reliability will depend on the field-rel-
evant knowledge possessed by the assessors. What is needed for
subjective reliability is that the assessors agree on the field-rel-
ative standards but, despite our requirement that the they have
about the same level of education, it is to be expected that agree-
ment will often be hard to come by, especially as the subject
matter lies outside the common knowledge of the assessors. For
objective reliability what is needed is that the assessors have the
correct field-relative standards, and that they can use their imag-
inations well. Objective reliability will then depend on how good
the fit is between the knowledge of the assessors and the subject
matter of the arguments that will be examined.
The method of argument schemes, although it is not formal
or mathematical, does, nevertheless, take considerable effort to
learn. This is because, if it is to have broad application, it must
include many schemes (perhaps as many as 60) and their associ-
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Formal Logic ‘Thinking about it’ Argumentation Schemes
Learner
efficiency
LOW: difficult b/c
of abstract nature;
requires math-like
skills
HIGH: not concept
heavy and hardly
any technical
concepts
LOW to MEDIUM:
many schemes; even
more associated
questions; Qstns
contain difficult
concepts
User
efficiency
This will DEPEND
on the complexity
of the argument
MEDIUM: b/c it
requires some
knowledge of field
relative standards
MEDIUM to HIGH:
many arguments and
schemes fit easily
together
Subjective
reliability
HIGH among
those who have
learned the
method
DEPENDS on
extend of shared
field-relative
knowledge of
assessors; and parity
of imaginative
powers
MEDIUM to HIGH: b/c
the questions will
direct the assessors to
consider the same
issues
Objective
reliability
LOW: b/c of
limited scope
DEPENDS on
assessors identifying
the correct
field-relative
standards; and
powers of
imagination
MEDUIM: b/c of scope
restrictions
Scope
NARROW: b/c
works only for
arguments suited
to be measured by
deductive
standard
WIDE: can be
applied to all kinds
of arguments
MEDIUM: b/c
restricted to
presumptive reasoning
(leaving out deductive
and inductive); varies
directly with the
number of schemes in
use
Table 3. Comparing the Adequacy of Methods
ated questions. So, we should judge it to have rather low learner-
efficiency. Again, with a long list of schemes, the method may
be cumbersome to employ, and hence its user-efficiency is ham-
pered. The method may fare better in terms of subjective reli-
ability because all the assessors will have to deal with the same
critical questions, which will channel their attention in the same
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direction which should facilitate agreement. The degree of objec-
tive reliability will be a function of how well the inventory of
schemes matches up with the arguments that are ‘out there’; we
should expect that the more comprehensive the list, the greater
the objective reliability. (So, objective reliability is inversely
related to efficiency.) The presentation of the schemes method
currently being promoted by Walton is, however, restricted to
those arguments that are presumptively valid, leaving out argu-
ments to be measured by the deductive and inductive standards,
and this amounts to a scope limitation.
Let me repeat: these comparisons of functional adequacy are
conjectures. They should be compared with other people’s
insights and experience, and they are revisable or dismissable in
light of our empirical findings. Table 3 summarizes my conjec-
tures.
4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Some have suggested that the term ‘informal logic’ is an oxy-
moron, like ‘business ethics’; it cannot both be logic and infor-
mal, they say. I disagree with this. But I also disagree with those
who think that informal logic should be a kind of argument eval-
uation or argumentation theory that includes judgments about
premiss acceptability as well as other dialectical and rhetorical
considerations. Logic is about making illative judgments, and
these can be made with the aid of logical forms, or without them.
Insofar as that they can be made without them, there is informal
logic.
What started this inquiry was the question whether it would
be advantageous to train a group of logiciners (logical novices),
who were to be put to work evaluating natural language argu-
ments, formal or informal methods of illative evaluation. Not
enough has been found out for us to answer that question yet,
for although it is true that formal logic has some shortcomings
as a method of evaluating NLA’s, so too do each of the informal
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methods, and what is wanted is a judgment about what is the best
overall method. Nevertheless, a framework has been proposed
that, in conjunction with empirical enquiry, can be used to even-
tually give us a basis for answering that question.
This enquiry brings with it some externalities. We have come
to see that it is possible to recast some of the work that has been
done in informal logic as methods of informal illative evaluation.
There are three benefits to this observation. One of them is that
it demarcates an area of investigation distinct from dialectical
theory, rhetorical theory and epistemological theory. A second
and related benefit is that informal illative evaluation is identi-
fied as an area of research. Projects can be designed to mark and
define the concepts and techniques needed for each of the meth-
ods, and to formulate the needed operational standards and, in
general, to improve the functional adequacy of the methods. Our
increased concentration in this area will be a benefit to our stu-
dents who want to learn to make justifiable illative judgments.
The final boon, and not an insignificant one, is that we can now
propose a new definition of ‘informal logic’. It is the set of meth-
ods of non-formal illative evaluation.
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CHAPTER 6.
DUETS, CARTOONS, AND TRAGEDIES:
STRUGGLES WITH THE FALLACY OF
COMPOSITION
TRUDY GOVIER
Abstract: We apply to groups the intentional language of emotions,
attitudes, and beliefs. Such language is paradigmatically individual
in application and yet we apply it to groups of all sizes – small,
medium, large and very large – and of varying degrees and kinds of
organization. I consider a number of themes related to this compo-
sitional phenomenon. I consider several responses that would pur-
port to eliminate it, then move on to set it in the context of theory
of argument. I argue that there really is a problem here: that the Fal-
lacy of Composition is genuinely a fallacy, and an important one –
but that the gap underlying this fallacy can be plausibly bridged in
some cases.
1. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental problem arises concerning much of our language
about groups. The problem is this: we apply to groups the inten-
tional language of emotions, attitudes, and beliefs. Such language
is paradigmatically individual in application and yet we apply it
to groups of all sizes – small, medium, large and very large –
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and of varying degrees and kinds of organization. In important
contexts, we refer to groups not only as doing things and being
accountable for what they do, but as having attitudes and inten-
tions related to their actions. Groups may be said not only to
undertake actions but to be resentful, hateful, generous, com-
passionate, accepting, suspicious or trusting. They may be said
to hold beliefs and make value judgments, and reach decisions
on the basis of these. Corporate boards and parliaments, for
example, are organized groups empowered to act for still larger
groups. They make decisions and act – and when they do so, it is
on the basis of beliefs and attitudes which underpin their inten-
tions and actions. Suppose, for instance, that a corporate board
reaches a decision to spend millions on exploratory drilling in
some area of the Arctic. Why? Its decision is made intelligible on
the grounds that it knows the price of oil to be high and rising,
and has evidence implying that the area in question contains oil.
Or a parliamentary body might reach a decision to send peace-
keeping troops to a particular country, on the basis of beliefs
about the risks and needs of the people in that country, and the
feasibility of its troops making a constructive difference in that
context.
For those who contest the observation that intentional lan-
guage is commonly applied to groups, I suggest a reading of jour-
nals and magazines containing commentary about economic and
political affairs. You will find many attributions of actions to
groups and you will find that these actions are rendered intel-
ligible in much the way we make individual actions intelligible,
namely by attributing beliefs, attitudes, and values to groups. My
particular interest in this area stems from work on challenges
of political reconciliation, and from seeing how questions about
compositional attributions arise in that context. However, as the
following examples will show, compositional attributions are by
no means restricted to that sort of context.
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For convenience, let us call the application of intentional lan-
guage to groups the compositional phenomenon. The compositional
phenomenon strikes many people as highly problematical. Many
have raised difficulties about it, saying that it cannot possibly
make sense for groups to think, feel, believe, and decide. Why
not? Because groups are not conscious; there is no group mind.
Some go even further, contending that groups cannot do any-
thing, qua groups, and cannot properly be held accountable for
their actions. This claim strikes me as implausible to the point
of perversity, given such obvious phenomena as wars, elections
and corporate activity; I will not explore it here. I will assume
that groups, small or large, organized or not, can do things. In
fact there are some things that can only be done by groups – per-
forming choral works, reaching a jury decision, winning a soccer
game, and passing laws in parliament being obvious examples.
In discussions of group conflict and its resolution, the compo-
sitional phenomenon is quite conspicuous. We find, for example,
allusions to distrust, trust, apology, forgiveness, and reconcilia-
tion as phenomena in politics in the relations between groups
(Govier, 1997). Does such discourse make sense? Can we engage
in it without systematically committing mistakes of logic and
metaphysics? These questions will be the focus of this presenta-
tion. What I have in mind here is the Fallacy of Composition, in
which we mistakenly infer conclusions about wholes or groups
from premises about parts or individuals.
In this essay, I consider a number of themes related to the com-
positional phenomenon. First, I consider several responses that
would purport to eliminate it. I then move on to set it in the con-
text of the theory of argument. The view I will take is that there
really is a problem here, the Fallacy of Composition is genuinely
a fallacy, and an important one – but that the gap underlying this
fallacy can be plausibly bridged in some cases.
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2. SOME PRELIMINARY METAPHYSICS
As discussed here, the problem of compositional attributions
begins from the supposition that, with respect to intentional lan-
guage, group attributions are problematical whereas individual
attributions are not. This casting of the problem will seem cor-
rect to many. Nevertheless, there are several ways of resisting the
dichotomous contrast between individual and group that con-
structs this problem. First, the individual can be regarded as
a kind of plurality or collectivity. In the Republic, Plato envis-
aged a tripartite soul and a state based on this model. Hume
too famously compared the self to a commonwealth. Seeking to
understand personal identity, Hume argued that we attribute it
on the basis of relations of resemblance and causation between
those ideas and impressions which are distinct perceptions of the
mind. Stating that impressions cause ideas, which then cause fur-
ther impressions, Hume said,
In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any-
thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several
members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and sub-
ordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same
republic in the incessant changes of its parts. And as the same
individual republic may not only change its members, but also its
laws and constitution; in like manner, the same person may vary
his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas,
without losing his identity. Whatever changes he endures, his sev-
eral parts are still connected by the relation of causation. (Hume,
1975, chap. 35)
Hume offered this comparison not as an argument from analogy,
but rather as an explanatory illustration of his theory about
causal relations among the distinct perceptions that constitute a
human mind.
Hume, then, endorsed an account in which individual selves
were compositional. As illustrated in the comparison between
the self and the commonwealth, Hume argued that individuals
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are composite. The implication here seems to be that there is no
categorical difference between the individual self and some com-
posite entity such as a republic or commonwealth. If we were to
endorse such an account, we might conclude that the dichotomy
between group and individual levels of analysis be resisted and
there would be no special problem about attributing to groups
the same kind of properties attributed to individuals.
A differently oriented approach can provide different grounds
for the same conclusion. Often emotions and attitudes that are
attributed to individuals presuppose interactions with other per-
sons, or are themselves the product of cultural patterns and
responses. An individual who is suspicious of persons in another
ethnic group may hold these attitudes because of beliefs and feel-
ings acquired from traditions in the culture. To some extent, peo-
ple believe, feel, and think as they do because of enculturation
(Govier, 1997). Along the same lines, we speak of collective
memory; for example, the collective memory of the Serbs
includes long struggles against the Turks. An individual Serb
who has been taught his history will know and use elements of
this national narrative which appears and is taught as collective.
Thinking along these lines, one might argue that we do not need
to take an individualistic approach and try to account for group
attitudes by arguing up to macro from micro. One could appeal
to the cognitive importance of collective education and teach-
ing, and insist that explanation goes in the very opposite direc-
tion, downward from macro to micro. But within such an account,
one that would put group cognitions first, it would be essential to
acknowledge that there are variations in individual responses to
cultural traditions. While one person may inherit racial prejudice
from his culture, another may find it repugnant and be motivated
to struggle against it (Cohen, 2001; Moody-Adams, 1997).
These broadly metaphysical considerations argue against any
dichotomous construction of the individual and the collective.
But they cannot fully address the concerns of those who find
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compositional attributions problematic. As we will see, they fail
to address specific gaps that arise when evidence about individual
persons is cited as support for conclusions about groups of such per-
sons. Many arguments for compositional attributions are weak,
falling into the well-known trap of the Fallacy of Composition.
3. ON A PRAGMATIC LEVEL: THREE DISPUTED
RESPONSES – AND A FURTHER PROPOSAL
Apart from these broadly oriented metaphysical arguments
about individuals and collectives, there are three further reac-
tions to the compositional phenomenon as it is commonly con-
structed. These are:
(i) The Forbidding Response
On the forbidding view, all intentional language, as applied to
groups, is based on error; compositional attributions should be
banned because intentional language applies paradigmatically to
individuals. It should not be extended to groups, because groups
are not conscious and are thus not the sorts of entities that can
have beliefs, attitudes, and feelings.
(ii) The Legitimating Response
On this view, intentional language as applied to groups must be
legitimate because it passes the only realistic and sensible test
of legitimacy – namely actual use. Along the lines of ordinary
language philosophy and the later Wittgensteinian philosophy,
which stated that ordinary language is all right as it is, one might
simply resist any systematic criticism of standard practice
(Wittgenstein, 1963). After all, we regularly employ composi-
tional attributions when they interpret and respond to actions
and events; given that they do so, compositional attributions are
functional. To seek to reform ordinary language on philosophi-
cal grounds would be misguided and futile.
158 TRUDY GOVIER
(iii) The Discriminatory Response
On this view, there are indeed contexts in which intentional
language applies to groups. We know from experience of war
and intense conflict that nations and groups are often suspicious
of each other and harbour feelings of resentment and hostility,
based on felt grievances about wrongs of the past. That groups
and nations have often had relationships characterizable in these
ways are established facts of history. Such considerations are part
of standard lore in the so-called realist school of international
relations. Distrust and fear are frequently said to characterize
relations between nation states. On the Discriminatory account,
such negative attributions are allowed but if we attribute such
traits as compassion, generosity, forgiveness, and trust to groups,
that goes too far in the direction of idealism, being too emotional
and value-laden to be realistic. Positive intentional attributions
must be resisted or systematically reinterpreted as manifesta-
tions of self-interest. On the Discriminatory account, it is
insisted that ethically positive traits are purely individual.
I submit that all three of these responses are open to criticism.
An objection to the forbidding response is that it is dogmatic,
inflexible, and unrealistic given standard practice. An objection
to the legitimating response is that its confidence in ordinary
language goes too far in avoiding explanation and justificatory
argument. An objection to the discriminatory response is that it
is biased toward the negative. This response is grounded more in
a Hobbesian attitude to the social world than in a sound theory
of logic and language. Consistency indicates that if we can make
sense of a nation distrusting, we can make sense of a nation trust-
ing; if we can make logical and epistemic sense of a group resent-
ing, we can make sense of a group forgiving.
In this paper, I develop a fourth approach, along the following
lines.
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(iv) Compositional Construction, or Gap-filling
On this view, compositional attributions pose questions, espe-
cially when claims about group actions and attitudes are based
on evidence about individuals. Real issues arise. The challenge is
to acknowledge the gap and the problem, and find ways in which
the gap can be bridged.
4. THE FALLACY OF COMPOSITION: EXAMPLES AND
COMMENTS
To relate this problem more specifically to issues about argument
and argumentation, I move to consider the Fallacy of Composi-
tion. I might add here that this fallacy has been strikingly memo-
rialized in a sculpture by that name at the University of
Groningen. This sculpture, a lighted structure, by Trudi van Berg
and Jos Steenmeijer, occupies most of a wall on the building for
the Faculty of Economics. (A photograph of the structure ‘The
fallacy of composition’ may be found by searching under that
title in Google images: www.rug.nl.)
As is well-known, the Fallacy of Composition is committed
when there is reasoning from premises about parts to a con-
clusion about a whole. There are many interesting instances of
this fallacy, and many important questions, that arise in material
and physical contexts. Here, I consider primarily social phenom-
ena, given my interest in compositional attributions to groups
of people. In the social context, instances of this fallacy typically
involve premises about individuals and conclusions about some
group of which those individuals are members. There are, of
course, many examples of such flawed arguments. I will mention
several instances here.
The Duet: John is a terrific tenor and Susan is a brilliant soprano. So
a duet by John and Susan will be superb.
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The Cartoons: A Danish newspaper, under a particular editor, pub-
lishes some cartoons that are found to be offensive by some Mus-
lims. Through this action, Denmark has offended Muslims.
The Tragedy of the Commons: If one farmer grazes his cattle on the
commons, that will be beneficial for him; therefore if all the farmers
graze their cattle on the commons, that will be beneficial for all.
The Dinner Party: No one would set out dinner for her family and
exclude one member from the table, refusing for no good reason to
allow the ostracized person to eat. You can see from this that it is
wrong for some human beings to have inadequate food while many
others enjoy good meals. Therefore the world community should
accept responsibility for world hunger.
The Utilitarian: Each person desires his own happiness, and each
person’s happiness is in that way a good to that person. Therefore
the general happiness is a good to the aggregate of persons.
In the Fallacy of Composition, the basic mistake is not merely
quantitative. It arises from the fact that there are often significant
structural differences between the micro and macro level. We go
astray if we reason so as to fail to consider those differences. In
the social context, which is our concern here, there are signif-
icant differences between individuals as such and groups com-
prised of these individuals in relationship with each other.
Individuals in groups stand in relationships to each other and
interact – sometimes cooperatively, sometimes conflictually,
sometimes when occupying institutional roles, sometimes
according to various habits and expectations (May, 1987). The
nature and quality of the interactions between individuals in a
group affects that group – even when it is very small, as in the
case of the duet. If we reason that (simply) because John and
Susan are both good singers as individuals, they will be good as a
duet, we have ignored the fact that to present a successful duet,
these two have to harmonize and work together. We have made
a mistake, ignoring complications and complexities which may
arise from their need to work together. The individual abilities
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of these two do not guarantee that they can successfully combine
their talents.
In terms of the theory of argument, it is interesting to note
that the Fallacy of Composition can appear in arguments of dif-
ferent types. If an argument is taken to be deductive, and the
premises are about individuals while the conclusion is about a
group, clearly that argument will be deductively invalid in the
straightforward sense that it will be possible for the premises to
be true while the conclusion is false. We may locate the Fallacy
of Composition within this gap. If an argument is taken to be an
analogical argument in which the primary subject is a macro phe-
nomenon, while the analogue is described at the micro level, the
analogy will be inadequate because there are relevant differences
between the analogue and the primary subject. We consider the
Fallacy of Composition in considering the nature and relevance
of these differences. If an argument from individual to group is
taken as inductive generalization, it can be criticized as hasty; the
individual cases do not give sufficient evidence about the group
as a whole. If it is regarded as an inference-to-the-best-explanation,
there will be doubts about whether a compositional attribution
to a group does, indeed, provide the best explanation of the pos-
session of characteristics by an individual or individuals, given
that individuals within the group may differ from each other and
can exert a certain degree of autonomy. Concerning the gap con-
stitutive of the Fallacy of Composition, there are two crucial fac-
tors to be considered.
i. The problem of less. The individuals, considered simply
as individuals, are less than the group considered as such,
because they do not stand in relationships to each other,
do not interact, cannot be said either to cooperate or to
be in conflict, and are not organized institutionally.
ii. The problem of more. The individuals, considered as such,
are more than groups as such, since individuals have
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something every group lacks, namely consciousness. An
individual can literally, by himself or herself, think,
reflect, plan, choose, feel, amend her feelings and so on.
No group has consciousness in the literal sense in which
an individual has consciousness.
In pursuing the gap-filling approach, I will return to these basic
problems of less and more. But first it will be useful to consider
some approaches that will be resisted here.
5. REDUCING COMPOSITION TO SOMETHING ELSE?
In a version of the legitimating response to our problem, the very
notion of a Fallacy of Composition may be contested. For exam-
ple, one might say that there are recognized figures of speech in
which one element serves to represent the whole – as when we
say “all hands on deck” or “give us this day our daily bread”. The
figure of speech here is that of synecdoche. And in these familiar
expressions, it is quite clear what is being said. The hand repre-
sents the person of a crew member and the bread represents the
nutritional needs of people. Surely these things are understood
and only the most pedantic person would object to these ways of
talking. Synecdoche, one might say, has been around for a while
and is an unobjectionable device.
Within political discourse, consider this statement: “Berlin
opposes Washington on Iraq.” In this locution, we find synec-
doche insofar as the capital cities are named to represent the
people of nation states. Pedantically we can spell it out: to say
that Berlin opposes Washington on some matter is to say that
Germans, as represented by their government in Berlin, disagree
with Americans, as represented by their government in Washing-
ton, on policies regarding Iraq. One might insist that what is said
is surely understood and perfectly legitimate; there is no problem
here, we know what is meant, and synecdoche is an established
mode of speech. But wait a minute: unlike that of the hands on
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deck, this claim about Washington and Berlin involves at least
one compositional attribution. There does seem to be some amount
of philosophical mystery in the matter. What does it mean for a
nation or collectivity (Germany as represented by Berlin, or Ger-
mans) to disagree with another nation or collectivity (the United
States as represented by Washington, or Americans)? How are we
to understand such claims? What sorts of evidence would sup-
port them? This is the compositional problem. The fact that we
understand synecdoche in some other contexts does not make
the compositional problem disappear in this sort of context.
It is sometimes said that the Fallacy of Composition has to be
judged case by case and is in this respect a “material” fallacy and
not a formal one. (In this context, “formal” and “general” should
not be confused. My treatment claims to be general, but not for-
mal) (Govier, 1987, 1999). I leave the social sphere to find a sim-
ple example here. Consider, for instance, the case of a uniformly
brown cookie; say it is a peanut butter cookie and its ingredients
have been well mixed by the cook so that all its visible parts are
brown. If we were to reason that because all the visible parts of
the cookie are brown, the cookie itself is brown, we would reach
a true conclusion. Yes indeed. However this result does not mean
our argument from parts to the whole avoids errors in reasoning.
We got to the true conclusion by luck alone. It does not follow
from the fact that we sometimes get lucky and arrive at a true
conclusion that the Fallacy of Composition is material and has to
be understood on a case-by-case basis. There is still something
wrong with the argumentation scheme in this case because of the
structural factor; there is a problem with any general scheme rea-
soning from parts to whole with no gap-bridging device. That
we are lucky in some cases, because in those cases the shift from
micro to macro happens in this instance not to be negatively rel-
evant to the conclusion, does not show that the general scheme is
rationally defensible.
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Perhaps what is going on in compositional attributions is akin
to, or an instance of, stereotyping. We too easily form a “them”,
where instead distinctions and divisions are needed. In some
cases, our simplistically formed category of “them” serves to but-
tress the polarization or even the demonization of an “out-
group” as contrasted with an “in-group.” The basic mistake here
is that a group is cast according to the attributes of some few
individuals within it. Although some generalizations about
groups may hold true, statistically, there are individuals within
a group who do not fit the stereotype. And furthermore even
a description that applies to a majority of individuals within a
group may not apply to the group considered as a collective.
The notion of stereotyping seems to fit the case of the Danish
cartoons, a case which will receive special attention here because
of its considerable political importance. Initially it was one editor
who chose to commission and publish the contested depictions
of Mohammed. This man, Flemming Rose, commissioned the
drawings for a children’s book, and did that for reasons of his
own. Rose suspected that Danes were self-censoring in their
comments on Islam and Islamism because they were afraid of
intense reactions, including physical violence, by radical
Islamists. He wanted to find out whether people would be bold
enough to make some drawings and send them in. Rose said, “I
commissioned the cartoons in response to several incidents of
self-censorship in Europe caused by widening fears and feelings
of intimidation in dealing with issues related to Islam” (Rose,
2006). Flemming Rose was one individual in one particular sit-
uation, with his own quite specific goals and concerns. In the
initial situation, there was little reason to deem him typical of
Danes generally; nor was Rose in any way authorized to repre-
sent Danes as a collectivity. In their response to the distribution
of the cartoons, some Muslims in some countries rioted, burned
embassies, and advocated boycotts of Danish products on the
grounds that the cartoons were blasphemous and offensive. Now
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it is by no means clear that Flemming Rose offended Muslims in
general, which was the interpretation of those inciting the riots
and boycotts. But even if we say that he did, a vast leap is made
if attitudes attributed to Rose are attributed to Danes more gener-
ally. Flemming Rose is not all Danes or most Danes; still less so
did he represent the state of Denmark. (As embassies and prod-
ucts of Denmark were attacked, Danes began to rally to support
Flemming Rose. At that point it could be more plausibly argued
that “Denmark” supported his actions; this scenario seems char-
acteristic of the polarization underlying serious group conflict.)
One of the strongest objections in the case was to a particular
cartoon depicting Mohammed wearing a turban with a bomb in
it. If Mohammed is represented as a terrorist and is the prophet
of this religion, then, one might say, that the person who drew
this particular cartoon was guilty of stereotyping because in his
representation of the bomb in the turban, he implied that all
Muslims are violent terrorists. About this suggestion, Rose com-
mented,
Angry voices claim the cartoon is saying that the prophet is a ter-
rorist or that every Muslim is a terrorist. I read it differently: Some
individuals have taken the religion of Islam hostage by committing
terrorist acts in the name of the prophet. They are the ones who
have given the religion a bad name. (Rose, 2006)
It did not escape the attention of commentators that violent reac-
tions to the stereotyping of one’s group as violent only serve
to confirm the very stereotype that one protests (Fatah, 2006).
But then this whole matter is not, fundamentally, one where
we would expect logic to reign supreme. Some of these reflec-
tions suggest an inductive interpretation of the Fallacy of Com-
position, according to which we would assimilate it to another
fallacy, that of Hasty Generalization. Leaving the cartoons and
conflicts surrounding them, I turn here to a dispute regarding
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Many
of the TRC’s early defenders – including Archbishop Desmond
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Tutu himself – emphasized stories of individual forgiveness and
reconciliation, and then went on to speak of national reconcili-
ation between black and white South Africans (Tutu, 1999). The
logical gap is apparent here. But what is its nature, exactly? Is
the problem simply that there were not enough individual sto-
ries… the sampling of cases was not large enough, and possibly
not representative, so that there is a problem of hasty generaliza-
tion? To generalize to “most” or “all,” we need more of the some
– and that is the problem? I do not think that is quite the prob-
lem here. Getting more of the some would not suffice, because it
would not address the issue of level shift, from micro to macro,
from relationships between individuals to relationships between
large groups. For a group to forgive another group, or to recon-
cile with it, group processes are required. If we are to say that
there is some kind of reconciliation between groups that have
previously been opposed, then we have to be able to speak of the
attitudes of these groups (either aggregatively or collectively) and
we have to characterize them as shifting in ways that are recon-
ciliatory. Compositional problems arise here as they do not if our
concern is straightforwardly a matter of Hasty Generalization.
It is sometimes suggested that the Fallacy of Composition can
be understood as involving Equivocation. On this account, there
is a shift of meaning when we move from micro to macro level.
If we use the same terminology in both contexts, we ignore this
shift, and reason on the basis of an equivocation (van Eemeren
& Grootendorst, 1992). For example, individuals may remember
things, may experience traumas, and may work through those
traumas in a quest for healing. People speak, as well, of the need
on the part of nations and groups to collectively remember aspects
of the past and work through traumas that have been experienced
by the nation, and heal. But what does such language mean in the
context of a collectivity? There has to be a shift in meaning, and
when we make compositional attribution, we ignore that fact. On
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this interpretation the Fallacy of Composition might seem to be
reducible to another fallacy, that of Equivocation.
As with the brown cookie, there are instances in which an
answer to these questions seems easy to come by. Consider, for
instance, the case of acknowledgement. Many discussions of
post-conflict processes call for acknowledgement, by nations and
groups, of wrongs committed by agents acting on their instruc-
tion and behalf.
And nations and groups really can acknowledge; it is easy to
see what this means. A nation can, for example, establish memo-
rial days, commission sculptures, build and maintain museums,
issue official statements of apology and recognition, and estab-
lish institutions for funding projects. It is thereby acknowledging
various historical facts, and committing itself to value judgments
about them. So far as policy and expressive artifacts are con-
cerned, collectivities are likely to have greater resources and
more power than individuals. Individuals can acknowledge too.
They typically do so by making statements of admission expres-
sive of their beliefs and attitudes, and in the case of wrongdoing,
those admissions allow that the acts were wrong, were done cul-
pably, and should not be repeated. Groups are not disadvantaged
compared to individuals when it comes to acknowledgement;
in fact, given their greater resources, they may be more able to
acknowledge and memorialize than are individuals.
But the fact that in this particular case and some others com-
positional attributions seem unproblematical only suggests a
more general solution; it does not in itself provide one. General
questions about the legitimacy of the shift have not disappeared.
What would it mean for a nation to remember? To forgive? To
show concern and generosity? To deal with its past? To reconcile?
To say that there may be equivocation, that there is an alteration
in meaning when we proceed from micro to macro, remains true
for many cases. But these observations about equivocation do
not fully handle the problem. What is the shift? What sorts of
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evidence (if any) can justify compositional attributions? The gap
remains and must be bridged. How do we do it?
6. WAYS TO BRIDGE THE GAP
There are human actions that are not the actions of individuals.
These actions include such things as the singing of choral works,
the waging of wars, and the conducting of national electoral
campaigns. These are actions and they are human actions. It is
people, human beings, who do these things. And people do not
and in many cases cannot do them as individuals. So how do
human beings do these things? How do we manage to sing the
choral movement of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony? Conduct an
election? Or dispatch troops to fight in a distant country? The
answer is obvious: we do these things in organized groups, in
which there are procedures and practices.
Suppose that the organizational structure is tight enough that
a large group has a smaller sub-group authorized by its rules to
deliberate and act in a range of cases. Let us call this sub-group
the executive. Suppose further that the executive conducts delib-
erations in which people speak and reason together and reach
decisions on the basis of its proceedings. In these deliberations,
individuals put forward ideas and arguments and other individ-
uals respond to them. Assuming even a modicum of democra-
tic process in the case, the reasoning and decisions of the group
are not necessarily those of any individual within it. There will be
exchanges of information and judgment, argument, dialogue, and
dialectical developments. The process in which various people
make and respond to claims and arguments engages a number
of people, and their arguments and responses affect each other.
The decision may be said to emerge from the deliberations of the
group, and may be deemed to be a joint decision (Gilbert, 1987).
Suppose, for example, that the executive of a political action
group decides not to send messages out to members using the
national postal system. It reaches this decision after deliberations
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involving considerations about possible delays and losses that its
members claim to have occurred within that system. Its deci-
sion with regard to this matter indicates an attitude that may be
attributed to the executive. Its attitude is one of distrust in the
postal system. If the executive decision is known to the larger
group and not opposed by them, thereby being tacitly accepted,
we can attribute the attitude to the larger group. To consider
another illustration, suppose the executive of a judges’ organiza-
tion meets to consider criticisms of a number of judicial deci-
sions on matters pertaining to gender and its deliberations
cumulate in an executive decision to organize workshops to edu-
cate judges on the matter. Let us suppose that the executive
comes up with a policy and recommendation for action. Given
this decision by the executive, certain beliefs and attitudes can be
attributed to it. For example, if the executive is recommending
educational workshops for judges, on gender themes, it must
believe that judges need more information and training about
gender and legal process, and that these workshops could pro-
vide them. Given its authorized role, the beliefs and attitudes
attributed to the smaller group may also be attributed to the
larger group, presuming that most do not object when given
information about this initiative. By their failure to object, they
may be said to indicate tacit consent to these policies and to the
beliefs and attitudes indicated by them.
Relationships and processes affect results. I am proposing that
in such cases the gap between individual attitudes and those of
the group may be bridged by the facts of group process. What
A,B,C,D, and E come up with after meeting together emerges
from their discussion and – because it emerges in this way –
is distinguishable from what any one of them would have come
up with individually. There is something distinctive about the
process in which the decision has been reached, because it has
involved these individuals in relationship to each other (Gilbert,
1987). The decision or action that results from the deliberations
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of the executive is a group product, attributable to the executive
because it is a product of the interactions of its members, and
attributable to the larger group if they tacitly consent. Because
the decision or action can be attributed to this group, the inten-
tional attitudes and beliefs implied can also be attributed to it.
The two members of a duet can speak directly to each other,
but large groups cannot deliberate face-to-face. Canada cannot
have a discussion except insofar as some representative persons
have discussions in some contexts, and these discussions are
publicized and become public. An obvious possibility is that of an
explicit and authorized political process. If the context is that of
the House of Commons in Ottawa, these participants are repre-
sentative of the Canadian public because they have been elected
in a process that is broadly accepted as legitimate. Given repre-
sentativeness and tacit consent, policies adopted in the House of
Commons can be regarded as those of Canada. Insofar as these
policies are understood and stand unopposed, they can be attrib-
uted to Canada as a collectivity. The collectivity has engaged in
deliberations and actions through its representatives.
A complication arises at this point. Where there is no group
process, the problem of compositional attributions cannot be
solved in this way (May, 1987). What about more loosely orga-
nized groups or groups that are scarcely organized at all? It
would seem that unorganized groups can act – as they do in vari-
ous forms of street demonstration and protest. A recent example
is that of extensive protests in Paris, with regard to the proposed
law on youth employment. In some cases of street protest, people
come together without there being a clear organizational struc-
ture constituting them as a collectivity. We may consider cases in
which there is nothing like a designated executive enjoying pow-
ers granted by a collectivity in which persons are members or
not. Suppose, for example, that 200,000 people have gathered in
the center of Paris to express their discontent with a proposed
law, and many of them are carrying signs and shouting slogans
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against that law. Given that participation in the protest is volun-
tary, given the context and the reasonable supposition that the
meaning of signs and slogans is understood, it makes sense to
attribute to these persons attitudes of opposition to the proposed
law. (Indeed, the attribution of such attitudes is already implied
when we describe a crowd as protesting the proposed law.)
But suppose now that one hundred or so of these people begin
to engage in property violence. Let us say that they throw stones
and smash the windows on cars and shops. And suppose that
such persons are a minority. Should we say that the protesting
youth are engaging in property violence? That they are threat-
ening, destructive? My account here would have the implication
that these further attributions cannot be justified unless there is
further evidence, according to which we would have grounds for
attributing these attitudes to most of the individuals present or
to the group as a whole. How do those present respond to the
violence? Do they indicate support by cheering and joining in?
Do they indicate opposition by shouting out against the violence
or trying to prevent it? Or by leaving the scene? Do they indicate
ambivalence and embarrassment by standing awkwardly by? If
there is no predominant pattern of response in such a case, given
that there is no representative executive to speak for the group,
we cannot attribute either approval or disapproval. Clearly, my
account of gap-bridging presupposes that there is organization
within the group. When representativeness and tacit consent are
less clear, it is difficult to justify attributions to the group as a
whole or even to a majority of its members.
7. CONCLUSION
I have argued here that there is an important sense in which
compositional attributions are problematic. When premises are
about individuals and conclusions are about groups, there is a
gap in the argument. The existence and understanding of this
gap underpin the tradition of the Fallacy of Composition. I have
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maintained here that this fallacy is genuine and important, and I
believe there is much to learn by logically probing claims about
“the Danes,” “the West,” “Muslims,” and so on. Stereotypes, hasty
generalizations, and unclear language often underlie simplistic
polarization, at a cost both to accurate understanding and to
decent relationships. For all the qualifications we may make
about the individual/group dichotomy and the clarity of some
concepts, there is a problem of compositional attributions. But I
am arguing against any notion that all such attributions should
be resisted. On the contrary, I have claimed that some of them
are unobjectionable because they can be warranted by a line of
argument in which the gap is bridged. This warranting is most
straightforward when groups are organized.
The gap defining the Fallacy of Composition can be bridged
insofar as group structures and relationships provide contexts
for people to think together and act on the basis of their joint
deliberations. We can understand how the deliberations and
actions of an interactive group provide grounds for attributing to
it attitudes and beliefs: the individuals are not considered purely
individualistically when they think and act together; thus they
stand in relationships and constitute a group. Thus the prob-
lem of less is overcome: this was the problem that individuals as
such have less than groups because they do not exhibit relation-
ships. By these same mechanisms, the problem of more is over-
come: this was the problem that individuals as such have more
than groups in the sense that they have consciousness. We can
attribute intentional attitudes to the group on the basis of inter-
actions between its members, and thereby bridge this gap. Then,
in virtue of representativeness and tacit consent, we can see how
those attitudes and beliefs can also be said to characterize a larger
group. Putting together emergence, representativeness, and tacit
consent, we are able to bridge the gap constitutive of the Fallacy
of Composition as it applies to groups and individuals.
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CHAPTER 7.
THE DIALECTICAL TIER REVISITED
RALPH H. JOHNSON
Abstract: Since I originally proposed that arguments require a
dialectical tier, many commentators have weighed in with objec-
tions and challenges. Now, here, in this auspicious setting, it does
seem propitious, even incumbent upon me, to say something about
how I now view that proposal, perhaps taking this opportunity to
repent of my sins. For Govier has said that the requirement of the
dialectical tier, as I have stated it, leads to an infinite regress–“a
staircase that mounts forever” (233) which would not be a “Stairway
to Heaven” but rather a descent into Hell.
INTRODUCTION
Since I originally proposed that arguments require a dialectical
tier, many commentators have weighed in with objections and
challenges. Originally Govier (1997/98;1999), then Leff (1999/
2000), Hitchcock (2000/2002), Tindale (2000/2002), Groarke
(2000/2002), Hansen (2000/2002), van Rees (2001) and Wyatt
(2001) – to mention just those who have gone on record with
objections to that proposal.
Now, here, in this auspicious setting, it does seem propitious,
even incumbent upon me, to say something about how I now
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view that proposal, perhaps taking this opportunity to repent of
my sins. For Govier has said that the requirement of the dialec-
tical tier, as I have stated it, leads to an infinite regress – “a stair-
case that mounts forever” (233) which would not be a “Stairway
to Heaven” but rather a descent into Hell.
I intend to take this occasion to respond to some of these
objections and criticisms, as well as to share some thoughts they
have set in motion. I will begin by revisiting the proposal, briefly,
particularly with respect to its purpose. Since the division of
labour in argumentation theory into logical, dialectical and
rhetorical dimensions seems to have gained a certain level of
acceptance among argumentation theorists, I have decided to use
that division to structure most of my response. Accordingly, I
will first look at an objection that is logical in character (that of
Govier), then one that is rhetorical (that of Leff); and finally one
that is dialectical (that of van Rees). After indicating how I pro-
pose to respond to these three objections, I want to a look at what
difference the proposal makes and the broader issues it raises for
argumentation theory.
RATIONALE FOR THE PROPOSAL
The rationale for the proposal had its origins in our efforts (more
than 30 years ago) to teach logic to undergraduates in a univer-
sity setting. [By “our” here I mean Johnson and Blair and other
informal logicians.] We began with the tradition in which we
had been raised which I have baptized FDL (Formal Deductive
Logic). According to that account, a good argument is a sound
argument: an argument that is valid and all of whose premises
are true. In this tradition, we find argument typically defined as:
“a sequence of propositions one of which follows from the oth-
ers.” We were not alone in experiencing difficulties teaching this
sort of approach to logic to our students in the late 60s who
demanded relevance and who wanted logic to help them appraise
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the arguments they came across in their attempts to deal with the
issues of the day.
It seemed to us that extant logical theory did not provide the
sort of theory that would underwrite such efforts. We were
struck by a number of gaps between that theory and argumenta-
tive practice. In real life arguments, have various purposes; but
no mention of purpose in FDL. In real life arguments, we often
have to go with premises that are not known to be true (Ham-
blin 1970); no provision for that in FDL. In real life, good argu-
ments often fall short of validity; no provision for that in FDL.
In real life, there are good arguments for and good arguments
against a particular proposition or proposal (Hamblin); no provi-
sion for that in FDL. In real life, good arguments typically con-
front objections and other dialectical material; but no mention of
that in FDL.
In making such observations, we were simply noticing the
sorts of problems that had been discussed in the work of Toul-
min (1958), Perelman (1958/1969) and Hamblin (1970). We
found allies in our attempt to achieve reforms in logical theory
and practice in the work of Kahane (1971) and Scriven (1976),
and throughout the 80s in various papers (see Johnson and Blair,
1983), we attempted to develop a better theory we termed “infor-
mal logic.” We were assisted in that effort by two developments.
First, in the early 80s we made a connection between our pro-
ject and the critical thinking movement in North America – an
attempt to install the critical thinking skills in a more prominent
place in higher education. That brought into clear focus for us
the pivotal role of argument in the teaching of critical thinking.
In the middle 80s, we became ever more aware of the many
different initiatives outside of logic, among them the pragma-
dialectical approach to argumentation, and the broad interna-
tional and multidisciplinary community working on
argumentation theory. How this latter awareness affected us may
perhaps be seen in our 1987 paper “Argumentation as Dialecti-
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cal” (Blair and Johnson, 1987: 41-56; reprinted in 1996: 87-102)
where the seeds of the proposal regarding the dialectical tier may
be found (100-101). (I don’t propose here to discuss the genesis
of the idea.)
However, even with the attempts at reform we were making, it
seemed to me that the very idea of argument found in our the-
ory (one we had downloaded from FDL) remained, to my way
of thinking, too mathematicized, too enervated, and that notion
set me on the path of fortification which I announced in my
1990 ISSA paper and which I then attempted to provide in Man-
ifest Rationality. I explained there that one important motivation
for my attempt at reconceptualization was my belief that argu-
ment as a vehicle for rational persuasion has much to recom-
mend itself to a world in which there are such deep divisions
about vital issues, but in which force and violence are seen as
increasingly unattractive options. I expressed my fear that the
human community would not be much moved to turn to this
important resource as long as logical theorizing remained fet-
tered to an approach to argument in which the ideal remained
that of sound argument – a view not attractive in a world of
uncertainty and competing allegiances, where proof and refuta-
tion are not to be thought of except perhaps among dogmatists.
In such a world, we need a theory of argument that gives proper
credit to arguments which, if not sound, are yet good, or good
enough, and to arguments in which the arguer acknowledges and
comes to terms with what I call dialectical obligations.
Part of that rethinking took the form of proposing that dealing
with one’s dialectical obligations is an essential component of
the very idea of argument, robustly considered. Arguments in
the paradigmatic sense require a dialectical tier in which the
arguer discharges his or her dialectical obligations: i.e., antici-
pates objections, deals with alternative positions, etc. That pro-
posal had the following two presuppositions. First, the focus is
on the use of argument to achieve rational persuasion. Argument
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has many others uses, as Blair, Goodwin, Walton, and Wenzel
and many others have reminded me. Second, the focus in the
first instance is on argument as it expresses itself in texts (such
as found in newspaper editorials, journal articles, books, etc.), as
distinguished from an oral argument between two participants,
which is what dialogue logics (such as those of Barth & Krabbe,
1882, and Walton & Krabbe, 1995) and the pragma-dialectical
approach take as their focal point. (This is roughly the distinction
between product-driven and process-driven theories.)
In summary, then, the proposal regarding the dialectical tier
originated in reflection on the limitations of the logical approach
to argument, and at the same time a desire to bring the concep-
tion of argument in line with best practices and fortify it.
The justification for the proposal emerges from reflection on
the requirements of rational persuasion. If in order to persuade
you must provide evidence and reasons, and if such persuasion
takes place in the context of controversy, then it seems clear that
to do the job you must also deal with dialectical matters. The
same justification that requires the illative core also requires the
dialectical tier; the demands that generate the illative core also
generate the dialectical tier.
If you were to ask me for examples of arguments that satisfy
this proposal, that have a dialectical tier, I would mention
Aquinas’s arguments for the existence of God in the Summa The-
ologiae, Mill’s defense of freedom in expression in On Liberty
(1859/1967), Martin Luther King’s Letter from a Birmingham Jail
(1964), and Stanley Fish’s defense of affirmative action in The
Trouble with Principle (1999). Many other examples could be cited
from both popular and academic fora. (Of course, not all argu-
ments take this form, which is one of the many problems that
have been raised concerning the proposal.)
In summary, then, the proposal regarding the dialectical tier
originated in our attempt to move beyond the traditional logical
perspective on argument and bring the conception more into
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line with best practices. The dialectical tier was never the end,
just the means to an end. What end? To the end of calling to
consciousness an aspect of the practice of argument that in my
judgement had been overlooked in theorizing (though not in the
practice nor even the teaching), viz., that the arguer has some
obligation to deal with objections, etc. The proposal might also
be seen as a counterpoise to the tendency to broaden the range
of argument. Groarke (1996) has argued forcefully that paintings
and images can be included in the spectrum of argument, and
Gilbert (1997) has argued that emotional and visceral modes of
communication should also be included. If we are going to adjust
our theories and approaches to include such specimens (which
my proposal makes provision for), then it seems to me impera-
tive – as a matter of balance – that we should also adjust in the
other direction by also emphasizing the more developed forms
of argument – those with a dialectical tier.
SOME OBJECTIONS AND MY RESPONSE
I turn now to some of the objections that have been raised to my
proposal.
(i) Response to Govier’s Objection
Govier argues that the requirement that every argument have a
dialectical tier leads to an infinite regress. She put the matter this
way (1999: 232-33):
The regress problem seems to arise for Johnson’s account because
of his claim that every argument is incomplete without a dialectical tier.
In my terminology, this means that every arguer has a dialectical
obligation to buttress his or her main argument with supplemen-
tary arguments responding to alternative positions and objections.
Supplementary arguments are also arguments. Thus they too would
appear to require supplementary arguments addressing alternatives
and objections. Those supplementary-to-the-supplementary argu-
ments, being again arguments, will require the same. And this line
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of reasoning can clearly be continued. Thus Johnson’s view seems
to imply an infinite regress.
This regress would appear to be intolerable. Surely it is not plau-
sible to say that an arguer has an obligation to put forward an infi-
nite number of arguments in order to build a good case for a single
conclusion! On this interpretation, the dialectical tier would not be
a tier; it would be a staircase that mounts forever. A theory demand-
ing such an explosion is not a realistic or coherent one.
The regress objection can I think be met by a three-prong strat-
egy. First, by pointing out that Govier overlooks a qualification;
that at least in MR, the proposal was not that every argument
requires a dialectical tier but rather that the paradigm case of argu-
ment should display this structure. [I admit that I am to blame for
this confusion because the text is, if not inconsistent, at least con-
fusing on this point.] My proposal allows that not all arguments
will require a dialectical tier; but wants to call to the attention
of logical theory the sort that we want our theory to cover. Sec-
ond, by pointing out the parallel between the illative core and the
dialectical tier. That is, the same line of reasoning that prevents
an infinite regress in the illative core can also be deployed to pre-
vent the exfoliation of the dialectical tier. Third, by specifying
the contents of the dialectical tier more carefully, and this takes
us into the broader issue of dialectical adequacy. The intuition
here is that an argument is dialectically adequate just in case the
argument contains an adequate treatment of the arguer’s dialec-
tical obligations. [That means allowing that there may be argu-
ments where the arguer does not have dialectical obligations.]
This question breaks down into two relevant sub-questions.
Q1: How are those dialectical obligations to be identified
and specified?
What sorts of dialectical material are there? Typically, one thinks
of objections and criticisms as the same, but might there not be
a point in distinguishing them? Govier argues, rightly I think,
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that an objection is different than an alternative position (1999:
227-232.) But that presupposes an answer to the question: “What
exactly is an objection?” Strange to say, this clearly important
question has not received much attention in the secondary liter-
ature of the theory of argument! Such questions are in need of
further exploration, whether or not one subscribes to the dialec-
tical tier.
Q2: What is required for an argument to discharge these
obligations?
In other words, what are the criteria that the argument must sat-
isfy in responding to objections and other forms of dialectical
material?
The objections raised by Leff and van Rees provide an oppor-
tunity to engage with these crucial questions and thereby
respond further to Govier’s objection.
(ii) Response to Leff’s Objection
In his keynote address to OSSA in 1999, Leff sought to carve out
a place for what he calls dialectic, which he positions between
logic (and its abstractness) and rhetoric (and its concrete ways).
I cannot here follow the interesting path that Leff takes in his
argument to revive dialectic. Rather I shall limit myself to his
response to my proposal of a dialectical tier (1999: 5-9).
Leff says that the “concept is elegant” but notes that there are
problems with it. Leff complains that the idea “lacks situational
ballast” (7). He says: “Johnson wants to construct an autonomous
dialectical system that can encompass all instances of argument,
and to achieve this end he must know the criteria for dialectical
adequacy in advance of any particular case of dialectical argu-
ment” (7). Leff then floats the attractive thesis that the reason
I have problems answering the question “Which objections?” is
that this cannot be done in advance. One has to look at the situa-
tion, the details, which provide the ballast.
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Now there is something obviously right-minded about Leff’s
point. How one deals with obligations will differ according to the
audience one is dealing with, the setting of the response, etc. But
it seems equally clear to me that there is more to the story, as I
shall shortly indicate. Leff is certainly correct in pointing out that
I seek to develop criteria for dialectical adequacy in advance of
any argument, just as I (and others) have sought to develop crite-
ria for adequacy of the illative core in advance of any particular
argument.
The broader issue Leff is raising here is that of how standards
or criteria for the evaluation of arguments are to be developed. That’s
a complicated and important issue, and yet another example of
an issue that has not, it seems to me, thus far attracted sufficient
attention from argumentation theorists. Now I do not believe
that such criteria must be dictated a priori from an Olympian or
heavenly standpoint, as Moses received the ten commandments
from Yahweh. I find myself inclined to adopt the sort of approach
that Dewey outlines whereby normative standards are extracted
from the practice by judicious reflection and then dip back into
the practice.
There is, I suspect, another aspect to Leff’s complaint about
lack of ballast; i.e., the proposal has not been anchored in suffi-
cient detail. Here it seems to me that Leff and I agree that our
theorizing must be informed by and responsive not just to prac-
tice, but best practices. And therein lies the rub. For this right-
minded suggestion raises the question of how we will identify those
best practices, which, we may expect, will involve identifying spe-
cific exemplars of good arguments. But that in turn means that
we must bring to bear some implicit or intuitive notion of what
counts as a good argument, to that degree the empirical turn
to context presupposes some degree of conceptual elaboration!
Prior cognition (and theory) guide us, faute de mieux, in what we
see and what we take into account, as Peirce (1878/1982) well
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knew. Thus it is not the case that “it all depends” on context and
situation, for it also “somewhat depends” on prior theorizing.
In the search for ballast, while acknowledging the need for a
variety of cases drawn from different disciplines and settings, I
would argue for a special place for philosophical arguments. Phi-
losophy has had long experience with the practice of argumen-
tation; and though its sins are many (i.e., its overcommitment to
deductivist and essentialist views, its abstractness, its tendency to
eschew detail and context), yet its virtues are many also, partic-
ularly if one looks at philosophical arguments through the lens
of informal rather than formal logic. Look at Mill’s argument for
freedom of expression in On Liberty. You will find Mill engaged
in anticipating and responding to objections, and it seems to me
that worthwhile leads about the issue of dialectical adequacy can
be found here.
To conclude, I am grateful to Leff for this criticism and the
problems it brings to the fore.
(iii) Response to van Rees’s Objections
I turn now to some of the challenges raised by van Rees in her
wide-ranging review of my book. In this paper, I can only deal
with her “reservations” about the dialectical tier and only with
some of those. Van Rees also builds on Govier’s regress criticism,
as well as Leff’s criticism of abstraction. She writes: “In a truly
pragmatic conception of dialectic, what the arguer needs are
nothing more (but nothing less) than the actual or anticipated
objections of the opponent that he tries to convince” (2001: 234).
Precisely; those actual and anticipated objections form part of
the content of the dialectical tier (the remainder being the
response to them).
What works very well for the setting of a critical discussion
(what I call process-driven theories) is not so helpful when one is
constructing an argument for what Govier calls “a Noninterac-
tive audience” (1999: 183-201). Such an audience poses its own
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special problems that cannot be solved by models, like pragma-
dialectics, developed for two or more participants who are face-
to-face with one another. Both Blair (1998) and Govier (1999)
have argued, and I think effectively, that such a model cannot be
transported to other settings. Govier says: “Dialogue is a won-
derful thing, and greatly to be recommended, but dialogue
requires real as opposed to hypothetical interaction. I want to
say, in the manner of Wittgenstein, ‘A picture held us captive.’
When no one else is there, we are not interacting with another
person” (198). In my terms, this means that the process-driven
approach will not provide all the answers for an argument as the
product-driven approach. And vice-versa. Both types of theory
are necessary, and their respective contributions have yet to be
fully discussed.
Van Rees also takes me to task for not providing criteria for
dialectical adequacy. “What,” she asks, “are the criteria for dialec-
tical adequacy?” (van Rees 2001: 233). I acknowledged that there
were no such criteria in MR and indeed expressed some won-
derment at how this could be so – 2000 years into the theory of
argument. [Here we have yet another striking indication of the
gap between theory and practice.]
Time for some ballast. Let us turn to Mill’s On Liberty, Chapter
II: “Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion.” Without attempt-
ing to recap his entire argument, Mill is here defending the view
that the government should not impose any constraint on the
expression of opinion. The argument has two branches and is,
from my standpoint, dialectical all the way down. Branch One
proceeds on the supposition that we can never be sure that the
opinion we are endeavouring to suppress is false. His argument
against this invokes the premise that all silencing of discussion
is an assumption of infallibility. Having presented his defense
of this claim (in what I could call the illative core of the argu-
ment), Mill now steps back in order to anticipate an objection
(1859/1974: 19). “The objection likely to be made to this argu-
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ment would probably take some such form as the following.
There is no greater assumption of infallibility in forbidding the
propagation of error than in any other thing that is done by
public authority on its own judgement and responsibility.” The
objection here is an objection to one of the premises of Branch
One. Mill develops this objection at length and having done that,
makes his response: “I answer that it is assuming very much
more.” He is not (obviously) responding to any particular person,
it seems to me; rather he is responding to what he can imagine
someone might put by way of a challenge. In thus anticipating
and responding, Mill has gone some distance toward satisfying
his dialectical responsibilities.
An important but hitherto unasked question is: Does Mill’s
argument achieve dialectical adequacy? To get a handle on this,
I suggest we ask: How might Mill have gone wrong here in this
part of his argument? I believe there are at least three ways. He
might have failed to give a faithful articulation of the objection;
he may have overstated it or understated it. Or, he might have
not given a good response to it. There is a third way he might fail
to achieve dialectical adequacy: he might have failed to deal with
an objection that he should have dealt with.
In line with these conjectures, I now offer the following pro-
posal regarding dialectical adequacy. The arguer achieves dialec-
tical adequacy in her argument provided that:
a. the arguer deals fairly, accurately with each objection;
The typical complaint that points to a dialectical failure of this
sort is: “You have misrepresented the position you are criticiz-
ing.” (Straw person)
b. the arguer’s response to the objection is adequate;
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The typical complaint that points to a failure of this sort is: “But
you did not say how you would deal with the strongest objection;
that objection still stands.”
c. the arguer deals with the appropriate objections.
The typical complaint that points to a dialectical failure of this
sort is: “But you have not dealt with the most pressing (impor-
tant/significant) objection.”
I propose then that the criteria for the dialectical tier are
appropriateness, accuracy and adequacy. Accuracy here means
that the arguer engages with the real position and not some dis-
tortion of it; i.e., the arguer must avoid the fallacy of straw per-
son. It seems likely that adequacy can be handled by the criteria
for the illative core; that is, the arguer’s response to the objec-
tion will be adequate just in case the argument given (if one is
given) satisfies the criteria of relevance, sufficiency and accept-
ability. But when it comes to the issue of which are the appropriate
objections, it seems to me we are in uncharted territory. I think
Govier is headed in the right direction in invoking salience (1999,
201) but that concept itself needs unpacking.
I have framed this new proposal (as I did its predecessor) in
deontic language: “the arguer must deal with his or her dialectical
obligations or responsibilities.” But to return to our theological anal-
ogy, all this talk of obligations sounds so very Calvinist (or
Roman Catholic). Perhaps I need to adjust my theorizing to take
advantage of New Age theologies that would urge us to think:
“The cup is not half empty; it is half full.” Such a voice would
say here: “What you call obligations can equally well be viewed
as opportunities and challenges.” Viewed this way, the question
changes: no longer is it a matter of which objections one must
respond to but rather which challenges one chooses to respond
to, which objects capture one’s interest. Now the whole matter
of interest and choice (van Rees, 2001: 232) emerge as central.
Instead of thinking of the arguer as obliged to respond, it may be
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preferable to look at dialectical material as presenting a range
of possible points for further development, understanding that
which of these the arguer chooses will depend legitimately upon
not only one’s obligations but also one’s interests.
Indeed, it seems evident to me that their own interests have to
a non-negligible degree led my respondents. Thus Govier looks
at the proposal from the perspective of a logician; Leff looks at
those aspects which would perhaps be of interest to a rhetori-
cian; van Rees scrutinizes those aspects of my position which,
as it were, leap out from the viewpoint of pragma-dialectics. It
seems both natural and inevitable that in responding to some-
one’s argument/position, each of us will be led by our own inter-
ests. If the critic/objector can legitimately use interest to
structure his or her response, it seems that the same principle
might apply to the arguer in deciding what objections to respond
to.
In the final analysis, a doctrine of dialectical adequacy will
require attention to both obligation and interest. But how to
integrate these competing tendencies, I do not know.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSAL
At this point I can anticipate an objection in the form of a ques-
tion: What difference does it make whether we build the dialec-
tical tier into our conceptualization of argument? The one who
asks probably has in mind William James’s statement which
roughly paraphrased is this: “A difference which makes no differ-
ence is no difference.”
Let me briefly indicate the differences my proposal makes in
three areas: theory, practice, and pedagogy.
My proposal has fewer implications for the practice of argu-
mentation than it does for the theory or for the pedagogy. The
reason for this strange situation is that the dialectical tier has
always been strongly represented in the practice of argumenta-
tion. The problem is that it has not been included in the theory;
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and because textbooks tend to follow theory (Massey, 1981), it
has not been made much of an appearance in logic pedagogy.
There is perhaps no better illustration of this than Solomon’s
1989 Introduction to Philosophy text. When he is providing direc-
tions to the student about how to construct an argument, he
makes a special point of telling them that they should anticipate
objections. But later when he is giving the standard FDL story
about what counts as a good argument, his theory makes no pro-
vision for how well the arguer does in this assigned task of antic-
ipating objections.
So the implications for pedagogy are these: that when we give
examples of argument to our students, we should present as
examples arguments in which the arguer at least recognizes the
dialectical situation, and we should be teaching them as well
what they must do to carry this part off well. If this means that
we retire or move to the background the infamous Socrates
example, I, for one, would not object.
At the level of theory I have indicated a number of tasks that
remain to be accomplished. What is dialectical adequacy? What
are the arguer’s dialectical obligations (if any)? What is an objec-
tion, and how does it differ from other forms of dialectical mate-
rial? What is required to deal with an objection properly? What
other forms of dialectical material are there? How are the criteria
for the dialectical tier to be developed? What is the role of best
practices, and how shall we identify them? What is the role of
interest in dialectical issues? How did logical theory manage to
overlook the dialectical tier? What are the respective strengths
and weaknesses of product driven vs. process driven theories?
That this series of questions has emerged in this review may
perhaps be taken as some indication of the fertility of the pro-
posal.
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CONCLUSION
The proposal regarding a dialectical tier comes out of the tra-
dition of informal logic and brings, I hope, something new and
important to the table. Even if one does not accept the proposal
yet the issue its raises, the questions that surround it may be
enough to redeem it. For, as I said earlier, the proposal was not
itself the end but rather a means of calling attention to over-
looked issues and questions. I hope I may have succeeded in per-
suading that the proposal is not without merit. And if not, then
possibly I have illustrated that the issues that it raises are very
much worth continued attention. Perhaps, then, the proper the-
ological destination for my proposal will turn out to be neither
Heaven nor Hell, but rather Limbo, where according to Roman
Catholic theology the as-yet unredeemed souls await their eter-
nal destiny.
At this point in the service, one expects a blessing. As we
go forth this morning to begin three days of intense discussion
about argumentation, we might well remember what Carnap
said in Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.
Let us grant to those who work in any special field of investigation
the freedom to use any form of expression which seems useful to
them; the work in the field will sooner or later lead them to the
elimination of those forms which have no useful function. Let us be
cautious in making assertions and critical in examining them, but
tolerant in permitting linguistic forms.
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CHAPTER 8.
HOW THE CONTEXT OF DIALOGUE OF AN
ARGUMENT INFLUENCES ITS EVALUATION
DOUGLAS WALTON
Abstract: A common theme of the Canadian approach to informal
logic is to take as its central tasks the identification, analysis and
evaluation of real arguments found in natural language discourse.
Along with this came the recognition of taking factors of the con-
text of dialogue in the given case, such as burdens and standards
of proof, into account by ascending to the so-called dialectical tier.
This paper surveys how the resulting typology of dialogues has had
applications in many fields. It is shown that distinctions between
the various kinds of dialogue can be clarified and formulated more
precisely by showing how each of them relies on different
approaches to the burden of proof.
The understanding of argumentation as dialectical in nature was
central to the founding of informal logic as a tool for evaluating
arguments in natural language discourse by transcending the tra-
ditional ideal of a good argument being one that is deductively
valid and has true premises (Blair and Johnson, 1987, 41). The
meaning of the term ‘dialectical’ that they use, said to borrow
heavily from Aristotle’s account of dialectical argumentation,
sees argument as a process in which two parties participate, one
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having the role of questioner and the other having the role of
answerer of these questions (45). Moreover, they also character-
ized argumentation as a purposive activity in which each of the
participants has a goal guiding his or her moves in the dialogue
(46). Johnson (2003) acknowledged the importance of this notion
of dialectical argumentation further when he focused on the use
of argument to achieve rational persuasion by introducing what
he called a dialectical tier postulating that the arguers engaging
in a dialogue have dialectical obligations and responsibilities.
Adoption of this kind of dialectical viewpoint in recent logic,
even though it was very much a minority view at the time, was
pioneered by Hamblin (1970) who built formal dialectical sys-
tems that borrowed from Aristotle’s account of dialectical argu-
mentation, and rejected the view that the traditional idea of a
deductively valid argument with true premises could cope with
problems of evaluating real arguments. However, Hamblin
(1971) did not explicitly classify such formal dialogues as having
the purpose of rational persuasion, but portrayed them as having
an information-seeking goal. Hamblin made no attempt to sys-
tematically classify different types of dialogue representing goal-
directed frameworks in which argumentation takes place. This
task was subsequently carried out by Walton and Krabbe (1995).
This work has had many citations
1
, as its dialogue typology has
had applications in many different fields, including artificial
intelligence, law, medicine, discourse analysis, linguistics (espe-
cially pragmatics) and education (Rapanta et al., 2013). The pur-
pose of this paper is to survey many of these applications to see
how they fit with informal logic.
Section 1 introduces the reader who is not familiar with the
typology of the different types of dialogue in argumentation to
explain the basic concepts in this area and the motivations for
applying formal models of dialogue to study examples and char-
acteristics of natural language arguments. The dialogue typology
1. There have been 1,701 citations according to Google, as of September 13, 2017.
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of Walton and Krabbe (1995) is explained, and it is mentioned
how one new type, discovery dialogue, has been added in. The
basic ideas behind persuasion dialogue, inquiry dialogue, delib-
eration dialogue, and the notion of the dialectical shift from one
type of dialogue to another, are introduced. Section 2 introduces
the reader to the basic characteristics of persuasion dialogue,
presenting a precise definition of persuasion dialogue and a sim-
ple example of it. Section 3 also briefly explains how legal argu-
mentation of the kind found in the common law trial setting
has been shown to be a species of persuasion dialogue by intro-
ducing the important notions of burden of persuasion and bur-
den of proof. Beginning with an example of deliberation in a
real doctor-patient consultation in the field of medicine, section
3 outlines the basic concepts and characteristics of deliberation
dialogue, drawing on the recent literature on deliberation in arti-
ficial intelligence, where formal models of this type of dialogue
have been built. Section 4 offers advice on the commonly
encountered problem of how to tell whether an example of real
argumentation within the context should be classified as that of
a persuasion dialogue or deliberation dialogue. Sections 5, 6, and
7 briefly outline the main characteristics of the inquiry, the dis-
covery and the information-seeking types of dialogue. Very brief
outlines of the characteristics of the negotiation dialogue and the
eristic type of dialogue are presented in sections 8 and 9. Section
10 provides some conclusions.
2. TYPES OF DIALOGUE AND DIALECTICAL SHIFTS
The six basic types of dialogue previously recognized in the
argumentation literature (Walton and Krabbe, 1995) are persua-
sion, inquiry, negotiation dialogue, information-seeking dia-
logue, deliberation, and eristic dialogue. Discovery dialogue
(McBurney and Parsons, 2001) has been added in the revised
list of the properties of the basic types of dialogue in Table 1.
These dialogues are technical artifacts called normative models,
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meaning that they do not necessarily correspond exactly to real
instances of persuasion or negotiation, and so forth, that may
occur in a real conversational exchange. Each model of dialogue
is defined by its initial situation, the participants’ individual
goals, and the aim of the dialogue as a whole.
TYPE OF
DIALOGUE
INITIAL
SITUATION
PARTICIPANT’S
GOALS
GOAL OF
DIALOGUE
Persuasion Conflict ofOpinions
Persuade Other
Party
Resolve or Clarify
Issue
Inquiry Need to HaveProof
Find and Verify
Evidence
Prove (Disprove)
Hypothesis
Discovery
Need to Find an
Explanation of
Facts
Find and Defend a
Suitable
Hypothesis
Choose Best
Hypothesis for
Testing
Negotiation Conflict ofInterests
Get What You
Most Want
Reasonable
Settlement Both
Can Live With
Information-Seeking NeedInformation
Acquire or Give
Information
Exchange
Information
Deliberation Dilemma orPractical Choice
Co-ordinate Goals
and Actions
Decide Best
Available Course of
Action
Eristic Personal
Conflict
Verbally Hit out at
Opponent
Reveal Deeper Basis
of Conflict
Table 1: Seven Basic Types of Dialogue
A dialogue is formally defined as an ordered 3-tuple {O, A, C}
where O is the opening stage, A is the argumentation stage, and C
is the closing stage (Gordon and Walton, 2009, 5). Dialogue rules
(protocols) define what types of moves are allowed by the par-
ties during the argumentation stage (Walton and Krabbe, 1995).
At the opening stage, the participants agree to take part in some
type of dialogue that has a collective goal. Each party has an indi-
vidual goal and the dialogue itself has a collective goal. The ini-
tial situation is framed at the opening stage, and the dialogue
HOW THE CONTEXT OF DIALOGUE OF AN ARGUMENT INFLUENCES ITS
EVALUATION 199
moves through the opening stage toward the closing stage. The
type of dialogue, the goal of the dialogue, the initial situation, the
participants, and the participant’s goals are all set at the opening
stage. In some instances, a burden of proof, called a global burden
of proof, is set at the opening stage, applies through the whole
argumentation stage, and determines which side was successful
or not at the closing stage. In some instances, another kind of
burden of proof, called a local burden of proof, applies to some
speech acts made in moves during the argumentation stage (Wal-
ton, 2014).
Persuasion dialogue is adversarial in that the goal of each party
is to win over the other side by finding arguments that defeat
its thesis or casts it into doubt. Each party has a commitment
set (Hamblin, 1970), and to win, a party must present a chain of
argumentation that proves its thesis using only premises that are
commitments of the other party. One very well known type of
dialogue that can be classified as a type of persuasion dialogue
is the critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992).
The goal of a critical discussion is to resolve a conflict of opin-
ions by rational argumentation. The critical discussion has pro-
cedural rules, but is not a formal model. However, the term
‘persuasion dialogue’ has now become a technical term of argu-
mentation technology in artificial intelligence and there are for-
mal models representing species of persuasion dialogue
(Prakken, 2006).
Inquiry is quite different from persuasion dialogue because
it is cooperative in nature, as opposed to persuasion dialogue,
which is highly adversarial. The goal of the inquiry, in its para-
digm form, is to prove that a statement designated at the opening
stage as the probandum is true or false, or if neither of these find-
ings can be proved, to prove that there is insufficient evidence to
prove that the probandum is true or false (Walton, 1998, chapter
3). The aim of this type of inquiry is to draw conclusions only
from premises that can be firmly accepted as true or false, to pre-
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vent the need in the future to have to go back and reopen the
inquiry once it has been closed. The most important character-
istic of this paradigm of the inquiry as a type of dialogue is the
property of cumulativeness (Walton, 1998, 70). To say a dialogue
is cumulative means that once a statement has been accepted as
true at any point in the argumentation stage of the inquiry, that
statement must remain true at every point in the inquiry through
the argumentation stage until the closing stage is reached. How-
ever, this paradigm of inquiry represents only one end of a spec-
trum where a high standard of proof is appropriate. In other
inquiry settings, where there are conflicts of opinion and greater
uncertainty, cumulativeness fails, but cooperativeness is a char-
acteristic of inquiry. The model of inquiry dialogue built by
Black and Hunter (2009) is meant to represent the cooperative
setting of medical domains. Black and Hunter (2009, 174) model
two subtypes of inquiry dialogue called in argument inquiry dia-
logues and warrant inquiry dialogues. The former allow two
agents to share knowledge to jointly construct arguments,
whereas the latter allow agents to share knowledge to construct
dialectical trees that have an argument at each node in which a
child node is a counterargument to its parent.
Inquiry dialogue can be classified as a truth-directed type of
dialogue, as opposed to deliberation dialogue, which is not aimed
at finding the truth about that matter being discussed, but at
arriving at a decision on what to do, where there is a need to take
action. While persuasion dialogue is highly adversarial, deliber-
ation is a collaborative type of dialogue in which parties col-
lectively steer actions towards a common goal by agreeing on a
proposal that can solve a problem affecting all of the parties con-
cerned, taking all their interests into account. To determine in a
particular case whether an argument in a text of discourse can
better be seen as part of a persuasion dialogue or a deliberation
type of dialogue, one has to arrive at a determination of what the
goals of the dialogue and the goals of the participants are sup-
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posed to be. Argumentation in deliberation is primarily a mat-
ter of identifying proposals and arguments supporting them and
finding critiques of other proposals (Walton et al., 2009). Delib-
eration dialogue is different from negotiation dialogue, because
the negotiation deals with competing interests, whereas deliber-
ation requires a sacrifice of one’s interests.
Deliberation is a collaborative type of dialogue in which par-
ties collectively steer group actions towards a common goal by
agreeing on a proposal that can solve a problem affecting all of
the parties concerned while taking their interests into account.
A key property of deliberation dialogue is that a proposal that
is optimal for the group may not be optimal for any individual
participant (McBurney et al., 2007, 98). Another property is that
a participant in deliberation must be willing to share both her
preferences and information with the other participants. This
property does not hold in persuasion dialogue, where a partici-
pant presents only information that is useful to prove her thesis
or to disprove the thesis of the opponent. In the formal model of
deliberation of McBurney et al. (2007, 100), a deliberation dia-
logue consists of eight stages: open, inform, propose, consider,
revise, recommend, confirm and close. Proposals for action that
indicate possible action-options relevant to the governing ques-
tion are put forward during the propose stage. Commenting on
the proposals from various perspectives takes place during the
consider stage. At the recommend stage a proposal for action can
be recommended for acceptance or non-acceptance by each par-
ticipant (Walton et al., 2010).
A dialectical shift is said to occur in cases where, during a
sequence of argumentation, the participants begin to engage in
a different type of dialogue from the one they were initially
engaged in (Walton and Krabbe, 1995). In the following classic
case (Parsons and Jennings, 1997, 267) often cited as an example,
two agents are engaged in deliberation dialogue on how to hang
a picture. Engaging in practical reasoning they come to the con-
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clusion they need a hammer, and a nail, because they have fig-
ured out that the best way to hang the picture is on a nail, and the
best way to put a nail in the wall is by means of a hammer. One
knows where a hammer can be found, and the other has a pretty
good idea of where to get a nail. At that point, the two begin
to negotiate on who will get the hammer and who will go in
search of a nail. In this kind of case, we say that the one dialogue
is said to be embedded in the other (Walton and Krabbe, 1995),
meaning that the second dialogue fits into the first and helps it
along toward achieving its collective goal. In this instance, the
shift to the negotiation dialogue is helpful in moving the deliber-
ation dialogue along towards its goal of deciding the best way to
hang the picture. For after all, if somebody has to get the hammer
and nail, and they can’t find anyone who is willing to do these
things, they will have to rethink their deliberation on how best
to hang the picture. Maybe they will need to phone a handyman,
for example. This would mean another shift to an information-
seeking dialogue, and involvement of a third party as a source of
the information. This example of an embedding contrasts with
an example of an illicit dialectical shift when the advent of the
second type of dialogue interferes with the progress of the first.
For example, let’s consider a case in which a union-management
negotiation deteriorates into an eristic dialogue in which each
side bitterly attacks the other in an antagonistic manner. This
kind of shift is not an embedding, because quarreling is not only
unhelpful to the conduct of the negotiation, but is antithetical
to it, and may very well even block it altogether, by leading to a
strike for example.
3. PERSUASION DIALOGUE
Here is a simple example of a persuasion dialogue adapted from
an example of Prakken, 2006 (166), presented in the format of
Table 2. There are two parties, Olga and Paul, who take turns
making moves. Each move contains a speech act, such as asking
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a question or making an assertion. A so-called adjacency pair is
a pair of speech acts one following the other. The Z column
numbers the adjacency pairs in Table 2. According to Schegloff
and Sacks (1973), adjacency pairs are sequences of two utter-
ances that are (1) adjacent, (2) produced by different speakers, (3)
ordered as a first part and a second part, and (4) typed, so that
a particular first part requires a particular second part (or range
of second parts) (Levinson, 1983, 303). For example, a why-ques-
tion (of a certain type) demands an answer that offers an argu-
ment supporting a statement that is in question or has been
claimed by the other party.
Z Olga Paul
1 Why is your car safe? Since it has an airbag.
2 That is true, but this does notmake your car safe. Why does that not make my car safe?
3
Since the newspapers recently
reported on airbags expanding
without cause.
OK, but newspaper reports are unreliable
sources of technological information.
4 Still your car is not safe, becauseits maximum speed is very high.
But it says in Consumer’s Reports, a
reliable source, that this type of car is
safe.
5
Even so, if a car has a maximum
speed that is very high, we cannot
say that it is safe.
In some cases, having rapid acceleration
enables a driver to avoid an accident.
Table 2: Argumentation Stage in the Airbag Example
The central characteristic of a persuasion dialogue is that each
party has the goal of persuading the other party that their thesis
is true where, at the opening stage of dialogue, there is disagree-
ment about whether some designated proposition is true (accept-
able, based on the evidence) or not. Each side tries to rationally
persuade the other to reverse its original opinion using argu-
ments with premises the other party already accepts or can be
gotten to accept by further arguments. Rational persuasion, in
204 DOUGLAS WALTON
this sense can be defined using the following four-part précis-
ing definition: a rationally persuades b to accept claim C iff (1) b
does not accept C, (2) a presents an argument Ai with premises
P1, P2, …, Pn such that (3) b accepts all of P1, P2, …, Pn, and (4)
Ai is valid, according to the criteria for validity of arguments set
in place at the opening stage. In any instance of dialogue where
all four requirements are met by a’s argumentation, b is ratio-
nally obliged to accept C, unless b can present further arguments
against C. Whether or not b is allowed to do this depends on
whether the closing stage of the dialogue has been reached.
For those familiar with argumentation theory, the notion of
the persuasion dialogue is reminiscent of the type of dialogue
called the critical discussion defined by a set of rules in the
pragma-dialectical model. In all three versions of their set of
rules for the critical discussion van Eemeren and Grootendorst
set down a particular rule that governs burden of proof. In the
1992 version (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, 208), the
rule governing burden of proof is simple. It only requires that “a
party that advances the standpoint is obliged to defend it if the
other party asks him to do so”. For example, rule 8a of the formal
dialogue system PPD (Walton and Krabbe, 1995, 136) says, “If
one party challenges some assertion of the other party, the sec-
ond party is to present, in the next move, at least one argument
for that assertion”. Hahn and Oaksford (2007, 47) have ques-
tioned whether van Eemeren and Grootendorst need to have
rule 3 requiring burden of proof in a critical discussion. They
think it makes sense to have a burden of proof for a participant’s
ultimate thesis set forth at the opening stage of the critical dis-
cussion, but they question why it is useful for each individual
claim in the argumentative exchange to have an associated bur-
den of proof. They concede that although there is a risk of non-
persuasion in not responding to a challenge by putting forward
an argument to defend one’s claim, this risk is a relatively small
factor in the outcome of the dialogue and “is entirely external
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to the dialogue and not a burden of proof in any conventional
sense” (Hahn and Oaksford, 2007, 47). They have a point. It is
worth asking what function the requirement of burden of proof
has in a persuasion dialogue.
The addition of a third party audience to the persuasion dia-
logue affects brings out the utility of this function. If a party in a
persuasion dialogue puts forward an argument, and then fails to
defend it when challenged to do so, this failure will make his side
appear weak to the audience who is evaluating the argumenta-
tion on both sides. They will ask why he put forward this partic-
ular claim if he can’t defend it, and he may easily lose by default.
This can come about because the audience has the role of being
a neutral third party in the dialogue, and is not merely one of the
contestants who is trying to get the best of the opposed party. It
helps the audience to judge which side had the better argument
if each side responds to challenges by putting forward arguments
to support its claims. Law is an area where there is such a third
party trier (a judge or jury) in addition to the opposed advocates
on each side.
In legal argumentation, burden of proof rests on the notion
that there are different standards of proof (Gordon and Walton,
2009; Walton, 2014, 57-61). The standard required in most civil
cases is called that of the preponderance of evidence, sometimes
also called the balance of probabilities (Gordon and Walton,
2009). According to this standard, a proposition is acceptable if
it is more likely to be true than not true. There is also a standard
of proof called clear and convincing evidence, which is taken to
be higher than a preponderance of evidence standard and is only
met if the proposition is not only substantially more probable but
also there is a firm belief that it is true. According to the beyond
reasonable doubt standard, applicable in criminal cases, there can
be no reasonable doubt that a proposition is true given the evi-
dence supporting it, and the lack of evidence against it. In gen-
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eral a burden of proof relates to the level of certainty required in
order to prove a proposition that is in doubt.
In legal argumentation of the kind found in a common law
trial setting (a species of persuasion dialogue), there is a burden
of persuasion set at the opening stage of a dialogue, and a burden
of production of evidence is set during the argumentation stage
(Gordon and Walton, 2009). But there is also a tactical burden of
proof that plays an important role in the formal system for mod-
eling burden of proof of Prakken and Sartor (2009, 228). On their
account, the burden of persuasion specifies which party has to
prove some proposition that represents the ultimate probandum
in the case, and also specifies what proof standard has to be met.
The judge is supposed to instruct the jury on what proof stan-
dard has to be met and which side estimated at the beginning
of the trial process. Whether this burden has been met or not
is determined at the end of the trial. The burden of persuasion
remains the same throughout the trial, once it has been set. It
never shifts from the one side to the other during the whole pro-
ceedings (Prakken and Sartor, 2007). The burden of production
specifies which party has to offer evidence on some specific issue
that arises during a particular point during the argumentation in
the trial itself as it proceeds. The burden of production may in
many instances only have to meet a low proof standard. If the
evidence offered does not meet the standard, the issue can be
decided as a matter of law against the burden party, or decided in
the final stage by the trier (Prakken and Sartor, 2006). Both the
burden of persuasion and the burden of production are assigned
by law. The tactical burden of proof, on the other hand is decided
by the party putting forward an argument at some stage during
the proceedings. The arguer must judge the risk of ultimately
losing on the particular issue being discussed at that point if
he fails to put forward further evidence concerning that issue
(Prakken and Sartor, 2007). The tactical burden is not ruled on or
moderated by the judge. It pertains only to the two parties con-
HOW THE CONTEXT OF DIALOGUE OF AN ARGUMENT INFLUENCES ITS
EVALUATION 207
testing on each side, enabling them to plan their argumentation
strategies.
This research on burden of proof in artificial intelligence and
law (Prakken and Sartor, 2006, 2007, 2009; Gordon and Walton,
2009) rests on the assumption that legal argumentation of the
kind that takes place in a common law court setting fits the con-
text of a persuasion dialogue.
4. DELIBERATION DIALOGUE
Lamiani et al. (2017) applied the formal model of deliberation
dialogue of Walton, Toniolo and Norman (2014) to real doctor-
patient consultations in the field of hemophilia, a rare inherited
bleeding disorder that requires patients to comply with burden-
some treatments. It was concluded by their study of 30 consulta-
tions that the deliberation model can be applied to empirical data
showing how to identify and remedy physician-patient deliber-
ation interactions that are suboptimal. A particularly interesting
finding (Lamiani et al., 2017, 691) was that the topic can shift
during a deliberation dialogue as each problem that arises needs
to be solved, during a visit. Studying transcripts of these con-
sultations between physician and patient, they found that there
could be more than one deliberation dialogue. This finding con-
firms the basic feature of deliberation dialogue postulated in the
model, namely that the topic of the deliberation can shift dur-
ing the argumentation stage. Thus a contrast can be drawn in
this respect between deliberation dialogue and persuasion dia-
logue. In the latter, the topic is fixed at the opening stage and
remains fixed at the closing stage. In this instance the application
of the theoretical model to examples of real clinical dialogues
confirmed a characteristic postulated in the theoretical model.
In the following example, (Lamiani et al., 2017, 693), the
patient shares his arguments explaining why he does not want
to start the cure proposed by the physician. Nevertheless at the
end of the dialogue agreement is reached as the patient explicitly
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expresses his commitment to the physician’s proposal for treat-
ment (at the closing stage). The dialogue has been quoted but
some details have been simplified and shortened.
Opening Stage
MD: Why did they write ‘previous viral hepatitis’? Do you
still have hepatitis?
Patient: Yes.
MD: So you didn’t undergo treatment in the meantime?
Patient: No, no, no! I’m not doing any treatment…
Patient: Are there people who are already doing this therapy?
MD: Well, everybody! Basically all of our patients are doing
it! So absolutely you should also do it! Do you want to?
Patient: No
MD: Why?
Argumentation Stage
Patient: Because I feel good the way I am now.
MD: Yes, I know you feel good. However, the hepatitis virus
is silent for 30 years and when it wakes up then there is
nothing more you can do!
Patient: Why, can this virus go away?
MD: There is an 80% probability of success!
Patient: Yes I know, because I am a bit special.
MD: Explain to me. Let’s talk about it!
Patient: I have always been against all sorts of drugs and I
have never taken medicine all my life, not even for flu. And
you had talked to me about the interferon also three years
ago.
MD: And will keep on doing it! We absolutely recommend
you to do the therapy. I repeat, to start does not mean that
if the side effects are too heavy we tie you to a chair and
make you go on. We decide together. If we give it a try,
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there are too many side effects and we stop. It’s not a prob-
lem. The virus doesn’t become more resistant
Closing Stage
Patient: Yes, okay
MD: Very well, so I’m writing that for us it will be useful to
do it. And if you want to do it here it’s okay
Patient: Yes I’d better do it when I do the other treatment.
The findings showed that 80% of the sample of consultations
contained at least one deliberation dialogue, suggesting that
deliberation is common in clinical practice and chronic care. In
the study, the model of deliberation was taken as an ideal model
of optimal deliberation so that the study of empirical examples
could be used to identify misalignments with the model, or cases
where there were suboptimal realizations of the ideal model.
The intent of applying the model to real consultations was to
offer practical suggestions to improve collaborative physician-
patient communication in hemophilia care. Note that in the case
outlined above all three stages were present, but in some cases
regarded as suboptimal, either the opening stage or the closing
stage was missing.
The types of dialogue that have been centrally highlighted in
the past in the argumentation literature, such as the critical dis-
cussion, concern claims that are put forward in the form of a
proposition that is held to be true or false. But other types of dia-
logue, such as deliberation and negotiation, do not have the cen-
tral aim of proving that a particular proposition is true or false.
There is no global burden of proof in a deliberation dialogue,
because no thesis to be proved or disproved is set into place for
each side at the opening stage (Walton, 2010). Deliberation is
not an adversarial type of dialogue, and at the opening stage all
options are left open concerning proposals that might be brought
forward to answer the governing question. At the opening stage,
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the governing question cites a problem that needs to be solved
cooperatively by the group conducting the deliberations, a prob-
lem that concerns choice of actions by the group. The goal of the
dialogue is not to prove or disprove anything, but to arrive at a
decision on which is the best course of action to take. Hence the
expression ‘burden of proof’ is not generally appropriate for this
type of dialogue.
During a later stage, proposals for action are put forward, and
what takes place during the argumentation stage is a discussion
that examines the arguments both for and against each proposal,
in order to arrive at a decision on which proposal is best. Some-
thing like the standard of proof called the preponderance of evi-
dence in law is operative during this stage. The outcome in a
deliberation dialogue should be to select the best proposal, even
if that proposal is only marginally better than others that have
been offered. A party who offers a proposal is generally advocat-
ing it as the best course of action to take, even though in some
instances a proposal may merely be put forward hypothetically
as something to consider but not necessarily something to adopt
as the best course of action. In such instances it is reasonable to
allow one party in a deliberation dialogue to ask another party
to justify the proposal that the second party has put forward, so
that the reasons behind it can be examined and possibly criti-
cized. Hence there is a place in deliberation dialogue for some-
thing comparable to burden of proof. It could be called a burden
of defending or justifying a proposal. What needs to be observed
is that this burden only comes into play during the argumen-
tation stage where proposals are being put forward, questioned
and defended. In contrast with the situation in persuasion dia-
logue, none of these proposals is formulated and set into place
at the opening stage as something that has to be proved or cast
into doubt by one of the designated parties in the dialogue. In
this regard, persuasion dialogue and deliberation are different
in their structures. Since persuasion dialogue (the critical dis-
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cussion type of dialogue) has been most discussed in the argu-
mentation literature, it seems natural to think that there must be
something comparable to burden of proof that is also operative
in deliberation dialogue. But this expectation is misleading.
In deliberation dialogue, there is no burden of persuasion set
at the opening stage, because the proposals will only be formu-
lated as recommendations for particular courses of actions at the
later argumentation stage. A deliberation dialogue arises from
the need for action, as expressed in a governing question for-
mulated at the opening stage, like ‘Where shall we go for dinner
tonight?’, and proposals for action arise only at a later stage in
the dialogue (McBurney et al, 2007, 99). There is no burden of
proof set for any of the parties in a deliberation at the opening
stage. However, at the later argumentation stage, once a proposal
has been put forward by a particular party, it will be reasonably
assumed by the other participants that this party will be prepared
to defend his proposal by using arguments, for example like the
argument that his proposal does not have negative consequences,
or the argument that his proposal will fulfill some goal that is
taken to be important for the group. How burden of proof fig-
ures during the argumentation stage can be seen by examining
some of the permissible locutions (speech acts allowed as moves).
One of these is the ask-justify locution (McBurney et al., 2007,
103), quoted below. The locution ask_ justify (Pj , Pi , type, t) is
a request by participant Pj of participant Pi , seeking justification
from Pi for the assertion that sentence t is a valid instance of type
type. Following this, Pi must either retract the sentence t or shift
into an embedded persuasion dialogue in which Pi seeks to per-
suade Pj that sentence t is such a valid instance
What we see here is that one participant in a deliberation dia-
logue can ask another participant to justify a proposition that
the second party has become committed to through some pre-
vious move of a type like an assertion or proposal. As long as
the proposition is in the second party’s commitment set, the first
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party has a right to ask him to justify it or retract it. But notice
that when the second party offers such a justification attempt, the
dialogue shifts into an embedded persuasion dialogue in which
the second party tries to persuade the first party to become com-
mitted to this proposition by using a valid argument. So what we
see here is that burden of proof is involved during specific groups
of moves at the argumentation stage, but when the attempt is
made by the respondent to fulfill the request for justification,
there is a shift to persuasion dialogue. By this means the notion
of burden of proof appropriate for the persuasion dialogue can
be used to evaluate the argument offered.
A key factor that is vitally important for persuasion dialogue
is that the participants agree on the issue to be discussed at the
opening stage. Each party must have a thesis to be proved. This
setting of the issue is vitally important for preventing the dis-
cussion from wandering off, or by shifting the burden of proof
back and forth and never concluding. In deliberation dialogue
however, the proposals are not formulated until a later stage. It
makes no sense to attempt to fix the proposals at the opening
stage, because they need to arise out of the brainstorming dis-
cussions that take place after the opening stage. Burden of proof
only arises during the argumentation stage in relation to specific
kinds of moves made during that stage, and when it does arrive
there is a shift to persuasion dialogue which allows the appropri-
ate notion of burden of proof to be brought in from the persua-
sion dialogue.
For these reasons the speech act protocols for deliberation dia-
logue need to be configured so that one agent can ask another
about the plans and goals of the second agent, and the second
agent can offer an explanation about its own plans and goals
(Walton, Toniolo and Norman, 2016). In general, an agent in a
deliberation dialogue often needs to be able to explain its plans
and goals, as well as its knowledge of the current circumstances
of the case, to another agent who questions a proposal that has
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been put forward by the first agent. Thus there is a kind of bur-
den on the first agent in such a case to offer explanations and
clarifications that the other agents in the deliberation dialogue
can understand. If one agent is a problem because he does not
understand some aspect of another agent’s proposal, the pro-
poser needs to explain his plan in a way that responds to the
questioner’s problem. The need to respond in this way, however,
is better described not as a burden of proof but as a burden of
responding constructively (Walton, Toniolo and Norman, 2016,
12).
5. DECIDING BETWEEN PERSUASION AND
DELIBERATION
It is a fundamental but common problem in trying to apply a
formal dialogue model to examples of real argumentation that
there is disagreement in many instances about whether a given
argument should be classified as taking place in the context of
a persuasion dialogue or that of a deliberation dialogue. To see
the problem consider some examples. The pervasiveness of the
problem can be indicated by listing the topics of some recently
featured debates in Debatepedia.
• Should there be a ban on sales of violent video games to
minors?
• Should colleges ban fraternities?
• Should public schools be allowed to teach creationism
alongside evolution?
• Should governments legalize all drugs?
A student encountering these debates armed with the distinction
between persuasion dialogue and deliberation would at least ini-
tially be tempted to classify them as instances of deliberation dia-
logue, because in each instance, the topic of the debate concerns
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an issue of a choice of actions or policies. Deliberation dialogue is
about a decision to decide between different courses of action, or
whether to take action or not, on a situation requiring some sort
of choice. However, it needs to be noticed in each instance that
the debaters discussing the issue are not in a position to make
the decision whether to move ahead with the course of action or
not, or to choose which action of the opposed pair they will carry
out. For example, the debaters concerned with the second issue
on the list are not in a position to ban fraternities in all colleges
or decide not to. This observation might prompt the student to
reconsider, and classify the examples as persuasion dialogues.
But on the other hand there is a problem with that, because a
persuasion dialogue is about a conflict of opinions where each
opinion is a statement that is true or false. And very often the
criterion used to distinguish between persuasion dialogues and
deliberation dialogues is that the latter are about actions whereas
the former are about whether a particular factual proposition is
true or false.
The solution to the problem is to recognize that there can be
persuasion over action, so just because in a given instance argu-
mentation is about a course of action, is does not follow that
the context has to be that of a deliberation dialogue. This lesson
can be brought out even more forcefully by considering a sim-
ple example (Atkinson et al, 2013) of a group of academics at the
end of a day of conferencing who need to make a decision on
where to go for dinner. Some of them make proposals about cer-
tain restaurants they have some experience with, while others of
them give reasons to support a claim to the effect that one or
the other of the restaurants being considered would be less than
ideal. For example, one of the participants might argue that a
particular restaurant proposed by one of the others does not have
vegetarian food. Or another participant might argue that his time
is limited and one of the restaurants recommended by another
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person is too far away, and would therefore take too much time
to get to and back from.
A complicating factor revealed by the study of this example is
that there are frequently shifts from the one type of dialogue to
the other. For example if one participant argues that this restau-
rant is too far away while the other argues it is really not too far
away, they might shift to a persuasion dialogue on this issue by
presenting what purport to be facts about how long it would take
to get to this restaurant and back given the kinds of transporta-
tion available in the city. This kind of shift is typical, because
intelligent deliberation needs to be based on the participants’
knowledge of the circumstances of the case. Once there has been
a shift to arguing about the factual issues of this kind of the dia-
logue may have shifted from deliberation to a persuasion dia-
logue or an information seeking dialogue. In other instances a
deliberation dialogue may shift to a negotiation, as shown in the
example of the hammer and the nail in section 1.
Still other dialogues are not mainly about argumentation.
Some are about the giving and receiving of explanations. In this
kind of dialogue, there is no burden of proof, because the central
aim is not to prove something but to explain something that the
questioner claims to fail to understand. However, in this type of
dialogue when a questioner asks for an explanation, there is an
obligation on the part of the other party to provide one, assum-
ing he is in a position to do that. So generally, in all types of
dialogue of the kind that provide normative structures for ratio-
nal communication, there are obligations to respond in a certain
way to a request made in a prior move by the other party. These
obligations are quite general, but the notion of burden of proof is
more restricted, and only applies where a response to an expres-
sion of doubt by one party as to whether some proposition is
true or not needs to be made by offering an attempt to prove that
the proposition is true or false. For obvious reasons, this type of
dialogue exchange is centrally important in science and philoso-
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phy, but the problem is that the vocabulary used to describe its
operation has a tendency to be carried over into other types of
dialogue where the central purpose is not to prove or disprove
something.
6. INQUIRY
The type of dialogue where use of the expression ‘burden of
proof’ is most clearly appropriate is the inquiry. The aim of the
inquiry is to collect sufficient evidence to either definitively
prove the proposition at issue, or to show that it can not be
proved, despite the exhaustive effort made to collect all the evi-
dence that was available. The central aim of the inquiry is proof,
where this term is taken to imply that a high standard of proof
has been met. The negative aim of the inquiry is to avoid later
retraction of the proposition that has been proved. And so the
very highest standard of proof is appropriate. The inquiry is
therefore the model of dialogue in which the expression ‘burden
of proof’ has a paradigm status.
The goal of an inquiry is to produce solid inferences to prove
or disprove some claim at issue using clear concepts and clearly
articulating the burden of proof at the opening stage. As a con-
sequence, the evidential standard for the inquiry type of dialogue
needs to be high (Upshur and Colak, 2003, 291). In medical con-
texts this kind of argumentation requires evidence from studies,
such as randomized trials, based on a collective research effort
where criteria are stipulated in advance to determine the accept-
ability of the evidence (Upshur and Colak, 2003, 292). Hence
there is a need to ensure that all the relevant evidence has been
taken into account before closing off the inquiry and reaching a
conclusion.
The inquiry as a type of dialogue is somewhat similar to the
type of reasoning that Aristotle called a demonstration. On his
account (1984, Posterior Analytics, 71b26), the premises of a
demonstration are themselves indemonstrable, as the grounds of
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the conclusion, and must be better known than the conclusion
and prior to it. He added (1984, Posterior Analytics, 72b25) that
circular argumentation is excluded from a demonstration. He
argued that since demonstration must be based on premises
prior to and better known than the conclusion to be proved, and
since the same things cannot simultaneously be both prior and
posterior to one another, circular demonstration is not possible
(at least in the unqualified sense of the term ‘demonstration’).
In contrast, persuasion dialogues, as well as deliberation dia-
logues and discovery dialogues, have to allow for retractions. It is
part of the rationality of argumentation in a persuasion dialogue
that if one party proves that the other party has accepted a state-
ment that is demonstrably false, the other party has to immedi-
ately retract commitment to that statement. It does not follow
that persuasion dialogue has to allow for retractions in all cir-
cumstances, but the default position is that it is presumed that
retraction should generally be allowed, except in certain situa-
tions. In contrast, in the inquiry, the default position is to elim-
inate the possibility of retraction of commitments as much as
possible, except in certain situations.
Cumulativeness appears to be such a strict model of argu-
mentation that many equate it with the Enlightenment ideal of
foundationalism of the kind attacked by Toulmin (1959). To rep-
resent any real instance of an inquiry, it is useful to explore
inquiry dialogue systems that are not fully cumulative. Black and
Hunter (2007) have built a system of argument inquiry dialogues
meant to be used in the medical domain to deal with the typical
kind of situation in medical knowledge consisting of a database
that is incomplete, inconsistent and operates under conditions of
uncertainty. The kind of inquiry dialogue they model is repre-
sented by a situation in which many different health care pro-
fessionals rule in the care of the patient, who must cooperate by
sharing their specialized knowledge in order to provide the best
care for the patient. To provide a standard for soundness and
218 DOUGLAS WALTON
completeness of this type of dialogue, Black and Hunter (2007,
2) compare the outcome of one of their actual dialogues with the
outcome that would be arrived at by a single agent that has as
its beliefs the union of the belief sets of both the agents partic-
ipating in the dialogue. Their model assumes a form of cumu-
lativeness in which an agent’s belief set does not change during
a dialogue, but they add that they would like to further explore
inquiry dialogues to model the situation in which an agent has a
reason for removing a belief from its beliefs set it had asserted
earlier in the dialogue (Black and Hunter, 2007, 6). To model real
instances of argumentation inquiry dialogue, it would seem that
ways of relaxing the strict requirement of cumulativeness need
to be considered.
One difference between burden of proof in inquiry and per-
suasion dialogues is that the standard of proof generally needs to
be set much higher in the inquiry type of dialogue. A similarity
between the two types of dialogue is that the burden of proof,
including the standard of proof, is set at the opening stage.
Global burden of proof in a dialogue is defined as a set {P, T,
S} where P is a set of participants, T is an ultimate probandum,
a proposition to be proved or cast into doubt by a designated
participant, and S is the standard of proof required to make a
proof successful. If there is no thesis to be proved or cast into
doubt in a dialogue, there is no burden of proof in that dialogue,
except where it may enter by a dialectical shift. The local burden
of proof defines what requirement of proof has to be fulfilled for
a speech act, or move like making a claim, during the argumenta-
tion stage. The global burden of proof is set at the opening stage,
but during the argumentation stage, as particular arguments are
put forward and replied to, there is a local burden of proof for
each argument that can change. This local burden of proof can
shift from one side to the other during the argumentation stage
as arguments are put forward and critically questioned. Once
the argumentation has reached the closing stage, the outcome is
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determined by judging whether one side or the other has met
its global burden of proof, according the requirements set at the
opening stage.
It seems fair to conclude that although the bulk of the lit-
erature on burden of proof so far is on persuasion dialogue,
it should also be important to investigate burden of proof in
inquiry dialogue where it is a central concept. Burden of proof
is only significant in deliberation dialogue when there has been
a shift to a persuasion dialogue. Burden of proof is important
in information-seeking dialogues when arguments need to be
brought forward to get permission to receive the information, or
when the reliability of the information is a concern. Burden of
proof is especially important in the study of scientific argumen-
tation because of the characteristic shift in scientific research
from the discovery stage to the inquiry stage.
7. DISCOVERY DIALOGUE
Discovery dialogue was first recognized as a distinct type of dia-
logue different from the any of the six basic types of dialogue
by McBurney and Parsons (2001). On their account (McBurney
and Parsons, 2001, 4), discovery dialogue and inquiry dialogue
are distinctively different in a fundamental way. In an inquiry
dialogue, the proposition that is to be proved true is designated
prior to the course of the argumentation in the dialogue, whereas
in a discovery dialogue the question of the truth to be deter-
mined only emerges during the course of the dialogue itself.
According to their model of discovery dialogue, participants
began by discussing the purpose of the dialogue, and then during
the later stages they use data items, inference mechanisms, and
consequences to present arguments to each other. Two other
tools they use are called criteria and tests. Criteria, like novelty,
importance, cost, benefits, and so forth, are used to compare one
data item or consequence with another. The test is a procedure
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to ascertain the truth or falsity of some proposition, generally
undertaken outside the discovery dialogue.
The discovery dialogue moves through ten stages (McBurney
and Parsons, 2001, 5) called open dialogue, discuss purpose,
share knowledge, discuss mechanisms, infer consequences, dis-
cuss criteria, assess consequences, discuss tests, propose conclu-
sions, and close dialogue. The names for these stages give the
reader some idea of what happens at each stage as the dialogue
proceeds by having the participants open the discussion, discuss
the purpose of the dialogue, share knowledge by presenting data
items to each other, discuss the mechanisms to be used, like the
rules of inference, build arguments by inferring consequences
from data items, discuss criteria for assessment of consequences
presented, assess the consequences in light of the criteria previ-
ously presented, discuss the need for undertaking tests of pro-
posed consequences, pose one or more conclusions for possible
acceptance, close the dialogue. The stages of the discovery dia-
logue may be undertaken in any order and may be repeated
(2001, 6). They add that agreement is not necessary in a discov-
ery dialogue, unless the participants want to have it.
McBurney and Parsons also present a formal system for dis-
covery dialogue in which its basic components are defined. A
wide range of speech acts (permitted locutions) that constitute
moves in a discovery dialogue include the following: propose,
assert, query, show argument, assess, recommend, accept, and
retract. There is a commitment store that exists for each par-
ticipant in the dialogue containing only the propositions which
the participant has publicly accepted. All commitments of any
participant can be viewed by all participants. They intend their
model to be applicable to the problem of identifying risks and
opportunities in a situation where knowledge is not shared by
multiple agents.
To be able to identify when a dialectical shift from a discovery
dialogue to an inquiry dialogue has occurred in a particular case,
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we first of all have to investigate how the one type of dialogue is
different from the other. Most importantly, there are basic dif-
ferences in how burden of proof, including the standard of proof,
operates. In an inquiry dialogue the global burden of proof, that
is operative during the whole argumentation stage, is set at the
opening stage. In a discovery dialogue no global burden of proof
is set at the opening stage that operates over both subsequent
stages of the dialogue. McBurney and Parsons (2001, 418)
express this difference by writing that in inquiry dialogue, the
participants “collaborate to ascertain the truth of some question”,
while in discovery dialogue, we want to discover something not
previously known, and “the question whose truth is to be ascer-
tained may only emerge in the course of the dialogue itself”. This
difference is highly significant, as it affects how each of the two
types of dialogue is fundamentally structured.
In an inquiry dialogue, the global burden of proof is set at the
opening stage and is then applied at the closing stage to deter-
mine whether the inquiry has been successful or not. This feature
is comparable to a persuasion dialogue, where the burden of per-
suasion is set at the opening stage (Prakken and Sartor, 2007). At
the opening stage of the inquiry dialogue, a particular statement
has to be specified, so that the object of the inquiry as a whole is
to prove or disprove this statement. In a persuasion dialogue, this
burden of proof can be imposed on one side, or imposed equally
on both sides (Prakken and Sartor, 2006). However, in an inquiry
dialogue there can be no asymmetry between the sides. All par-
ticipants collaborate together to bring forward evidence that can
be amassed to prove or disprove the statement at issue. Discov-
ery dialogue is quite different in this respect. There is no state-
ment set at the beginning in such a manner that the goal of the
whole dialogue is to prove or disprove this statement. The basic
reason has been made clear by McBurney and Parsons. What is
to be discovered is not known at the opening stage of the discov-
ery dialogue. The aim of the discovery dialogue is to try to find
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something, and until that thing is found, it is not known what it
is, and hence it cannot be set as something to be proved or dis-
proved at the opening stage as the goal of the dialogue.
8. INFORMATION-SEEKING DIALOGUE
Information-seeking dialogue is common in healthcare in com-
municative settings such as physician-patient conversations,
relations between physicians, such as between a specialist and
a generalist physician, student-teacher interactions, expert con-
sultations and communications with administrators (Upshur and
Colak, 2003, page 293). This kind of dialogue is asymmetrical
because it is assumed at the opening stage that one party has
some information that the other party does not possess. Hence
the main characteristic of this type of dialogue is that it is not
necessarily truth-seeking. For example the goal may be to have
a reasonable enough exchange of information to support a deci-
sion. Based on their observations, Upshur and Colak (2003, 293)
propose that the evidential standard and information-seeking
dialogue is highly contextual and variable. Narrative evidence
may be more significant than quantitative evidence.
An important subtype of information-seeking dialogue that
has been studied in the argumentation literature is called exam-
ination dialogue. Van Laar and Krabbe (2010) classify examina-
tion dialogue as a mixture of persuasion dialogue and inquiry.
Dunne et al. (2005) take the approach however that examination
dialogue should count as a main type of dialogue such as infor-
mation-seeking and persuasion. Walton (2008) takes examina-
tion dialogue to be a species of information-seeking dialogue in
which the goal is to acquire some information possessed by the
answerer but not by the questioner. The means is to extract this
information from the answerer by asking a series of questions.
But there is also a secondary aim. This is the testing of the relia-
bility of the information extracted from the respondent (Walton,
2006), for example by testing the answerer’s current statement
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against his previous ones, or against facts generally known in the
case. In the model of examination dialogue of Dunne et al. (2005)
the questioner wins if he pins down an inconsistency in the
answerer’s collective set of responses to questions. This brings in
an argumentative element that goes beyond the mere extraction
of statements from the possessor of the information, suggesting
that it has a testing function as well.
Bolton (1999, 80) used the term peirastic (peirastike), as found
in Aristotle, to refer to an art of testing claims to knowledge by
critically probing into the answerer’s set of replies. This criti-
cal testing procedure can require the use of different kinds of
arguments, such as argument from commitment, especially argu-
ment from inconsistent commitments, and certain kinds of ad
hominem arguments. These observations suggest the view of
Walton (2006) that examination dialogue should be classified
as a hybrid type of dialogue blending information‑seeking dia-
logue with persuasion dialogue. These matters have not been
very widely studied yet, and could use further research, for
example on their applications to legal cross-examination dia-
logues.
There seems to be little to say about burden of proof in infor-
mation-seeking dialogues at first sight, but there are at least two
ways in which burden of proof might enter into this type of
dialogue. Information-seeking dialogue is not exclusively taken
up with the putting forward of ask and tell questions, or with
the kind of searching for information one might do when using
Google. One reason is that there is a concern not only with
obtaining raw information, but with determining the quality of
this information by judging its reliability. Judgments of reliability
of collected information would seem to involve standards of
proof, and therefore also may involve burdens of proof. Another
reason is that in many instances of information-seeking dia-
logue, the requesting agent needed to provide the responding
agent with an argument in order to obtain access to the infor-
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mation requested. As noted in Doutre et al. (2006), such dia-
logues may be viewed as consisting only of ask and tell locutions
if this argument component of them is not considered. But if this
argument component is considered as part of the information-
seeking dialogue, then burden of proof is involved. This might
suggest that when agents argue about receiving permission to get
information during an information-seeking dialogue, there has
been a shift to some other type of dialogue such as a persuasion
dialogue.
9. NEGOTIATION DIALOGUE
Since negotiation is really rooted in interests rather than in the
pursuit of truth, consideration of the truth or falsity of a state-
ment is subordinate to the exchange or purchase of items of
exchange value, such as money (Upshur and Colak, 2003, 292).
More important here is the reasonableness or fairness of the bar-
gain. Thus the evidential standard is variable, and the dispute
may be resolved reasonably without recourse to empirical evi-
dence (Upshur and Colak, 2003, 291). However, in negotiation
dialogue there are typically intervals where there is a shift to
another type of dialogue where burden of proof is important.
For example a contractor and a homeowner may be negotiating
a price for installing a new basement in the house, and at some
point in the dialogue it may become important for the contractor
to try to convince the homeowner that the building code for
walls in basements in that area specifies certain requirements
that have to be met, for example discerning the thickness of the
walls. In such a case, the notion of burden of proof may not play
any direct role in the negotiation argumentation itself, but when
there is a shift from it to a persuasion dialogue where the con-
tractor tries to convince the homeowner the walls of a certain
minimum thickness are mandatory, burden of proof may be an
important factor in evaluating his arguments.
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10. ERISTIC DIALOGUE
An eristic dialogue (Walton, 1998, 181) is a combative verbal
exchange in which the two participants bring forward their
strongest arguments to attack the opponent by any means that
might allow them to win the dispute. This type of dialogue was
well known to the ancient philosophers, and was known as eris-
tic by them, the expression driving from the noun eris meaning
strife or quarrel. Schiappa (1999) suggested that the Greek word
for eristic dialogue originated in Plato’s writings. Eristic dialogue
requires some minimum degree of cooperation, because each of
the participants takes a turn in the exchange. However, the rules
are very minimal and a central type of argumentation frequently
used is the ad hominem attack, where each party tries to attack
the other personally by arguing that he or she has some per-
sonal characteristic indicating untrustworthiness. Because it is
characterized by personal attack, the quarrel is typically an emo-
tional type of exchange which seems to break out suddenly and
be very intense. Such quarrels are typically sparked by an under-
lying disagreement or grudge between the two parties that sud-
denly breaks out into explicit argumentation. Eristic dialogue is
not entirely negative, because it often has a cathartic effect as its
benefit, allowing underlying antagonisms to be brought to the
surface and acknowledged by both parties.
However, eristic dialogues can be dangerous when there has
been a shift between another type of dialogue, such as a persua-
sion dialogue, to the eristic format. Aristotle, in On Sophistical
Refutations (170 1b5-172 b8) is careful to draw a distinction
between dialectical argumentation and eristic argumentation. He
identifies eristic argumentation as representing a merely appar-
ent kind of reasoning that appears to be genuine dialectical argu-
mentation but is merely contentious, and is associated with
fallacies and sophistical rhetorical tactics. A well-known example
in ancient philosophy was the Platonic dialogue called the Euthy-
demus, in which two clever Sophists use all kinds of verbal tricks
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and fallacious moves. Aristotle writes in On Sophistical Refutations
(171 b24-31) that eristic reasoning is an unfair kind of fighting
in arguments in which those who are bent on victory at all costs
do not hesitate to use any kind of argument that works in the
exchange for them. He also links this kind of argumentation to
the use of fallacies or sophistical arguments by remarking that
the dialogue is eristic if the semblance of victory is the aim,
whereas it can be classified as sophistical if a semblance of wis-
dom is the aim.
As noted by Dufour (2014, 7) there are some differences in
how eristic dialogue has been defined in the literature. Walton
and Krabbe (1995, 76) define eristic dialogue as a specific kind
of dialogue that includes a number of subtypes, one of which
is the quarrel while another is the eristic discussion. The eristic
discussion is defined by Walton and Krabbe (1995, 76) as a type
of dialogue where the participants engage in verbal sparring to
show who is the more clever in constructing persuasive but often
tricky arguments that devastate the opposition. In the account
of Walton (1998, 181), eristic dialogue is defined as a combative
verbal exchange in which the two parties are allowed to bring
out their strongest arguments to attack, and even to defeat and
humiliate the other. Van Laar (2010, 390) defines the eristic dis-
cussion as a kind of game that has the aim of determining which
of the two parties is the most capable, smart and artful in devis-
ing and presenting arguments and criticisms.
These differences on how to precisely define eristic dialogue
remain to be resolved, but generally we can say that there is a
broad distinction between the simple verbal quarrel, of the kind
we are all highly familiar with in everyday conversational argu-
mentation, and the more refined meaning of the sophistical dia-
logue where two participants engage in verbal sparring to show
which of them is the more clever by using persuasive and often
tricky arguments to win the exchange by impressing the audi-
ence with their argumentation skills.
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11. CONCLUSIONS
An important lesson brought out in this paper is that distinctions
between the various kinds of dialogue can be clarified and for-
mulated more precisely by showing how each of them relies on
different approaches to the burden of proof. A key factor in per-
suasion dialogue is that the participants agree on the issue to
be discussed at the opening stage. Each party must have a the-
sis to be proved. This setting of the issue is vitally important
for preventing the discussion from wandering off, or by shifting
the burden of proof back and forth and never concluding. This
burden of persuasion comes into play at the local level during
the argumentation stage where each party takes turn making its
moves. In deliberation dialogue however, the proposals are not
formulated until a later stage. It makes no sense to attempt to fix
the proposals at the opening stage, because they need to arise out
of the brainstorming discussions that take place after the open-
ing stage. Hence in a deliberation dialogue, burden of proof only
comes into play during the argumentation stage, and then only
in a limited way. In the deliberation itself, there is only a burden
of responding constructively by answering a request for justifi-
cation with a range of replies that moves the dialogue forward.
This burden can be fulfilled, for example, by offering an explana-
tion or an argument. For these reasons, in this chapter it is con-
cluded that there is no burden of proof in a deliberation dialogue.
Burden of proof has recently come to be a topic of interest
in argumentation systems for artificial intelligence (Prakken and
Sartor, 2006, 2007, 2009; Gordon and Walton, 2007, 2009), but
so far the main work on the subject seems to be in that type
of dialogue which has most intensively been investigated gen-
erally, namely persuasion dialogue. The most significant excep-
tion is probably deliberation dialogue, where some recent work
has begun to tentatively investigate burden of proof in that set-
ting. This paper has surveyed work on burden of proof in the lit-
erature on artificial intelligence and argumentation, and offered
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some thoughts on how this work might be extended to the other
types of dialogue recognized by Walton and Krabbe (1995) that
so far do not appear to have been much investigated in this
regard.
Upshur and Colak (2003) studied how research evidence, val-
ues and professional experience function in carrying probative
weight in evidence-based decision-making in medical contexts.
On their account, the usefulness of the new dialectic is that by
directing attention to the type of dialogue in question, it estab-
lishes how the need for evidence is relative to a particular context
of application. A consequence of this approach is that there is no
invariant hierarchy of evidence that can be applied to every med-
ical context of argumentation (Upshur and Colak, 2003, 294).
This aspect of the work surveyed in this paper has shown how
standards of proof represent a key tool for understanding how
the context of an argument influences its evaluation in the field
of medicine (Upshur and Colak, 2003, 90).
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CHAPTER 9.
INQUIRY: A DIALECTICAL APPROACH TO
TEACHING CRITICAL THINKING
SHARON BAILIN AND MARK BATTERSBY
Abstract: We argue that the central goal of critical thinking is the
making of reasoned judgments. Arriving at reasoned judgments in
most cases is a dialectical process involving the comparative weigh-
ing of a variety of contending positions and arguments. Recogniz-
ing this dialectical dimension means that critical thinking pedagogy
should focus on the kind of comparative evaluation which we make
in actual contexts of disagreement and debate.
The ultimate goal of this paper is to argue for a particular
approach to critical thinking pedagogy. Our argument is aimed
particularly at those courses taught at the post-secondary level
which currently tend to focus on analyzing and evaluating indi-
vidual arguments in the name of critical thinking instruction.
We shall argue that the underlying concern of critical thinking
is the making of reasoned judgments. Arriving at reasoned judg-
ments in actual cases is a dialectical process involving the com-
parative weighing of a variety of contending positions and
arguments. Thus taking seriously the dialectical dimension
implies having as a central focus for both theory and pedagogy
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the kind of comparative evaluation which we make in actual con-
texts of disagreement and debate.
In order to make this case, we draw upon arguments con-
cerning the nature of argumentation. Thus a note about how
we view the relationship between critical thinking and argu-
mentation is in order. Although we agree with theorists who
argue that the two are not synonymous and that critical thinking
may include aspects that do not focus on arguments (e.g. Govier
1989), nonetheless, we believe that argumentation constitutes a
significant aspect of critical thinking. This is especially the case
as we view argumentation quite broadly and would argue that
much discipline-specific reasoning, including inference to the
best explanation or the justification of interpretations of an art-
work, constitute examples of argumentation (Bailin & Battersby
forthcoming). Because of the centrality of argumentation in crit-
ical thinking, we shall draw implications from the dialectical
nature of argumentation for critical thinking pedagogy.
2. ARGUMENTATION AS DIALECTICAL
Our discussion will take as its point of departure three points
made by Ralph Johnson:
1. the theory of argumentation should develop out of an
understanding of the practice of argumentation;
2. an important feature of the practice of argumentation is
that it is dialectical;
3. the pedagogy of argumentation should include this dialec-
tical dimension.
We shall begin by registering our agreement with Johnson’s first
point that “the normative dimension of the theory of argument
[…] must develop out of a proper understanding of the practice
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of argumentation”
1
( Johnson 2000, p. 6). It was a very similar
view, that argumentation theory and pedagogy should be more
faithful to how arguments are actually conducted, that motivated
the Informal Logic movement, and it is a view with which we
concur. We also concur with Johnson’s view that the aspect of the
practice of argumentation which is missing from the theory is its
dialectical dimension.
It is important to clarify that Johnson uses the term ‘dialectical’
to refer to a feature of the practice of argumentation and not
to an approach to argumentation theory, as for example the
Pragma-Dialectical approach. It is, in Finocchiaro’s terms,
dialectical as distinguished from monological and not dialectical
as distinguished from rhetorical or logical. We shall also use
‘dialectical’ to refer to a feature of the practice of argumentation.
What might be meant by claiming that argumentation is
dialectical? In their 1987 paper, “Argument as Dialectical,” Blair
and Johnson offer the following characterization of the dialecti-
cal features of argumentation, a characterization which seems to
have been followed in subsequent work.
1. An argument as a product can only be understood against
the background of the process of argumentation.
2. The process of argumentation presupposes at least two
roles: questioner and answerer, although the roles may be
exchanged at various stages of the process.
3. The process of argumentation is initiated by some ques-
tion, doubt or challenge to a proposition.
4. Argumentation is a purposive activity (Blair & Johnson
1987, pp. 45-46).
1. “By ‘the practice of argumentation,’ I mean to refer to the social and cultural activity
of constructing, presenting, interpreting, analyzing, criticizing and revising argu-
ments” ( Johnson 2007, p. 8).
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They summarize as follows: To say that argumentation is dialec-
tical, then, is to identify it as a human practice, an exchange
between two or more individuals in which the process of inter-
action shapes the product” (Blair & Johnson 1987, p. 46).
2
In our view, these points capture some central aspects of the
dialectical dimension of argumentation. To say that argumen-
tation is dialectical means that it takes place in the context of
some controversy or debate. This implies 1) that it is initiated
by some question, doubt, challenge, and 2) that there is a diver-
sity of views on the issue, arguments both for and against (if the
controversy is genuine, then it is likely that there will be at least
some plausible arguments on both sides).
3
The dialectical aspect
also means that there is an interaction between the arguers and
between the arguments involving criticism, objections,
responses, and, frequently, revisions to initial positions.
One implication of this view is that we seldom make and assess
individual arguments in isolation. Rather, we make them in the
context of a dialectic, of a historical and ongoing process of
debate and critique, of competing views and the give-and-take
among them. Thus an individual argumentative exchange must
be viewed in the context of this dialectic (Bailin 1992, p. 64). The
following reference by Blair and Johnson to Aristotelian dialectic
captures the essence of this perspective.
In Aristotelian dialectic, an interlocutor’s contribution has to be
seen against the background of the questions already asked and
the answers already given. In understanding argumentation, this
feature points in the direction of background beliefs shared, or
debated, by the community of informed people for whom the key
2. Johnson continues to make a similar point in more recent work: “An exchange is
dialectical when, as a result of the intervention of the Other, one’s own logos (dis-
course, reasoning, or thinking) has the potential of being affected in some way”
(Johnson 2000, p. 161).
3. Johnson makes a similar point: typically “there are good arguments for and good
arguments against a particular proposition or proposal” ( Johnson 2003, p. 42).
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propositions of the argument arouse interest and attention. (Blair &
Johnson 1987, p. 45)
3. REASONED JUDGMENT VS. RATIONAL PERSUASION
An implication of the recognition that argumentation is dialec-
tical is that, in order to understand the nature of argumentation
and its evaluation, one needs to focus on the whole process of
argumentation. This involves a focus on the comparative evalua-
tion of competing views rather than simply on the evaluation of
particular arguments.
Argumentation is a purposive activity, as Blair and Johnson
have pointed out. We engage in argumentation to some end, but
what that end is has been the subject of some debate. Johnson
holds that there are different goals of argumentation: rational
persuasion, inquiry, decision-making and justification. For him
rational persuasion is primary, with other goals being generated
from it. We agree that arguers may have different purposes or
intentions in arguing such as the ones he lists. Nonetheless,
because of the rational and dialectical character of argumenta-
tion, we would argue that the primary goal should be seen as
arriving at a reasoned judgment, a process we deem inquiry.
4
Whatever the original intentions of the arguer, because of the
normative constraints on arguers to be open-minded, to put
their arguments to the test of reason, and to be willing to concede
to the most defensible position, the normative structure of the
practice necessitates inquiry at some level or stage (Bailin 1992).
We might think about this issue in terms of MacIntyre’s notion
of the point of a practice, which does not necessarily or always
coincide with the psychological purposes of particular practi-
tioners engaging in the practice (MacIntyre 1984). Yet, through
participating in the practice and abiding by its normative con-
4. By inquiry, we mean critical inquiry, i.e., the process of arriving at a reasoned judg-
ment, and not simply the gathering of information.
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straints, one can learn to appreciate its underlying structure and
share in its constitutive purposes.
In order to probe this point further, let us look at what Johnson
has to say about his rationale for taking rational persuasion as
primary.
I cannot argue it here but I believe this purpose [rational persuasion]
is the fundamental one and others (like justification, inquiry, rein-
forcement) can be generated from it. My strategy would be to
mount an argument that parallels Wittgenstein’s argument that first
we learn to talk to others, then to ourselves. We justify to others,
then to self. ( Johnson 2007, p. 3, note 10)
We would, however, hesitate to equate justifying to others with
rational persuasion. If you make an argument to someone, but
the interlocutor presents you with sound criticisms and a more
cogent alternative argument, then you ought to change your
mind. If one views the purpose of argumentation as rational
persuasion, and you fail to persuade, then the argumentation
has failed. This seems an unpalatable conclusion. If the outcome
of the exchange has been to reach a reasoned judgment, then
we would want to say that the argumentation has succeeded. It
seems to us that the ‘rational’ in ‘rational persuasion’ is central
and points to an underlying strata of inquiry.
It is not our intention to imply that the purposes or intentions
of the arguer are irrelevant to the process of argument. These
purposes may frame how we go about the inquiry and where we
put our emphasis. When I sit down to make my case in an op-
ed piece, I am doing something which is different in certain ways
than when I am discussing an issue with a colleague. In the lat-
ter case, I am trying to decide what to believe, and in the for-
mer I am trying to (rationally) persuade someone. The rational
persuasion must, however, be preceded by inquiry in order to
be rational—it involves, in effect, a presentation of the results of
inquiry. And even when presenting my case, I have an obliga-
tion to be open to the objections, criticisms, and argument on
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the other side that may be offered in response. Thus I am still, in
some sense, engaged in an inquiry process. We shall argue in due
course that taking reasoned judgment as primary is also benefi-
cial from a pedagogical perspective.
4. REASONED JUDGMENT AND COMPARATIVE
EVALUATION
Thus we are arguing that we should view as the central goal of
argumentation the making of reasoned judgments. This process
of arriving at a reasoned judgment is what we refer to as inquiry.
By a reasoned judgment we mean not simply a judgment for
which one has reasons, but a judgment for which one has good
reasons, reasons which meet relevant standards. Hitchcock’s
revision of Johnson’s notion of argumentation in terms of argu-
mentative discussion has considerable overlap with our notion
of inquiry.
An argumentative discussion is a sociocultural activity of con-
structing, presenting, interpreting, criticizing, and revising argu-
ments for the purpose of reaching a shared rationally supported
position on some issue. (Hitchcock 2002, p. 291)
An important difference is that Hitchcock frames his definition
in terms of the purpose of the participants whereas we frame
ours in terms of the point of the practice (a move which Hitch-
cock explicitly rejects). Nonetheless, his notion of the purpose
as reaching a shared rationally supported position on some issue
comes close to our notion of arriving at a reasoned judgment.
In addition, his list of examples of the practice of argumentative
discussion (288) would all qualify as well as examples of the prac-
tice of inquiry.
Given that argumentation is dialectical, the process of arriving
at a reasoned judgment on an issue necessarily involves the com-
parative evaluation of contending positions and arguments.
Kuhn makes the point thus:
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Only if knowledge is seen as the product of a continuing process
of examination, comparison, evaluation, and judgment of different,
sometimes competing, explanations and perspectives does argu-
ment become the foundation upon which knowledge rests. (Kuhn
1991, 201f., cited in Govier 1999, p. 212)
Such an evaluation requires knowledge of the details of the cur-
rent debate, or what Johnson refers to as the dialectical environ-
ment. He defines the dialectical environment as “the dialectical
material (objections, criticisms, alternative positions, etc.) that
congregates around an issue” and goes on to describe what
would be involved in mapping the dialectical environment sur-
rounding an issue.
A mapping of the dialectical environment surrounding this issue
[same sex marriage] would require us to lay out the various posi-
tions, the objections and criticisms of those positions, the responses
to them. (Johnson 2007, p. 10)
It also requires one to address alternative positions. Johnson
views this process of mapping as necessary in order to be in a
position to address objections to one’s argument, but we view it
as much more fundamental. If argumentation is dialectical and
coming to a reasoned judgment on an issue involves a compara-
tive evaluation of contending positions, then having knowledge
of the dialectic is central to the enterprise of arriving at a rea-
soned judgment.
5
An example of the importance of knowledge of the dialectical
context can be found in the role of identifying alternative argu-
ments. A number of authors have adduced evidence demonstrat-
ing how significant errors of reasoning can be attributed to a lack
of understanding of other positions (Kuhn 1991) and the failure
to pursue alternative lines of reasoning (Finocchiaro 1994).
5. For a discussion of the difference between alternative positions, objections, criti-
cisms, and counter-arguments, see Govier 1999, pp. 223—232.
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In addition to the current debate around an issue, another
aspect of the dialogical context is the history of the debate. If an
issue is controversial, it is likely that the debate will have gone
on over a period of time. Knowledge of the history of the argu-
mentation which has led to the current debate, of “the questions
already asked and the answers already given,” can be helpful and
is in some cases essential, to understanding the issue and the
various positions which are contesting for acceptance. It is, for
example, only possible to understand the ascendancy of certain
scientific theories by understanding the nature of the problem
which they were addressing and seeing what other theories they
defeated and why. Only in this way we will understand why the
dominant theory is seen as the best explanation and what issues
still remain contested. Similarly, we can really only understand
contemporary political debates by knowing something about the
historical situation and the historical disagreements in which the
contemporary debate has its roots. And knowing the history of
a debate is important in order to determine where the burden
of proof lies (looking at the history of the capital punishment
debate, for example, will reveal that the deterrence argument has
largely been discredited and that, as a consequence, any deter-
rence-based arguments would now assume the burden of proof).
5. THE ROLE OF ARGUMENT ASSESSMENT
We have argued that coming to a reasoned judgment involves a
comparative evaluation of competing cases. But what is the role
of the analysis and evaluation of individual arguments in this
enterprise? Certainly the evaluation of individual arguments has
an important role to play as arguments are the building blocks of
cases or positions. Thus an initial assessment of individual argu-
ments is a necessary part of the process of arriving at a reasoned
judgment. It is, however, not sufficient. A complete assessment
usually requires a comparative assessment of the strengths and
weaknesses of the cases in which the arguments are embedded.
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We would, however, also question the extent to which one
can actually evaluate individual arguments apart from the con-
text in which the arguments are situated.
6
One may be able to
make an initial, prima facie assessment of whether a particular
argument is fallacious, but often, in order to know how good an
argument really is, one has to evaluate it in its dialectical con-
text. Judging how strongly a particular set of premises supports a
conclusion frequently requires more information than that sup-
plied in the particular argument. One might, for example, con-
struct what seems like a strong argument for euthanasia on the
basis of individual human rights, but this argument may not be
strong enough to prevail against arguments regarding the possi-
ble abuses of legalization.
Moreover, this type of comparative contextual evaluation will
call on criteria from the particular area as well as traditional
argument evaluation criteria.
7
Thus, for example, evaluating a
causal claim in social science may require criteria for evaluating
statistical arguments; and evaluating a claim about the merit of a
particular painting will call on criteria of artistic value.
6. LIMITATIONS OF THE DIALECTICAL TIER
As a way to recognize the dialectical dimension of argumenta-
tion, Johnson makes the move of adding a dialectical tier to the
requirements for an adequate argument. In so doing, he main-
tains the focus on individual arguments but adds a requirement
which enlarges the scope of what constitutes an argument. This
move to have the dialectical dimension of argumentation
reflected in the theory of argument is an extremely promising
and important development. We would argue, however, that this
6. We discuss the role of other types of contexts (social, political, historical, discipli-
nary, and personal perspectival) in argument evaluation in Battersby & Bailin 2009.
7. In their 1987 paper, Blair and Johnson state that “single arguments are normally
parts of a larger process and need to be interpreted and evaluated in that context”
(Blair & Johnson 1987, p. 46).
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approach does not go far enough in recognizing the implications
of the dialectic dimension of argumentation. Taking rational
persuasion as primary dictates a focus on particular arguments
and how to improve them in order to achieve this goal. Dealing
with criticisms, objections, and alternative arguments is a way
to strengthen (or possibly amend) one’s original argument(s). We
would argue, however, that truly recognizing the dialectical
dimension means more than simply discharging one’s dialectical
obligation to address criticisms and objections to particular
arguments. Rather, taking seriously the dialectical dimension
means focusing not on particular arguments, but instead on the
debate and an evaluation of competing cases in order to make a
reasoned judgment on an issue.
Johnson has the insight that argumentation is dialectical and
that current theory and pedagogy does not take this into account.
His solution is to augment the notion of what constitutes an
argument and build more into the requirements for argument
adequacy. Thus a knowledge of the dialectical environment is
necessary in order to anticipate and deal with criticisms, objec-
tions etc. and to improve one’s argument. He describes ways to
go about anticipating objections as follows.
Perhaps even more effective is the step of immersing oneself in
the issue and the various positions that have been developed. That
means becoming familiar with the dialectical environment of the
argument […] The better one knows the dialectical environment
[…], the more successful one can be in anticipating various objec-
tions. Because one then knows what sorts of objections are around,
what sorts of objections others have raised. One will be familiar
with the alternative positions and possibly be able to immerse one-
self in them in order to see how someone who holds that view
might object. One can then make use of one’s knowledge of similar
argumentative situations to extrapolate to the current one […] Typ-
ically some of this thinking occurs in the construction of the argu-
ment—so it is likely the dialectical environment will influence the
arguer in the very formation of the argument. ( Johnson 2007, p. 4)
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This process of becoming familiar with the dialectical environ-
ment around an issue (becoming knowledgeable about the vari-
ous positions, objections, and alternative positions) sounds very
similar to how we would describe a major component of the
process of inquiry. For Johnson, this process in undertaken as a
way to anticipate objections and thereby support one’s argument.
However, if one then evaluates these various positions, argu-
ments, objections, etc. in a rational and fair-minded way, with
the intent of identifying the most reasonable position, then one
is really engaging in the inquiry process.
One criticism which has been leveled against Johnson’s inclu-
sion of the requirement of a dialectical tier is that this move
would lead to an infinite regress in that supplementary argu-
ments may themselves require further support, and so on (Govier
1999, p. 218). We would argue, however, that such a result is only
problematic if one tries to build a dialectical tier into the require-
ments for an individual argument. Otherwise it can be seen as a
realistic reflection of the dialectical character of argumentation,
as Govier points out:
From a practical point of view, the fact that supplementary argu-
ments may be questioned and may themselves require further sup-
port is only realistic, and quite plausible when we reflect on the
history of actual controversies about important matters. Far from
showing that there is a problematic infinite regress in the account,
it could be alleged that this indefiniteness simply points to a feature
of real debate, one that is mirrored in the intellectual and dialectical
structure of the issues themselves. (Govier 1999, p. 236)
7. IMPLICATIONS FOR PEDAGOGY
The third point of Johnson’s which we highlighted at the begin-
ning, and with which we whole-heartedly agree, is that the ped-
agogy of argumentation should reflect how arguments are
actually conducted and thus should include the dialectical
dimension.
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If my view is correct, then it follows that a critical thinker must pos-
sess as part of his or her argumentative skills what I called dialecti-
cal skills: being familiar with the standard objections to his position
and responding to them, facing off against alternatives. (Johnson
2007, p. 1)8
He believes, moreover, that these dialectical skills are absent
from most texts and tests of critical thinking, which tend to pre-
suppose a traditional account of argument. We concur with this
diagnosis. In order to fill this lacuna, we would argue for an
approach to critical thinking pedagogy focusing on inquiry.
8. TEACHING CRITICAL THINKING AS INQUIRY
What might such an approach look like and include? 1) It would
have as its goal the making of reasoned judgments; and 2) it
would emphasize the comparative evaluation of contending
positions and arguments in actual contexts of disagreement and
debate. The following are the aspects which we have included in
the inquiry approach which we have developed:
1. the nature and structure of arguments, the prima facie
identification of fallacies, and the use and evaluation of
central argument types such as analogical and causal rea-
soning;
2. identifying and clarifying issues, as well as determining
the kinds of claims or judgments that are involved in dif-
ferent kinds of inquiry;
3. understanding the dialectical environment, including the
current debate and history of the debate;
4. understanding the various aspects of context which may
8. The dialectical skills which Johnson outlines include the following: dealing with
objections and alternative positions (including seeking out criticism); knowing what
would count against one’s position as well as for it - knowing weaknesses in one’s
own position; changing one’s mind when appropriate; taking time to reflect rather
than rushing to judgments (Johnson 2007, p. 7).
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be relevant, including the social, political, historical, dis-
ciplinary, and personal perspectival contexts (Battersby &
Bailin 2009);
5. making a reasoned judgment, including the comparative
weighing of arguments, the evaluation of alternative posi-
tions, synthesizing the strengths of various views, and
proportioning judgment to the weight of evidence;
6. making one’s own case, including constructing argu-
ments, creating analogies, generating alternative explana-
tions, and anticipating objections.
In addition to addressing inquiry in general, we also look at
inquiry in specific areas, including the physical sciences, the
social sciences, the arts, the humanities and interdisciplinary
contexts. Considerable emphasis is placed throughout on the
cultivation of the appropriate habits of mind in inquiry and dia-
logue.
We see a number of benefits in this type of approach. First,
in focusing on argumentation as it is actually conducted, the
approach should furnish students with some of the knowledge
and skills necessary for making reasoned judgments in real con-
texts.
There are also dispositional benefits to an inquiry based
approach. Inquiry is an active process. Students go beyond eval-
uating the arguments that may come their way or be put in their
path to actively seek information and arguments in order to
resolve an issue or puzzlement. Habits of mind such as intellec-
tual curiosity, truth-seeking, self awareness, and intellectual per-
severance may be fostered in the process.
An inquiry approach is also preferable to an approach based
on rational persuasion because of the orientation to argumenta-
tion which it promotes. One of the challenges in teaching critical
thinking is: “to counter students’ tendencies to avoid challenge to
their own beliefs, to ignore contrary evidence, to straw-person
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the beliefs of others, to refuse to concede points, to start with
conclusions and then look for arguments to support them, to
want to win at all costs” (Bailin 1992). Thinking about argu-
mentation in terms of rational persuasion may have the result
of reinforcing students’ tendencies to try to find support for and
persuade others of positions they already hold (even though this
is avowedly not the intention), and it may not provide sufficient
conceptual antidote to closed-mindedness and a desire to win.
Adding a dialectical tier is a move in the right direction in that it
imposes a requirement to look beyond one’s own arguments, as
Govier points out:
Thinking of argument as having a second dialectical tier links the
practice of arguing with an open and flexible form of thinking
in which we come to consider how other people think as well as
how we ourselves think, and we attempt explicitly to consider and
address alternatives to our own beliefs about the world. (Govier
1999, p. 207)
Nonetheless, the focus on rational persuasion limits the extent
to which such open and flexible thinking is likely to be encour-
aged. Lawyers do, after all, anticipate objections to their own
arguments, but they do so in the service of the effectiveness of
the case they are making for their client. It is unlikely that in
so doing, they are seriously considering changing their commit-
ment to their client’s position. We would argue that an open-
minded, fair-minded, and flexible attitude is much more likely
to be encouraged by an approach which puts less emphasis on
the persuasive function of argumentation (rational though it may
be); which focuses on the evaluation of competing cases rather
than on the evaluation of individual arguments; and which has as
its explicit goal arriving at a reasoned judgment.
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CHAPTER 10.
ARGUMENTATION AND THE FORCE OF REASONS
ROBERT C. PINTO
Abstract: Argumentation involves offering and/or exchanging rea-
sons – either reasons for adopting various attitudes towards spe-
cific propositional contents or else reasons for acting in various
ways. This paper develops the idea that the force of reasons is
through and through a normative force because what good reasons
accomplish is precisely to give one a certain sort of entitlement
to do what they are reasons for. The paper attempts to shed light
on what it is to have a reason, how the sort of entitlement arising
from reasons differs from other species of entitlement and how the
norms by which such entitlement is assessed obtain their status as
norms.
The theme of the 2009 OSSA conference is Argument Cultures
– something which may be taken to mean the various cultures
of theorizing about arguments and argumentation. With respect
to these varying cultures, Tindale (1999, pp. 3-4) has identified
three “perspectives” on what argument or arguing entails – the
logical, the dialectical and the rhetorical. Of course, within each
of these there are a variety of ways in which the perspectives can
unfold or develop. Formal and informal logic represent quite dif-
ferent species of “logical” perspective on argument, and them-
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selves divide into varieties of sub-species. The formal dialectic of
Hamblin (1970, esp. chapter 8) or of Barth and Krabbe (1982),
the “controversy-oriented approach to the theory of knowledge”
in Rescher (1977), the pragmatic-dialectic approach of the Ams-
terdam school, and the somewhat different dialogue approach
that Walton takes (see for instance Walton and Krabbe 1995) are
among the quite different species of dialectical approach. And
finally, you will find just some of often quite different approaches
that may be classed as rhetorical in Aristotle, Cicero, Perelman,
Wenzel, Tindale himself, as well as in the design theoretic
approach to normative pragmatics inspired by the work of Scott
Jacobs and Fred Kauffeld and described by Goodwin (2002).
However, across this broad spectrum of “cultures of theoriz-
ing” there appears to be general agreement that arguing involves
offering and/or exchanging reasons. My aim in what follows is
to outline a general account of reasons – of what it is to have
them and of what is required to offer or present them. My intent
is to outline a way of thinking about reasons that is neutral
with respect to the “perspectives” on argumentation and the “cul-
tures” associated with them, but which can, perhaps, throw at
least some light on why there can be such different approaches to
practices which turn on the presentation and exchanging of rea-
sons.
*****
Philosophical discussions of reasons have tended to focus
either on reasons for action or on reasons for belief. But it is a
mistake to limit our purview to one or another of these two, or
only to these two. To start with, there are reasons for cognitive
attitudes other than belief – reasons for doubting, reasons for
expecting that something will turn out to be the case, reasons
for presuming, and so on. Moreover, there are reasons for adopt-
ing or holding conscious attitudes other than cognitive attitudes
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– for example, reasons for wanting this or that to be the case,
reasons for choosing one or another course of action (i.e. form-
ing an intention to engage in that course of action), reasons
for fearing, reasons for hoping, reasons for preferring one thing
over another, and so on. One way to capture the broad array
of reasons that we need to take account of is to say that we
are (or ought to be) concerned with reasons for doing, where
‘doing’ is used in the very broadest of senses and is not limited
to “actions” that are overt and/or deliberate – a sense of ‘doing’
in which it applies not only to actions, but to holding almost
any sort of conscious attitude as well. In what follows, my dis-
cussion will highlight conscious propositional attitudes, both as
states that can provide us with reasons for doing things, as well
as states for which there can be reasons.
1
I should add that the
account which follows recognizes three principal categories of
conscious propositional attitude – cognitive, conative and eval-
uative. This classification reflects Rescher’s recognition (Rescher
1988, p. 3ff.) of three types of rationality: cognitive rationality
(whose “product” is factual contentions or beliefs), practical
rationality (whose “product” is action recommendations or
injunctions), and evaluative rationality (whose product is evalua-
tion or appraisal).
2
1. In my view, there are in fact conscious attitudes other than propositional attitudes
for which we can have reasons – reasons for liking someone, reasons for distrusting
someone, and so on – see Pinto 2001, chapter 2 (“Generalizing the notion of argu-
ment”), esp. pp. 17-19. For purposes of this paper I will simply ignore conscious atti-
tudes toward non-propositional objects and the reasons we may have for adopting
them.
2. Davidson (1963/2001) offers an account of the primary reason of an action as con-
sisting of a belief and a pro-attitude. Some instances of ‘pro-attitudes’ would fall
under my category of conative attitudes, others would fall under my category of
evaluative attitudes. One reason I find it useful to distinguish between these two
sorts of pro-attitude is the fact that I think that typically our reasons for adopting
conative attitudes – commitments to bring about certain goals or intentions to act
in a certain way – lie in evaluative attitudes. For example, among my reasons for
deciding (i.e. forming the intention) to go for a swim today will be the fact that I
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*****
Let me mention two advantages of broadening our account of
reasons along the lines I propose.
a. Since one species of cognitive attitude consists of a range
of doxastic or belief-like attitudes – suspecting that some-
thing is the case, being inclined to believe it, expecting it
will turn out to be the case, presuming it to be the case,
as well as straightforwardly or fully believing it to be the
case – this proposal opens up the possibility of adopting
a qualitative version of evidence proportionalism,
3
a view
according to which the type of doxastic attitude we adopt
must be appropriate in the light of the reasons available
to us – a variety of evidence proportionalism that has no
need to quantify degrees of belief or to quantify degrees of
support.
4
value physical exercise and that I prefer swimming to most other sorts of physical
exercise.
3. Feldman and Conee (1985, p. 15) appear to advance a qualitative version of evidence
proportionalism in their formulation of the principle they call EJ: “Doxastic attitude
D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only if having D
toward p fits the evidence S has at t.” However, the only doxastic attitudes they
explicitly mention are belief, suspension of belief and disbelief. In note 1, they say
“EJ is compatible with the existence of varying strengths of belief and disbelief. If
there is such variation, then the greater the preponderance of evidence, the stronger
the doxastic attitude that fits the evidence.” Recognizing varying “degrees of belief”
need not commit one to a quantitative version of proportionalism – everything
depends on how the “varying strengths” are characterized. Counterparts of the three
doxastic attitudes explicitly mentioned by Feldman and Conee can also be found in
the three types of “standpoint” that may be taken toward a “view” that are recog-
nized by van Emeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 15-16).
4. Though there are obvious ways to quantify (assign a real or cardinal number to) the
degree of support that a reason affords its conclusion for some types of reasons (e.g.,
those reasons which exhibit the pattern which Pollock (1995) calls “statistical syllo-
gism”), how to extend quantification of degree of support to many other types of
reason is not obvious. One way of doing so is proposed by Pollock (1995, p. 93-94) –
it involves the supposition that we can in effect intuitively (my word, not Pollock’s)
equate the degree of support offered by any sort of argument with the degree of
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b. The proposal enables us to unpack the idea of being or
having a reason in such a way that we can say, along with
Rescher (1988, p. 4):
Rationality… pivots on the deployment of ‘good reasons’: I am being
rational if my doings are governed by suitably good reasons – if I
proceed in cognitive, practical and evaluative contexts on the basis
of cogent reasons for what I do.
The approach to reasons outlined here provides a way of extend-
ing the reach of reasons to the broad range of contexts that
Rescher has in mind and gives us a way of formulating questions
about the interplay among reasons operative in these different
contexts.
2. THE FORCE OF REASONS AS A NORMATIVE FORCE
Let me begin by recalling what Davidson and Dennett said quite
some time ago about explaining an action by citing an agent’s rea-
sons for taking that action.
Davidson (1962/2001, p. 3) calls explanations in terms of rea-
sons “rationalizations,” and says that a reason “rationalizes an
action only if it leads us to see something the agent saw, or
thought he saw, in his action – some feature, consequence, or
aspect of the action the agent wanted, desired, prized, held dear,
thought dutiful, beneficial, obligatory or agreeable.” He goes on
to say his account of the primary reasons for an action requires
that “that the agent have certain beliefs and attitudes in the light
of which the action is reasonable” (p. 9, italics mine).
5
support offered by a related argument having the form of statistical syllogism (I omit
the details). Pollock himself notes (p. 94) that there are possible objections to the
universal application of this strategy. I myself am inclined to think that any method
of assigning a number to the support that “He promised to do X” gives to “He ought
to do X” will produce results that are quite artificial.
5. It is perhaps worth noting that when ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes” was reprinted in
Davidson 2001, Davidson wrote (p. xvi): “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” was a reac-
tion against a widely accepted doctrine that the explanation of an intentional action
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Dennett (1978, p 236) calls explanations in terms of reasons
“intentional explanations” and says that “they explain by giving
a rationale for the explicandum. Intentional explanations explain
a bit of behavior, an action, or a stretch of inaction, by making
it reasonable in the light of certain beliefs, intentions, desires
ascribed to the agent.” Dennett (1978, p. 388) explicitly identifies
reasons for action with the beliefs, desires, etc., in light of which
actions become reasonable: “We typically render actions intelli-
gible by citing their reasons, the beliefs and desires of the agent
that render the actions at least marginally reasonable under the
circumstances.”
In these passages Davidson and Dennett are talking about rea-
sons for action, not reasons for belief. But I submit that the com-
mon element in what Davidson and Dennett say about reasons
for action also applies to a person’s reasons for believing or
accepting a proposition. For example, if I say: “Sarah believes
that her father won’t go to work tomorrow because she thinks
tomorrow is a holiday.” I explain Sarah’s belief by “giving a ratio-
nale”, that is by making the belief to be explained appear rea-
sonable by citing another belief in light of which it is reasonable
“from the believer’s point of view.” In what follows I shall assume,
therefore, that reasons for belief, like reasons for action, also
explain by “giving a rationale” for the belief to be explained, and
therefore explain by making the explicandum reasonable in the
light of other things that person believes or accepts.
in terms of its motives or reasons could not relate reasons and actions as cause and
effect. A principal argument was that causal relations are essentially nomological
and based on induction while our knowledge that an agent has acted on certain rea-
sons is not usually dependent on induction or knowledge of serious laws. The argu-
ment had found influential if brief expression in Wittgenstein's Blue and Brown
Books, which were widely circulated from the middle thirties onward (though pub-
lished only in 1958). In Essay 1 I accept the view that teleological explanation of
action differs from explanation in the natural sciences in that laws are not essen-
tially involved in the former but hold that both sorts of explanation can, and often
must, invoke causal connections."
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*****
Now to say that what makes something a reason for an action
or belief is the fact that it renders the action or belief reasonable
does not look like a very promising strategy. For it is hard to see
how we can make sense of something’s being reasonable without
appealing to a prior notion of reasons for it.
Davidson (1963/2001, p. 9) had observed that the reasons for
an action “justify” it.
6
And we might be tempted to make sense
of what reasons are by saying that the beliefs, desires, etc., which
render doing something (at least provisionally) reasonable do so
because they “justify” it. But to proceed in that way is, I think,
to get things backwards. The careful examination and criticism
of the use of the expression “epistemic justification” recently
offered by William Alston (2005, chapter 1) should make it clear
that if we want to appeal to a notion of “justification” we must,
at the very least, first pin down what we take such justification to
consist in.
Robert Brandom (1994, p. 56) takes still another approach
when, commenting on “intentional explanations,” he observes
that “attributing suitably related beliefs and desires is attributing
a certain sort of reason for action” but that it “is not yet to say that
the one who has such a reason will act according to it….” Bran-
dom says (1994, p.56).
What follows immediately from the attribution of intentional
states that amount to a reason for action is just that (ceteris
paribus) the individual who has that reason ought to act in a cer-
6. He wrote (p. 4) that "corresponding to the belief and attitude of a primary reason for
an action, we can always construct (with a little ingenuity) the premises of a syllo-
gism from which it follows that the action has some (as Anscombe puts it) "desirabil-
ity characteristic". Thus there is a certain irreducible – though somewhat anaemic –
sense in which rationalization justifies: from the agent’s point of view there was,
when he acted, something to be said for the action.” Davidson goes on, in part III of
that paper, to say that the fact that the reasons for an action justify it does not pre-
clude their also being its causes – which was, of course, the central point that he was
making in the paper.
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tain way. This ‘ought’ is a rational ought — someone with those
beliefs and those desires is rationally obliged or committed to act
in a certain way.
*****
Despite the fact that the term “ought” seems to work well with
some examples, I doubt that in general the reasons I have for
performing an action “oblige me” to perform it. When it comes
to actions, there are typically many ways to skin a cat and often
any one of them will do. Even with respect to cognitive attitudes
(beliefs, for example), to say that a person is obliged to believe
everything she has reasons for believing – perhaps everything
that “follows from” what she believes – seems like overkill.
7
But
there is something right in Brandom’s approach: to ascribe to
someone a reason for doing something is not to say the he or she
will do it, but is rather to ascribe some kind of normative status to
doing it. In the preliminary account of reasons that follows, I will
characterize the normative status which reasons confer on doing
what they are reasons for with the deliberately vague normative
expression ‘it is OK to do it’ – where for starters to say that some-
thing is OK is to say that it merits or deserves approval. Only at the
end of this paper will I try to bring into clearer focus what the
particular “species” of being OK I’m talking about amounts to.
7. To be fair to Brandom, he distinguishes between acknowledged commitments and
consequential commitments (those commitments we have as a consequence of
acknowledged commitments), which correspond roughly to two senses of belief. He
says (1994, p. 195), “In one sense, one believes just what one takes oneself to believe,
what one is prepared to avow or assert. In another sense, one believes, willy-nilly,
the consequences of what one believes.” And he suggests further (p. 196) that
because of this ambiguity, “An unambiguous technical term ‘doxastic commitment’
is introduced, which comprises both commitments one is prepared to avow and
commitments that follow from those one acknowledges.”
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3. WHAT IT IS FOR ONE THING TO BE OR PROVIDE A
REASON FOR ANOTHER
Consider first the following suggestion about what it is for the
proposition that R to be a reason for holding that Q
(1) R is a reason for holding that Q if and only if its being OK to hold
that R would make it OK to hold that Q.89
In other words, the force of a reason for holding that Q lies in its
power to make it OK to hold that Q.
Even though I think there is something importantly right
about this first suggestion, there are two considerations each of
which points to a need to revise the idea it expresses:
a. it makes no provision for defeasible reasons, and
b. it makes no provision for the idea that what provides a
reason may be the confluence of a belief and a desire or
pro-attitude – or more generally the confluence of several
propositional attitudes.
8. Why not, instead of invoking the idea of “making it OK to hold that Q,” adopt some-
thing like the following formulation? (1a) R is a reason for holding Q if and only if
whenever it’s OK to hold that R it is also OK to hold that Q. (1a) won’t do, for the
following reason. There may be propositions or propositional contents which it is
always and everywhere OK to hold (e.g., something like “self-evident truths” or
things which it is OK to hold even in the absence of reasons, such as so-called “self-
justifying” propositions). And if there are such – call one of them R! – then (1a)
would commit us to the problematic idea that any proposition or propositional con-
tent is a reason for holding R!. This, of course, is an analogue of the principle that a
necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition. (In my view, that principle is
correct – and in my scheme of things provides additional grounds for concluding
that R’s being a reason for holding that Q is not to be equated with R’s entailing Q.)
9. Notice that if we were to assume that it is OK to hold that P if and only if it is true
that P, (1) would come close to an account of what it is to be a reason that deduc-
tivists might be comfortable with, namely: (1b) R is a reason for holding that Q if
and only if its being true that R would make it true that Q.
ARGUMENTATION AND THE FORCE OF REASONS 259
Consideration (a)
To suppose that R is a defeasible reason for holding that Q is to
suppose that the force of R to make it OK to hold that Q can
be “defeated”—can be undermined or overridden
10
by — con-
siderations that are consistent with the reason R. If and when
such “defeating” considerations come to light,
11
holding that R no
longer makes it OK to hold that Q. Moreover, since a defeater
may come to be available to one person but not come to be avail-
able to another, it will often turn out that a reason which makes
it OK for one person to hold that Q does not make it OK for
another person to hold that Q. In order to take defeasible reasons
into account, then, we must replace (1) with something like:
(2) R is a reason for holding Q if and only if, in the absence of con-
siderations available to a person S that would undermine or over-
ride the force of R, its being OK for S to hold that R would make it
OK for S to hold that Q
10. With Pollock, I recognize two types of defeaters – Pollock (1970, 1995) calls them
undercutting defeaters and rebutting defeaters, I call them undermining and over-
riding. See also Raz (1978, pp. 12-13). In my account, where R is a defeasible reason
for Q, D is a overriding defeater which cancels the force of R if and only if (i) D is
consistent with R and (ii) the conjunction of R and D is a reason for holding not-Q.
D is an undermining defeater if and only if (i) D is consistent with R and (ii) the con-
junction of D and R is not a reason for holding Q and is not a reason for holding
not-Q.
11. The power of certain considerations to undermine or override the force of a reason
R cannot be simply a matter of the fact that the states of affairs with which those
considerations are concerned are possible or even that they in fact obtain. This is
most apparent in cases where those considerations override R by indicating that Q
is false. (i) If R is a defeasible reason for holding that Q, then it is possible that not-Q;
so that if the mere possibility of something were enough to override the force of R,
the force of a defeasible reason would always be overridden. And (ii) if the mere fact
that something incompatible with Q actually obtains overrides the force of R with
respect to Q, then the mere fact that Q is false will override the force of R – with the
result that it wouldn’t be possible to have defeasible reasons for conclusions which
are in fact false. For these reasons, overriding considerations must be considerations
which have “come to light” – considerations of which we are in some way aware, or
perhaps of which we ought to be aware.
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In this paper I will not attempt to spell out the conditions under
which a defeating consideration is “available” to a person S, nor
the conditions under which a consideration D undermines or
overrides the force of a reason.
12
In the literature that deals with
defeaters there are contentious issues surrounding both of these
questions that will have to be sorted out on another occasion.
13
Note that as soon as we recognize that its being OK to hold that
Q is relative to persons, we must abandon any attempt to equate
its being OK to hold that Q with its being true that Q, since its
being true that Q is not relative to persons.
14
12. A complicating factor arises when we recognize that a (potential) defeater can itself
be defeated. Strictly speaking, a consideration D available to S, which potentially
overrides the force of a reason R, may itself be undermined or overridden by other
considerations available to S. I would want to say that in such a case D itself would
not count as a consideration that actually undermines the force of R. Things get
more complicated still when we recognize a consideration D1, which potentially
defeats D, may itself be defeated –perhaps thereby “restoring” the status of D as an
actual defeater of the force of R. I want to thank Scott Aikin of Western Kentucky
University for reminding me of the bearing which such considerations have on how
we must apply concept of “a consideration available to a person S that would under-
mine or override the force of R.” See also Pollock (1995, chapter 3, section 6, espe-
cially 6.1 on p. 110) for one way of dealing with these complications in a context
somewhat different from the context I am operating in.
13. For an overview of the issues to be faced in working out details of defeasible reason-
ing and about what is to be counted as a defeater, see Pollock (1995, esp. Chapters 2
and 3) and Koons (2009). Pollock (1995, chapter 3) offers a somewhat detailed
overview of his account of defeasible reasoning in general and of defeaters in partic-
ular – worked out in the context of what he calls (p. 52) “epistemology from the
design stance” (i.e., “epistemological questions that bear on the design of a rational
agent”). That Pollock is forced in chapter 3 to take a series of positions which are
open to debate as evidence of the extent to which contentious issues surround ques-
tions about the proper characterization of defeaters. From my perspective, a serious
drawback of Pollock’s approach is that it requires quantification of the degree of
support supplied by any prima facie reason to what it is a reason for (see note 4
above for my reservations about Pollock’s approach to quantifying degrees of sup-
port).
14. Recognizing that its being OK to hold that P is relative to persons does not require
us to make the relationship in virtue of which something is a reason for something
else relative to persons. For we can insist on the following principle. If the fact that
it’s OK for a particular person S to hold that R makes it OK, in the absence of undermining
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Consideration (b)
In order to accommodate Davidson’s idea that a reason for action
consists of a belief and a pro-attitude, we can view (2) as a con-
sequence of a still more general principle which provides for
cases in which the confluence of someone’s holding several propo-
sitional attitudes is what provides that person with a reason for
doing something. We may take that more general principle to
constitute a definition of what it is for something to provide a rea-
son for something else. Here is a preliminary, if slightly compli-
cated, version of that more general principle:
(3) Holding one or more cognitive, conative or evaluative attitudes
toward various propositional contents provides a reason for doing
X if and only if, in the absence of considerations available to a per-
son S that would undermine or override their force, its being OK
for S to hold all of those attitudes would make it OK for S to do X
In this context, it is assumed (i) that doing X is either performing
an action or is holding a cognitive, conative or evaluative attitude
toward a specific propositional content, and (ii) that the attitudes
in question may or may not be qualitatively different types of
attitude.
For example, suppose Sam believes that Jones has been mur-
dered and also believes that among Jones’ acquaintances Smith
had the strongest motive for murdering him. Its being OK for
Sam to have those two beliefs taken together would, in the
absence of a defeater, make it OK for Sam to suspect that Smith
or overriding considerations, for that person to hold Q, then anyone’s being entitled to hold
that R makes it OK, in the absence of undermining or overriding considerations, for him or
her to hold that Q. Whether the relationship in virtue of which something is a reason
for something else holds over time is a more complicated matter. For example, it is
plausible to suppose that at an earlier point in time the fact that Mr. Smith was both
male and married was a reason for being sure that Mr. Smith had a wife. But in our
time, when same sex marriages are not uncommon, it would seem no longer to be a
reason for being sure that Mr. Smith has a wife (though it is still a reason for being
sure that Mr. Smith has a spouse).
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murdered Jones – though they would not make it OK for Sam to
be certain that Smith murdered Jones.
Notice that in (3) I have shifted focus slightly – instead of say-
ing of a proposition or statement that it is a reason, I am saying that
holding one or more attitudes toward various propositional con-
tents provides someone with a reason for doing something.
15
On the basis of this account,
• Part 4 will formulate criteria for determining when a per-
son has a reason – and has a good reason – for doing
something,
• Part 5 will deal with how the attitudes which provide rea-
sons are put into words
• And Part 6 will deal with how reasons come to be embed-
ded in explanations, justifications and arguments.
15. Pryor (2007, pp. 217-218) recognizes three distinct “ontologies” of reasons – that
reasons are facts, that reasons are propositions and that reasons are attitudes or
“states” such as beliefs and desires. He calls the third sort of ontology ‘statism’ and
his paper is devoted to deconstructing certain arguments that can be advanced
against statism and in favor of the view that reasons are propositions. Pollock (1995,
p. 55) also explicitly endorses the view that what function as reasons are mental
states rather than propositions. Though my sympathies are with those who endorse
“statism”– I am personally prepared to identify reasons with conscious attitudes
rather than with propositions - I don’t want to make the story I’m telling here to
hinge on “ontological” issues about reasons. Accordingly, I have phrased (3) in terms
of “providing a reason”, thereby hoping to sidestep the ontological issues. I’m quite
prepared to admit that where it is clear that we are talking about beliefs providing
reasons for other beliefs, it is natural and useful to identify the reasons simply by
referring to the propositional contents of those beliefs. I am also prepared to admit
that facts, unknown to a person S, can be called reasons for that person to act in a
certain way. About cases where facts not known to an agent are called reasons for
that agent to act in one or another way I would say: (i) in such cases there is a reason
for S to act in such and such a way because a certain fact obtains, but S doesn’t have
a reason to act in that way merely because that fact obtains and (ii) a fact can be
called a reason for a person S to act in a certain way if and only if it is the case that if
S were to be aware of that fact then S would have a reason to act in that way. In
other words, I would construe the sense in which facts can “be” reasons as derivative
from the sense in which conscious states and attitudes are or provide reasons.
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4. HAVING A REASON
Given the idea encapsulated in (3), we may formulate a criterion
for determining when someone has a reason for doing something
as follows.
(4) If (a) there is a set of one or more propositional attitudes of
appropriate types which together provide a reason for doing X and
(b) a person S holds each of those attitudes then S has a reason for
doing X
If the reason which a person has is defeasible,
16
we may want to
say that she has a prima facie reason for doing what she has a rea-
son for doing.
How should we describe cases in which a person does X as a
result of conscious attitudes which don’t in fact “support” doing
X? I suspect that most will want to describe them as cases in
which a person has a defective reason. However, a few have given
accounts of argument which seem to imply that such cases are
best described as cases in which a person doesn’t actually have
a reason for what he does – see for example Blair (2004, p. 143)
and Goldman’s (1999, p. 131) account of what an argument is.
17
For the purposes of this paper, I shall adopt the second way of
speaking, and will describe such cases as cases in which agents
think they have a reason for doing X, but in fact lack a “genuine
reason” for doing so. As far as I can see, adopting this way of
speaking involves only a decision about linguistic usage and does
16. I.e., if there are conceivable considerations which, if they came to light, would
undermine or override the force of what would otherwise make it OK to do some-
thing.
17. “A set of statements or propositions schematized as ‘R1..., Rn, therefore P” constitute
what logicians and philosophers call an argument. It contains one or more premises
and a conclusion, where the premises jointly supply evidential support (not neces-
sarily conclusive) for the conclusion.” From the preceding paragraph it's clear that
Goldman intends this definition of argument to apply to the verbal expression of a
person’s reasons for his or her beliefs.
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not have substantive philosophical import. In line with (4), we
can formulate a criterion for having a good prima facie reason:
(5) If (a) there is a set of one or more propositional attitudes of
appropriate types which taken together provide a reason for doing
X, (b) a person S holds each of those attitudes and (c) it is OK for S
to hold each of those attitudes then S has a good prima facie reason
for doing X.
Notice that even though S has a good prima facie reason for
doing X, it may not be OK for S to do X if considerations avail-
able to S undermine or override the force of that reason. Accord-
ingly, with these criteria in mind we need to say what it is for a
person to have a good reason all things considered.
(6) A person S has a good reason all things considered for doing
X if and only if (a) S has a good prima facie reason for doing X and
(b) no considerations available to S undermine or override the force
which that reason provides for doing X.
Let me stress again that to say it is OK for a person to do some-
thing is to make a normative claim. There is no guarantee that
the person in question will do what he or she has a good reason
all things considered to do. However, we might want to borrow
a phrase from Siegel (1988, p. 2) and say that a person who is
“appropriately moved by reasons” is likely to do what he or she
has a good reason all things considered to do.
5. PUTTING REASONS INTO WORDS
When we offer our reasons for what we did or are about to do,
or offer Sarah a reason for her to do something (e.g., to believe
something), we put our reasons into words, typically in the form
of declarative sentences.
18
Indeed, Brandom (1994, p. 158) has
18. Typically, but not always. David Godden and Jean Goodwin have each called my
attention to cases in which a question or an imperative can be used to call a hearer’s
attention to a reason for doing something. In one of Goodwin’s examples – “Look at
your watch. It’s time to go home” – the speaker doesn’t state a reason, but directs the
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claimed that “to offer a reason is always to make an assertion.”
How can we square the idea that reasons are typically put into
words by uttering declarative sentences with the idea that what
provides us with a reason is holding one or more cognitive, cona-
tive and/or evaluative attitudes?
These two ideas are compatible because when I make an asser-
tion, either I describe myself as holding an attitude (saying, for
example, ‘I want to see my sister this afternoon’) or else I represent
myself as holding one or another attitude toward a propositional
content. If I say without qualification, ‘John is standing over
there’ I represent myself as believing that John is over there – as
is apparent from the pragmatic inconsistency of ‘p, but I don’t
believe that p’. If I say, ‘Presumably, that’s John standing over
there’, I represent myself as presuming that John is over there.
‘Presumably’ is just one of a class of “epistemic modals” which
can be taken as indicators of the sort of cognitive attitude a
speaker is adopting or thinks it is appropriate to adopt toward a
propositional content.
It is perhaps worth noting that if I say, “I am driving downtown
because I want to see my sister this afternoon,” what defeats
the reason I’ve put forward typically are not considerations that
undermine or override the force of my belief that I want to see my
sister, but are rather considerations that undermine or override
the force of my wanting to see my sister as a reason for driving
downtown. What I am offering as a reason for driving downtown
is not the belief that I have a certain want but rather that very
want itself.
It is important to note another aspect of what happens when
I make an assertion – namely that in asserting that P I typically
invite those I’m addressing to adopt the attitude that I represent
myself as adopting– and in many cases I can be viewed as licens-
hearer to do something as a result of which the hearer will uncover a reason for sup-
posing that it’s time to go home. Ditto for “What time is it? Perhaps we should head
home.” Rhetorical questions represent still another sort of case in which a sentence
having the form of a question may be used to convey a reason.
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ing them to adopt that attitude.
19
In saying to Sarah, “Presumably,
Sam is no longer married” I invite Sarah to presume that Sam is
no longer married and perhaps license her to so presume. And if
the presumption that Sam is no longer married provides a rea-
son for presuming that Sam is either widowed or divorced, then
I will have offered Sarah a reason for so presuming. It is because
of considerations like these that Brandom (1994, p. 168) is on the
right track when he says, “assertions are fundamentally fodder for
inferences. Uttering a sentence with assertional force or signifi-
cance is putting it forward as a potential reason.”
20
6. WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PUTTING
REASONS INTO WORDS
When a speaker puts reasons into words, he or she is often pre-
senting those reasons as reasons for doing one or another specific
thing. Those reasons may be presented as reasons for the speaker
to do this or that. Or else they may be presented as reasons for
one or more hearers to do this or that – for example, as reasons
for hearers to believe a conclusion.
(a) Consider first those cases in which a person gives her
reasons for what she is doing or has done.
Sally may offer R as a reason for her to believe that Q, or to sus-
pect that Q, whether or not it is OK for her to hold that R. And oth-
ers may take her to have offered R as a reason for believing that Q
even if they have no idea whether it’s OK for her to hold that R
19. I.e., in those cases in which the speaker can be viewed as “taking responsibility” for
the soundness of what she has put forward for acceptance by the hearer. I’m
indebted to Jean Goodwin for this point.
20. The passage continues, “Asserting is giving reasons – not necessarily reasons
addressed to some particular question or issue, or to a particular individual, but
making claims whose availability as reasons for others is essential to their asser-
tional force. Assertions are essentially fit to be reasons. The function of assertion is
making sentences available for use as premises in inferences.”
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– indeed even if they think it’s not OK for her to hold that R. In
order for others to take Sally to have offered a reason for holding
that Q, all that is necessary is for them to think that if it should be
OK for Sally to hold that R, then in the absence of a defeater its
being OK for her to do so would make it OK for her to hold that
Q.
What a speaker accomplishes by articulating her reasons for
what she has done or is about to do depends on what has
prompted her to articulate those reasons. For example, where it
is clear that a speaker gives reasons in response to or in anticipa-
tion of a question like ‘Why did you do that?’ a hearer who takes
what she said to provide a reason for doing what she did will
take her to be explaining what she did. Whether a hearer will take
such an explanation to be a good explanation will depend largely
on whether the hearer thinks the speaker in fact acted because she
held the attitudes which she invoked as providing a reason. The
goodness or success of someone’s explanation for what she did
does not seem to depend on whether the reasons proffered are
good reasons (in the sense of ‘good reason’ defined above).
On the other hand, where it is clear that the speaker’s reasons
are given in response to or in anticipation of someone criticizing
or condemning him for what he did, a hearer who takes what was
said to be a reason for the speaker to have done what he did will
normally take him to be attempting to justify what he did. If Sam
has been criticized or condemned for doing such-and-such, he can
respond to the criticism by saying, “I did (or am doing) such-
and-such because I thought (or think) that R” – e.g. “I think that
tomorrow is Friday because I know that today is Thursday” or “I
refused to talk to him because I’d heard that he called me a thief.”
PJ1 Where it is clear that people state their reasons for doing
something in response to or anticipation of criticism or condem-
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nation of what they did, they can be viewed as attempting
to justify what they did.
21
Attempted justifications differ from explanations in that justifi-
cations aren’t judged successful unless the reasons put forward are
good reasons – e.g., unless the attitudes cited as providing a rea-
son are attitudes the agent was entitled to have at the time he or
she acted.
PJ2 Where people state their reasons for doing something
in an attempt to justify their doing it, and it is or can be
made clear that they were entitled to the attitudes which
provided them with those reasons, they have presented a
prima facie justification of what they did.
Of course, a prima facie justification can be undermined or over-
ridden by other considerations. Where we think that the speaker
was aware or ought to have been aware of those considerations,
it is unproblematic to say simply that the speaker’s attempt to
justify what she did fails. But suppose we are aware of considera-
tions that defeat the prima facie justification, but don’t think the
speaker was or ought to have been aware of them. It isn’t com-
21. Interestingly enough, this account of justifying is consistent with Brandom’s
account of the role of justification in the “game of giving and asking for rea-
sons.”According to Brandom (1994, p. 173) those who produce assertions not only
“authorize” further assertions by themselves and their audience (see note 20 above),
but they also undertake “a specific task responsibility, namely the responsibility to
show that they are entitled to the commitment expressed by their assertions, should
that entitlement be brought into question.” This is a matter, of course, of showing or
demonstrating that it is OK for them– the speakers –to be committed to what
they’ve asserted: where what they’ve asserted is that P, it is a matter of showing it is
OK for them to believe that P. “This,” Brandom says, “is the responsibility to do
something, and it may be fulfilled for instance by issuing other assertions that justify
the original claim.” But as is made clear in the pages that follow, which describe the
default and challenge structure of entitlement (pp. 176-78), the need to produce a
justification arises only “when a challenger is entitled to the challenge” (p. 178). For
more about Brandom’s account of the default and challenge structure of entitlement
and its implications, see point (3) in note 25 below.
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pletely clear to me what we should say in such a case – perhaps
we should say only that the speaker has shown she had a good
excuse for doing what she did.
Finally, I should make it clear that these remarks concern only
sufficient conditions for determining when giving a reason
should count as an explanation or as a justification. Clearly the
conditions I’ve pointed out are not necessary conditions. For
example, I can explain or attempt to justify what somebody else
did, not just what I did. And though I personally am sceptical
about the wisdom of using the word ‘justification’ in connection
with reason-giving not offered in reply to or anticipation of
condemnation or challenge, such usage is commonplace among
philosophers and even among argumentation theorists. I har-
bour no totalitarian desire to legislate how others may use that
word.
(b) Consider the next cases in which a speaker intends to
offer one or more hearers a reason for them to do some
specific thing.
That, it seems to me, is what is typically going on when a speaker
says something of the form ‘R, so Q’, saying, perhaps,
‘Today is Thursday, so there are two more days between
today and Sunday.’
or
‘The movie we want to see starts in half an hour, so let’s
leave now.’
Hearers will construe what the speaker has said as an argument
just when (i) within the transaction in which they are involved,
what the speaker has given a reason for is something about which
there is disagreement or doubt and (ii) the hearers take what comes
before the ‘so’ to be a reason for what comes after it. Moreover,
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a speaker can be seen to be making or presenting an argument
without uttering an “indicator” word such as ‘so’ or ‘therefore’
or ‘because.’ For example, in a context in which a question has
implicitly or explicitly been raised about whether it is the case
that Q, those who take R to be a reason for supposing that Q are
likely to construe a speaker’s assertion that R to be an attempt to
present an argument for supposing that Q.
It is important to note that in the sorts of cases just described,
construing the speaker to have presented an argument for Q does
not require attributing to the speaker any specific purpose beyond
that of presenting a reason for doing some specific thing – for
example, there is no need to suppose that the speaker is trying
to persuade someone of Q
22
or trying to resolve a difference of
opinion (see Pinto 2003 and Goodwin 2007).
Where, as in the examples above, R in fact provides a reason for
doing what a speaker presents it as a reason for doing, anyone
who says to another ‘R, so Q’ will in fact have offered that other
person a reason – perhaps for believing that Q, or for acting in a
certain way. But how we describe the “transaction” between the
speaker and hearer depends on what we think the hearer makes
of what the speaker said.
If we think the hearer has come to accept that R as a result of
what the speaker said, it is unproblematic to say that the speaker
has given the hearer a reason for believing that Q or for leaving
now, and we should be prepared to say that the hearer now has
a reason (at least a prima facie reason) for doing so (though not
necessarily a good prima facie reason). If the hearer had already
22. The view I put forward in Pinto 2001 (chapter 4) that arguments are invitations to
inference traded on the idea that we call something an argument just when the
arguer is trying to get a hearer to accept a conclusion by presenting him with a rea-
son for adopting that conclusion. Though I still think that view of argument correct
insofar as it pictures arguers offering others reasons for them to do this or that, I
now think that view was too narrow in assuming that arguments are always
attempts at persuasion – i.e. that arguers are always trying to get hearers to accept
an argument’s “conclusion”. See Pinto 2003.
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accepted R, but only now comes to see that R is a reason, e.g.,
for believing that Q, we might want to say that the speaker has
made the hearer realize that she has a reason for believing that
Q. If the hearer doesn’t accept R (doesn’t take the speaker up
on her offer), it becomes problematic to say that the speaker has
given him a reason to believe that Q or to leave now – since, for
all we know, having refused to accept R, the speaker may have
no reason for doing what the speaker presented him with a rea-
son for doing. If the hearer doesn’t accept R, a discussion may
ensue about whether the hearer should accept R – a discussion in
which the speaker and hearer may begin by trading reasons for
and against accepting R.
Even if the hearer accepts R, he may or may not take R to be a
reason for doing X (e.g., believing that Q or leaving now for the
movie). For example, the hearer may have counted up the days
incorrectly, and think that if today is Thursday then there are
three more days between today and Sunday, or the hearer may
think it doesn’t matter whether one gets to a movie before it
begins. If the hearer doesn’t take R to be a reason for doing X, he
won’t think that the speaker has presented him with a reason for
doing it, and a discussion may ensue about whether R is in fact a
reason for doing it.
Furthermore, the hearer may accept R and take R to be a
reason for doing X, but may be aware of considerations which
undermine or override the force of R as a reason for doing it.
In this event, the hearer may concede R and concede that R is a
prima facie reason for doing X, but in light of the undermining or
overriding considerations may not take it to be a reason all things
considered for doing X.
The hearer may or may not explain his refusal to accept R as
an all things considered reason by explicitly stating those under-
mining or overriding considerations. If he does so, a discussion
may ensue about (i) whether the considerations to which the
hearer calls attention really do undermine or override the force
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of R or (ii) whether it is OK to give standing to those considera-
tions.
Alternatively, it may not dawn on the hearer that he is aware
of considerations which undermine or override the force of R. In
that event the hearer may take R to be an all-things-considered
reason for doing X, even though it is some kind of mistake for
him to do so.
Finally, if it is OK for you to accept that R merely on my say-so,
then in saying ‘R, so Q’ I have given you – put you in the position
of having – a good prima facie reason for accepting R. And if no
considerations are available to you which undermine or override
the force of R, I have given you a good reason all things consid-
ered and thereby made it OK for you to believe that Q. In Pinto
(2003, p. 1) I wrote that the first or primary effect
23
of presenting
an argument “consists in making it manifest to participants in a
communicative context (i) that there is a reason for doing some-
thing and (ii) what one such reason is.” In keeping with that idea,
we could say that normally someone who presents an argument
aims at the very least to make it manifest to those addressed that
it is, or may be, OK for them to do what that argument presents
them with a reason for doing.
7. TAKING SOMETHING TO BE A REASON
Participants in a conversation could not view what transpires
in that conversation as explanations or justifications or arguments
unless, correctly or incorrectly, they took certain statements or
attitudes to be or to provide reasons for doing one or another
specific thing.
23. In that paper I recognized secondary and tertiary effects that might or might not
flow from an argument’s primary effect – and which a speaker may or may not be
aiming at in presenting her argument. For example, making it manifest to Sam that
there is a reason for him to call Sarah might result in Sam’s forming an intention to
call her (a secondary effect of the argument presented). And Sam’s intention to call
Sarah might result in his actually calling her (a tertiary effect of the argument pre-
sented).
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Moreover, the standards or norms in light of which an indi-
vidual or community assesses whether it is OK for someone to
do something are implicit in what they take to be reasons for
doing it – implicit because one can take something to be a reason
without saying that it is a reason. Those norms become explicit
when such takings are challenged, and discussion ensues about
whether what has been taken to be a reason ought to be taken
to be reason for this or that. When such discussion transpires, a
space opens up in which the difference between our taking some-
thing to be or provide a reason and its actually being or providing
a reason makes its presence felt.
A hearer who questions whether something is or provides a
reason may or may not explain why she doesn’t accept it as being
or providing a reason. Let me offer two examples in which the
hearer offers an explicit reason for calling into question whether
what the speaker has proffered as a reason for doing something
is a genuine reason for doing it.
Example 1. The speaker says, “There was heavy rain half an hour ago,
so the streets must be wet,” and hearer responds by saying, “But it
doesn’t usually take more than a few minutes for the streets to dry
after a rain shower.” The hearer has made it clear that she doesn’t
take what speaker presented as a reason to be a genuine reason, and
does so by offering a reason for not accepting the proffered “pre-
miss” as a reason for believing that the streets are wet.
Notice that the speaker can dispute the rejoinder, perhaps citing
studies in which measurements have been taken of the mean times
it takes for streets to dry after various sorts of rain storms.
Example 2. The speaker says, “Sarah accepted our invitation to the
dinner we’re having tonight, so presumably we’ll see her tonight.”
The hearer says, “Don’t presume that. People frequently accept invi-
tations and then don’t show up.”
Here again speaker can dispute the rejoinder – perhaps by pointing
out for starters that presuming something will happen is not the
same as counting on it to happen. Notice that at the heart of such
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a dispute would be the question of what sort of reason or evidence
makes it sensible to presume that something will occur.
In short, such challenges and the discussions they give rise to
can be rational in the sense that challengers or discussants can
support what they say about reasons with reasons and, with luck,
can reach agreement based on the reasons they exchange. What is
explored in such discussions is what Toulmin calls the backing
from which “warrants” get their force; and Weinstein (2006)
would surely point out that full exploration of such backing is
often a complex undertaking indeed.
In example 1 the issue of whether the “premiss” advanced pro-
vides a reason for believing or expecting a particular outcome
turns largely on factual matters open to empirical investigation.
But that is not the whole story. The issue of whether that premiss
provides a reason – whether its being OK to accept the premiss
makes it OK to believe or expect a certain outcome – is a normative
issue whose resolution may depend crucially on factual matters,
but which cannot depend only or wholly on factual matters. In
my view, Toulmin (2003/1958, p. 98) gets it basically right when,
distinguishing between a warrant and its backing (which in the
example he was discussing had consisted of facts about British
statutory law which lay down requirements for being a British
citizen), he said:
Though the facts about the statute may provide all the backing
required by this warrant, the explicit statement of the warrant itself
is more than a repetition of these facts: it is a general moral of a prac-
tical character, about the ways in which we can safely argue in view
of these facts.
Example 2 brings this point more out clearly, I think. The fre-
quency with which those who accept invitations actually turn up
certainly has a bearing on whether somebody’s having accepted
an invitation makes it OK to presume that they will turn up. But
whether or not frequency in a given range makes it OK to so
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presume depends just as crucially on the practical implications of
presuming – on what further things its being OK to presume that
P makes it OK for us to do.
24
In Pinto 2006 (p. 268) I suggested that cognitive attitudes such
as believing, expecting, presuming, and so on, can be type-iden-
tified by reference to their functional role in our cognitive lives. I
went on (pp.304-306) to suggest something that amounts to this:
whether evidence of a certain sort warrants a given cognitive
attitude toward a specific type of propositional attitude depends
on whether the practice of adopting such an attitude toward such
propositional contents on the basis of such evidence would serve
the role that the practice plays in our cognitive lives. In Pinto
2007 I tried to show how a functional analysis of the cognitive
attitude of expecting could help us make sense of an idea drawn
from Sellars, as modified by an observation made by Carnap
–namely, that to ascribe non-metric probability to a proposition
is to say that it is reasonable all things considered to expect that
that proposition will turn out to be true.
I am currently inclined to think that deciding whether to rec-
ognize the validity of a warrant – deciding whether a given “body
of evidence” licenses the adoption of a given doxastic attitude
toward a given propositional content – depends less on the pur-
poses served by the inferences endorsed by the warrant and more
on the role which the licensed doxastic attitude plays in our con-
scious lives. I see the “epistemic modals” with which we qual-
ify our assertions or claims as indicating the doxastic attitudes
we take or ought to take toward the propositional content of
what we say, and I maintain in Pinto (2007, p. 4), “it is not diffi-
cult to see how [the practical] implications [of epistemic modals]
are readily construed as epistemically normative considerations.”
However, what I’m saying in this paper doesn’t depend on
24. In two recent papers I’ve tried to shed light on what makes a warrant valid or OK,
trying to show this depends crucially on what it is that various doxastic attitudes
commit us to and on the purposes for which we reason.
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accepting the details of any particular story about the grounds on
which we adopt a warrant – i.e. the grounds on which we ought
to decide whether this is a reason for that.
Two important conclusions should be drawn from these con-
siderations:
a. The mere fact that something is taken to be a reason does
not mean that it is a reason – a person or, for that matter,
an entire community can be wrong with respect to what is
a reason for what.
b. Although matters of fact typically have a crucial bearing
on what is a reason for what, the question of whether
something is or provides a reason for something else is
always a normative question and cannot be settled by facts
alone.
8. WHAT KIND OF NORMATIVITY IS THIS?
As a matter of fact, in the course of this exposition I have been
putting flesh on the skeletal idea from which I started – the
idea of its being OK for someone to do something. In the story
I’ve told I’ve explicitly restricted the intended application of ‘it’s
OK for S to do X’ to only two categories of doing: to actions
performed by specific individuals and to holding cognitive, cona-
tive and evaluative attitudes having specific propositional contents.
Moreover, I have explicitly restricted the grounds for its appli-
cation to criteria of a certain type – criteria which turn on there
being an appropriate relationship of the doing being evaluated
to cognitive, conative and/or evaluative attitudes toward propositional
contents held by the individuals whose doing is being evaluated.
Finally, I have portrayed the appropriateness of such relation-
ships as something to be settled by rational discussion of a cer-
tain sort – discussion in which factual and normative
considerations are brought to bear on the question of whether its
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being OK to do one sort of thing makes it OK to do another sort
of thing.
I submit that in light of these restrictions what is picked out by
the intended application of ‘It’s OK for S to do X’ constitutes a
recognizable species of meriting approval.
Notice that it follows from (3) and (6) that
(7) If S has a good reason all things considered to do X, then it is OK
for S to do it.
However, the converse of (7), namely
(8) It is OK for S to do X only if S has a good reason all things con-
sidered to do it.
is problematic, since nothing in the account I’ve offered so far
makes any obvious provision for avoiding an infinite regress of
reasons that might be required if (8) were to be accepted.
25
I cur-
rently lean toward enhancing the account offered here so as to
25. The problem of avoiding an infinite regress of reasons is a problem any epistemol-
ogy must face. A variety of such strategies is available in the literature. (1) One strat-
egy is to recognize what Pryor (2005) calls “immediate justification” – see note 26
below for the details. (2) Another quite intriguing attempt to avoid the problem can
be found in Jonathan Adler’s account of “tacit confirmation” in Chapter 6 of Belief’s
Own Evidence (Adler 2002) – an account which Adler thinks enables him to avoid
falling back on either a foundationalist or a coherentist epistemology. (3) Still
another approach can be found in Brandom (1994, pp. 176-178), who claims (p. 177)
that “the social practices that govern the giving and asking for reasons... need not be
– and the ones that actually confer content on our utterances are not – such that the
default entitlement status of a claim or assertional commitment is to be guilty till
proven innocent.” Brandon goes on to say, “If many claims are treated as innocent
until proven guilty – taken to be entitled commitments until and unless someone is
in a position to raise a legitimate question about them – the global threat of regress
dissolves.” He calls this “a default and challenge structure of entitlement.” (4) A
fourth strategy is to maintain that being in a doxastic state which is the result of a
“reliable belief forming mechanism” is justified. As a matter of fact, Brandom (1994,
pp. 213-229) adopts a complicated variant of this strategy with respect to perceptual
reports. However, in Brandom’s account the ascription of entitlement to reliable
perceptual reports is based on reasons which those who ascribe such entitlement
have.
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permit us to recognize regress stoppers – so that, for example,
things like perceptual experiences could be said to provide good
prima facie reasons for adopting certain cognitive attitudes
26
or
the fact of having enjoyed one sort of thing more than another
could provide a good prima facie reason for preferring things
of the first sort to things of the second.
27
But I will leave the
26. See Pollock (1995, pp. 52-55, especially principle 2.2 on p. 55), who argues that it is
perceptual experience itself (in his terminology, “having an image”), and not beliefs
about perceptual experience, which constitute the prima facie reasons for many of
our beliefs about our immediate environment. And see also the careful and insight-
ful discussion of “immediate” or “non-inferential” justification in Pryor (2005).
Pryor works with a notion of justification (explained in Part I of draft 9), and is con-
cerned basically only with the justification of beliefs. Despite these restrictions, what
he has to say can be made relevant to the themes in this paper. Pryor says, “When
your justification to believe P does not come from your justification to believe other
propositions, I’ll call it immediate” (p. 3 of draft 9). In his view, “the best argument
[for immediate justification] comes from considering examples” (p .6 of draft 9). Part
IV of the draft contains an extensive discussion of whether experiences - and he
points out on p. 11, that “unlike beliefs, experiences aren’t the sort of thing which
could be, nor do they need to be, justified” – can be thought to justify beliefs. The
basic thrust of the case he makes in Parts IV and V is to undermine what he takes to
be the principal arguments against the supposition that experiences can justify
beliefs.
27. In his account of the logical structure of practical rationality, Pollock (1995, pp.
12-32) accords crucial roles to situation-likings and feature-likings. He says (p. 12),
for example, “Situation-likings provide the ultimate starting point for rational delib-
eration. These are not representational states – the agent need not be thinking about
the way things are. Situation-liking is a feeling rather than a propositional attitude.”
He ties feature-likings to our ability to “react conatively to imagined situations” and
says, “As such, our reaction to these imagined situations constitutes a conative
response to situation types rather than situation tokens, although it is not clear that
these two kinds of likings should be regarded as genuinely different kinds of mental
states” (p.20). Pollock's use of the word “conative” is, I think, different from mine – I
would see what he is calling ‘likings’ as mental occurrences that can give rise to and
justify evaluative attitudes. For me, conative attitudes arise only when, on the basis
of evaluative attitudes, we adopt something as a goal and adopt plans to achieve such
goals. Pollock himself recognizes something like this distinction when he says (p.
23), “Goals are chosen on the basis of their expected likabilities....” Though there are
many features of Pollock’s account of practical reasoning I don’t agree with, his idea
that situation-likings and feature-likings are not propositional attitudes, but are
capable of grounding evaluative propositional attitudes strikes me as a very promis-
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attempt at such enhancements for another occasion. Enhancing
the account of reasons so that (8) becomes acceptable would per-
mit us to equate its being OK to do X with having a good reason
all things considered to do it. Of course, taking that equation to
be a definition would be viciously circular – since what it is to be
a reason has been explained in terms of its being OK to do X. But
there would be no need to take the equation as a definition.
28
Notice also that apart from one complication,
29
if we could
accept (8) we might be able to equate this species of its being OK
for someone to do something with its being reasonable for him or
her to do it.
9. CONCLUSION
Does this account of reasons shed any light on why there are dif-
ferent “cultures of theorizing” about argumentation – theorizing
about practices which turn on the presentation and exchange of
reasons? In particular, does it help to understand the existence of
the triad Tindale calls attention to – the logical, dialectical and
rhetorical perspectives? I think that to some extent we can see
each of these three perspectives arising out of an emphasis on
ing idea. For useful summaries and assessments of Pollock’s account of practical rea-
soning, see Hitchcock (2002) and Girle et al. (2003).
28. In “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth”, Davidson (1996/2005, esp. pp. 20-21 and
36-37) claims – correctly I think – that when it comes to the very fundamental
notions in terms of which we understand ourselves, definition is out of the question.
Each of them is too basic to be defined in terms of anything more basic, but none of
them is intelligible except by reference to the others – the best we can hope for is to
illuminate the ways in which they are related to each other.
29. I’m inclined to think we ought to require that an additional condition be met before
we deem it reasonable for a person to adopt an attitude A toward the idea that P. A
person may have good, undefeated reasons for adopting an attitude A only because
that person failed to make inquiries she or he should have made – inquiries that
would have or could have brought to light considerations which undermine or over-
ride his or her reasons for adopting A. For purposes of this paper, I have not
attempted to recognize this as a requirement for its being OK to do X. And without
such a requirement it’s probably not defensible to equate ‘reasonable for S to do X’
with ‘OK for S to do X’.
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one or another aspect of what I’ve tried to describe in this gen-
eral account of having and giving reasons.
1. The varieties of logical perspective tend to emphasize
questions about what is a reason for what. Of course,
when an informal logician like Ralph Johnson (2000)
insists that arguments (or at least good arguments) must
have a dialectical tier as well as an illative core, the concept
of what is involved in presenting an argument becomes
more complex than the account that was offered in Part 6
above.
2. The value of making dialogue the preferred context for
studying argumentation – which might be seen as lying at
the heart of dialectical perspectives – is, to my mind, most
clearly seen when we recognize the important effect that
undermining and overriding considerations have on the
force of reasons. For it is discussions between and among
two or more participants that provide contexts in which
such considerations most readily come to light (as is evi-
denced in Rescher 1977, especially chapter 1).
3. The value of emphasizing the effect of argument on an
audience – which if we follow Tindale 1999 is at the heart
of rhetorical perspectives – though not immediately obvi-
ous on an account like mine which insists that the force of
reasons is a normative force, is nevertheless quite real, and
for the following reason. If an argument fails to persuade
an audience, the fault may lie in the audience’s failure to
accept what they see it is reasonable for them to accept, or
it may lie in the arguer’s failure to make it manifest to the
audience that it is reasonable for them to accept what the
arguer wants them to accept. Adopting a rhetorical per-
spective requires getting clear about what it will take to
get an audience in a proper frame of mind to accept what
they’ll be shown it is reasonable to accept,
30
as well as get-
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ting clear about what it will take to make it manifest to
the audience that it is reasonable to accept what the arguer
wants them to accept.
31
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CHAPTER 11.
AGGRESSION, POLITENESS, AND ABSTRACT
ADVERSARIES
CATHERINE HUNDLEBY
Abstract: Trudy Govier argues in The Philosophy of Argument that
adversariality in argumentation can be kept to a necessary mini-
mum. On her account, politeness can limit the ancillary adversari-
ality of hostile culture but a degree of logical opposition will remain
part of argumentation, and perhaps all reasoning. Argumentation
cannot be purified by politeness in the way she hopes, nor does
reasoning even in the discursive context of argumentation demand
opposition. Such hopes assume an idealized politeness free from
gender, and reasoners with inhuman or at least highly privileged
capabilities and no need to learn from others or share understand-
ing.
Trudy Govier’s 1999 book The Philosophy of Argument provides
an extensive response to the feminist critiques of adversarial
assumptions about argumentation. Govier defends an adversar-
ial orientation of argumentation both for its cognitive necessity
and role in critical thinking and for its political fruitfulness.
Govier’s exposition of how adversariality or opposing positions
in argumentation support the value of controversy demands
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feminist attention, because controversy is part and parcel of fem-
inism.
Govier introduces a fruitful distinction of “minimal adversari-
ality” constituted by taking up an opposing position from “ancil-
lary adversariality,” the culture of aggression and hostility often
associated with argumentation. She shares a distaste for that cul-
ture with other feminists and other argumentation theorists, but
she values minimally adversarial discourse because controversy
depends on it.
I will explain Govier’s position that politeness provides a
hedge against the discursive hostility and aggressive emotional-
ity that constitute ancillary adversariality but argue that polite-
ness cannot suffice. It reflects and thus reinforces gendered (and
perhaps other unjustified forms of) social dominance. While we
— all people and perhaps especially feminists — need a theory of
argumentation that can address controversy and lead us through
hostile entanglements, we must not obscure the possibility and
fruitfulness of alternate modes of argumentation and reasoning.
We may exchange reasons without opposing each other’s ideas —
never mind opposing each other personally. Adversariality is not
necessary or even ideal for argumentation, despite its value for
democratic politics and critical thinking. It only seems ideal if we
neglect the gendered realities of discourse and the limitations of
human cognition.
2. ANCILLARY ADVERSARIALITY AND RATIONAL
PERSUASION
Govier recognizes that many of the demands emerging from the
feminist critique of masculine standards in philosophy and argu-
mentation accord with the direction taken by the informal logic
movement. Both orientations suggest that education in logic and
critical thinking “should not: be primarily in formal logic; model
all arguments as deductive; cavalierly apply generalizations to
particular cases; dichotomize reason and emotion; or ignore
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relationships” (p. 52). She argues that the proper operation of
reason in argumentation suffers from aggressive emotions and
the culture of “ancillary adversariality” that feminists maintain
have masculine associations making them more accessible to
men and more accepted from men. Adversarial and aggressive
metaphors can foster interpersonal aggression, encouraging peo-
ple to slide into arguing against each other when they disagree
rather than just questioning each other’s ideas. Adversarial struc-
tures in law, politics, and debate, and the personal stake we often
have in our own views (p. 50) heighten the likelihood that oppos-
ing opinions will slip into aggressive modes that interfere with
rational exchange.
Both feminists and informal logicians develop non-adversarial
metaphors for argumentation: “build a case, explore a topic, or
think through a problem” (p. 9). Yet, many philosophers — and
other reasoners as this is part of the common culture of argu-
mentation — still use metaphors of cutting, capture, trouncing,
skewering, and other violent and militaristic language to
describe successes and failures in argumentation. In response to
feminist and other critiques, those who actually work on the top-
ics of argumentative strength and weakness tend to eschew such
language, because of the ideological baggage it brings with it,
especially the militaristic and eristic (aiming to win) metaphors.
Govier holds out hope that the void left from removing inter-
personal aggression, the harsh language, fraught emotion, “stri-
dent repetition[,] and loud voices,” can fill with respect through
people engaging each other as rational agents by appealing to
reason and evidence. She argues that persuasion can be a deeply
respectful enterprise when the means are rational.
The other person is addressed as a rational being, as a person with
beliefs and values of his own, as one who thinks and is capable of
changing his beliefs on the basis of reasons and evidence. To pre-
sent someone with an argument is to attend to his or her mind and
thinking processes and to do so in a non-manipulative way. It is to
honestly acknowledge differences of opinion and belief, not to skirt
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over them, hide them, or seek to avoid them…to show respect for
[arguers] as autonomous thoughtful people. (p. 8)
Govier contrasts rational persuasion more generally with the
coercive means having residual presence in “slogans, loaded ter-
minology, or visual imagery” (from the elipsis in previous quo-
tation). The common language of argumentation reflects
assumptions that may run deep in our models and norms of
argument, but that are outmoded. Conflict, contest, or battle
need not result from disagreement; metaphors of defense and
victory may be “dead”
1
(p. 54).
Language does often change its meaning and metaphors lose
certain resonances; for instance, the misogynist history behind
“rule of thumb” does not taint that very useful expression. Yet,
the adversarial language of argumentation expresses models and
norms that remain lively because of the way militarism and emo-
tional aggression define masculinity in many cultures — espe-
cially the dominant culture of Euro-American, white,
able-bodied, heteromasculinity, and the conflation of aggression
and domination with both masculinity and success (Moulton
1983).
3. AGGRESSION, POLITENESS AND GENDER
Govier argues that “adversariality is not necessarily confronta-
tional” which is to say that it can be “kept to a logical, and polite
minimum,” to bare opposition and respectful objection (which
describes epistemological opposition) (p. 55). Politeness provides
background conditions for argumentation practices also in Dou-
glas Walton’s theory of presumptive argumentation, as a source
for argumentation schemes that guide reasoning based on spe-
cific types of presumptions (1996, pp. xi, 39, 42). Walton (2007, p.
77) takes politeness to be codified by Paul Grice’s conversational
maxims that encourage conversation to be collaborative rather
1. I suspect intentional irony here from Govier.
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than adversarial (Walton 2007, p. xvii). Recent research on polite-
ness, however, reveals that it will not suffice as a hedge against
aggressive behaviour. Some people’s aggression, especially men’s,
operates as part of polite discourse, endorsing specific forms of
rough-housing, both verbal and physical. (I speak of “women”
and “men” as a shorthand to refer to people of any age gendered
feminine and masculine.)
2
Politeness institutionalizes rather than
moderates certain aggressive tendencies in argumentation, cre-
ating gendered power strata in discourse, and preventing
metaphors of war and aggression from losing their confronta-
tional implications.
The demands of politeness separate men and women in almost
all cultures. In the dominant white able-bodied middle-class het-
erosexual, Euro-American culture that tends to override other
attendant identities and cultures, norms of politeness tend to be
more severe and restrictive for women, requiring greater pas-
sivity and conformity. And yet women appear immature, irra-
tional, or unserious to the extent that they are “small, timid in
manner, have high voices, speak with qualifications and tonali-
ties of uncertainty, dress in a feminine style connoting prettiness,
a desire to please, non-seriousness, etc.” (Govier, p. 31). Discur-
sively, women’s politeness strategies in Euro-American cultures
include various markers of subordinate status that at the same
time function to elicit cooperation, including tag questions such
as “don’t you think?”, diminutives (“tiny bit”), and euphemisms
(Burrow, p. 247). Such demands undermine women’s ability to
engage others independently, to be assertive, and hence their
ability to operate as arguers and be accepted as reasoners.
Transgressing feminine modes can be liberating and exhili-
rating, making the assertiveness of argumentation and even its
2. New research suggests that the stereotypes that guide our discursive interactions
may racialize people in the same terms that define gender, at least in the U.S.A.
(Galinsky, A., Hall, E., and Cudd, A. (forthcoming 2013) in Psychological Science).
The intersectionality (how different forms of oppression impact on each other) of
psychological bias and stereotypes remains mostly neglected and in need of work.
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tendency toward aggression both exciting and deeply empower-
ing for many women (Burrow, p. 242). Perhaps most radically
transgressive, then, are fallacy labels because wielding them pro-
vides an authority to say “no” and to silence that women and oth-
ers who are socially marginalized rarely have (Hundleby 2010).
However, transgressing gender norms is tough going, and
women arguers regularly do not gain the same uptake as men
when they adopt behaviour associated with masculinity. When
women defy gendered standards of feminine, polite passivity,
they initially tend to be viewed as merely requesting an active,
authoritative role —especially in expert discourse. If not prima
facie excluded, women are denied the responses that men receive,
and pro tanto, seem to be speaking out of turn or continuously
entreating to argue (Kukla). The presumptive exclusion of
women from argumentation becomes clear as dialogues play out,
despite specific individuals’ conscious good intentions to respect
and include each other.
3
For instance, regardless of discussants’
perceptions and good will, women are interrupted much more
often than men—even by other women, and their suggestions
ignored unless repeated by a man. The effective entreaty for
permission to speak, manifest for instance in expectations that
women and people of colour will smile, undermines their full
participation in argumentation.
The regular phenomenon of men aggressively asserting their
authority over women in matters where the particular woman
has objective expertise, or in regard to women’s issues, has
recently gained the humorous nickname “mansplaining” (Roth-
man). The term emerged from a series of articles beginning with
Rebecca Solnit’s “Men Who Explain Things,” which includes the
following anecdote.
3. Kukla’s attention to the material context of social effect makes her approach of dys-
functional speech acts better able to account for the possibile self-deception of the
audience than approaches that adhere to J.L. Austin’s attention to the intentions of
the audience.
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I was in Berlin giving a talk when a writer friend invited me to
a dinner that included a male translator and three women a little
younger than me who would remain deferential and mostly silent
throughout the meal. Perhaps the translator was peeved that I
insisted on playing a modest role in the conversation, but when I
said something about how Women Strike for Peace, the extraordi-
nary, little-known antinuclear and antiwar group founded in 1961,
helped bring down the communist-hunting House Committee on
Un-American Activities, Mr. Very Important II sneered at me. The
House committee, he insisted, no longer existed in the early 1960s
and, anyway, no women’s group played such a role in its downfall.
His scorn was so withering, his confidence so aggressive, that arguing
with him seemed a scary exercise in futility and an invitation to
more insult. I had written a book that drew from primary docu-
ments and interviews about Women Strike for Peace. (p. 2, empha-
sis added)
Mansplaining, while about the gendering of expertise and gen-
eral discourse and authority more than politeness specifically,
sometimes illustrates how women’s polite assertions receive
aggressive responses from men that women cannot effectively
return.
Mere participation by women counts as unacceptably aggres-
sive and rude. “Giving good arguments, speaking with confi-
dence, and otherwise behaving in ways that would count as
“playing well” if we were already recognized as playing can come
off as arrogant and off-putting” (Kukla, p. 11). Such discursive
failures of agency that track and reinforce social disadvantage
amount to “discursive injustice,” according to Rebecca Kukla. A
loss of control over our speech acts arises from the inability to
mobilize social conventions, such as those of adversarial argu-
mentation, and can result from norms of politeness that deny
women — and other subordinates — polite adversarial roles.
Should they explicitly assert a place in argument then the
dilemma becomes manifest, as women become perceived as
harsh, bitchy, defensive, “dragon-ladies”, Sylvia Burrow explains
(p. 255). The word “strident” almost exclusively applies to
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women. In sum, they appear aggressive, inappropriate, and impolite
for behaviour that would be perfectly polite for men, especially
among other men. On the other hand, women who decline to
defend their reasoning risk appearing (to themselves as well as
others) inadequate to the task, reinforcing the perception that
they are not competent arguers. The gendered flow of polite dis-
course can prevent women from acting as fully fledged arguers
whether or not they intend to embody stereotypes of white, able-
bodied, middle-class, heterosexual, Euro-American femininity,
and leaves women in a double-bind (Frye).
What constitutes politeness in argumentation reflects the
dominant culture’s masculine homosociality: the not-specifi-
cally-sexual bonding between men that may involve seeking, or
enjoyment of, or preference for the company of other men. Inso-
far as men control all sorts of power and resources, including
intellectual stimulation and with the notable exception of pater-
nity, men can receive most of what they need or even want
from each other (Lipman-Blumen, p. 16). Less substantial bene-
fits accrue from women’s homosociality. However, both men and
women may find it easier to operate in same-sex groups in which
others’ behaviours are more predictable and less complicated
by heteronormative tensions between the genders — e.g., how
to draw the line between friendliness and inappropriate flirta-
tion. Women’s derivative status in social discourse impedes their
social interaction with men especially in competitive contexts
that resonate with male homosociality as in the case of much
argumentation and perhaps especially in the discipline of philos-
ophy (Rooney 2010).
Therefore, the assumption by Govier and Walton that polite-
ness can eliminate unnecessary aggressiveness does not stand up
to scrutiny. The gendered quality of politeness disadvantages and
even disqualifies some arguers via differentially gendered mea-
sures of aggression. What counts as an adversarial or aggres-
sive violation of etiquette depends a good deal on the arguer’s
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perceived gender. Norms of politeness may even demand men’s
aggression and adversariality, for instance in a playful exchange
of insults, or a hearty slap on the back. Adversarial discursive
modes will in turn exclude certain people whose social roles
do not permit polite rough-play, and women’s efforts to engage
in argumentation will go unrecognized or seem disproportion-
ately rude. Grice’s conversational maxims may not be specific
enough to alleviate the gendering of politeness because of the
open-endedness of their terms, e.g., “adequate evidence,” “pro-
lixity,” and “informative as is required.” Formal systems of dis-
cursive etiquette such as Robert’s Rules, even when adversarial
hold out more promise because they supersede informal systems
of politeness and have greater specificity than Grice’s maxims.
Likewise, some women find the adversarial culture of philosophy
liberating to the extent that it authorizes their transgressions of
the usual politeness norms.
The exclusiveness of polite aggression may reflect general
social privilege (of the archetypal white, able-bodied, middle-
class, heterosexual, Euro-American man) or be more specific to
masculinity as a form of domination (Burrow). Either way, it
sanctions aggressive behaviour, including adversarial discourse
and argumentation, from those otherwise currently advantaged,
condoning their dominance through aggression. Excluding from
acceptable aggression women and others who violate the social
categories that define politeness helps to perpetuate existing
social divisions and maintain a power structure defined by
aggression (Moulton). Women may avoid taking feminist posi-
tions or identifying as “feminist” in mind of being perceived as
angry or unpleasant and so remain or become further disen-
franchised. Likewise people in the working class avoid behav-
iour that is “asking for trouble.” Gays, lesbians, and people of
colour may decline their rights for fear that acquiring any atten-
tion may entail violence and persecution; the disabled may sim-
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ply not wish to waste their time given the likelihood of being
ignored.
4. CONTROVERSY, COERCION AND RATIONALITY
Even in wealthy countries benefitting from centuries of femi-
nism, merely participating in discourse may be controversial for
women:
Most women fight wars on two fronts, one for whatever the puta-
tive topic is and one simply for the right to speak, to have ideas,
to be acknowledged to be in possession of facts and truths, to have
value, to be a human being. (Solnit, p. 3)
Controversy clings to women who aspire to status of human
beings or rational agents even more in other cultures and for
women living under intersecting forms of oppression, such as
race, class, and ability. Aggression and opposition toward exist-
ing situations, individual practices, institutional policies and
structures, etc., construct feminist identity and epistemology in
specific ways (de Lauretis; Collins, pp. 8ff; Sandoval; Hundleby
1997). The controversies surrounding and within feminism thus
might benefit from better understanding of adversarial argu-
mentation. Adversarial structures of controversy may allow space
for the development of non-coercive standards for persuasion
that involve a negotiable rationality.
Feminism is intrinsically controversial, drawing attention to
problems with institutions, including frameworks for thought
and action, and working for change in the surrounding culture.
Feminist political progress demands adversarial engagement that
politeness restricts from some of those, notably women, whose
interests demand change. Articulating feminist adversarial ori-
entations thus can be aided by argumentation theory. Feminism
and other liberatory projects need an effective account of con-
troversy and tools for addressing it because their nature involves
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controversy: fighting for women’s rights, for fairness and equal-
ity; demanding change.
Feminism produces a wealth of internal disputes and contro-
versies too, such as over the significance of pornography and
regarding the value of feminine qualities associated with moth-
ering. Opposition comes as part of the package of working for
change. While feminists pioneered explicitly collaborative
research methods, they also came quickly to recognize that crit-
icism must be involved at various stages as understanding devel-
ops. More than sharing experience was required by the
innovative consciousness-raising groups of the 1960s and ’70s,
who stressed the affirmation of lived experience and provide the
historical and practical basis for much feminist methodology.
The development of such concepts as “sexual harassment” and
“marital rape” required criticism and challenges to personal
experiences—including self-blame and resignation, in order to
shed light on the larger political significance of those experiences
(Wylie).
Govier’s concern with controversy dovetails with political
philosopher Chantal Mouffe’s argument that democratic
engagement depends on adversarial or agonistic processes:
Mobilization requires politicization, but politicization cannot exist
without the production of a conflictual representation of the world,
with opposed camps with which people can identify, thereby allow-
ing for passions to be mobilized politically within the spectrum of
the democratic process. (Mouffe 2005, pp. 24-25)
Mouffe argues that the intrinsic adversariality of politics
demands agonistic structures be built into political systems.
4
Resistance to the fundamental human need to define ourselves
and identify in terms of friends and enemies makes our political
4. Argumentation theorists may find rich resources in the related literature on femi-
nism and citizenship. For instance a special issue of The Feminist Review addresses
“Citizenship: Pushing the Boundaries” (Eds. Helen Crowley, Gail Lewis, Pnina
Werbner and Nira Yuval-Davis, 57, Autumn 1997).
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structures dys-functional. Although social identity does not con-
cern Govier, who defends an individualist adversariality, holding
between particular persons and between their ideas, she offers
Mouffe and feminists a model of how agonistic reasoning can be
rational.
Adversariality may entail winners and losers. Thus eristic dis-
course can reinforce existing (just or unjust) power relationships
and undermine cooperative and egalitarian modes of arguing,
especially when some participants have extra experience and
license with aggressive techniques. Those with the power tend to
have greater resources, anyway, even when in the wrong. Eris-
tics may also suppose a radical opposition between truth and
falsity (Cohen), leaving no room for constructive uncertainties
or sensitivity to new evidence, and so subvert epistemic goals
(Rooney 2010). One possible value remains in that eristic exhibi-
tions, such as formal debates, can serve the purpose of allowing
the audience to make up their minds even when the arguers have
no intention of altering their own views (Kock 2009).
In practical contexts, we must choose our argumentative goals
with care, avoiding the temptations of coercive force. Some argu-
mentation theorists maintain that any persuasion, even rational
persuasion, can be coercive and so not an adequate standard or
goal for argumentation. Govier counters that an arguer does not
pin the audience up against a wall, in even a figurative sense (p.
50). Rational argumentation employs “considerations … supply-
ing evidence or grounds that make a claim seem more believ-
able because of a cogent connection between that claim and the
claims cited as its support” (p. 45). That the audience might
accept the line of reasoning receives motivation from hope, not
aggression (p. 50).
The believability or persuasiveness thus depends on cogency;
and in turn “cogency” receives recursive support from “rational-
ity”:
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An argument is cogent when its premises are rationally acceptable
and relevant to its conclusion and when, considered together, they
provide good or sufficient grounds for that conclusion. (Govier, p.
46)
Cogency leans on rationality (of the premises), the persuasive
force that helps define it; yet it also demands relevance, and good
or sufficient grounds holding between the premises and the con-
clusion. Thus, leaving aside what may be the independent criteria
for evaluating grounds (and perhaps relevance), one finds at least
one element in cogent argumentation for which further reasons
can be sought: the rationality of premises (and perhaps their rel-
evance).
The rational element of a cogent argument may be fleshed
out through sub-arguments or replying to possible objections,
a dimension of argumentation that Ralph Johnson describes as
the “dialectical tier” (Govier, p. 46). Rationality remains subject to
judgment, and so I suggest still may be coercive should the processes
of negotiation supporting that judgment involve coercion. The possi-
bility that a judgment could be coerced may sound odd to those
unfamiliar with feminist epistemology. Reasoning has complex-
ities that include historical patriarchal baggage (Lloyd; Rooney
1991, 1994) and unconscious social bias that recent psychology
reveals to hold sway especially when evaluative terms are not
clearly defined. These are not conscious views about domination,
or even about ancillary cultural adversariality, but nonetheless
these assumptions can powerfully distort decision-making. Par-
ticipating in the adversarial discourse of Johnson’s dialectical tier
may for many women demand contravening the tacit gender
hierarchy (and perhaps other hierarchies), and risk complete
exclusion. As we have seen above, politeness will not help.
Admittedly, the room Govier allows to contest and construc-
tively decide what counts as rationality may prevent the concept
of rationality from being another tool (along with politeness) that
primarily serves existing structures of rhetorical power. Ratio-
AGGRESSION, POLITENESS, AND ABSTRACT ADVERSARIES 299
nality itself can be controversial.
5
Govier’s attention to controversy
provides the political edge to her philosophy of argument: she
insists on controversy’s desirability, and its dependence on
adversarial relationships. Controversies depend on there being
more than one view, each being held in rejection of the others
and sustained by arguing against those who hold the other views;
they are oppositional in requiring one person to disbelieve
another’s claim. Such “minimal adversariality” she argues is nec-
essary for practical politics under democracy, which demands
more than tolerant regard. People who hold differing views
engage and attempt to persuade each other and their representa-
tives on matters of policy and governance.
Govier’s account of controversy helps to show the broad value
of feminist discourse. Adversarial argument feeds democratic
politics, and may be rational at the core and non-coercive: “the
existence of controversy is a healthy thing in many contexts, and
if controversy implies a degree of adversariality, then perhaps
some modest adversariality is acceptable in the interests of criti-
cal thinking and lively debate” (p. 51).
5. THE NEED FOR MINIMAL ADVERSARIALITY?
Sliding into adversariality can be difficult to avoid in a culture
that prioritizes masculinity and aggressiveness, and conflates the
two; the importance of adversariality to democratic politics
complicates this still further. Yet for Govier, adversariality has
significance beyond its function as a social means to benefit con-
troversy and agonistic politics; it has a fundamental role in
human reasoning and philosophical methods. Govier’s view that
5. Govier’s separate discussion of how rationality operates in critical thinking appeals
to judgment in a way that seems to lack normative force, as Harvey Siegel argues
(2004, Rationality and judgment. Metaphilosophy 35(5): 597-613). His account of
rational thought as coherence with rules, including unrecognized rules, while
intended to account for individual thought, might also define rational persuasion
better than Johnson’s adversarial dialectical tier. However, exploring that option is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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reasoning requires internal debate has initial plausibility. We cer-
tainly do argue in our heads. “A person may critically reflect
on and appraise her own thinking, thus embracing an internal-
ized adversariality which is not negative” (p. 10). Yet thought and
argumentation do not depend on recognizing the opposite per-
spective held by even an imaginary adversary.
Govier provides two different explanations of minimal adver-
sariality. On the one hand it involves opposition to other views,
a specific psychological attitude that emerges in what she calls
“Deep Adversariality.”
1. I hold X.
2. I think that X is correct. (Follows from 1.)
3. I think that non-X is not correct. (Follows from 2.)
4. I think that those who hold not-X are wrong, or are mak-
ing a mistake. (Follows from 3.)
5. Should I need to argue for X, I will thereby be arguing
against not-X (?)
6. Those who hold not-X, are, with regard to the correctness
of X and my argument for X, my opponents. (?) (Govier, p.
244)
Most of these steps seem questionable. Govier acknowledges
there may be some doubt starting with (5) and Phyllis Rooney
(2010) argues that it is wholly unnecessary. My central concerns
are with how this process is supposed to get off the ground, in
steps (1) – (3) which may be necessary for critical thinking in some
sense, but not for thinking itself, as Govier would have us believe.
The epistemological leap to (2) demands a self-reflection not
part of the original doxastic attitude in (1). We believe all sorts of
things at any given time without consciously recognizing them
as beliefs, never mind evaluating them. Such awareness may be
forced by argumentation but that is part of the value that argu-
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mentation can add to thought: dialectical exchange encourages
self-reflection that we otherwise may not have.
The more serious problem with Deep Adverariality lies in the
minimally adversarial move from step (2) in which a reasoner
epistemologically evaluates a thought to an epistemological eval-
uation of that contradictory belief in step (3). Again, this
demands a cognitive self-awareness that has little psychological
plausibility, but this time reasoners are supposed to render judg-
ment on propositions that play no part in our own belief system.
This move, however logically sensible, seems on any regular basis
to be beyond our finite cognitive capacities. It describes “critical
thinking” that provides the important exception to the rule of
unreflective thinking.
Govier’s other argument for the necessity of minimal adver-
sariality has more modest terms, occurring when one “openly
acknowledges the actuality or possibility of disagreement or doubt”
(p. 47). Recognizing the “possibility of disagreement or doubt”
may be part of reasoning — accompanying anything more solid
than a faint glimmer of thought — but need not entail enter-
taining contradictory propositions as she argues. Disagreement
or doubt may merely involve contrary possibilities, for instance.
Say that I think it’s cold outside and you think it’s beautiful out,
and perhaps we are both right. Or we might both be wrong, or
only one of us may be right. Any of these sorts of logical rela-
tionships might undergird my doubt or the disagreement may be
irresolvably incoherent, say if we understand terms in different
ways. Doubt and even disgreement need not involve considering
contradictions and can take the forms of open-mindedness and
exploration, compiling data, or casting about for further infor-
mation. Those who do not agree and who are thus subject to
persuasion may be undecided, tentative, or even have suspended
their belief or disbelief. So may anyone be when entering into
discussion and attempting rational persuasion. The possibility
of disagreement or doubt intrinsic to argumentation need not
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entail belief in the wrongness of the contradictory of one’s posi-
tion.
Disagreement and doubt may not depend on wrongness or
contradictories at all, and yet still be the basis for openness to
rational persuasion, and so foundational to argument. We may
pitch in together to develop shared understanding or anticipate
how things pan out under specific circumstances. These modes
of thinking provide the grist for the mill of critical thinking and
testing. Although scientific testing may depend on abductive rea-
soning, comparing opposing lines of thought, not all reasoning
demands competitive inference to the best explanation and its
logic of competition. The lines of thought have to come from
somewhere. Even in science, an explanatorily adequate or merely
interesting account of the evidence may be our only goal. Con-
sider how people, including scientists, sometimes begin their
interjections with “so…,” suggesting a collaborative rather than
an adversarial intention.
I may aim to persuade you because you are not yet convinced
— of the value of dogs for household safety, for instance. Like-
wise, we argue without disputing a claim when we receive edu-
cation. The explanation to a student of what makes water expand
when it freezes persuades that student rationally that the ice-cube
tray may overflow. Instructors even play at not knowing in order
to elicit student collaboration in learning, a technique famously
described as the Socratic method. In many other cases it is true
that none of the arguers has sorted out our beliefs on the topic
and we may explore the information together, pooling it.
These examples all support Rooney’s suggestion that we may
“argue with” people without arguing against them (2010), and
feminists have developed a range of practices for reasoning col-
laboratively. The collaborative exchanges of reasons that I have
argued may be means for rational persuasion play central roles
too in science and other arenas that depend on the division of
epistemic labour. A physicist may build equipment for a chem-
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istry experiment, and a statistician do the calculations. Each con-
tributes to the development of an argument about some
phenomenon in chemistry and may have to persuade the others
by way of argument that the techniques applied will do the job.
However, there is no opposition to the techniques or claims of
expertise, only inadequate understanding that can be overcome
by sharing some of the expert or testimonial evidence. These
non-adversarial practices deserve to count as forms of argument,
and argumentation theorists such as Govier seem to deny them
that status only because they presume that argumentation must
be adversarial.
6. IDEALIZED ARGUMENTS AND ABSTRACT
ADVERSARIES
The problems I’ve identified with Govier’s account of adversarial
argumentation seem to lie in its idealization, a tendency in phi-
losophy that Charles Mills (2005) argues undermines a theory’s
effectiveness. Despite the intention of Govier and others to
account for real reasoning practices, idealization or ideal theory
persists in informal logic. While all philosophy may be normative
and ideal in a generic sense, the type of abstraction and its degree
may impede philosophers’ ability to address concrete problems.
Misguided abstraction can make our ideals too idealized or ide-
alized in the wrong ways. Failing to account for how gendered
communication practices including politeness affect norms of
argumentation and for human logical frailty makes Govier’s pic-
ture of the argumentative adversary problematically abstract and
idealized.
Philosophers must abstract away from concrete situa-
tions—whether epistemic, ethical, or argumentative—in order
to develop ideals in the broad philosophical sense of norms.
“Abstraction is something of a relative and situated notion, as
when we abstract from some of the contextual specifics or salien-
cies of a given situation and not others” (Rooney 2010, p. 215).
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So we must take care not to abstract away from what we rec-
ognize to be problems demanding attention. A pitted or cracked
surface—due to natural variation or normal wear and tear, can-
not be modelled well by a frictionless plane, though that model
may account quite well for a teflon-coated plane suspended in
a vacuum (Mills, p. 167). Likewise, adversarial logic may suffice
to characterize controversies but be wholly inadequate for other
types of argumentation, and even aggravate their difficulties.
Opposition has limited benefit as an orientation for rational
persuasion. The oppositional mode appears universally produc-
tive only because the adversaries we have in mind are abstract:
subject to identical norms of politeness and with no limits on
time or cognitive capacity, such that they can appreciate and
account for the logical implications of their beliefs. Idealized
social ontology, idealized capacities, and silence on oppression
are among the characteristic aspects of idealized theory, sug-
gested by Mills. These three can be found in Govier’s argument
that we can and should keep adversariality to a necessary mini-
mum.
The idealized social ontology of liberal atomic individuals in
contemporary moral and political theories, Mills argues,
abstracts away from the realities of “structural domination,
exploitation, coercion, and oppression” (p. 168). Those concrete
forces create hierarchical roles and identities, such as the gen-
dered quality of politeness that Govier neglects. Likewise, every
major approach to argumentation theory ignores the role of the
arguers themselves, allowing the agents of argument to recede
into the theoretical background, explains Dale Hample (2007).
Argumentation theorists generally idealize social ontology by
assuming the text of an argument fully represents “whatever we
need to know about arguers’ motivations, assumptions, knowl-
edge, reasoning, and feelings” (p. 166).
Govier assumes idealized capacities by suggesting that rea-
soners must (and so can) hold multiple reflective views on their
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own understandings: the steps proceeding from (1) to (3) in her
proposal for Deep Adversariality. While those steps sometimes
might be possible for a reasoner with a good deal of leisure, they
cannot be standard for cognizers with limited time, or lacking
the opportunity for reflection, never mind training in logic or
reasoning. Such privileges cannot operate as the base line for rea-
soning.
She passes up opportunities to address oppression, gesturing
toward it only by mentioning the difficulties of feminine dis-
course in the way Mills describes as typical for idealizing
philosophers (pp. 168-169). Govier’s neglect of the deep social
patterns prevents her from recognizing how oppression per-
vades social institutions from formal organizations such as
schools and the law to informal institutions such as politeness,
marriage, and even the discipline of philosophy. Oppression
shapes the people in those institutions and influences their argu-
mentation practices, and the reception of their arguments. Even
without ancillary adversariality, and imagining that politeness
were effective, adversarial practices typical of the discipline of
philosophy and perceived as “free and open” perpetuate both
implicit and explicit social biases, including those that follow
lines of gender, class, and race. Thus “epistemic injustice is likely
to be exacerbated in skepticism-informed argumentative
exchanges where minority members, whose experiences and
claims are likely to be given less credibility, are thereby assigned
greater burdens of proof” (Rooney 2012, p. 319).
Govier stops short of idealizing the cognitive sphere, the
fourth marker of idealization suggested by Mills (p.169), insofar
as her attention to ancillary adversariality and distinction of it
from minimal adversariality points to the complexity of argu-
mentation’s social context. At the same time, the complications
of ancillary adversariality and the inadequacy of politeness indi-
cate that arguers may resist the norm of rational persuasion that
she defends. She thus does not ignore exceptions, and so seems
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to avoid the fifth marker of idealization (Mills, p.181). Govier’s
work outside of argumentation theory on political reparations
further indicates an intention for theory to account for existing
problems.
Yet the exceptions to the norm of rational persuasion may be
fostered by social roles such as masculine gender that allow for
polite aggression and heighten the burden of proof for those on
the social margins, factors not addressed by Govier. The distinc-
tion of politeness from adversarial rudeness itself idealizes the
difference between argument and quarrel, ignoring the multi-
ple connections providing various forces that cause arguments to
degrade into quarrel.
Govier’s abstract arguer has qualities distinctively resonant
with white middle-class able-bodied heteromasculinity. Not
only do we associate adversariality with such men to the effect
that women (at least) receive disproportionately negative sanc-
tion for oppositional behaviour or even uttering contrary opin-
ions. By excluding or extracting out collaborative contexts from
our model of argumentation we assume that no argumentation
goes on during learning, one of the most lively and commonplace
arenas for sharing reasons with others and inviting inferences
from each other, and one typically governed by women. So the
abstract arguer marginalizes both women and children, or
imposes upon them an adversarial model that neglects the con-
texts and forms that their reasoning often takes.
7. CONCLUSION
Adversarial modes of reasoning have neither foundational nor
overriding value as means for rational persuasion. Other forms
of social engagement and shared reasoning practices deserve
recognition as forms of argumentation, from the most estab-
lished views shared through persuasive teaching to the most dar-
ing explorations achieved through the division of cognitive
labour in science. These involve rational persuasion among peo-
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ple who may disagree or doubt a proposition under consider-
ation, but who need not have contradictory opinions. I suspect
we’ll be hard pressed to find a good discursive definition of argu-
ment that requires adversariality without being ad hoc, and that
would make circular any argument for the necessity of adversar-
iality.
Despite the problems with Govier’s position that politeness
can reduce adversariality to a necessary minimum, her account
of the value of adversarial reasoning at the social level retains a
vital significance for feminism and social progress. Feminists and
other arguers need tools for working through situations of min-
imal adversariality, for keeping the minimum from becoming
aggravated and blooming into a culture of hostility, and perhaps
for recognizing when argument will not suffice as a means for
addressing conflict. Whether we need to institutionalize adver-
sarial practices as Mouffe argues, progress of one kind or another
depends on change and requires some opposition to the current
state of affairs and the reasoning that supports it. Govier’s dis-
tinction between minimal and ancillary adversariality opens up
space for discussing the different forms and levels of adversar-
iality. Developing this further could help us figure out how to
minimize harmful adversariality and when the minimal adver-
sariality constituted by different opinions is productive, politi-
cally and epistemologically.
Mills advises, “the best way to bring about the ideal is by rec-
ognizing the nonideal, and…by assuming the ideal or near-ideal,
one is only guaranteeing the perpetuation of the nonideal” (2005,
p. 182). We must know how aggression works and how it takes
hold in order to minimize it and allow rationality to play its
intended role. Empirical studies of aggression tend to conflate
argumentation with aggressive communication (Rancer and Avt-
gis) and yet research also shows that training in argumentation
decreases verbal aggression such as swearing (Hamilton and
Tafoya). The empirical understanding concerning aggression
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may be irreducibly complex, as Helen Longino argues, but argu-
mentation theorists will get better answers to our questions
about aggressive arguers if we consider the available evidence.
Rationality remains an ideal or paradigm for reasoning, and
when we make it open to negotiation, as does Govier, we may
help to avoid the regressive pitfalls of ideal theory. However,
much remains to be said about the constitution of that ratio-
nality, or how it can be negotiated in argumentation, and how
it might be controversial and in some sense adversarial without
playing into existing masculine norms of adversariality. Govier
expects politeness to do too much work, to cleanse argumenta-
tion of the aggression implicit to masculine strategies for polite-
ness in the dominant culture. While feminists and all fair-minded
people need adversarial strategies for argumentation, we must
not assume that rationality can provide a transparent neutrality
to guide adversarial processes any more than we can assume that
of politeness. It remains to be seen whether rationality might
provide the means for argumentative persuasion that enables
respect and acknowledges difference in the way Govier main-
tains. Rationality might ground a more inclusive account of
argument, and do the work that politeness cannot. We also might
be able to transform our norms of politeness, by adopting spe-
cialized rules for particular contexts, to make them better sup-
port rationality and the adversarial discourse that reasoners
sometimes need.
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CHAPTER 12.
MULTI-MODAL 2010: MULTI-MODAL
ARGUMENTATION 20 YEARS LATER
MICHAEL A. GILBERT
Abstract: My essay, “Multi-Modal Argumentation” was published
in the journal, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, in 1994 (Gilbert 1994).
This information appeared again in my book, Coalescent Argumenta-
tion in 1997 (Gilbert 1997). In the ensuing 16 years, there have been
many changes in Argumentation Theory, and I would like to take
this opportunity to examine my now teen-aged theory in light of
the developments in our discipline. I will begin by reminding you
of the essential aspects of my theory, make some general comments,
and then review the several modes individually.
The theory of multi-modal argumentation holds that communi-
cation in general, and argumentation specifically, never occurs
in one single mode. By a ‘mode’ I mean, fuzzily, a means or way
of communicating, a form of expression, or a style of imparting
information. Modes, then, are systems of messaging using cul-
turally dependent signs, signals and methods intended to pass
information from one subject to another. I never suggested that
messages were exclusively in one mode or another, but rather
that they were all mixed and could only be examined separately
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for the purposes of argumentative investigation. Moreover, I
never argued for the correctness of the four modes I chose, and
allowed that other models might select three or five or other
numbers of modes.
The four modes I did identify were the Logical, the Emotional,
the Visceral, and the Kisceral. The logical mode appears in vir-
tually every argument in one way or another. It is the mode that
assists us in moving from a message to a conclusion in a reasoned
and patterned way. Some arguments are more logically derived
than others, especially those that Perelman has called quasi-logi-
cal. Moreover, premises within a logical argument will not, ipso
facto, be themselves highly logical. The second mode is the emo-
tional mode, and here I have written that the key is that the emo-
tions being expressed in or by an argument are more important
that the words being used for that expression. Thus we often dis-
regard the words someone utters because we are confident that
the message is expressed in the emotional package in which the
words are located.
The third mode is the visceral, and covers all aspects of a mes-
sage or an argument that are physical or environmental. Here
the idea of environment is being used widely to include political
and social aspects of a context such as power relations, physical
configurations, and such like. Visceral events can themselves be
premises in an argument and I have used a double square bracket
to indicate them. E.g., [[Robert touches Marcia’s hand]]. This is
important because an action can change the significance of the
words in a message, and, therefore, is part of the message. The
final mode I identified involved the area of communication that
is intuitive, mystical, religious, or revelatory. I call this mode the
kisceral deriving from the Japanese word ‘ki’ meaning energy.
This is a mode that is often disdained by rationalists, though they
have difficulties dismissing it due to its widespread use (Gilbert
2010). It’s fairly clear, for example, that more of the human popu-
lation believes in the existence of invisible entities than does not,
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and even scholars who are otherwise highly rationalistic believe
in various sorts of deities.
My reasons for introducing the complication of multi-
modalaties into Argumentation Theory has to do with my
respect for its importance. I believe that Argumentation Theory
is a vital discipline that can be used to understand and hone the
tools people draw on to communicate with each other, embrace
agreement and avoid violence. In order to do this it seems to me
that we need to examine those sorts of arguments that ordinary
arguers actually use. We cannot simply look at those argument
forms we believe arguers ought to use, but rather those which
they do use. It is this belief that leads me to make so much trou-
ble about the forms of argument we study and to insist that we
must go to the arguer rather than have the arguer come to us. The
issue, as I saw it, was that Argumentation Theory was focusing
on the easy parts, the CRCs that were analyzable and that could
be broken into easily digested bits and be categorized and sorted
without too much dissension. Yet our own lived experience of
arguing with colleagues, friends and family, demonstrates that
arguing is not a linear process with clearly defined edges and
readily identifiable components. Our lived experience entails, if
anything, the exact opposite conclusion: real, everyday, market-
place argumentation is frequently chaotic, rambling, emotional,
and rife with explicit and implicit references to, and reliance on,
the context, social milieu, personalities, and personal history of
the argument and the arguers.
This is the point made by Willard in 1989, based on his work
going back to the 1970s (Willard 1989). He claimed that arguers
use all tools at their disposal to persuade a dispute partner, and
also that all communications taking place in an argument are
part of it. In my work, I took these ideas to the extreme, and
included as parts of an argument the physical setting, manner-
isms used, and a multitude of other factors not normally included
in the analysis of an argument. I hope that now the purpose
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and importance of a multi-modal approach becomes clearer: In
order to investigate the role that all these aspects and factors play
in a complex communication it is necessary to examine them
using more than the tools logic and even informal logic makes
available. We need to analyze them according to their purpose,
intended and actual, and their results, intended and actual. This
demands a very wide breadth. That is where the multi-modal
approach comes in. A multi-modal analysis allows us to examine
a situation from a variety of perspectives with each one adding
more information and insights.
The tools, multi-modal aside, that currently exist are very
valuable and very important. The ability to diagram an argu-
ment, investigate it for fallacies, apply a Pragma-Dialectic analy-
sis, are all vital tools for the argumentation analyst. Nonetheless,
my sense that the richness of communication was being missed
by not applying these tools within the various modes, by not
applying them in a finer way, led me to believe that a great deal
of importance was lost to the analyst. By using these tools within
the individual modes, and by tailoring them to the use and value
of the individual modes a great deal more can be captured.
*****
I want to emphasize several points that, while mentioned in
my work, should be stressed. The first involves the difficulty
of separating the modes, and, more importantly, placing com-
munications in modes. By this I mean to refer to the process
of determining that some communication, action, message, or
argument, occurs in, say, the visceral mode rather than the emo-
tional mode. The fact is, that while there are paradigms of each
mode, separability, and its analogue categorizability, are never
definite. Consider, for example, a grimace. A grimace can be used
to demonstrate disapproval, pain, discomfort, or other emotions.
In itself, it is a visceral action, a physical movement of the lips and
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face. In context it might indicate something emotional, as when
one grimaces at the thought of going to the dentist or taking an
exam. We cannot know, and need not know, if a grimace is pri-
marily a visceral or emotional object, except when we are actu-
ally analyzing the role one particular grimace-token plays in a
particular argumentative interaction.
In this regard, it might have been better to have referred to the
modes as “aspects” as this might have emphasized the ability of
an occurrence to play many roles, and to be viewed in different
ways. The modes do not indicate real different things, but rather
ways of analyzing or dissecting things according to certain inter-
esting conceptions. A grimace, as it occurs in an encounter, sim-
ply is what it is. The phenomenological experience of a grimace
provides us with cues that can be played out in different ways
depending largely on the balance of the context. We know from
Wittgenstein and Grice, to name but two philosophers, that we
cannot determine meaning outside of context. The phrase,
“That’s just great!” can indicate joy or bedevilment, just like, ¡Per-
fecto, es todo necesitamos ahora!” Interestingly, an English
speaker might well understand the import of the Spanish dec-
laration simply by virtue of the context, grimace, and tone. The
modes, rather than being tools for categorizing, are tools for
understanding the meanings of a communication.
Whenever we do philosophy, communication theory or any
sort of abstract analysis, we necessarily take things apart, break
them up into bite-size analyzable bits. It is imperative, however,
that we not mistake the analysis, the model for the reality. We
need to look at the reality as if it were made up of bits and pieces,
but we must not forget that it is a heuristic and that the reality
is itself dense and complete. If, to use an analogy, we mix several
colours together in a glass bowl, we end up with a new colour.
We know what colours we put in, but the result is still one colour,
and it is not possible to subsequently separate them out. The
modes are like the colours: we know that they are all in there, and
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we can discuss their impact on the whole, but in doing so we are
using constructs and not reality. It is this that I would emphasize
more and, perhaps, the term ‘aspects’ would add to that empha-
sis.
*****
I would like to turn now to the various modes and discuss
them in light of the further work I have done, and some of
the comments that have been made. Of course, the pre-eminent
mode, the grandmother, la abuela, is the logical mode. In fact,
some rationalists believe that all communication is really logical
communication in other guises. That is not to say that every
communication is straightforwardly logical, but rather that the
way in which we make sense of it is logical. So we translate, if you
will, in lightning speed so that it just seems that the reasoning is
non-logical when in reality it is very logical. Fricker (1995, 183)
responds to this sort of approach when she is talking about intu-
ition. Can we really imagine, she asks, that the many things we
do automatically or quickly like hitting a tennis ball or recogniz-
ing a face are really long drawn out processes done quickly? That
hardly makes sense. Damasio (1994, 171) calls this the High Rea-
son view and argues that it simply can’t work: the available alter-
natives when we make choices are overwhelmingly vast, and it
would take forever to sort through them no matter how quickly
we did it.
I do not want to spend a great deal of time here simply arguing
that the non-logical modes exist. I concede that we can just about
always create a story about a non-logical communication that
provides it a logical gloss, but I do not see what that proves. We
can give a mechanistic interpretation of, say, love and the sacri-
fices one makes for it, but such explanations are inevitably unsat-
isfactory. They fail to explain why some people fall in love and
others do not. They fail to explain altruism, why Jane might love
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Jack but not his twin brother Alan, and other lovely anomalies.
Moreover, there is a difference between the cause of something
and the experience of it. Knowing that when I burn my hand I
am just exciting a bunch of nerves to an extremely high level of
activity, does not make the pain any less.
I was very careful, back when I first introduced the idea of
modes, to choose the term ‘logical’ rather than the term ‘rational.’
This was done to emphasize that there is nothing irrational about
the non-logical modes, but rather, as I put it then, logic is impe-
rialistic and likes to seem in charge of everything, but that’s just
highlighting, if you will, its aggressive underpinnings. So, in my
world, saying of a communication that it is not logical is not to
denigrate it, but, rather, to point out that different tools need to
be used. Among the tools I have examined most closely are those
pertaining to the emotional mode.
*****
There is a good case for saying that (virtually) every argument
contains at least a minimal emotional component for the simple
reason that one is moved from inertia to make an argument. The
stimulus that moves one from inertia is some degree of emo-
tional reaction, some sense of disagreement, some feeling that
something is wrong and that one cares enough to act. This does
not mean that every argument is, at heart, an emotional argu-
ment. Rather, it means that emotion and whatever logical sense
goes into an argument are inseparable. Even though the com-
munication might be quite logical, an emotional argument may
still be present provided the emotions expressed in the argument
are more important than the words and signals used to express
them (Gilbert 1995, 8). In other words, the message is in the emo-
tions and not in the discursive component. A simple example is
when, as above, the grimace contradicts the statement. Someone
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grimacing and saying they are not in pain will not be believed
whereas someone smiling and not exhibiting stress will be.
All this I take to be non-controversial, and I believe that any-
one involved in any form of communication studies, let alone
Argumentation Theory, would not demur from such an inane
conclusion. What is puzzling is that given this obviousness so lit-
tle attention has been paid to arguments involving these forms
by the major theories. I have provided specific maps for investi-
gating emotional arguments in both the Informal Logic approach
and the Pragma-Dialectic theory, (Gilbert 2004, 2005) but nei-
ther has moved to embrace these views and attempt to incor-
porate emotion into argument analysis. Moreover, these major
theories have not embraced any alternative way of including the
analysis of emotion in argument. I believe this demonstrates,
more than anything else, that there still exists a strong prejudice
within Argumentation Theory against emotion as an argument
forming apparatus (Vide Godden 2003).
There have been, to be clear, a number of scholars who have
been examining the relationship between emotion and argu-
ment. These include, aside from myself, Walton, Ben-Ze’ev, Plan-
tin, Tindale, Burleson, Palnalp, Wohlrapp and Carozza
(Ben-Ze’ev 1995; Burleson and Planalp 2000; Plantin 1999; Wal-
ton 1992; Wohlrapp 2006; Carozza 2007). Nonetheless, emotion
is still an aside, as opposed to a factor that must be considered
in all circumstances. One reason for this is the mistaken belief
that discursive communication is considerably more precise and
manageable than emotional communication. I have argued
against this (Gilbert 2002) but the prejudice is deeply rooted
even though the truth is that we trust emotional communications
more than their linguistic components. Everyone who is married
knows that when the spouse says, “Do whatever you want; I don’t
care,” it is the emotion and not the words that contain the real
message.
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There is a reason for the avoidance of emotional messages that
goes to the heart of the issue: the fear of psychologism. As I use
the term here, I refer to the ascription to a subject of a position,
belief or attitude based on non-discursive information commu-
nicated by the emotion present in a message. Such an ascrip-
tion is a direct violation of the Pragma-Dialectic rule III: Rule III:
“An attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has
really been advanced by the protagonist” (Eemeren and Grooten-
dorst 1987, 286). So, assuming that an interlocutor has expressed
an emotional statement that she has not explicitly uttered, it may
violate this rule. On the other hand, the very next rule, IV, states:
“A person can be held to the premisses he leaves implicit” (op
cit 287). It is possible that one could play with this tension pro-
vided one can determine safe rules for identifying those situa-
tions when an emotional message can be considered implicit. I
have attempted such an analysis (Gilbert 2002), but it has yet to
be embraced within Pragma-Dialectics.
Informal Logic similarly has a prejudice against the unex-
pressed except insofar as it might be seen to apply to virtually
deductively entailed enthymematic consequences. Here the
penalty is most likely a charge of Hasty Conclusion or possibly
Ignoratio Elenchi. In any case, Informal Logic has a decided
antipathy toward including emotional message components as
integrated parts of argument. This is not to say that emotional
components are ruled out of court, but rather that they must be
expressed quite explicitly in ways that emotions are rarely pre-
sented. This is clearly demonstrated when arguments are dia-
grammed: there is simply no place to put the emotional
interpretation of a message that may, in fact, straightforwardly
contradict its discursive statement. In fact, the ideal communi-
cation for Informal Logic is one that Barbara O’Keefe (1988)
describes as utilizing the Expressive Method Design Logic, the
least flexible of the three she describes. In short, even though I
have been spending most of my energy on the question of the
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role of emotion in argumentation, there is still a lot of headway
that needs to be made.
*****
The visceral mode covers a wide range of communicative fac-
tors that, like emotion, are often considered peripheral or irrel-
evant. Certainly the visceral mode includes what is generally
considered non-verbal communication, but also further areas
that go beyond that category. To begin with, I would place some
non-verbal communications in the emotional category rather
than the visceral because their emotional content simply out-
weighs their physicality. That is, the fact of the action or mes-
sage’s being attached or connected to the body or context is not
as important as the emotional content it carries. This is analo-
gous to discursive versus emotional content: where when the lat-
ter outweighs the former, the message is considered emotional.
Secondly, there are visceral aspects of a communication which I
believe to be very important that would only be considered non-
verbal communication at a stretch. These include power rela-
tions, argument style, social and cultural considerations such as
class and gender, as well as other factors that influence an argu-
ment or can be used in an argument that would not traditionally
be considered non-verbal communication.
The standard approaches place a huge emphasis on the discur-
sive, often to the point where if something is not discursive it
is, for all practical purposes, ruled out of court. How, I wonder,
can one remove the physical setting of an argument from the
process of the argument? How can we ignore the role, for exam-
ple, of uniforms? Of a judge’s robes? Or even the male professor’s
ubiquitous tweed jacket? Oh, the traditionalist answers, but it
is a fallacy to take those things into account when evaluating
an argument. But it is impossible not to take them into account
when having an argument (Gilbert 2002). To mention but one
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area in which such visceral considerations play an important
role, consider gender in this argument. Edeslky and Tannen
(1993), for example, show that men take more speaking turns
than women in mixed gender meetings, and go so far as to sug-
gest that the traditional yakky female is likely one who talks as
much as a man. Gender makes an enormous difference in the
process of an argument no matter how much we think it ought
not (Gilbert 1994), and I cannot shake the feeling that it is impor-
tant that we pay attention to what is before we focus only on
what ought be.
Authority and categorization, whether by race, gender, culture,
or any other means play an overwhelming role in the process
of argumentation and we ignore it at our peril. The dearth of
women in philosophy, for example, is laid by some (Rooney
2010) at the feet of the style of argumentation used in philosophy,
and especially its reliance on the argument-as-war metaphor.
What does it mean, then, to state that such factors are irrelevant
to the analysis of an argument? It means that we are removing the
argument from its context, examining it en abstracto, as a CRC, a
claim-reason-complex, something that exists independent of its
users, its hearers, its senders, or persons, and, I believe, there is
no such thing. Having said that, let me give an appreciation to
every model that is a tool in the Argumentation Theorist’s tool-
box. There is nothing wrong with taking a piece of an argument
and using it to demonstrate the kind of connectivity that occurs
in argumentation, or to show that different parts of an argument
support each other in identifiable ways. Whether the process is
one involving formal logic, informal logic, an argument map, or a
Pragma-Dialectic speech act analysis, it is very valuable – so long
as the analysis is not confused with the argument.
What I am doing by including the visceral mode as a form that
must be investigated is making room for all the factors men-
tioned above as well as many others to be examined. Once we
understand a mode, how it works, what its dynamics are, how it
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can be used both properly and improperly, then we might be able
to create some valuable normative correlates that will be use-
ful. And this is why Argumentation Theory must be a discipline
in its own right, rather than an area cobbled together from bits
and pieces of other, more established areas. A ship builder will
employ carpenters, electricians, all sorts of engineers, glaziers,
and so on, but it is the art of creating a ship that must hold it all
together so that the finished project is functional, beautiful, prac-
tical and buildable.
*****
Recently I have been thinking about the role of kisceral argu-
ments (Gilbert 2010). The kisceral mode includes argument
forms and data that are involved with intuition, the mystical,
hunches, the religious, mysterious, and generally, non-sensory
knowledge and forms of persuasion. As I regularly point out,
more of the human population believes in the existence of invis-
ible being such as gods, ghosts, spirits and so on than does not.
Moreover, many of these people believe they have communion
with such entities and/or insight into their nature and being.
As puzzling as I find this, it is nonetheless the case, and even
many highly educated persons maintain such beliefs. One need
only look at the scholarly journals that abound in theology and
religious studies to see the truth of this. The difficulty with the
kisceral mode is two fold. The first issue reflects the strong sense
of certainty, of surety, that many people have concerning some
non-sensory belief, while the second centres on the inability of
such beliefs to be subject to falsification. These two problems are
closely related and intertwined.
Surety is at the core of intuition insofar as it puts these beliefs
and arguments apart from other, more empirical beliefs. In fact,
we often feel more strongly and believe more fervently in a select
number of our non-sensory beliefs than we do in our collection
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of facts. I believe with a great deal of certainty, for example,
that if one were to write out an integer with as many places
as hairs on the head of this audience, there would still be one
higher. I can’t prove this, yet I believe it with certainty. This is
truly bizarre: here I am a highly rational person holding firmly
to an unfalsifiable belief that claims that there exists an infinity
of invisible objects. It gets worse. Not only do I hold such beliefs,
but I also hold that many others who hold different falsifiable
beliefs with just as much evidence as I have, and believe them just
as fervently as I believe my beliefs, are wrong.
My friend Kathy believes that everything that happens to you
happens because you want it to happen. You may not know
that you want it to happen, but you must because otherwise
it wouldn’t happen. This includes everything from winning the
lottery to having cancer. The analyticity and circularity of her
position does not faze her in the least, anymore than the defini-
tional quality of there being no highest integer perturbs me. Yet
it strikes me that she is wrong and is not justified in holding her
belief while I do have such justification. Here we might say: my
belief is fact, yours is theory, and hers is mysticism. This trans-
lates somewhat less amusingly to, Mi opinión refleja los hechos,
la tuya es mera teoría, la de ella es un caso de misticismo. In other
words, I know what I am talking about but she doesn’t. Nonethe-
less, both beliefs are unfalsifiable and both are held with a great
deal of certainty, perhaps hers more than mine, but mine is pretty
solid as well.
When philosophers talk about kisceral arguments they typi-
cally worry about such things as axioms and foundational nor-
mative principles (DePaul and Ramsey 1997). One ultimate
difficulty for those who would like to dismiss intuitional argu-
ments, is that the grounds for doing so typically rely on intuition
(Sosa 2006). One way of thinking about kisceral arguments is
to consider the Discovery/Justification distinction. We tell our
introductory students that the process of discovery is different
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than the presentation of justification. Yet in many kisceral argu-
ments this is not the case; in those cases the experience of dis-
covery is the same as the justification. The mystic whose acolyte
proceeds along certain specified steps may be following the only
form of justification available, just as the Intuitionist mathemati-
cians saw the process of proof creation, the actual construction
of a mathematical object, as essential to its justification. Are there
facts we cannot comprehend if we do not have certain experi-
ences? Can a male never understand a mother’s love because he
has never experienced pregnancy? Am I an atheist because I have
never had a revelation or a mystical experience? In most cases I
reject these ideas for what I consider are good reasons. I believe,
for example, that there is likely no major difference between the
love of an adoptive mother compared to a biological one, and
once exceptions begin to accrue, it’s only a matter of time before
they become overwhelming.
The problem is that my belief, even if supported by evidence
from social psychology, ultimately rests on an intuition as well.
This means that the role of Argumentation Theory is to find the
means for separating and evaluating different beliefs according
to criteria that can be accepted by the partners, and agreed upon
as legitimate grounds for distinguishing between acceptable and
unacceptable beliefs. This, of course, has both object level and
meta level applications. The object level may have identifiable
rules and procedures as Western philosophy does with logic and
its less formal siblings, or if not carefully laid there are likely
precedents and traditions. On the meta level matters are more
complex because it is there that we will find differences in basic
means of establishing beliefs and truths. A Papal edict, for exam-
ple, does not carry weight with a non-Catholic, while for a mem-
ber of the faith it is a sign of absolute truth. In these cases kisceral
arguments carry great weight, and the question of whether or not
we can separate those we like and those we do not becomes much
more tenuous. Still, the job is there to be done.
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*****
It will have been noticed in my presentation that I have not
distinguished between arguments as objects and arguments as
processes, or, to use D. O’Keefe’s (1977) language, argument1 and
argument2. I have avoided this distinction because, on the one
hand, the multi-modal framework cuts across them, and on the
other, the distinction itself is not terribly useful aside from pro-
viding some paradigmatic exemplars. The real problem with the
argument1 and argument2 distinction lies in the complexity and
necessity of context in understanding arguments. The identifica-
tion and isolation of a typical argument1 requires that we under-
stand enough of the context to be able to remove it and inspect
it, and yet, unless we are examining something created for a Crit-
ical Thinking class, it is impossible to understand it in isolation
from that context. Moreover, if we allow that anything that influ-
ences an argument is part of it, then the context is part of it
and, thereby, an argument2. We end up with a sort of Heisenberg
Principle of Argumentation: to remove a part of an argument
from its context is to thereby, ipso facto, change it. This is not to
say that we cannot study something in isolation, but rather that
when we do so we are missing a great deal of important informa-
tion.
I believe it is obvious that the notion of context is important,
and many authors and theories pay lip service to this. Examples
are often preceded by short paragraphs that describe the general
background, for example, of a letter to the editor. But this is
nothing. Compare this to the analysis that might accompany
the discovery of an anthropological relic where the surrounding
area, adjacent soil, general location, historical knowledge of the
area, flora and fauna will all be examined to learn more about
the object. Context can demonstrate a great deal as when we
examine a political situation and the arguments presented for it.
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Duran’s 2006 analysis of the Chilean press (Duran 2006), takes
enormous amounts of local, social and historical information
into account. Moreover, a rich account naturally examines the
several modes as a means to understanding an object and its
processes. If our archeological find was a tool, was it decorated?
Did it appear cared for? Important to its owner? Part of a set?
These are emotional questions. Was it made from local materials?
What tools were used to make this one? These are visceral ques-
tions. Did it have a spiritual aspect? Were there designs appealing
to gods or demons? These are kisceral aspects. Just as with other
endeavours, understanding arguments requires a knowledge of
the context, and the ways in which the message was communi-
cated, intended and used. This, in turn, can be ably assisted by a
multi-modal analysis.
*****
I have, in the preceding, tried to present both an amplification
and defence of multi-modal argumentation. I believe, as do some
others, that it can be a useful and powerful tool for investigating
the structure, meaning, and reliability of arguments. We must
never forget, in examining the models that make theorizing pos-
sible, that the models are but mere shadows of the reality.
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CHAPTER 13.
DEPICTING VISUAL ARGUMENTS: AN "ART"
APPROACH
LEO GROARKE
Abstract: Twenty years after the publication of the first papers on
visual argument, this essay provides an account of visual argument
which reflects what we have learned from the subsequent discus-
sion. It proposes an approach to the analysis of visual arguments
that identifies their key components and depicts their structure.
The same methodology can more broadly be applied (to purely ver-
bal or other kinds of multimodal arguments), providing a system-
atic way to analyze all instances of argument. I propose it as one
part of an “ART” approach to argument which acknowledges visual
arguments and provides us with a way to represent their contents
and test their strength.
Twenty years after the publication of the first papers on visual
argument (Groarke 1996; Blair 1996), this paper presents a state-
of-the-art account of visual argument and its place within infor-
mal logic and argumentation theory. It reflects what we can learn
from the discussions of visual argument that have occurred over
the intervening years. I will call the informal logic I develop ART
for mnemonic reasons that emphasize its three constituent parts
– parts I will label A, R, and T. A is an account of arguing which
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is designed to ACKNOWLEDGE visual and other non-verbal
(multimodal) argument components. R is a method that can be
used to REPRESENT the components and the structure of visual
arguments. T is a set of tools that can be used to TEST visual
arguments in a way that determines whether they are weak or
strong.
Though the ultimate goal of informal logic and argumentation
theory is argument assessment (T in my theoretical tripod), I will
leave this aspect of ART for discussion elsewhere. In this essay,
I will provide an acount of argument that acknowledges visual
arguments (A), though my primary focus will be the develop-
ment of the second component of ART, i.e. the development of
a method of representation (R) which can be used to represent
the content and structure of a visual argument. The method I
propose builds upon well established ways of analyzing and dia-
graming verbal arguments and extends them in way that can
be applied to visual arguments (and other modes of arguing). It
aims at ease of application at the same time that it dramatically
expands our ability to analyze and represent the arguments that
occur in real life arguing.
2. SOME PRELIMINARIES
I understand an argument as an attempt to justify a conclusion
(a point of view) with premises that give us reasons to believe it
is plausible, likely, true, acceptable, certain, etc. So understood,
arguments are instances of reasoning that arguers use to support
a point of view (which may be the view that some other view
is mistaken). They may do so by citing physical evidence in its
favour (as in “There are fresh footprints in the snow, so someone
walked here recently.”) or some thought or idea that supports it
(as in “They are too angry to listen right now, so we shouldn’t
waste our time trying to talk to them.”). As rhetoric and dialectics
emphasize, instances of argument play a central role in attempts
to convince an audience or interlocutor of some point of view,
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but I take their core function to be more fundamental: to estab-
lish and provide support for what we can justifiably believe.
A visual argument is an argument with premises and/or a con-
clusion which are in some important way visual and not verbal.
In visual arguments, what matters is not (or not merely) what is
said in words, but what we see when we look at their non-ver-
bal visual components. The latter may be gestures, photographs,
illustrations, video, maps, graphs, cartoons, sculpture, architec-
ture, pictorial signs, or other visual phenomenon. In most cases,
visual arguments have verbal as well as visual components. In
many cases, the interplay between them is a key element of an
argument.
Some commentators (Fleming 1996; Johnson 2005; Patterson
2010) have rejected the idea that there can be visual arguments.
I will say something about their views shortly. At the start of an
essay on the current state of our understanding of visual argu-
ments, it is more important to say that their doubts have not
stopped the emergence of a growing literature focused on visual
arguments and their analysis. This literature has been chronicled,
added to, and discussed in Kjeldsen 2015; and in three special
issues of Argumentation & Advocacy which were published in 1996
(Birdsell & Groarke 1996), 2007 (Birdsell & Groarke 2007), and
2016 (Groarke, Palczewski, & Godden, 2016). More recently, the
discussion of visual argument has expanded to include accounts
of “multimodal” arguments which incorporate not only pictures
and other visuals, but gestures, sounds, smells and other kinds
of experiences (see, e.g., Kišiček 2014; Groarke 2015; Van den
Hoven & Kišiček 2015; Groarke and Kišiček 2016; and Tseronis
and Forceville 2017). Other important works in argumentation
theory (notably, the account of modes in Gilbert 1997 and Van
den Hoven 2016) have made important contributions to the dis-
cussion. Tseronis and Forceville 2017 provide a helpful intro-
duction to the study of multimodal arguing.
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In this essay I will not discuss the critique of visual arguments
found in Fleming 1996 (the reader can find a detailed response in
Groarke, Palczewski, & Godden 2016). One finds a more recent
rejection of visual argument in Patterson 2010. I cannot discuss
his views in detail here, but I will note some keys ways in which
they differ from the view elaborated here.
One problem with Patterson’s arguments is his focus on
“purely visual arguments.” As he puts it at one point, his thesis
is that “it is a mistake to think that there are purely visual argu-
ments, in the sense of illative moves from premises to conclu-
sions that are conveyed by images alone, without the support or
framing of words” (Patterson 2010, p. 115). Here it will suffice
to note that I have not defined visual arguments as arguments
that are “purely visual” (“conveyed by images alone, without the
support or framing of words”). The definition I assume only
requires that they have important (non-verbal) visual content.
This content usually is combined with words, all the more so
when one considers the broader context which provides “sup-
port” or “framing” for a particular instance of argument. In real
life arguing, arguers typically mix words and visuals and what-
ever other modes of expression (non-verbal sounds, music, etc.)
which can be used to make a compelling case for a conclusion
they propose. I can find no author who has studied and defended
visual arguments who has defined them in the rarefied way that
Patterson has suggested.
One might still ask whether Patterson’s doubts about purely
visual arguments can be applied to visual arguments in some
more general way. The crux of these doubts is the notion that
pictures cannot have the meanings that arguments require
because they lack the conventions we associate with words. As he
writes:
The ways in which we might interpret a sentence are bounded by
the sentence’s being embedded in the rule-governed, communal
activity of language. The conditions under which a sentence,
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uttered by a speaker, will be intelligible to an audience of the same
linguistic community restrict the possible meanings of the sentence.
Importantly, these conditions restrict not just the meanings that the
audience is likely to ‘take away’ from the speaker’s utterance, but
the meanings that the speaker may coherently intend by what he
says…. Whereas rules and communal criteria of meaning keep us
from falling into humpty-dumptyism with language, there are no
such checks on picturing. (Patterson 2010, pp. 111-112)
In this essay it must suffice to say that one of the first lessons
one learns in art history and other disciplines that study visuals is
that arguers use visuals in ways that follow commonly accepted
conventions, parameters and constraints (see, to take one exam-
ple, Kostelnick and Hassett 2003). A skull represents death; a flag
represents a nation; a company is known by its logo or coat of
arms; in a photographic essay, images are understood as literal
representations of reality; in political cartoons, they are typically
understood as caricatures, metaphors or allusions to canonical
stories; a halo represents a saint; the colour red may mean stop
(or the red ink of a deficit) while the colour green signifies go (or
the environment); the different kinds of lines in a blueprint or on
a map are understood in a particular way; and so on and so forth.
Patterson appeals to the later Wittgenstein in defense of his
own views. In response to his interpretation I would argue that
Wittgenstein can be more plausibly interpreted in the opposite
way, Nyíri suggests that he embraces pictures in an attempt “to
overcome the barriers of verbal language by working towards a
philosophy of pictures” (Nyíri 2001 p. 4). In keeping with this,
Wittgenstein’s account of meaning in the Investigations (1953) is
founded on an account of language games which is designed to
expand his earlier account of language and does so in a way that
includes many activities in which communication relies on visu-
als as well as (or instead of) words (see, e.g., 1.16, 1.23, 1.86, 1.140,
1.291, 48, 70, 108, 108, 166, 169, 216, 280, 398, 432-434, 454,
520, 522, 526; 539, 548, 563; 2.iii, 2.xi 2.xii).
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In a practical account of visual argument that aims to analyze
real life instances of arguing, questions about the interpretation
of visual arguments can be answered by applying the pragma-
dialectical principles of communication to instances of visual
argument (see Groarke 2002). They suggest that we should inter-
pret visual arguments in a way that:
i. assumes that the visual components used by a visual arguer
are part of an understandable act of arguing;
ii. interprets key visual components of an argument in a way
that makes sense of the major elements they incorporate –
visual, verbal, or otherwise (and are in keeping with the con-
ventions that apply in the case at hand); and
iii. favours an interpretation that makes sense within the con-
text and the discourse in which the argument is embedded.
This does not mean that the interpretation of visual arguments
is always easy or definitive. Like verbal claims, visual acts of
communication may be unclear, vague or ambiguous (or guilty
of fallacies like equivocation). In particular instances of arguing,
it is enough to say that these three principles of interpretation
raise the key questions that need to be asked when we attempt
to interpret the visuals, words, sentences and other components
that make up an act of arguing.
No general account of interpretation will solve all the prob-
lems of interpretation that arise in the study of visual or verbal
arguments, but the ART approach to visual arguments is
expressly designed in a way that reduces the role that the verbal
interpretation of visuals needs to play in argument analysis. It
does so by emphasizing a visual account of the visual rather than
verbal interpretations of their visual content (something that was
more frequently emphasized in early attempts to analyze visual
arguments – see, for example, Groarke 1996).
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3. ACKNOWLEDGING VISUAL ARGUMENTS
In many ways, the growth of visual (and multimodal) argument
has been driven, not by contributions to the theory of argument,
but by a desire to explain the reality that visuals are important
components of many real life acts of arguing. Words provide us
with one important way to provide reasons for accepting a con-
clusion, but they are not the only way to do so. Real life arguers
often use visuals for the simple reason that they can be an effec-
tive way to express a standpoint or present reasons in its favour.
If we want a comprehensive theory of argument that accounts
for real life arguing, the use of visuals in these two roles implies
that our theory must account for visual arguments in one way or
another, and cannot be bound by the traditional assumption that
arguments are composed of sentences (or of propositional ana-
logues which are defined and understood in terms of them).
Outside of argumentation theory, visual arguing has a long
history. Gestures (pointing, hand signs, facial expressions, etc.)
can be used to create very basic arguments without the use of
language and probably preceeded it. In the history of art, paint-
ing is often used to tell stories in a way that favours some con-
clusion. In modern times, the use of visual argument increased
significantly because technological advances made it easier to
create and reproduce images. Most notably, the invention of the
printed book allowed the widespread printing and circulation
of illustrations as well as text. In the 17th century the work of
Athanasius Kircher, one of the intellectual giants of his time (see
Findlen 2004), is notable for its frequent use of illustrations.
They include illustrations in support of mundane scientific pro-
jects – showing how hot and cold springs originate, depicting
different planetary systems, illustrating the way that various
machines work, etc. – as well as more eccentric images that are
said to depict what Noah’s ark must have looked like (said to
be proven by reference to testimony in the Bible), the shape of
the lost island of Atlantis (derived from ancient accounts), and
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an illustration which is said to prove that the Tower of Babel
could not have reached the moon. Works of this sort include
many attempts to support visual conclusions or provide visual
evidence for a conclusion that is expressed verbally or visually.
The rise of visuals as we know them gains more momentum
from the invention and evolution of photography. A famous
example that illustrates its implications in the world of argument
is associated with the racist murder of Emmitt Till in the United
States in 1955. Till was a 14 year old black boy who was kid-
napped, beaten, tortured and then murdered because he whistled
at a white woman. Sturken and Cartwright (2009, p. 11) describe
what happened in the aftermath.
Till’s mother, recognizing the power of visual evidence, insisted on
holding an open-casket funeral. She allowed his corpse to be pho-
tographed so that everyone could see the gruesome evidence of vio-
lence exacted upon her son. The highly publicized funeral, which
brought 50,000 mourners, and the graphic photograph of Till’s bru-
talized body [with his eyes gouged out], which was published in
Jet Magazine, were major catalysts of the nascent civil rights move-
ment…. In this image, the power of the photograph to provide evi-
dence of violence and injustice is coupled with its power to shock
and horrify.
In making her decision to ‘go visual,’ holding an open-casket
funeral and widely disseminating photographs of Emmitt Till’s
mutilated body, Till’s mother and her supporters provided visual
evidence that gave others a reason to believe that Till was grossly
mistreated. The photographs they arranged still circulate widely
on the internet, and are still employed in arguments in support
of the conclusion that America has issues of racism that need to
be addressed.
The use of photography – still photography, documentary
film, video and, most recently, virtual reality – now plays a cen-
tral role in social and political discussion, debate and argument.
Visual argument also plays an important role in scientific argu-
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ment and discovery. Dove 2011 provides an example in his
account of the use of visual reasons for conclusions about the
Ivory-Billed Woodpecker. Recent claims that it is not extinct are
rooted in controversial video footage which is said to record
an existing Ivory-bill in the southern United States. Whatever
one decides about the footage and the debate, the controversy
emphasizes the importance of visual evidence in ornithology.
Donahue 2017 summarizes the views of four key authorities
(Jackson, Collins, Fitzpatrick, Gallagher) as follows.
The bottom line [according to Jackson] … is there’s no way to know
what Collins saw from that video. Which raises an important ques-
tion: What exactly would be considered enough evidence to prove
the bird’s existence? Fitzpatrick, an Ivory-bill chaser himself, says
that … “a clear, unambiguous photo of an Ivory-bill is what every-
one expects for full, conclusive proof.” … Tim Gallagher, who led
the search for the Ivory-bill in Cuba last year, agrees that the bar is
high….
Collins has argued that the debate should, in lieu of clear visual
evidence, consider a “move away from an image-only definition
of evidence,” but not because he rejects such evidence (which
he himself employs). His suggestion is that ornithologists should
consider other kinds of evidence as well, but not in a way that
would undermine photographic images as necessary evidence in
a convincing argument that some species of bird currently exists.
The importance of visual evidence and visual reasoning in real
life arguing continues to increase in the wake of the development
and spread of digital technology which has made visual arguing
ubiquitous. In a way that was not imaginable in earlier epochs,
almost anyone can record and distribute what they see (and,
remotely, what they don’t see directly) in some form of photog-
raphy. In recent weeks, the local news where I live has been pre-
occupied with an altercation between a truck driver and cyclist
which was recorded by a witness on their phone. The release
of the video (still available at <https://www.youtube.com/
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watch?v=lCuh8Dr0npE>) has precipitated widespread condem-
nation of the trucker’s actions and an intervention by the police,
who have charged him with assault with a weapon. In the news,
in conversation, and in court, the videotape functions as the
prime reason for concluding that the trucker is guilty of assault.
Most uses of photographs in arguing are instances of “demon-
strative” visuals – visuals which attempt to depict the physical
world and replicate its key properties (shape, colour, relative size,
etc.). Shelley 1996, 2001 distinguishes between demonstrative
and “rhetorical” visuals which support particular standpoints,
not by being literal depictions of the world, but by functioning as
Figure 1: Cartoon on Hamas (Bob Englehart)
symbols, metaphors and/or allusions that give reasons for some
moral judgment. Political cartooning, no longer confined to
print newspapers, is one argumentation genre which exploits the
effectiveness of visuals of this sort. Figure 1 provides a ready
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example, criticizing the Palestinian group Hamas by suggesting
that its bombing of Israel is foolish and counterproductive. It
does so by depicting the bombing metaphorically, as an attempt
to penetrate an impentrable Israeli iron dome that results, not in
the bombing of Israel, but of Palestinian families and citizens.
4. KC TABLES AND DIAGRAMS
Acknowledging visual argument is an important first step
toward an inclusive theory of argument, but a fully developed
theory must be built on systematic ways of analysing and assess-
ing visual arguments. ART’s second element addresses the first of
these requirements by proposing a way of analysing visual argu-
ments which is an extension of well-established ways of repre-
senting verbal arguments. The resulting approach can be used to
analyse any argument, whether it is verbal, visual, or multimodal
in some other way.
An ART analysis of an argument consists of two parts:
• a “Key Component” (KC) table which identifies the argu-
ment’s premises and conclusions; and
• an argument diagram that depicts its structure.
In the case of simple arguments, there may be no need to conduct
this kind of analysis, though it can still serve as a helpful way to
clearly specify the content and structure of an argument. In the
case of long and complex extended arguments, the most practical
way to apply the ART method may be by distinguishing various
subarguments and applying the method to each of them.
Real life instances of argument are often unclear in a variety
of ways. In the process of constructing KC tables and diagrams,
arguments can be clarified by discarding unnecessary, irrelevant
or redundant digressions; by better stating claims that are poorly
expressed; by recognizing implicit premises and conclusions;
and by restating or explaining rhetorical questions, allusions and
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other stylistic elements. In situations in which an argument can
be interpreted in a variety of ways, alternative interpretations
will correspond to different tables and diagrams.
The components of the ART approach can be illustrated with
simple examples of purely verbal argument. My first example,
adapted from a discussion of the work of the medieval logician
William of Sherwood in Kretzmann 1966, can be analysed as in
Figure 2: KC table and Diagram for Kretzmann’s Argument
Figure 2. In this case the components of the argument are clear
and straightforward, so there is little to explain in the column of
the KC table which I have labelled “Explanation.” I have simply
noted that the premises are expressed as verbal claims. The dia-
gram for the argument is, like the KC table, straightforward. Its
two arrows connect two reasons for agreeing with Kretzmann’s
conclusion. One of them cites the examples William of Sher-
wood uses in his writings; the other the philosophers he influ-
enced.
Our first application of the ART method is unremarkable, but
it usefully illustrates the basic format of the ART approach to
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argument analysis. In the case of other arguments, there are
other aspects of argument that must sometimes be recognized, as
they are in standard argument diagrams. One of them is the dis-
tinction between “linked” and “convergent” premises: between
premises which provide separate strands of evidence that con-
verge on a proposed conclusion (as in our first example) and
premises that are “linked” (or “dependent”), providing a reason to
believe the proposed conclusion only when they are combined
with (i.e. linked to) one another.
Figure 3 contains a KC table and a diagram for an argument
with linked premises taken from a game of “Detective” (“The
murderer was someone very strong, for they threw the chair in
the room at the victim and it was a heavy armchair.”). KC tables
Figure 3: KC Table and Diagram for a “Detective” Argument
follow standard diagramming conventions in the case of linked
premises, using a plus sign (+) to connect them. In this case, the
premises (t and h) are linked because the claims that the chair in
the room was a heavy armchair (h) and that the murderer threw
it at the victim (t) provide evidence for the claim that the mur-
derer was someone very strong (s) only when we combine them.
Implicit premises and conclusions are another aspect of argu-
ment we need to recognize when we construct KC tables and
their associated diagrams. In real life discourse, many claims or
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standpoints are left unsaid because they are obvious or obviously
implied. In analysing the content and the structure of arguments
(and ultimately their strength) these implicit components may
need to be recognized. When someone says: “The murderer was
very strong, so George cannot be the murderer.” they assume and
imply that George is someone who is not very strong. Because
this is a key component of the reasoning which must be consid-
ered when it is assessed as weak or strong, it needs to be
Figure 4: An Argument with an Implicit Premise
recognized in an analysis of the argument. Figure 4 shows how
this can be done in a KC table and diagram (by using square
brackets to indicate the implicit nature of this argument com-
ponent and by noting this when one explains it). Like other
enthymemes, this example is one which shows that arguments
may depend on more than what is explicitly said in words, and
that this can be recognized and accommodated when one con-
structs a KC table and diagram.
5. REPRESENTING VISUAL ARGUMENTS IN ART
We can apply the ART approach to argument analysis by rec-
ognizing visual elements as premises in KC diagrams. Consider
a situation in which my wife suggests that we should go to see
Neuschwanstein Castle (the famous Bavarian castle built by King
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Ludwig II) on a trip to Germany. When I question her suggestion,
she tries to convince me that it is something worth seeing by
showing me the photograph in Figure 5. In doing so she provides
me with a reason for concluding that we should visit
Neuschwanstein, though she does so visually – appropriately so
given that the issue at question is what we should go to see.
Figure 5: Neuschwanstein Castle at Dusk
We can describe the argument by saying that my wife has pro-
vided me with a visual premise (a visual reason) in support of her
contention that “We should go to see Neuschwanstein Castle.” As
Figure 6 demonstrates, we can analyze this simple visual argu-
ment using the ART method by including its visual premise in a
KC table and diagram.
The analysis in Figure 6 recognizes that the argument it sum-
marizes is a case of reasoning and inference that might in many
ways be compared to (or contrasted with) others. It outlines the
content and the structure of the argument in a way that remains
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true to its visual character. This is an essential element of the
argument. Arguments about the castle which are wholly verbal
can describe what it looks like, possibly in poignant ways. But
they cannot provide the detail we see in the photograph and do
not show us what the castle looks like. Unlike the words in a
description, the photograph allows us to see the castle in the way
photographed.
This does not mean that the photograph and the visual argu-
ment it informs cannot be criticized. Like other arguments,
visual arguments may be weak or strong. The reason it is impor-
tant to analyze them is because this is the way to prepare them
for assessment. Like verbal premises, a visual premise may be
rejected. In the current case, someone might claim the photo-
graph was ‘doctored’ in some way, taken on a rare evening, or
from a vantage point that makes it a poor indication of what
one is likely to see when one visits Neuschwanstein. Even if one
accepts the photograph as a reliable account of what is likely to
see there, one might reject the proposed conclusion by arguing
Figure 6: KC Table and Diagram for the Neuschwanstein Argument
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that it doesn’t follow (because there are other sites to visit that
are, for example, more spectacular or more historically interest-
ing).
Real life arguing proceeds dialectically, in ways that frequently
mix verbal and visual modes of arguing. I may respond to my
wife’s entreaty to go and see Neuschwanstein by saying that
the photograph in question shows that it is beautiful to see in
the summer, but we are visiting Germany in January. She may
respond by producing a photograph of the castle in the winter, in
an attempt to prove to me that it is something worth seeing then.
My wife might bolster her argument in other ways as well.
When I ask her to give me a reason why we should go to
Neuschwanstein she may show me the photograph of the mural
in Figure 7 and say “You love exquisite murals. So we should go
see Neuschwanstein.” In this case, the premises of her argument
provide (i) visual evidence for the suggestion that there is an
exquisite mural at Neuschwanstein and (ii) verbal testimony for
the claim that I love exquisite murals. Linked together, the visual
and verbal premise support the conclusion that we should visit,
in the way represented in the KC table and diagram in Figure 8.
In a very general way, constructing KC tables and diagrams
does for visual arguments what traditional standardization and
diagramming (what is usefully called the “dressing” of arguments)
does for verbal arguments. In both cases, one analyzes an argu-
ment by identifying and extracting its premises and conclusions,
and by representing them and its inferences in a diagram which
illustrates its structure. In the process, we ‘zero in’ on what is
essential to the argument, adding implicit elements that need to
be recognized at the same time that we eliminate explicit ele-
ments which are not directly relevant.
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Figure 7: Neuschwanstein Mural (St. George Slaying the Dragon)
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Figure 8: KC Table and Diagram for the Mural Argument
One last Neuschwanstein example can illustrate ART analysis.
Suppose that someone argues that one special feature of the cas-
tle’s art is a concerted attempt to incorporate visual references to
it in the works that it contains. If someone sceptically presents
the St. George mural as a counterexample, we might rebut their
claim by pointing to the swan on St. George’s helmet (a clear ref-
erence to Neuschwanstein – the “New Swan” castle, named after
a character in Wagner) and to the silhoutte of the castle on the
mountainin the background. In this situation, it is not the con-
text of the mural or its central elements that matter, but specific
details that provide visual reasons for believing the proposed
conclusion. Considered from this point of view, the image is like
a paragraph (not a sentence) insofar as it may be its component
parts, not its whole, that is central to an argument. In this case,
we can dress the argument as in Figure 9.
The ART way of representing visual arguments has many
advantages. It allows us to depict their structure in a systematic
way that shows it comparable to the structure of verbal argu-
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ments, but does so in a way that recognizes their visual content.
The ART approach allows us to use the same method of analysis
for verbal and for visual arguments – and, in principle, for other
kinds of multimodal argument. In the latter case, the Key Com-
ponent boxes in a KC table can include verbal statements, visuals,
or other multimodal carriers of meaning (e.g. a guttural sound, a
bar of music, an experience of some sort, and so on). The result
is a standard method that can be used in preparing any argument
for assessment – and in this way further the discussion and the
dialectical exchange in which it is embedded.
Figure 9: KC Table and Diagram for the Mural Argument
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6. THREE EXAMPLES
One feature of visual arguing which is difficult to overstate is the
extent to which it encompasses different forms of visual argu-
ment. The following three examples illustrate some of this diver-
sity.
Tailgating
Figure 10 is a photograph of a Colorado state billboard designed
by an advertising agency (Amélie). It was used in a campaign
which aimed to reduce the number of cars tailgating trucks on
public highways. The central image on the billboard provides
automobile drivers with a reason why they should not tailgate –
because it could precipitate the kind of accident graphically
Figure 10: Tailgating Billboard
depicted on the billboard. A second visual element combines the
insignia of the police force that patrols the highways (the Col-
orado State Patrol) with the verbal imperative “GIVE TRUCKS
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ROOM. IT’S THE LAW” making this a warning from the police
(as a signature on a formal letter ordering one to do something
authorizes what the letter says). So understood, we can dress the
argument the billboard conveys by constructing the KC table and
diagram in Figure 11.
Figure 11: KC Table and Diagram for the Tailgating Billboard
Our tailgating example highlights a visual argument which has
convergent premises. In other cases, visual premises are linked
to other premises that may be verbal or visual (or both). We have
already seen one example of this kind of argument in our dis-
cussion of the Neuschwanstein mural. Figure 12 is the basis of
another. It is a NASA photomontage which compares two pho-
tographs taken by the Mars Phoenix Lander. One shows a dig
made by the rover on sol (Martian day) 20, the other shows the
same dig four sols later. The details (outlined in yellow) at the top
of the montage are enlargements of the lower left corner of the
two larger photographs.
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Water on Mars
Figure 12: NASA Mars Photomontage
When one looks at the two photographs carefully, one sees an
important difference. In the first photograph (most prominently,
in the lower left corner of the dig and in the enlarged details)
one sees white crystal patches which are no longer evident in the
second photograph. As the following tweet reported at the time,
NASA scientists took this difference as a reason to conclude that
there is water (in the form of ice) on Mars.
There is water ice on Mars within reach of the Mars Phoenix Lan-
der, NASA scientists announced Thursday. Photographic evidence
settles the debate over the nature of the white material seen in pho-
tographs sent back by the craft. As seen in [the photographs]…,
chunks of the ice sublimed (changed directly from solid to gas)
over the course of four days, after the lander’s digging exposed
them. ‘It must be ice,’ said the Phoenix Lander’s lead investigator,
Peter Smith. ‘These little clumps [we see] completely disappearing
over the course of a few days, that is perfect evidence that it’s ice.’
(Madrigal 2008)
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This is an argument that corresponds to the first diagram in Fig-
ure 13. I have added a second diagram and a further premise to
the KC table (b) as a way to dress a later elaboration of this argu-
ment that added a verbal claim that ruled out the possibility that
the white crystals were some other substance that evaporated
when exposed to the sun (this premise was backed by other argu-
ments which I have not represented). The two diagrams outline
visual arguments that highlight visual premises which are linked
to other (visual and verbal) premises.
Figure 13: KC Table and Diagrams for two Mars Arguments
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A Placard at an Abortion Rally
Like many verbal arguments, visual arguments frequently
function as enthymemes. In such cases a visual argument has an
implicit premise or conclusion which is implied but not stated
(visually or verbally). The visual symbol pictured in Figure 14 has
become a standard meme used in the debate about abortion. It is
Figure 14: Pro-choice Abortion Symbol
Figure 15: KC Table and Diagram for the Abortion Sign
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often placed on placards at demonstrations supporting legal-
ized abortion. Participating in such a demonstration is itself a
speech act that declares that one believes (and, quite literally,
‘stands up’ for the view) that abortion should be legal.
When a demonstrator at such a demonstration holds up a plac-
ard with the coat hanger symbol it needs, like any visual symbol,
to be understood and interpreted in a way that is consistent with
the context and the visual conventions that govern its visual ele-
ments. In this case, this is not difficult to do. The red circle with a
diagonal is straightforward, functioning as a visual sign for nega-
tion. In the context of an abortion rally, the coat hanger which it
negates is readily interpreted as an allusion to the crude and dan-
gerous ‘coat hanger’ abortions that fueled a widespread call for
legalized abortion. Carrying the sign is a way to make an argu-
ment which provides a reason for believing the holder’s view that
abortion should be legal (for legalized abortion is a safe alterna-
tive to coat hanger abortions). The argument’s components and
structure are outlined in Figure 15.
7. COMPLEX VISUAL ARGUMENTS
So far, I have tried to show how the ART approach to argument
analysis identifies the key components and the structure of visual
arguments which are “simple” insofar as they consist of premises
which support one conclusion. “Extended” visual arguments, like
extended verbal arguments, incorporate layers of inferences and
subconclusions that ultimately lead to some main conclusion. In
some cases, such arguments incorporate very long and complex
chains of reasoning. A book or a documentary film defending
some point of view may offer an extended argument which com-
bines hundreds of premises and/or conclusions (visual, verbal, or
multimodal).
In many circumstances, the best way to deal with extended
arguments is by breaking them into their constituent subargu-
ments and analyzing each. But there are many extended argu-
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ments that can usefully be analyzed as one argument which
incorporates subarguments that support it. The following two
examples illustrate the point that this is often possible with visual
examples of extended argument.
Fast Food Advertising
Variations of the poster in Figure 16 can be found on hundreds
of websites on the internet. Sometimes it is featured with the
title “Fast Food Advertising vs. Reality.” It aims to discount fast
food advertising by pairing photographs of fast food items as
they appear in advertisements for these items with photographs
of these same items purchased at actual restaurants. In each case,
the comparison suggests that fast food advertisements are mis-
leading, and fail to accurately picture the food that fast food
brands sell at their actual restaurants. The result is an extended
visual argument that is made up of a series of subarguments that
support the implicit conclusion that Fast Food advertisements
misrepresent the food they advertise.
When we construct a KC table and diagram for this extended
argument we need to recognize four subarguments, each of them
tied to one of the four fast food items featured: Mcdonald’s Big
Mac; Burger King Whopper; Mcdonald’s Angus Deluxe TP; and
the Taco Bell Crunchy Taco. In each case, the subargument con-
trasts two visual premises, one which replicates the image of the
item one finds in fast food advertising, and one which is a pho-
tograph of an example of the item which was purchased at an
actual restaurant. The result is four comparisons which suggest
that the purchased items fail to match what is advertised in fast
food advertising. Each of these four conclusions support the fur-
ther conclusion that fast food advertising fails to represent real-
ity.
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Figure 16: Fast Food Advertising vs. Reality
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Figure 17: KC Table for Fast Food Argument
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Figure 18: Diagram for Fast Food Argument
A KC table identifying the key components of this extended
argument is found in Figure 17. Figure 18 is a diagram that maps
the structure of the entire argument. This dressing of the argu-
ment usefully demonstrates how the poster functions as an
extended argument which is made up of a series of inferences
that culminate in the final conclusion. This mapping of the argu-
ment is a useful guide when we assess it, for this needs to be
done by evaluating its various components as reliable or unre-
liable and each of the inferences that support its conclusion as
weak or strong. In the first case we must ask whether its key pho-
tographs are reliable reproductions of an advertising image or a
purchased item. In the second case we must ask whether the con-
clusion follows from the subconclusions. Doing so systematically
raises the questions that need to be answered in a full evaluation
of the argument.
In the present context, the important point is that one
misunderstands the poster if one treats it in the way that argu-
mentation theorists have traditionally treated visuals – as a visual
curiosity or an act of persuasion rather than argument. And that
one fails to fully engage it if one treats it in the way that most
viewers still do – i.e. as something which does not need to be
subjected to a detailed, systematic critical analysis.
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Obama Pinocchio
Figure 19: Obama Pinocchio
The Michael Ramirez Obama caricature in Figure 19 presents
the former President as Pinocchio. The Pinocchio story is a com-
mon theme in editorial cartoons (see Groarke 2017) which fre-
quently compare some political situation to the plot of some
canonical story (The Trojan Horse, David and Goliath, Alice in
Wonderland, etc.). In the case of Pinocchio, the key visual motif is
an elongated nose which grows, like Pinocchio’s nose in the orig-
inal story, every time its owner lies.
In the cartoon in Figure 19, the cartoonist’s ultimate standpoint
is best expressed in the caricature that is presented as a detail in
Figure 20.
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Figure 20: Obama Pinocchio Standpoint
There is no exact way to replicate this standpoint verbally, for
the visual ridicules Obama in a way that is difficult to capture
in words. Putting this aside, the standpoint can be roughly para-
phrased as the claim that Obama is, like Pinocchio, a (ridicu-
lously) inveterate liar who cannot be trusted. Taken as a whole,
the cartoon is best understood as an extended argument which
provides a series of reasons that purport to show that Obama is
a liar like Pinocchio. Each reason can be understood as a subar-
gument which extends the force of the claim that Obama is a liar
by building on the previous claims to this effect (something indi-
cated by extending Obama’s nose further. Figure 21 analyzes the
first of these subarguments.
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Figure 21: KC Table and Diagram for the First Subargument in
“Obama Pinocchio”
Within this essay, space constraints do not allow me to con-
struct a full KC table or diagram here, but it is easy to summarize
what it would look like. For Ramirez’s extended argument con-
tains thirteen subarguments which support the claim that
Obama is a liar (and, ultimately, an outrageous liar). Each sub-
argument pairs a claim that Obama has made with the implicit
claim that it is a lie, inferring (as the cartoonist’s own arrows
indicate) that Obama is a liar (and more and more so as the chain
progresses). We can separate the different components of the
argument by labelling each of the explicit verbal premises as p1,
p2… p13, and each of the corresponding implicit premises (claim-
ing that the verbal premise is a lie) as ip1, ip2… ip13; by repre-
senting the different subconclusions (that Obama is a liar) as c1,
c2…c12; and by representing the main conclusion (which is
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Figure 22: KC Table and Diagram for Obama Pinocchio
expressed in the visual caricature) as mc. We can then depict the
argument as an argument of the form diagrammed in Figure 22.
Once again, our dressing recognizes the content and the struc-
ture of an extended argument and can serve as a first step toward
a proper evaluation of it as an argument which successfully (or
unsuccessfully) establishes its conclusion.
8. QUOTATION, DESCRIPTION, AND
OSTENSION
One element of an ART analysis is a KC table which identifies the
key components of an argument. When they can be expressed in
purely verbal ways, a KC table identifies them by quoting them,
or by paraphrasing their content. In the examples I have already
analyzed, visual components are identified by visually reproduc-
ing them – as thumbnails in KC tables. I call this process “visual
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quotation” because it aims to reproduce an original (or some
detail of an original) it refers to.
In many ways, visual quotation is the best way to identify
visual premises and conclusions in an argument. A verbal
description can be helpful (typically, by highlighting some aspect
of it), but looking at a visual is an essential element of a visual
argument. Reading a description of it is a fundamentally different
act. Attempts to analyze visual arguments by translating them
into words are, in view of this, inevitably approximate, incom-
plete, and often open to dispute. Competing descriptions of a
visual are always possible.
This makes visual quotation the preferred way to identify
visual argument components, but there are practical circum-
stances in which it is impossible – because one does not have the
technology or the time it takes to create a visual quotation. In
circumstances of this sort, an alternative way to create KC tables
and diagrams is by specifying the visual elements of an argument
by “ostension.” Ostension does not aim to replace seeing with a
verbal description but instead attempts to direct our seeing in
some way – physically, by pointing, or by words that direct us to
something that can be identified and seen.
Figure 23: Smokefree Advertisement
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In cases in which we do not have a practical way to incorporate
visual images in a KC table, ostension can serve as an alternative
way to isolate an argument’s visual components. I have demon-
strated this method of constructing a KC table by analysing a
National Health Service anti-smoking advertisement in Figure 23
and Figure 24.
Figure 24: A KC Table Using Ostension to Indicate Visual Components
As Marraud 2016 has usefully pointed out, real life arguers
often use ostension as a way to incorporate visual components in
their arguments. I might answer the suggestion that one should
never paint a house pink by saying: “A pink house can be beauti-
ful – look at the famous house called ‘The Pink Lady’ – across the
street from the Carson Mansion in Eureka, California.” This is an
argument insofar as it supports the conclusion that a pink house
can be beautiful by citing as evidence a particular house that is
alleged to demonstrate that this is so. The argument is conveyed
in words, but the verbal part of the argument is incomplete and
the argument is ultimately visual, for the words themselves do
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not contain the evidence, but merely serve as a way to direct us
to it: as a way to ostensively demarcate visual evidence.
The same argument could in a variety of ways be reconstituted
in a way that incorporates visual evidence: by going to the house
and looking at it, by using photographs like the one in Figure 25,
and so on. In such a case, visual quotation is the preferred way
to present the evidence, for it is the ultimate basis for the pro-
posed conclusion, but there will be many situations in which one
does not have the means to make it available. In such circum-
stances, ostension may be the best available alternative. In real
life arguing, the answer to the question whether we should
Figure 25: The Pink Lady
represent visual argument components by visual quotation or
ostension is a practical one which must be answered by deter-
mining what is expedient, feasible and effective.
9. CONCLUSION
In this essay I have demonstrated a way of analyzing visual argu-
ments which creates a KC table that identifies the key compo-
nents of an argument and an associated diagram which depicts
its structure. This ART approach provides a method of analysis
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that can be applied to all arguments: to verbal arguments, to
visual arguments, and to other kinds of multimodal arguments.
In the case of visual arguments, I have argued that the best way
to identify visual components of an argument is through visual
quotation, though ostension can serve as a second best alterna-
tive. Both ways of identifying visual components allow us to sys-
tematically construct standard argument diagrams that outline
the structure of visual arguments.
In his rejection of visual argument, Johnson 2005 has written
that: “The … problem for a theory of visual argument is to deal
with the related issue of how to ‘convert’ the visuals, which are
the components of a visual argument, into reasons which can
function as premises that are supposed to lead to a conclusion,
so that the machinery of informal logic can be applied to the
resulting argument.” The method I have proposed shows that it
is a mistake to think that we need to “convert” the components
of a visual argument into verbal reasons that can function as
premises or conclusions. No conversion is required. All that is
needed is some way of identifying and recognizing visual ele-
ments and the way in which they are used within an argument.
The examples we have already noted show that they are tied to
the same kinds of structures (the inference patterns depicted in
argument diagrams) that characterize verbal arguments.
Considered from this point of view, one of the advantages of
ART analysis is its use of visual quotation and ostension, which
identify and recognize visuals as visuals. The issue Johnson raises
is not inherent in visual arguments themselves, but in traditional
approaches to argument, which define the key components of
an argument verbally (as sentences or the propositions that sen-
tences refer to). If one takes this for granted, then the only way
to make room for visual argument components is by translating
them into verbal analogues that can play the role of premise or
conclusion. The way to overcome the challenge is not by finding
a way to convert them into something they are not, but by giv-
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ing up on this assumption and adopting a more expansive view
of argument, inference, and communication.
I will end this essay by noting that the kind of analysis ART
proposes can be carried out informally, without the formal con-
struction of KC tables and argument diagrams. One might pro-
duce a documentary film interpreting Bosch’s three panel
painting, The Last Judgment, as an argument supporting the con-
clusion that we should live a pious life. In principle, this could
be done formally, by creating a series of KC tables and diagrams.
But a formal analysis of this sort is not the best way to develop
one’s argument if one is producing a film for an audience of art
lovers who are innocent of informal logic or argumentation the-
ory. In such circumstances, the important point is that one can
still apply the basic principles that inform ART by identifying
key visual components and showing how they work together to
create an argument.
Of course, the ultimate reason why we need to acknowledge
visual arguments and analyze them is because this is the way
to prepare them for assessment. So that we can assess them in
the ways that we assess other arguments – by deeming their
premises reliable or untrustworthy; by asking whether they pro-
vide compelling support for the conclusion; and so on. An
account of how to do so is the aim of the third element of the
ART approach to informal logic (T). But that is a topic for
another essay.
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CHAPTER 14.
INFORMAL LOGIC AND THE NATURE OF
ARGUMENT
CHRISTOPHER W. TINDALE
Abstract: In this paper, I review the advances informal logic has
made in reframing “argument” in ways that fit its everyday uses.
This contrasts it sharply with more traditional formal models of
argument. But there is still, I argue, a “static” conception behind the
way many informal logicians talk about arguments. That is, they
view arguments as products torn from the processes of argumenta-
tion, sitting lifeless on the page awaiting evaluation. By contrast, I
suggest we draw on Aristotle in developing a more dynamic rhetor-
ical model of argument, one that involves both internal and exter-
nal movement. Such a model better prepares informal logic to deal
with things like narratives and visual arguments.
It might seem that by now we would have plain and non-con-
troversial responses to the simple question of what an argument
involves. But this is not the case. The development of argumen-
tation theory in recent decades, and some of its subsidiary move-
ments like informal logic, has certainly led to a focus on the
nature of argument and attempts to settle on a central concep-
tion. But so far, those efforts have not been fully successful. As
I will argue here, while there have been tremendous advances in
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our conception of “argument” and what this entails, there is still
a retention of many of the traditional aspects, not all of which are
healthy.
1
If we turn to the textbooks (always a popular move in this kind
of inquiry) and look at how “argument” is used and illustrated,
then we may be surprised by the results.
We find examples like “New York is in New York, therefore
New York is in New York.” Such “entailments” are popular in
certain kinds of texts. They purport to show what must be the
case if something else is the case (See Tindale 1999: 31-2). But
how useful is this information? In evaluating arguments, we
expect premises to act as reasons that increase our acceptance of
some further statement, reinforce our holding of it, or persuade
us to accept it for the first time. But that New York is in New
York could hardly be judged as a reason on these terms. Even as
an inference, the repetition of one statement is alarmingly unin-
formative, and the “therefore” accomplishes nothing. Consider
some further examples.
There is the ubiquitous one that all students of logic meet,
intended to demonstrate one of the valid figures of the Aris-
totelian syllogism: “All humans are mortal, Socrates is human.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.” If we accept the premises, then
we must accept the conclusion, since it is contained within them.
But the lessons from this are few and hardly begin to help the
student address “real life” arguments.
Then there is the case of Irving Copi, whose textbooks are
among the most widely used in North America (or were), having
introduced generations of students (and professors) to the sub-
ject of logic. In the 4th edition of his Introduction to Logic (1972)
we find:
1. See, also, David Hitchcock (2006) for a detailed discussion of various definitions of
“argument” offered by some leading informal logicians, like Douglas Walton, Ralph
Johnson, and J. Anthony Blair, and other theorists associated with informal logic
(like Charles Hamblin). Hitchcock’s own definition of argument is “a set of one or
more interlinked premiss-illative-conclusion sequences” (19).
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All that is predetermined is necessary.
Every event is predetermined.
Therefore every event is necessary (7).
This has been preceded by the following explanations: “Inference
is a process by which one proposition is reached and affirmed on
the basis of one or more other propositions accepted as the start-
ing point of the process” (5); and “corresponding to every possi-
ble inference is an argument, and it is with these arguments that
logic is chiefly concerned” (6-7). Here, argument and inference
are synonymous, which explains why some of the uninteresting
entailments are deemed to work as arguments. But what might
most strike us is that over twenty years later, in the third edi-
tion of a similar text now called Informal Logic (1996) Copi, with
his co-author Keith Burgess-Jackson, while giving a different ini-
tial example, gives the same explanation: “Inference is commonly
defined as a process in which one proposition is arrived at and
affirmed on the basis of one or more other propositions accepted
as the starting point of the process (2); and “Corresponding to
every possible inference is an argument and it is with these argu-
ments that logic is chiefly concerned” (3).
There is certainly a relationship to be noted between argu-
ments and inferences. Robert Pinto (2001), for example, has
called arguments “invitations to inference” (37). But as J.
Anthony Blair (2012) has pointed out, while it is often possible
to shift without any harm from talking of inferences to talking
of arguments, “the two should not be conflated.” As he explains
matters, inferring is one type of reasoning (“making a judgment
that one proposition is implied by another or other” 141), and
this is clearly basic to the use of arguments in argumentation.
But argumentation is not required for inferring, and its use of
arguments involves much more. A person who reasons infers or
draws inferences. When they then turn to communicate their
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reasoning to others, to present an argument to them, the activity
involved is different. The reasons offered in the argument may be
different from the reasons that person inferred, because the audi-
ence is different and requires different strategies. Inference is at
the root here, but the communicative act of arguing has become
more complex and involves many more considerations. The two
cannot be conflated in the simple way that Copi proposes.
What is problematic about the traditional examples I have pro-
vided? What do they assume about arguments? The main con-
cern is that the conception of “argument” is a static one. By this
I mean that it exemplifies the idea of a product alone, without
any relation to the argumentative situation that gave rise to it. It
appears “finished”; nothing more needs to be said; it is not part
of any ongoing exchange of views (it is not dialectical). It can
be evaluated without any concern about the intent behind it, the
goals that prompted it, or the audience for which it is intended (it
is not rhetorical).
On these terms, the view of “argument” is one that it is solely
logical. But even here it reflects what might be called an “impov-
erished” logic, because we learn so little from it. It teaches us
about validity, and that is important (it is less obvious that it
teaches us much about soundness). So, there is a place for such
traditional examples. But they are not sufficient to explain,
reflect and teach how arguments operate in the social world, in
everyday life, and so the conception of “argument” that underlies
them is similarly restricted in value.
2. THE INFORMAL “TURN” IN ARGUMENT STUDIES
The position of concern that I have identified is the position of
some of the major critics of “traditional argument”. I will men-
tion just two of them and the points for which they argue. They
are both related to the informal logic movement: Stephen Toul-
min and Ralph Johnson.
378 CHRISTOPHER W. TINDALE
Toulmin’s The Uses of Argument (1958) is a seminal text in the
field. He strove to convince the community of philosophers that
a traditional model of argument was not sufficient to explain the
nature of argumentation across different fields. Toulmin rejects
the traditional belief that formal validity (focusing on structure,
not content) is the paradigm for assessing arguments. One of
his concerns is the simplicity of the traditional model: “It is one
thing to choose as one’s first object of theoretical study the type
of argument open to analysis in the simplest terms. It would be
quite another to treat this type of argument as a paradigm and
to demand that arguments in other fields should conform to its
standards regardless” (133). Hence, the traditional standard of
argument analysis is no longer sufficient. His own model (which
I do not have space to detail here) addresses a number of prob-
lems. For example, he argues that traditional arguments (syl-
logisms) have an over-looked internal complexity. They fail to
distinguish the force of universal premises as warrants and the
backing on which they depend. We see this traced through one
of his most famous examples—the Petersen is a Swede example
(101-02), where a major premise “Scarcely any Swedes are
Roman Catholics” can be unpacked as either, “A Swede can be
taken almost certainly not to be a Roman Catholic” (= Warrant).
Or “The proportion of Roman Catholic Swedes is less than 2%”
(= Backing for the Warrant). Also, he addresses existential impli-
cations. That is, does a universal premise “All A’s are B’s” (or “No
A’s are B’s”) imply that any A’s exist? Since the form of the state-
ment does not help us, Toulmin’s model shifts attention to the
practical use of the statement (107).
In arguing all of this, Toulmin was cautious in his strategy.
While his thesis is a damning one for formal logicians, he dis-
closes it gradually and is clearly conscious of his audience. He
leads the reader through an inquiry, exploring a problem, reach-
ing a conclusion. All of which simulates the philosopher’s
methodology. After each inquiry (what is field-invariant, and
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what field variant? How does the analytic differ from the sub-
stantial?) he turns to his audience of philosophers and logicians
and poses questions for them. His conclusions are often couched
in the least offensive manner possible: “If the purpose of an argu-
ment is to establish conclusions about which we are not entirely
confident by relating them back to other information about
which we have greater assurance, it begins to be a little doubtful
whether any genuine, practical argument could ever be properly
analytic” (Toulmin 1958: 117). The enormity of what is suggested
here is mitigated by the qualified way in which it is stated.
Ralph Johnson’s motivation for challenging the tradition of
logic and arguments (he calls this the tradition of formal deduc-
tive logic, or FDL) is similar to my own. He cites examples like
the following as cases where a sense of “argument” has lost its
moorings:
The sky is blue.
Grass is green.
Therefore, tigers are carnivorous.
(Lambert and Ulrich 1980: 19; cited in Johnson 2014: 74)
2
Johnson blames the textbook tradition for this state of affairs
and not individual logicians, like Frege or Russell. On Johnson’s
terms, it is not sufficient that there be reasons leading to a con-
clusion in order for there to be an argument. “That which is
argued about must be controversial, contentious, really in doubt;
and for this to occur, there must be contrary views” (75).
3
This
points to a strong dialectical vein in Johnson’s informal logic,
one that comes to the fore in his (2000) book. It leads him to
2. The original publication of Johnson’s text was in 1996. I cite the WSIA publication
of 2014, since this is readily available on the Internet. Readers should be aware of
the chronology involved: the 1996/2014 work precedes his major book of 2000.
3. Another of Johnson’s concerns with FDL—one we have already noted—is that
“argument” is often taken as synonymous with “inference.”
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call for the “naturalization of logic” as “the next important task
confronting us. Central to this development will be the recon-
ceptualization of argument so that its dialectical nature is fully
appreciated. In this process, logicians have something to learn
from other disciplines, among them rhetoric” (2014:81).
This reconceptualization of argument is taken up in Johnson’s
central work, Manifest Rationality (2000). There, he defines “argu-
ment” as:
An argument is a type of discourse or text – the distillate of the
practice of argumentation – in which the arguer seeks to persuade
the Other(s) of the truth of a thesis by producing the reasons that
support it. In addition to this illative core, an argument possesses a
dialectical tier in which the arguer discharges his dialectical obliga-
tions (168).
This is an innovative conception of our central concept and there
is much that could be said about it.
4
But the key thing of interest
to me here is the dual nature of the definition, offering both a
“traditional” core (called the illative core) of statements and a
“new” dialectical tier. It is this tier that deserves attention because
it begins to push in the direction of a more rhetorical conception
of argument (without quite reaching it).
It is in turning to the dialectical tier that Johnson clarifies what
he looks for in naturalized arguments that take account of alter-
natives. While “many arguments consist of the first tier only”
(in which case it is a misnomer to call them arguments or, at
least, complete arguments), the best practitioners “always take
account of the standard objections” (2000:166). It is this taking
account that constitutes the dialectical tier. More precisely, it is
the addressing of alternative positions and standard objections.
There are two things to address here: (i) the relationship between
the illative and dialectical tiers with respect to the product of the
4. In fact, I analyze the definition in detail in (Tindale 2002).
INFORMAL LOGIC AND THE NATURE OF ARGUMENT 381
argument itself, and (ii) the relationship between the arguer and
Other(s) implied by the dialectical tier.
Taking account of and anticipating objections is not contro-
versial, even if it has not been a feature of the tradition. But tak-
ing this feature and making it an essential component of what an
argument is, such that if it is absent then the discourse in question
is not to be identified as an argument, is a controversial proposal.
We should consider whether this dialectical tier is a part of the
product or whether it is something that arises afterwards, as par-
ticipants reflect on the initial argument or an evaluator begins to
work on it.
Since what separates rhetoric from argumentation in John-
son’s view is the requirement of manifest rationality, then the
proposal has negative consequences for understanding argumen-
tation rhetorically. At several points, Johnson discusses the dis-
tinctions between rhetoric and informal logic, and the
conception of rhetoric implicated in these discussions is not as
modern as his conception of argument. One noteworthy differ-
ence between rhetoric and informal logic is the difference in pur-
pose. He holds rhetoric to aim at effectiveness rather than truth
and completeness. This means that it neglects to recognize the
necessity of a dialectical tier. If there is an objection to the argu-
ment of which the arguer is aware, then from the point of view of
rhetoric he or she has no obligation to deal with it; the argument
will be effective (or not) without it. Informal logic, on the other
hand, has rationality as a goal in itself. The character of manifest
rationality, omitted from the definition of argument, turns out to
completely underlie it.
Trudy Govier (1998) has provided a detailed critical analysis
of the dialectical tier. Among her concerns is the apparent insis-
tence on completeness and the associated vagueness of knowing
when all the objections have been met. As it happens, both of
these concerns can be addressed if we observe that, implicitly,
Johnson’s definition of “argument” assumes the underlying
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importance of context. In moving beyond the traditional core, he
starts to consider aspects of the argumentative situation, or con-
text, and this context should tell us what the objections are that
need to be addressed (rather than allowing an infinite number of
potential objections). But we need to adopt a rhetorical perspec-
tive in order to see this.
Moreover, the inclusion of the dialectical tier within the con-
cept of argument creates an internal tension between the product
an argument is and the process it captures. Again, Johnson’s pro-
ject itself does suggest a way to resolve this tension, if we con-
tinue to judge it rhetorically. Anticipating the Other’s objections,
as required by the dialectical tier, informs and forms the arguer’s
own utterances and in this sense the dialectical “tier” cannot be
divorced from the structure. Understood this way, the line
between the two tiers begins to dissolve.
Johnson acknowledges that the arguer is only half the story
and that the process is incomplete without the Other, giving us a
dynamic relationship of back-and-forth responses. He writes:
Genuine dialogue requires not merely the presence of the Other,
or speech between the two, but the real possibility that the logos
of the Other will influence one’s own logos. An exchange is dialec-
tical when, as a result of the intervention of the Other, one’s own
logos (discourse, reasoning, or thinking) has the potential of being
affected in some way. Specifically, the arguer agrees to let the feed-
back from the Other affect the product (161).
This is quite dynamic, and it has echoes of the kind of dialogism
that we find in Mikhail Bakhtin’s work (Tindale 2004). Bakhtin
(1981) invokes the dynamic internal nature of discourse, includ-
ing argumentation. On these terms, dialogism challenges the
notion of the separated, self-reliant thinker/speaker who com-
poses a discourse in isolation and then brings it into a dialogue
(or argument) with another. As we will see below, recent work by
the philosopher Robert Brandom (1994) confirms this valuing of
the dialogical over the, singular, monological. All of this suggests
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that the dialectical tier is not something that is formed after the
illative core is fixed; it precedes the development of that “core,”
and this in turn begins to collapse any real distinction between
what is core and what is not.
In the passage just cited, Johnson, moves toward this position
through the remarks made about the logos of the Other influ-
encing the arguer. But he then falls back onto a more traditional
separation of opposing discourses when he makes the reference
to feedback. What works well, though, and is entirely consistent
with Johnson’s position, is a Bakhtinian gathering of that oppo-
sition within the argumentative discourse itself. But such emen-
dations require a deeper, more natural rhetoric of argument.
3. INFORMAL LOGIC’S RESPONSE TO THE TRADITION
An early statement from Ralph Johnson and J. Anthony Blair
defined informal logic as “a branch of logic whose task is to
develop non-formal standards, criteria, procedures for the analy-
sis, interpretation, evaluation, criticism and construction of
argumentation” (1987). More recently, Blair has settled on “the
study of the norms for reasonable non-deductive inference pat-
terns, as well as the norms for premise acceptability” (2012: 47).
This is a generally acceptable definition.
In accordance with their definition of informal logic, we find
Johnson and Blair tackling much more complex types of argu-
ment. In the opening discussion of their first edition (1977), they
give four examples. One comes from a letter to a newspaper
advice columnist (Ann Landers); the second from a speech given
by the president of the Police Association of Ontario. A third is
an excerpt for a newspaper editorial. And the fourth is from a
letter to a different newspaper. All of these arguments are rel-
atively lengthy (relative to the traditional examples), the short-
est being seven lines in length. And they all involve arguments
embedded in natural language, requiring the student to extract
the argument from the discourse and identify its component
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parts. Johnson and Blair point out a further thing they all have
in common: “they attempt to persuade us of something by citing
reasons intended to support that claim and prove its truth” (3).
This is what “is meant in logic by the term argument.”
In a similar vein, informal logician Trudy Govier in her text-
book (4th e. 1997) begins with an everyday, common example:
“Eating more than one egg a day is dangerous because eggs con-
tain cholesterol and cholesterol can cause strokes and heart
attacks” (1). In defining “argument” as “a set of claims that a per-
son puts forward in an attempt to show that some further claim
is rationally acceptable” (2), Govier fits easily into the infor-
mal logic cohort that improves upon the traditional examples by
drawing on the everyday. And as the above debate over Johnson’s
dialectical tier indicates, she is a strong proponent of this “core”
definition.
The definition of informal logic drawn from Blair and Johnson
is still very much a logical one. They would judge informal logic
to be just that—a logic. By contrast, another informal logician,
Douglas Walton, sees informal logic to be essentially dialectical.
5
This is not the place to explore this disagreement. For current
purposes, it simply means that for Walton an argument will be
something that arises in a dialogue. This reality affects the way
arguments are evaluated. But structurally, they looked much like
what we have seen above. Here is one of his examples, lifted from
a dialogue between two people (Bob and Helen) who disagree as
to whether the practice of tipping for service in restaurants is a
good thing. This is Bob’s argument:
Premise: University education is a good thing.
Premise: A lot of students depend on tips to help pay their tuition
costs.
5. Johnson would insist on this in spite of the very dialectical nature of his account,
witnessed in the importance of the dialectical tier.
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Premise: Discontinuing tipping would mean that fewer students
could afford a university education.
Conclusion: Therefore, tipping is a good practice that should be
continued (Walton 2006: 5).
In agreement with what we have seen in the traditional model, an
“argument” for Walton is simply “made up of statements called
premises and conclusions” (6). And this understanding informs
the various argumentation schemes characterizing his subse-
quent work in informal logic (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008).
There are clear advances in the way “argument” is being
understood by this admittedly small, but representative, sample
of informal logicians. Born from a need to make the logic class
more relevant for their students, informal logicians strive to treat
“real” arguments in their natural environments. Rather than the
made-up and contrived examples of the older textbooks, the
examples are taken from common everyday sources and illus-
trate how people actually employ arguments in their argumen-
tation. There is also an appreciation of arguing as an activity
(Hitchcock 2006 sees it as a speech act), witnessed in the dialec-
tical thrust of Walton’s dialogues and Johnson’s dialectical tier.
Arguments are not just things produced in the world; they are
produced by people, and those people are important to under-
standing them. Stripping arguments from their natural environ-
ments and analyzing them in the classroom lost that dimension
of understanding. So, there are suggestions of a more dynamic
sense of argument here. But they are only suggestions.
This is a place to pause and look at a piece of everyday reason-
ing and consider how it might be evaluated using traditional and
informal notions of “argument”.
This piece comes from a speech delivered by president Donald
Trump to an audience of Middle East leaders May 21, 2017. At
this point, he is rallying his audience against the threat of terror.
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If we do not act against this organized terror, then we know what
will happen. Terrorism’s devastation of life will continue to spread.
Peaceful societies will become engulfed by violence. And the futures
of many generations will be sadly squandered.
If we do not stand in uniform condemnation of this killing—then
not only will we be judged by our people, not only will we be judged
by history, but we will be judged by God.6
Informal logicians would recognize and structure this argument
as a Slippery Slope, and it can be expressed in terms of the
scheme for that argument, in which a proposed event is claimed
to set off a causal chain leading to an undesirable outcome.
7
Premise 1: If we do not act against this organized terror, then terror-
ism’s devastation of life will continue to spread.
Premise 2: Peaceful societies will become engulfed by violence.
Premise 3: The futures of many generations will be sadly squan-
dered.
Premise 4: If we do not stand in uniform condemnation of this
killing—then not only will we be judged by our people, not only will
we be judged by history, but we will be judged by God.
Hidden Premise: We do not want such judgment [this outcome is
undesirable]
Hidden Conclusion: We must act against this organized terror.
The argument as standardized fits the scheme for the Slippery
Slope and could be evaluated according to the critical questions
for that scheme, which would include an understanding of the
critical questions for causal arguments. How likely is each causal
6. <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-administration/334454-full-speech-
president-donald-trump-address-in-saud>
7. I pass over discussion of whether the Slippery Slope is to be judged as a fallacy, as
some informal logicians might have been inclined to do. There has been a shift away
from a primary fallacy-approach to one that explores argumentation schemes (Wal-
ton, et al, 2008).
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link? And is the alleged outcome really undesirable? While the
first question may allow us to stay with the propositions alone,
testing the strength of their relationships, the second sends us
outside to the audience for whom the outcome is or is not unde-
sirable. So, there is improvement here on a “traditional” argu-
ment analysis that focused only on the product without
consideration for its context. We cannot evaluate the argument’s
overall strength without considering the audience? But is that
sufficient to decide the “validity” or cogency of the argument? We
will return to this example later.
4. THE GHOST OF THE TRADITIONAL MODEL AND
THE NEED FOR RHETORIC
Informal logicians themselves are aware that the transition from
earlier conceptions of argument has not been complete or with-
out problems. Johnson (2014), for example, notes that the “infor-
mal logic textbooks offer the reader an anemic conception of
argument, one which does not differ markedly from that which
appears (when it does appear) in other standard introductory
logic textbooks, such as Copi; nor indeed from those in the FDL
tradition” (79).
The focus, then, is still primarily on the product, and the con-
cept is still largely a static one. What matters are the propositions
in the form of premises and conclusions. There are reasons to
be concerned about this. Many theorists are now discussing the
nature and evaluation of visual arguments and narrative argu-
ments (Olmos 2017). But how can the visual, for example, be an
argument on the traditional model or even the informal logic
model? Both “reduce” arguments to propositions. This raises the
question of whether propositions are all there are to arguments.
Is the propositional the “paradigm” case that anything (visual,
narrative, and so forth) that purports to be an argument must
reflect in some way? Consider, for example, concerns regarding
the possibility of narrative arguments. Govier and Ayers (2012)
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emphasize those “core” features that any argument must possess,
including, as we would expect, a claim and supporting reasons. It
would then seem that anything would be an argument only inso-
far as it exhibits such properties. Of course, to speak of “core”
features also assumes some non-core features, and these they
provide in a footnote: emotional indicators, counter-considera-
tions, and also jokes or illustrative anecdotes (2102: 166n.9). In
fact, a fuller exploration of that footnote, were we to have space
for it, might well find a case for understanding some narratives
as arguments (Tindale 2017). But as long as the core criterion
dominates, then the analyst can demand of the text, “what are
the premises?” and in the absence of a suitable response, reject
the candidate as an argument. In a sense, the problem is similar
to the treatment of images as arguments. All this invites a typi-
cally philosophical investigation of the core versus the non-core,
which would see the one perhaps displaced by the other. But we
do not have to go so far; we can simply question the prejudicial
nature of such a division that appears to exclude in advance any-
thing that does not fit a definition of argument that reaches back
through the informal logic accounts into the traditional models
that informal logic had professed to replace.
Again, what much informal logic most lacks, on Johnson’s
terms, is that appreciation of alternative arguments that involves
a wider dialectical grasp of the possibilities in an argumentative
situation. And with this comes a growing appreciation of a role
for rhetoric (Johnson 2014:81). Another way to capture what is
at stake here is to note that logicians of all stripes have failed to
make the distinction that Daniel O’Keefe (1977) noted between
argument1 and argument2. Argument1 is “something one person
makes”; while argument2 is “something two or more persons
have (or engage in)” (1977:122). What O’Keefe captures in the
second sense is the “personalizing” nature of argument. They are
human products, and they need to be recognized as such not just
in how they are evaluated, but also in how they are conceived
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and structured. A recent text from an informal logician focuses
almost entirely on argument2 (Gilbert 2014). In agreement with
the position being argued here, Gilbert holds that all perspectives
on argument (and argumentation) depend on rhetoric (24). It is
because of this that it is important to establish rhetoric’s relation
to informal logic.
Like other theories of argument and argumentation, informal
logic was developed without any positive engagement with the
traditions of rhetoric. Thus, bringing rhetoric into informal logic
(or vice versa) is a difficult project because informal logic is
already established. Consequently, it may seem as if the subse-
quent addition of rhetorical features amount to no more than an
add-on, or afterthought. We can only speculate on what infor-
mal logic would look like if rhetoric had been included from the
beginning.
In a posthumous paper, philosopher and argumentation theo-
rist Chaim Perelman makes an interesting observation: “It is on
account of the importance of audience that I bring the theory
of argumentation together with rhetoric rather than styling it
an informal logic, as do the young logicians of today who take
an interest in argumentation, but for whom the word ‘rhetoric’
retains its pejorative aspect” (1989: 247).
8
Perelman failed to
elaborate on the remark and provide names with which he asso-
ciates the negative attitude. While rhetoric and philosophy had
long since lost the positive connections they held for Aristotle
and those who followed him, we cannot simply infer from this
that rhetoric has been viewed distrustfully simply because it has
been judged irrelevant to the truth-seeking goals of philoso-
phers.
It is possible that Perelman has in mind remarks like this from
Copi (1982: 88) who speaks of rhetoric being “of course…wholly
worthless in resolving a question of fact;” and the more damning
8. Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca offer the same explanation for choos-
ing to call their approach rhetorical rather than dialectical (1969: 5; 54).
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statement in his Informal Logic: “In political campaigns today
almost every rhetorical trick is played to make the worse seem
the better cause” (Copi 1986: 97). Yet elsewhere in his standard
text, Copi speaks positively about rhetoric, and the 1986 book
that seems to associate it with the tricks of eristics did not appear
until after Perelman’s death.
An alternative possibility is that the source of Perelman’s con-
cern was the work of informal logicians like Johnson and Blair,
with whom Perelman was familiar.
9
A rhetorician giving a cur-
sory read to the first edition of Logical Self-Defense (1977) may
well be arrested by a section titled “Eliminating Rhetoric” (107)
that offered advice on extracting the argument from the rhetoric
and diluting the persuasive force of some characterizations that
are built into the language.
10
These selective “glimpses” may well
capture the general appreciation of rhetoric (or lack of appreci-
ation) in the late 1970s and early 1980s (when Perelman would
have made his judgment). But it also seems reasonable to suggest
that this attitude was grounded more in ignorance than ill will.
That is, philosophically trained informal logicians were likely
unaware that rhetoric could have anything other than a pejora-
tive sense. Recent decades have seen members of the rhetoric
and speech communication communities enter into fruitful dis-
cussions with those from the informal logic community, discus-
sions that have encouraged a more accurate appreciation of the
wider senses “rhetoric” can have, including the positive. Thus,
later work by informal logicians has tended to reflect this greater
9. He had declined an invitation to join the editorial board of Informal Logic because he
judged it to have a purely pedagogical focus, perhaps basing his judgment on the
earlier Informal Logic Newsletter.
10. While in the Proceedings to the First International Symposium on Informal Logic,
Johnson and Blair identify The New Rhetoric as one of only three monographs of sig-
nificance to informal logic, still the program set out there distinguishes informal
logic and rhetoric as separate disciplines whose relationship is unclear (Johnson and
Blair 1980: 26).
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awareness and sensitivity.
11
A case in point is the Johnson and
Blair text, which by the third edition (1993) asserts: “In our opin-
ion, rhetoric as a discipline has important insights about argu-
mentation which logicians need to embrace…In our experience,
logicians tend to underestimate the importance of audience and
context to the comprehension and evaluation of argumentation”
(142-3).
It is difficult, then, to see the pejorative sense of rhetoric pro-
moted in the work of serious informal logicians. If anything,
there is a tendency toward neglect rather than dismissal. Still,
not every informal logician agrees with Johnson and Blair on
what rhetorical features it might be important to consider. Trudy
Govier (1999), for example, challenges the idea that audience is
worth including. She judges that it is not useful to appeal to audi-
ence to resolve issues such as the acceptability of premises, and
so falls back on other more standard informal logic criteria like
whether premises are common knowledge, or knowable a pri-
ori, or defended elsewhere, or on reliable testimony or authority
(199). What is still lacking in mainstream informal logic, then, is a
full engagement with positive rhetoric, and that might begin with
the explicit recognition of a more dynamic conception of “argu-
ment.”
5. A DYNAMIC MODEL
The exercises of the logic book in the classroom may have
encouraged us to think otherwise, but if any semblance of a real
argument appears in the classroom it is only to the degree that
it simulates or reflects actual argumentative practice as this is
found in the social world. In a fundamental way, the practice
of arguing (which gives us the argument specimens of the text
books) involves the giving and receiving of reasons. In a dialogi-
cal exchange (recall Bakhtin above), those reasons are character-
11. See, for example, the article by Groarke (2011) in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-informal/#Rhe>.
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ized by considerations of both parties. Robert Brandom (1994)
contrasts what he calls dialogical reasoning with monological
reasoning. The monological focuses on the commitments of one
individual, expressed in premises and conclusions. But dialogical
reasoning involves assessments of what follows from different
social perspectives and different background commitments
(1994: 497). It is Brandom’s contention that the monological is
“parasitic on and intelligible only in terms of the conceptual con-
tents conferred by dialogical reasoning” (497). For now, it suf-
fices to appreciate the social character of the processes involved
and the ways in which Brandom’s analyses are given from the
perspective of the social. What it amounts to, I believe, is saying
that “argument” has to be understood in relation to “arguing.”
Or, in other terms, that argument2 is not so much different from
argument1, it is integrally related to it in the sense of deciding
what it will be. In further terms still, this confirms the need to
close the gap between the two tiers of Johnson’s definition.
One of the core ideas in Brandom’s pragmatic model is the
commitment made by a speaker. That commitment is under-
stood in terms of what is attributed to the speaker as much as what
the speaker acknowledges. That is, it is from the perspective of
the audience’s attributions that meaning should be understood.
Of course, a speaker can assert commitments that they are not
entitled to make, and thus be called upon by the audience to pro-
vide reasons that justify the assertion or entitle the speaker to
it (Brandom 2000:193). It is part of an audience’s task, in the
processes of communication, to police such assertions by judging
when entitlements exist and insisting on reasons when in doubt.
This more dynamic view of “argument” (in contrast to the sta-
tic view examined above) is closely related to that which can be
extracted from Aristotle. Adopting a rhetorical perspective on
argumentation involves the recognition that an argument’s pur-
pose and not just its structure must be part of its definition. By
that I mean, we have been used to defining an argument as a
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series of statements (minimally two), at least one of which (the
premise) provided support for another (the conclusion), and it
has the goal of persuading an audience. Bringing the audience
into the conceptual field marks the engagement with rhetoric
and the rich collection of ideas available from that tradition. But
as we have seen, there is still a tendency to separate out the
“structural” part of the definition and treat arguments in the sta-
tic way, as mere products. To repeat what was said earlier, this
effectively tears the product from the process in which it was
produced and pins it down for review and assessment, like a
butterfly on a display board—colorful, perhaps, but also lifeless.
When the argument is then analyzed this is done on its own
terms and without sufficient regard for the situation that pro-
duced it, along with the participants involved in that situation.
Treating arguments in this detached, static way amounts to a fail-
ure to recognize the dynamic nature of what is involved.
Stephen Toulmin hinted at what was at stake when he wrote:
“An argument is like an organism” (1958:87). In saying this he
meant that it has parts, an integrated structure. Toulmin’s state-
ment recalls the Aristotle of the Poetics (1984), describing the
work of art like an organism, with head, body and tail. But,
importantly, Aristotle also judged it to be like an animal because
it was alive, another animated thing among animated things. The
Poetics, with its demand for probable and necessary sequences in
plots, evinces reasonableness here at the heart of the poetic—a
moving train of logic. But if the poetic has a movement, so too
must logic itself: logic has a life, and its structures have internal
movement. This sense needs to be transported to the study of
argumentation. An argument is alive; it is a message of activated
potential. In terms of particularly important Aristotelian terms
that capture the way he conceived natural and social objects, an
argument is a potentiality (dunamis) and two actualities (energeia).
The relationship between these terms is complicated. Aristotle
used it famously in De Anima, or ‘On the Soul’ (1984), as a way to
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capture the interactions of the parts of a human being (body and
soul): a soul is the first actuality (activation) of a body that has life
potentially. Then, the second actuality is any expression of that
initial activation. For example an eye (a “body”) has the potential
for sight (the first actuality) but may be asleep. When the eye is
actively seeing it expresses the second actuality.
In argumentation, the first actuality is achieved in the move-
ment within an argument from the premises to the conclusion
(while there is not yet any uptake, any adoption (literally) of the
claim involved). This internal movement already indicates the
way in which an argument is alive with action, dynamic on its
own terms. There is a movement from premises to conclusion
that the mind follows, or, in Pinto’s terms, is invited to follow.
This is the level of inferencing, of the illative core. The sec-
ond actuality is in the audience, the one that adopts ideas in the
process of “uptake.” This uptake is a complicated matter that can-
not be fully explored here. It depends on many variables, includ-
ing the arguer’s skill at recognizing the audience and the means
of persuasion available for that audience.
We might see, then, that as a type of discourse an argument is
both an organization and a dissemination, since it collects ideas
and then moves them internally from premises to conclusion,
and then externally to an audience. And it has features that facil-
itate both of these movements. Or at least the arguer has access
to such features, many of which are to be found in the wealth of
ideas available in the rhetorical tradition.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The static sense of argument sees arguments as products with no
essential connection to the argumentative situation from which
they arose. They are inert pieces of discourse, connected state-
ments that can be judged “good” or “bad” merely in terms of their
structures. (This is clearly the case with the traditional model
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and, as we have seen, still the case generally with informal logic
models).
By contrast, the dynamic sense of argument sees arguments as
social events, personalized by those engaged in them. They are
alive with meaning and movement, and should only be judged
“good” or “bad” in light of consideration of the entire argumen-
tative situation (including the participants).
It has to be said that dealing with arguments was much simpler
on the traditional model. There was less to worry about and
more was within the evaluator’s control. But there was also a lot
that was lost or overlooked. As a case in point, we might return
to the example from the Trump speech and discuss it further.
The main claim of the argument was that “we” must act against
this organized terror. The scope of the “we” determines the audi-
ence for the argument, against which its reasonableness must be
tested. In so far as the entire speech was a call for partnerships
between the US and Middle Eastern states, then this fits within
that scope, identifying the agents who are being called on to act,
and who would be expected to find the outcome undesirable.
Support for this claim was gathered in the chain of slippery
slope reasoning. This argument needs to be an acceptable
instance of the scheme. The first critical question that asks
whether the causal links are plausible should be answered in
the affirmative for the argument to have objective strength. Still,
what we are judging here is the movement within the argument.
Does it flow according to what is cogent? Does it move the mind
from link to link in a reasonable fashion so that any reasonable
person would be expected to follow the flow and see the connec-
tions between the parts of the argument? It is not my intention
to provide a detailed analysis here, other than to suggest that it
is reasonable to expect that terrorism, if unchecked, will engulf
peaceful societies in violence, and that the futures of many (if not
many generations) will thereby be squandered. And from this it
is reasonable to believe that the leaders, given who they are and
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their belief systems (which again takes us beyond the proposi-
tions), being addressed will expect judgment from those parties
listed.
Is this enough to encourage uptake? Is it an effective argu-
ment? The second movement, beyond the propositions, involves
the audience. Although, we have already seen that this audience
was implicated in the initial judgment (suggesting that, as with
Johnson’s dialectical tier, the distinction here between internal
and external is largely academic). Informal logicians have been
fond of talking about evaluation as if we can assess any argument
as if we were the audience (consider Johnson and Blair’s exam-
ples noted earlier). But to judge uptake, to assess the dialogical
aspect that theorists like Bakhtin and Brandom are interested in,
we need to consider who will receive and act on this. Who is
the potential audience that can be actualized (moved to reflec-
tion and action) by the argument? We need to clarify the “we”
and then consider the appropriateness of the language, the style
of the argument, and even the manner of delivery, in light of
that “we”. Because we are here positioning ourselves, as much
as is possible, in that audience’s perspective. In this light, some
of the hyperbole becomes relevant (the choice of “engulfed” and
the “many generations,” for example). It gives presence to the
claims, bringing them before the eyes with conceptual vividness.
The individuals find themselves addressed in a personal way.
The gradatio in the fourth premise contributes to this, with its
movement from our people, to history, and then to god, building
the impact of the undesirable outcome, which in turn calls for
individual reflection, judgment and action. The argument moves
people to action (uptake) insofar as it is effective in addressing
them, and it is designed to accomplish that effectiveness.
In terms of the prospects for developing informal logic itself:
As I suggested earlier, a more dynamic conception of argument
better prepares informal logic for dealing with the argumentative
possibilities of narratives and visuals. In raising questions about
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visual and narrative arguments, bringing the audience into the
discussion and exploring potential “uptakes” expands our study
of argumentative strategies. How are different media better
suited to certain issues and situations, if they are? If we must
“reduce” anything that is to be considered an argument to the
basic propositions of the traditional model, then the prospects
of understanding the different strategies used (in advertizing or
propaganda, for example) are constrained before they even
begin. More modern conceptions of argument, like the one I
have discussed here, take us beyond those constraints to a wider
arena of possibilities.
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